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Abstract
This study analyzes the issue of self-determination, territorial integrity and
international stability, within the Yugoslav context. However, it is not confined to
the Yugoslav case of self-determination alone. The study stretches over other
several cases of self-determination and analyzes the historical background of the
phenomenon itself. The argument of this dissertation in terms of the history of
self-determination, is that the phenomenon has gradually crystallized over the
last two centuries. In addition, self-determination is viewed in connection with two
other issues: territorial integrity and international stability. In fact, these two
segments have been and remain intrinsic to every discussion of self-
determination.
The conclusion of this study is that the Yugoslav case of self-
determination should not be singled out from other similar cases of its time. This
covers not only the period following the end of the Cold War, but also the period
prior to the South Slav unification of 1918 and thereafter.  In all cases, the
Yugoslav case reflects the features of self-determination as they appeared at the
times under discussion. Evidence of this is best seen from the last period of the
Yugoslav self-determination after the Cold War. In this period, Yugoslav self-
determination was nothing but a part of the wider picture of self-determination
covering all former Communist Federations (Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia).
This further supports the argument that the Yugoslav case did not set any
precedent in terms of self-determination that could be applicable in the future:
self-determination as a principle has not been altered. It remains a political
principle with a moral value only, without any legally binding effect. The
relevance of this principle for the future rests in the fact that it has further
crystallized one of the aspects of self-determination, that is, the principle of uti
possidetis.  The Yugoslav case has shown that the fixed territorial borders, as a
rule of international law and relations that limits the territorial scope of self-
determination, is a rule of utmost acceptance.
The Yugoslav case of self-determination, however, has some unique
features. It concerns the nature of nationalism of its constituent nations, most
notably the Serbs. The interpretation of self-determination put forth by these
nations was unique as compared to the whole Communist world that collapsed
after the Cold War. Namely, they perceived self-determination in pure ethnic
terms, thus excluding other nations from being beneficiaries of the same right.
This perception was not without practical implications. The realization of pure
ethnic self-determination resulted in ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs and the
destruction of other cultures within the territory of former Yugoslavia. In addition
to stopping the war in the territories of former Yugoslavia, efforts of the
international community have also been focused on preventing the
implementation of ethnic self-determination. The issue of human rights, the rule
of law and democracy take prominence in the efforts of the international
community in these regards. In some cases, these efforts have been combined
with the use of force and sanctions against some of the Yugoslav actors.
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ÖZET
Bu çalışma, kendi kaderini tayin etme, toprak bütünlüğü ve uluslararası istikrar
gibi konuları Yugoslavya bağlamında incelemektedir. Ancak, çalışmanın içeriği
yalnızca Yugoslavya ile sınırlı olmayıp diğer kendi kaderini tayin etme konulu olayları
da kapsamına almakta ve olgunun tarihi altyapısını analiz etmektedir. Kendi kaderini
tayin etme bağlamında bu tezin savı, adı geçen olgunun son iki yüzyılda giderek
daha da belirginleşmiş olmasıdır. Kendi kaderini tayin etme iki diğer konuyla
bağlantılı olarak ele alınmaktadır: toprak bütünlüğü ve uluslararası istikrar. Hatta bu
iki olgu konuyla ilgili her tartışmanın özünü oluşturmuş ve oluşturmaya da devam
etmektedir.
Bu çalışmanın sonucu, Yugoslavya bağlamındaki kendi kaderini tayin etme
olgusunun, zamanın benzer kendi kaderini tayin etme örneklerinden bağımsız olarak
ele alınmaması gerektiğidir. Bu süreç yalnızca Soğuk Savaş bitimini takip eden
dönemi değil, aynı zamanda 1918 öncesi Güney Slav birleşmesini ve sonrasını  da
kapsamına almaktadır. Yugoslav örneği bütün zaman dilimlerinde, ele alınan bu
süreçlerde gözlendiği şekilde kendi kaderini tayin etme olgusunun özelliklerini
yansıtmaktadır. Bunun en iyi kanıtı Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Yugoslavya’da son
süreç olarak ortaya çıkan kendi kaderini tayin etme anlayışıdır. Bu dönemde
Yugoslavya’da kendi kaderini tayin etme olgusu bütün eski Komünist Federasyonları
(Sovyetler Birliği’ni  ve Çekoslovakya’yı) kapsayan geniş bir tablonun bir parçası
olmaktan ibaretti. Bu da, Yugoslav örneğinin kendi kaderini tayin etme bağlamında,
gelecekte uygulanabilirliği olabilecek bir emsal teşkil etmediği savını daha da
güçlendirmektedir: bir ilke olarak değerlendirildiğinde kendi kaderini tayin etme
herhangi bir değişikliğe uğramamıştır. Yasal olarak bağlayıcı bir etkisi olmamakla
birlikte, yalnızca ahlaki boyutla, siyasi bir ilke olarak varlığını sürdürmektedir. Bu
ilkenin gelecekle olan bağlantısı, ilkenin kendi dahilinde olan bir boyutu daha da
belirginleştirmiş olması gerçeğinde yatmaktadır: uti possidetis ilkesi. Yugoslav örneği,
bir uluslararası hukuk ve uluslararası ilişkiler kuralı olan, ayrıca kendi kaderini tayin
etme olgusunun topraksal boyutunu sınırlayan, “değişmez toprak bütünlüğü”nün
kabul gören bir kural olduğunu göstermiştir.
Ancak, Yugoslavya örneğinde gözlenen kendi kaderini tayin etme olgusunun
kendine özgü birtakım özellikleri bulunmaktadır. Bu da Yugoslavya’daki kurucu
ulusların, özellikle Sırpların milliyetçiliğinin doğasıyla ilintilidir. Bu ulusların kendi
kaderini tayin etme olgusuna yükledikleri anlam, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında dağılan
tüm komünist ülkelerle kıyaslandığında, kendine özgü özellikler sergilemektedir. Bu
uluslar, kendi kaderini tayin etme olgusunu yalnızca etnik açıdan ele almışlar,
böylelikle, diğer ulusların aynı haklardan fayda sağlamalarını engellemişlerdir. Bu
algılama biçimi davranışa dönüşmüş, etnik olarak kendi kaderini tayin etme
olgusunun hayata geçirilmesi eski Yugoslavya topraklarındaki Sırp olmayan
nüfusların etnik temizliği ve diğer kültürlerin de zarar görmesi sonucunu doğurmuştur.
Eski Yugoslavya topraklarındaki savaşı durdurmaya ek olarak, uluslararası toplumun
çabaları, etnik olarak yorumlanan kendi kaderini tayin etme olgusunun uygulanmasını
önlemek üzerine odaklanmıştır. Bu anlamda, insan hakları, hukukun üstünlüğü ve
demokrasi uluslararası toplumun çabalarında önemli yer tutmaktadır. Bazı örneklerde
ise bu çabalara güç kullanımı ve bazı Yugoslav unsurlara uygulanan yaptırımlar
eklenmiştir.
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1CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
In the years following the Cold War, self-determination has been a
frequently used concept. It has been associated with both ethnic conflicts and
with wars causing large-scale human suffering and tragedy. In addition to this,
self-determination has remained connected to two other concepts: territorial
integrity and international stability. Together with these, the concept of self-
determination forms the core of this dissertation.
The very aim of this work is to describe and explain the issue of self-
determination, both as a right and as a political and moral principle, as well as its
relationship with the concepts of territorial integrity and international stability. In
line with this, the significance of this study lies in the fact that, although
specifically related to the Yugoslav case of self-determination, its results are
equally applicable to other cases of self-determination. The existing literature on
self-determination, it is our hope, will be enriched by this work whose aim is to
explain that the Yugoslav case has confirmed and added to the strength of the
prevailing international norm on self-determination, its scope and practical
implications.
There are two reasons that render the Yugoslav case of self-determination
equally applicable to other cases and do not confine the results of this study to
this single case. One is that the Yugoslav case has, since its appearance as an
international problem, been very closely connected to the Soviet Union case,
both in political and legal terms. In fact, the approach of the international
community towards the Yugoslav self-determination has been applied, mutatis
mutandis, to the Soviet Union.  For this reason, we do not refer to the Soviet
case very often unless we need to show, through examples, the identical
features for both. The second reason for the narrow interpretation of the
Yugoslav case relates to the very phenomenon of self-determination. This
phenomenon has, throughout its development, manifested some general
2features. This is obvious when we look at the scope of self-determination as well
as at the key actors who have played an important role in the development of this
phenomenon. These are the main factors behind the decision to devote two
chapters to the historical development of self-determination and its relationship to
the concepts of territorial integrity and international stability.
Entitled “The Fundamental Concepts”, the second chapter explains the
core concepts related to self-determination from a historical perspective. This is
done with the hope that the third chapter, “Self-Determination: From the Peace of
Westphalia (1648) to the End of the Cold War”,  would naturally fit into the overall
treatment of the phenomenon of self-determination and its ramifications, the
Yugoslav case included, which can be seen throughout the four sections of the
second chapter. Thus, in the “Content and Function of the Uti Possidetis
Principle” (section one of the second chapter) we try to give an overview as to
the development of this important rule that sets out the territorial scope of self-
determination. Section two of this chapter, “the Concept of International Stability”,
although theoretical in nature, nevertheless deals with the issue from a historical
perspective, so as to enable us to see the obsolescence of some of the elements
regarding the definition of the concept of international stability, whereas the third
section deals with the Cold War. Needless to say, this is a part of our common
past. However, our approach tries to connect the concept of the Cold War with
that of self-determination. This is mainly due to the fact that the case we are
studying is closely connected to the end of the Cold War. In essence, in this
section we try to explain the relationship between the violent nature of the
Yugoslav and other post-Cold War self-determination with the collapse of
Communism and the end of the Cold War.  Such an approach paves the way for
the closure of the second chapter of this work. This is achieved through a lengthy
discussion of the various types of self-determination existing at the present.
Among them we single out two forms: territorial and ethnic self-determination.  A
historical overview of these forms of self-determination is given as well.
The third chapter, as noted above, is devoted to the development of self-
determination since the Peace of Westphalia. The first section discusses the
3dynastic legitimacy as the first initial form of self-determination and is followed by
the balance of power system and the role it played in the development of self-
determination (second section). However, it should be noted that the existence of
self-determination was not recognized as such. The so-called principle of
nationality was only one of the historical forms of self-determination, as was the
principle of dynastic legitimacy. Only within the Versailles system after World War
One did the existence of self-determination become a reality.  We discuss this in
the third section of this chapter entitled, “The Principal Manifestations of Self-
Determination Between the Two Wars (1918-1939)”. Under this heading fall the
Wilsonian and Lenin conceptions on self-determination. The views of these two
statesmen, together with the international practice developed in the Aaland
Islands case (also discussed under this heading), have been a decisive factor in
the development of self-determination within the Versailles system and beyond.
In this period emerged two basic types of self-determination, one Communist and
the other Western. These types were to dominate international relations in the
years following the Second World War. It is these two forms that served as a
basis for the birth of colonial self-determination, an issue to be discussed at
length in section 4.1. of the present chapter. This does not mean that these two
forms of self-determination that developed at the international level have seen a
harmonious coexistence. There was a clash between them. Throughout the Cold
War, however, considerable attempts were made to render feasible the
coexistence of these two forms of self-determination. These efforts culminated in
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE (now OSCE),
held in Helsinki in 1975. This is an issue we discuss in subsection 4.2. of this
chapter and bears the title “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe: Its Background and Beyond”. Throughout this chapter we argue that
both forms of self-determination, Communist and Western alike, have contributed
to a unified manifestation of the phenomenon of self-determination. This unified
manifestation is expressed in the self-determination based on territory. The other
form, based on ethnicity, is also discussed in the last paragraphs of this chapter.
4In the fourth chapter we elaborate about Yugoslav self-determination since
its emergence in the 19th century. The crucial stage in the development of
Yugoslav self-determination is the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918. In the
second section, we attempt to answer the main question as to whether its
creation in 1918 represented the embodiment of the principle of self-
determination or rather the hegemony of one nation. The following section covers
Yugoslav self-determination as developed during the Second World War. This is
then followed by the section regarding Communist Yugoslavia and the final
dissolution of the Yugoslav state in 1992. The issue concerning the succession of
the former Yugoslavia is analyzed in the last section of this chapter. This is done
not so much for the sake of discussion about the legal niceties in the field of state
succession but rather to demonstrate that Serbia’s insistence on its state
continuity with former Yugoslavia is nothing but a continuation of the centuries-
old project of Greater Serbia. This, in fact, answers the question as to whether
this Serbian view has been the main factor that has led to the dissolution of the
first common state of the South Slavs (apart from the Bulgarians). It is in the next
chapter that we turn to the issue of the Yugoslav dissolution.
Chapter five, nevertheless, is not reserved solely for the issue of
Yugoslavia’s dissolution. It is also a place for the discussion of the forms of self-
determination that emerged within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In this
context, in the first section we try to distinguish between the “Western-type” of
self-determination that developed in the north of Yugoslavia (Slovenia and
Croatia) and the other “non-Western” self-determination forms of the south. Here
we also argue that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were inclined more
towards the Western-type of self-determination. However, we argue as well that
these republics made this choice as a result of having a precarious position
during Yugoslavia’s existence. Following this treatment, in the next section we
turn again to Serbia’s war aims. This is done in order to find a potential causal
relationship between Serbia’s war aims and Yugoslavia’s violent break up in
1992. Serbian aims were not confined to Serbia proper. Rather they extended to
other former Yugoslav republics, an issue to which we devote section four of this
5chapter. The crux of the problem here is to demonstrate that the Serbs living
outside Serbia proper, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia,
misinterpreted the internationally recognized criteria for international statehood.
What have been the consequences of this misinterpretation and how has the
international community reacted. We try to answer these questions in section five
of chapter five, which relates specifically to the Kosova issue.
The penultimate chapter of this dissertation is reserved for discussions
about the international community’s efforts to prevent the illegal and illegitimate
ways of the implementation of self-determination within the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. This chapter comprises our elaborations regarding the legal and
political criteria for international statehood. These criteria were put together by
the international community, mainly by the member states of the European
Community (now the European Union), and served as a guide for the judgment
over the legal and legitimate ways to be pursued in the process of realization of
self-determination within the territory of the former Yugoslavia (and other
Communist federations, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia). These issues are
dealt with in sections one to three of the present chapter. The practical
implementation of self-determination, however, represents a different problem.
Our past history has shown that in most cases this process was violent and, not
often, pursued through illegitimate methods. The Yugoslav case is no exception
to this. Nevertheless, the international community has always had at its disposal
some means to counteract these illegitimate ways, pursued by various actors in
their quest for self-determination. So it did in the Yugoslav case. The means that
the international community has had at its disposal to counteract these illegal and
illegitimate ways is discussed in the last paragraph of this chapter. It treats both
the coercive and non-coercive means used by the international community in its
dealings with the Yugoslav self-determination actors.
The final chapter of this dissertation is devoted to our conclusions. In this
part we draw some conclusions as to the overall situation in the field of self-
determination and the impact the Yugoslav case might have had on it. The main
6conclusion of this dissertation attempts to answer one single question: did the
Yugoslav case set up any precedent in the realm of self-determination?
This would lack clarity if we did not say something about the method used
in this work. In this context, the theoretical framework that will inform the analysis
of this study is the “English School” of International Relations, which reflects a
Grotian and rationalist approach. This is an approach that recognizes the role
played by shared norms, rules, values and institutions in international relations
but that orders them in priority vis-à-vis international order and stability. The
latter, it is assumed by the majority of writers within this approach, takes
precedence. Translated in concrete terms of the subject we study, this means
that shared norms, rules, values, and institutions pertaining to self-determination
are fruitfully reviewed from the above theoretical standpoint. In addition to this,
the “English School” has been the IR approach that brought into the scholarly
agenda the issues of colonialism and juridical statehood, wherefrom stems the uti
possidetis principle, which is one of the core concepts in this study.
To achieve the above we have made use of the all relevant material in
English, Serbian/Croatian, Italian, French, and Albanian regarding the Yugoslav
case and beyond, although they are related mostly to the internal dynamics and
nationalism within the Yugoslav society. Moreover, this material often lacks
theoretical and legal perspective, a gap which this work aims to fill. To this end,
primary sources about self-determination, territorial integrity and international
stability as perceived and applied in the former Yugoslavia, like the opinions of
the Badinter Commission (1991-1993) and the documents of the two
international conferences on Yugoslavia, have been utilized extensively.
7CHAPTER   II:
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
1. The Content and Function of the Uti Possidetis Principle
The content and the function of uti possidetis as it stands at the present,
refers to inviolability of previous administrative borders, both within and outside
the colonial context. This means that uti possidetis does not cover the frontiers of
the existing states, although the impact of this principle remains practically the
same for both situations. For a better understanding of today’s uti possidetis, an
overview of the historical development and transformation of the principle is
needed. This overview starts with the Medieval times,1 Latin American
independence of the 19th century, nationalist movements in the Balkans and the
two world wars, ending up with the process of decolonization in the 1960s. The
application of this principle after the end of Cold War will be discussed in the
sixth chapter of this study, with specific reference to the former Yugoslavia.
The existence of two forms of uti possidetis best reflects the historical
development of the principle. One form is called uti possidetis juris, while the
other is uti possidetis de facto2. The first form is applicable at present, while the
latter belongs to the past history and its origin is traceable as far back as the
Medieval period. In fact, the latter form belongs to the period when Roman law
was transmitted into the realm of interstate relations. The division of territories in
these times had been based on an analogy with private property : Pope
                                                
1 In the realm of interstate relations, - the area of military operations-, the term uti
possidetis was first used by Richelieu. As an architect of the raison d’ etat, he proposed that an
armistice be concluded along the uti possidetis line, in a time when the Congress of Cologne was
still meeting. If accepted, this would have meant that the military of the warring parties had to
have stayed in the frontlines as of the time of the armistice. The proposal had been made in an
apparent hope to paving the way for calling to order the Congress of Westphalia, held between
1644-1648. See, Kenneth Colegrove,“Diplomatic Procedure Preliminary to the Congress of
Westphalia”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 13 No. 3  (July, 1919) pp. 450-482 at
475.
2 Steven Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States”.
American Journal of International Law Vol.  90 No. 4 (October 1996) pp. 590-624 at 594-595.
8Alexander VI was well known for his issuance of bulls (deeds) naming the title
holder of a given territory (usually various Christian rulers of the time). In some
cases, the title allocated in this way stretched over vast territories of a continent,
sometimes covering areas in Europe.3
In Roman Law, from where the principle was taken, there existed a quite
different and opposite meaning of the uti possidetis principle than in the realm of
international relations. The Pretorian Edicts of Republican (Classical) Rome,
regulating the issue of private property, made a distinction between the
possession of things and the ownership over them. Possession and ownership in
Roman Law were considered as two different and separate  issues. When the
possession of things was gained in good faith, that is, not by use of force or by
fraudulent means, the Roman magistrates applied the famous rule “uti possidetis,
ita possidetis” (as you possess, so you possess) . This rule did not allow for any
judgement as to the ownership: the issue of ownership over things was to be
decided through the regular procedure before the courts of law.4  The gradual
evolution of uti possidetis from private to international, as well as its
transformation into a rule of wider application, has gone in two directions. One
area of impact dealt with the practical implications of the application of uti
possidetis (the transformation of uti possidetis from a rule pertaining to the claims
over private property into that concerning state or territorial sovereignty), while
the other had to do with the possible status of a situation coming under the
domain of uti possidetis (the transformation of  possession as a factual and
provisional situation over things in private law into a permanent legal status of
sovereign rights over certain state territory). This gradual transformation of uti
possidetis should not be surprising if the timing of this process is taken into
                                                
3 Jesse S. Reves, “International Boundaries”. American Journal of International Law, Vol.
38 No. 4 (October 1944) pp. 533-545 at 539-541; Frederich von der Heydte, “Discovery, Symbolic
Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law”. American Journal of International Law
Vol. 29, Issue 3 (July 1935) pp.448-471 at 452.
4 For the Roman Law, see, in W. Michael Reisman, “ Protecting  Indigenous Rights in
International Adjudication “. American Journal of International Law Vol. 89 Issue 2 (April 1995) pp.
350-362, at 352, footnotes 8 and 9. In this study, the author gives an overview of a theory
founded by Moore confirming that uti possidetis had been taken into the realm of interstate
relations from the Roman (private) Law by the late Medieval lawyers.
9account. The process developed at a time when the use of unlimited force
between states with the view of gaining territories was not considered as illegal
and illegitimate. 5  This state of affairs lasted until the Second World War.
Uti possidetis juris, as it stands at present, has been the result of
development of two other principles: 1) self-determination and 2) non-
interference in internal affairs of other countries. Both of these have their origin in
Latin America at the beginning of the 19th century. The birth of uti possidetis and
its first formal application in Latin America reflects the nature of the relations
among Europeans themselves, on one side, and between them and the Latin
American countries following the Napoleonic Wars (1815), on the other. Europe
continuously interfered with the affairs of the Latin American countries in the
search for terra nullius (no-man’s land), later to become colonies.6 This
interference was especially obvious following the Latin American independence
(April 1810 – December 1824). Thereafter, the Europeans transferred the
balance of power practice into Latin America.7  In order to divert frequent
European interference, the Latin American leaders, after independence,
accepted the uti possidetis juris principle in their mutual relationships (except
Brazil until recent years). So, the territorial delimitation of the new sovereignties
was based on the uti possidetis juris form, not uti possidetis de facto. This meant
                                                
5 Frantz Despagnet, Cours de Droit International (Paris: Sirey, 1910) pp. 117-132; 575;
579-584; Thomas Joseph Lawrence, Les Principes de Droit International (Oxford: Imprimerie de
la Universite, 1920) pp. 766; Thomas Baty, “Can an Anarchy be a State?” American Journal of
International Law Vol. 28 Issue 3 (July 1934) pp. 444-455 at 444, 446, 454; Karl Strupp, “Les
Regles General du Droit de la Paix”.  Recueil de Cours de l’ Academie de Droit International,
Tome 47 (I), 1934 pp. 473-474; Lauterpacht (ed.), Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. II,
Seventh Edition (London: Longman, 1952) pp. 598-599; Sarah Joseph, “Resolving Conflicting
Claims of Territorial Sovereignty and External Self-Determination”. Part 1 .The International
Journal of Human Rights Vol. 3 No. 1 (Spring 1999) pp. 40-61 at 49-50.
6 A theory enunciated by the well-known lawyer Emerich de Vattel, set out three major
epochs of terra nullius corresponding to our analysis of uti possidetis. These epochs can be
briefly summarised as the sixteenth century Roman Law concept, when terra nullius referred to all
non-Roman territory; the seventeenth and eighteenth tenet, where non-Christian territory was
considered terra nullius; and finally the nineteenth century claim that territory not belonging to a
‘civilised state’ would be considered terra nullius. As cited by Joshua Castellino, “Territoriality and
Identity in International Law: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the Western Sahara”,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol. 28 No. 2 (1999), pp. 523-551 at 547. The case of
Latin America belongs to first category of terra nullius, while the rest of colonies fall under the
heading of  ‘territory not belonging to civilised state’.
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that the jurisdictions of these countries were confined along the former colonial
administrative borders and there were no terra nullius in that part of the world. In
this regard, the principle of uti possidetis preceded by a decade the Monroe
Doctrine, proclaimed by the U.S. President in 1823, concerning the non-
interference in internal affairs of the American continent.8 At the same time, the
acceptance of possidetis juris uti by Latin American states was designed to
prevent further conflicts over borders among these countries This issue is closely
connected with the previous one for the Europeans usually used the border
complexities and disputes in Latin America as an excuse to interfere and pit the
local leaders against each other. At the end, neither European interference nor
the conflicts over borders ceased, especially during the first decades of the 19th
century. 9 There is no Latin American country, with the exception of Argentina’s
armed conflict with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands in 1982, that has been
immune from conflicts over borders. At the same time, to prevent frequent
European interference within the region, Latin American states convened three
                                                                                                                                                
7 Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy: 1814-1914. (New York: McGraw–Hill, Inc. 1992)
pp.28-44; 167-184; 347-364.
8 Paul de Lapradelle, La Frontiere. Etude de Droit International (Paris: Imprimerie du
Centre Issoudun, 1928) pp. 76-87; George Schwarzenberger, “Title to Territory: Response to a
Challenge “. American Journal of International Law  Vol. 51 Issue 2 (April 1957) pp. 308-324 at
320.
9  The last contest over borders, which was settled in 1992, has been between El
Salvador and Honduras, with Nicaragua intervening. For an overall account of the history of
conflicts over borders in the region of Latin America since the 19th century, see, Alejandro
Alvarez,  “Latin America and International Law”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 3
Issue 2 (April 1909) pp. 269-353; James Brown Scott, “The Swiss Decision in the Boundary
Dispute Between Colombia and Venezuela“. American Journal of International Law Vol. 16 Issue
3 (July 1922) pp. 428-431; Chandler P. Anderson, “The Costa Rica-Panama Boundary Dispute”,
American Journal of International Law Vol. 15 Issue 2 (April 1921) pp. 236-240; L.H. Woolsey,
“The Bolivia – Paraguay Dispute”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 24 Issue 1 (January
1930) pp. 573-577; L.H. Woosley, “Boundary Disputes in Latin America”. American Journal of
International Law Vol. 25 Issue 2 (April 1931) pp.324-333; F.C. Fisher, “The Arbitration of the
Guatemalan–Honduras Boundary Dispute“. American Journal of International Law Vol. 27 Issue 3
(July 1933) pp. 403-427; L.H. Woolsey, “The Equator-Peru Boundary Controversy”.  American
Journal of International Law Vol. 31 Issue 1 (January 1937) pp. 97-100; Josef L. Kunz,
“Guatemala vs. Great Britain: In Re Belice”, American Journal of International Law Vol. 40 Issue
2 (April 1946) pp. 383-390; C.G. Fenwick, “The Honduras - Nicaragua Boundary Dispute”.
American Journal of International Law Vol. 51 Issue 4 (October 1957) pp. 761-765; Georg Maier,
“The Boundary Dispute between Ecuador and Peru”. American Journal of International Law Vol.
63 Issue 1 (January 1969) pp. 28-46; Alan J. Day (ed.), Border and Territorial Disputes. (Detroit:
Gale Research Company, 1982) pp. 332-388; Gideon Rottem, “Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 87 Issue 4 (October 1993) pp. 618-
626.
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congresses (held in 1826, 1847 - 48 and 1884). At the end of these congresses,
the Latin American states foresaw the creation of a confederation among
themselves as well as the need to avoid conflicts over borders and a unified
stance against the European interference.10 All these arrangements ended up in
failure but the Latin American contribution, inter alia, to the development of rules
on the territorial limits of the extension of new sovereignties remained
considerable, although this has not been noticed until very recently.11
As it has already been pointed out, the uti possidetis principle, at the outset,
has had a regional character, as did the Monroe Doctrine on the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Both became principles of
general application only after the end of the Second World War following the
process of decolonization. In the period between 1815-1945, the rules on
territorial sovereignty in Europe were based on a different set of criteria. This was
especially true for some parts of Europe – the Balkans. The philosophy and
practice of the so-called ‘spheres of interest’, born in the Congress of Vienna
(1815), was also extended to the Balkans. This meant that no consideration,
apart from geostrategy, would be given to the ethnic composition of the territories
to be partitioned. No consideration, apart from the use of brute force, was given
to the previous administrative borders of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian
empires respectively. The basic premise of the European borders in the Balkan
region after the Balkan wars was the preservation of stability and security, thus
excluding any real interest in the nations affected by the new territorial
rearrangements12
After the end of the Second World War, following the example of Latin
America, the African leaders, having won the struggle against colonialism,
                                                
10 Alejandro Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law”, pp. 221-230; 278-281; 286-
287; 291; Paul de Lapradelle, La Frontiere. Etude de Droit International,  pp. 76-87.
11 Alejandro Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law”, pp. 344-353; Philip Jessup, “
Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 58,
Issue 2 (April 1964) pp. 341-358 at 347.
12 Arthur W. Spencer, “The Balkan Question - Key to a Permanent Peace”. The American
Political Science Review, Vol. 8 Issue 4 (November 1914), pp. 563-582 at 563; 569-570; 575;
577; 580-581; Jesse S. Reves, “International Boundaries”, pp. 533-545 at 545; Michael Roux, Les
Albanais en Yugoslavie. Minorite Nationales, Territoire et Development (Paris: Fondation de la
Maison des Science de l’ Home, 1992) pp. 175-185; 187-191.
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insisted upon the respect of pre-existing  colonial administrative borders.13 In the
case of Africa, the principle of uti possidetis juris cannot be properly understood
without some comprehension of history related to the Berlin Congo Conference
(1884-1885), which is inaccurately thought of as a meeting that divided Africa.14
In fact, Africa had been divided before this date. The Final Act of the Berlin
Congo Conference, signed on 26 February 1885, provided for the free movement
of goods and persons within territories that were under the sovereignty of the
then colonial powers (Britain, France, Germany, Portugal and Belgium), as well
as for the banning the slave trade.15 The sovereign rights of these powers over
their respective territories were designed not on the basis of the effective
administrative control, as it used to be the case in Europe, but relying on the
astronomic criteria of certain longitudes and latitudes. The starting point of the
criteria of territorial delimitation were the coasts of Africa and not its hinterland.
Any state that would thereafter take into possession a piece of African land had
to notify other colonial powers in order to prevent mutual conflicts over territories.
Colonial powers were not allowed to set up any effective administration in these
lands. Given a colonial power’s minimal effective control along the coasts of
Africa sufficed to secure its rights over other powers, to regulate movement of
goods and persons, as well as to prevent the slave trade. Any extension of the
European administration to the African hinterland was deemed as an expensive
and difficult task not worth pursuing by European colonists.  Article 35 of the
General Act of the Conference spoke of the creation of a basic line of control
along the coasts of the continent only. From these coasts, the administrative
control and the protection of the above colonial rights were to be exercised.16
This European approach has been used for the sole purpose of modifying and
mitigating the exclusive nature of territorial sovereignty, that is, the function of
conflict - prevention over territory among the colonial powers. Dividing Africa into
                                                
13 See, also, Rupert Emmerson, From Empire to Nation. (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1960),Chapters VI and XVI.
14 See, more on this, in Daniel de Leon, “The Conference at Berlin on the West-African
Question “, Political Science Quarterly Vol. 1 No 1 (March 1886) pp. 103-139.
15  Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy: 1814-1914, pp. 237-242.
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‘spheres of influence’ among the Europeans had yet another impact vis-à-vis  the
local population. To regulate relations with local populations, various
protectorates, neutral and ‘buffer’ zones and suzerainties were set up. There was
no attempt made whatsoever to establish a form of modern  political
organization.  With the collapse of colonial rule, most of the abstract lines running
along given longitudes and latitudes, dividing the colonial ‘spheres of influence’,
were converted into international boundaries based on the principle of uti
possidetis juris. This meant the acceptance and recognition of the previous
colonial administrative borders existing at the time of independence of these
countries.17 Here lies the difference with Latin America. Whereas in the case of
Africa some institutions were set up, aimed at regulating the division of  ‘spheres
of influence’ as well as the relations with the local population, in Latin America no
such institutions existed. In the latter case, uti possidetis juris meant that the new
borders would be respected, not based on the existence of some international
arrangements establishing quasi sovereign institutions but on the internal
administrative acts of the Spanish (and Portugese ) crowns.
Despite the fact that forty per cent of African borders are straight lines dividing
scores of different ethnic groups, in most cases they proved to be stable and
viable.18  African leaders have very often claimed that their borders are artificial
and imposed arbitrarily by the foreign powers. However, since independence
these leaders have subscribed to the fact that today’s borders are the only viable
solution for the continent. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) stressed in
1964, a year after its formation, that the borders of Africa reflect a “tangible
reality”, while its leaders made a commitment to the effect of respecting the
borders existing at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris). Those African
countries that expressed territorial claims based on other than uti possidetis juris
principle, such as ethnic or historic claims, have lost their case and were
                                                                                                                                                
16 The General Act of the Berlin Congo Conference. In Arthur Berriedale Keith, The
Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919) pp. 314-315.
17 Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the
Formation of the State System”. World Politics Vol. 39 Issue 1 (October 1986) pp. 27-52 at 36-41.
18 Jeffrey Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa”.
International Organization  Vol. 43 Issue 4 (Autumn 1989) pp. 673-692, at 674.
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ostracized. The cases of Morocco and Somalia are the most conspicuous
examples 19 By the same token, those ethnic groups attempting secession from
the parent state were prevented from it by the whole international community,
such as in the case of Katanga (Zaire/Congo) and Biafra (Nigeria) in the 1960s.
On the other side, colonial powers that tried to forcefully hinder their  former
colonies from becoming independent, such as in the cases of Algeria or Guinea
Bissau , were barred from this  via the so-called premature recognition of the new
states and movements fighting for national liberation, a concept designed
primarily to help the process of independence of former colonies. 20 To gain
international recognition, in the African case, it sufficed that a country  (former
colony) possessed a government that was in control of its capital alone.  The
premature recognition by other states, in essence, stemmed from the practice
and philosophy of the Berlin Congo Conference, which required that the colonial
powers have only some minimal control along the coasts of Africa without a need
to extend that control deep inside their respective ‘spheres of influence’. The
sovereign rghts of the colonial powers followed the abstract lines of certain
longitudes and latitudes over the African continent.21 The OAU and its African
leaders adopted the same philosophy and practice as their colonizers : the rules
of the OAU, like those created by the Congo Berlin Conference, were designed
to preserve the external borders and relations among the new sovereign states of
Africa; internally,  it sufficed that a given country maintained a minimal
administrative control, quite symbolic and centred mostly around the capital
                                                
19 Ravi L. Kapil, “On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa”, World
Politics Vol. 18 Issue 4 (January 1966) pp. 656-673 at 633-634; Patricia Berko Wild, “The
Organization of African Unity and the Algeria-Maroccan Border Conflict: A Study of New
Machinery for Peacekeeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African States”.
International Organization Vol. 20 Issue 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 18-36 at 19-20; 27; 29-36; Saadia
Touval, “ The Organization of African Unity and African Borders”. International Organization Vol.
21 Issue 1 (Winter, 1967) pp. 102-127 at 105-119; Robert O. Matthews, “Interstate Conflicts in
Africa”. International Organization Vol. 24 No. 2 (Spring 1970) pp. 335-360 at 339-342.
20 Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation
Movements. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) pp. 119 -120 at footnote 101.
21  “We  (the colonial powers) have engaged … in drawing lines upon maps where no
white man’s feed ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each
other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we never new where exactly
these mountains and rivers and lakes were”. Lord Salisbury, British prime minister of the late 19th
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city.22  In other words, an African colony was said to have attained independence
when it had moved from the status of being under foreign rule to the status of
conducting foreign relations with full authority, notwithstanding the domestic
(internal) situation. 23 This means that the international law of the 1880s created
to mitigate and regulate quarrels over borders served as a model for the laws of
1960s and 1970s, when anti-colonial self-determination movements gained
international legitimacy. Other rules or principles, apart from uti possidetis, such
as those regarding ethnic self-determination, if applied would have only
complicated matters further, taking into consideration the existing ethnic diversity
in Africa. It would have certainly been too difficult, if not entirely impossible, to
find out the ethnic “selves” entitled to self-determination, meaning full
independence.24 The African concept of self-determination has remained, like
that in Latin America, based on territory, not ethnicity. The claims for self-
determination, meaning independence of various indigenous populations in these
two continents, have not been recognized, either by scholars25 or states, 26
meaning that the principle of uti possidetis “bestowed an aura of historical legality
                                                                                                                                                
century, as quoted in Joshua Castellino, “Territoriality and Identity in International Law: The
Struggle for Self-Determination in the Western Sahara”, pp. 523-551 at 529.
22 Jeffrey Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa”, pp.
673-692 at 687-689.
23 Ali A. Mazrui, “The United Nations and Some African Political Attitudes”. International
Organiztion, Volume 18 Issue 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 499-520 at 499. This author has
euphemistically named the very process of attaining independence in the African context as a
transition “from foreign rule to foreign relations”. Ibid. p. 499.
24 Rupert Emerson, “Pan-Africanism, International Organization Vol. 16 Issue 2 (Spring
1962), pp. 275-290 at 276-283.
25 “Not only do no territories ‘nullius’ exist on the American continent, but further, and in
consequence thereof, no international value is given to the possession of certain regions held
since time immemorial by native tribes not recognising the sovereignty of the country within
whose limits they find themselves. Two important  consequences follow from there : that the
occupation of those regions by the natives is a matter of internal public law of each country and
not only of International Law; and second, that the governments have, in certain cases, an
international responsibility for the acts of natives within their boundaries, even though those
natives do not recognise the sovereignty of the State”. Alejandro Alvarez, “Latin American and
International Law”, pp. 342-343 at footnote 95.
26 In the rulings of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), international borders follow
the line of uti possidetis juris, that is, the colonial administrative divisions or loyalties belonging to
pre-colonial era. This stance of the Court has been, among others, confirmed in the cases of
Western Sahara (1975); El Salvador v. Honduras, with Nicaragua intervening (1992); and,
recently, in the territorial dispute between Libya and Chad (1994). See, more, in W. Michael
Reisman, Protecting  Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication “,  pp. 350-362 at 354-357.
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to the expropriation of the lands of indigenous peoples”.27 In practical terms this
meant that the appropriation of uti possidetis juris in the determination of the
post-colonial boundaries did not recognize the right to “ restoration of authentic
communities destroyed by alien rule”.28
Asia is different in this regard. Scholars put foreword various explanations for
this difference. Among them, the history of colonialism and preserved state
traditions in Asia take precedence. In Asia, the system of frontiers set up by the
colonial powers (Britain and France) in most cases emulated the Western
system, living untouched pre-colonial state structures. This meant that after the
independence these countries inherited state borders of the already existing
sovereignties with a long state tradition. The implementation of self-
determination, therefore, was accomplished through full restoration of the pre-
colonial forms of state organization. This was especially obvious in South-East
Asia.29  As opposed to Africa, in this part of the world, respect for uti possidetis
was met with wide acceptance.30 It should be noted, however, that in this case
the application of the uti possidetis did not have the same role as in Africa, which
meant that it did not set the territorial limits for the realization of self-
determination. In the Asian context, uti possidetis had rather to do with the
classical sovereignty disputes over narrow strips of territory, scarcely populated
and with no need to ask for the wishes of the tiny populations. In the practice of
the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), only one case is recorded31, upon which
                                                
27 Malcolm Shaw, “The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Today”, British
Yearbook of International Law  67 (1996), pp. 75-154 at 98.
28 Martti Koskenniemi, “ National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory
and Practice”. International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 43 April 1994, Part 2, pp. 241-
269 at 243.
29 See, Robert L. Solomon, “Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia”. World
Politics Vol. 23 Issue 1 (October 1970) pp. 1-23.
30 Ibid. p.46. In the practice of the I.C.J., the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia
over the Temple Preah Viehar is the most conspicuous one (upon which theoretical observations
on uti possideti juris in Asia are based). Cf. Gunter Wiesberg, “Maps as Evidence in International
Boundary Disputes: A Reappraisal”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 57 Issue 4
(October 1963) pp. 781-803 at 792-796.
31 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Merits). Judgement of 15 June 1962.
I.C.J. Reports (1962). In this contest between Thailand and Cambodia, the Court recognized the
sovereignty of the latter over the disputed temple, based on the Annex I map that authentically
depicted, in Court’s view, the factual situation existing since the beginning of the 20th century. No
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theoretical observations on uti possidetis in Asia are based.32 This means that
the Asian case over the Temple Preah of Viehar had to do with a classic border
dispute in which case uti possidetis served only as a reference point regarding
the sovereignty of Cambodia over the disputed Temple Preah of Viehar, thus
excluding any question concerning the will of the local population (although the
area was scarcely populated)
2. The Concept of International Stability
The concept of international stability is probably one of the most widely used
concepts in the self-determination discourse, especially following the end of the
Cold War. The principle of territorial integrity of states, the restrictive
interpretation of self-determination, and the extreme caution in recognizing new
self-determination claims following Cold War’s demise,  have cumulatively been
justified by an appeal to the values of international (peace) and the stability of
international order. However, the concept under discussion is not related to self-
determination issues only. It is wider in scope and far more complex in its content
than it appears at first sight. The concept of international stability should not only
be seen as an end result of the self-interest and power politics pursued by states
in their mutual relationships. In the era of interdependence and globalization that
we live in , other principles and values, norms and institutions certainly influence
the interstate relationships, no matter how confused these principles, values,
norms and institutions might be. These are the factors that we to take into
                                                                                                                                                
attantion was given by the Court to the wishes of the ‘population’ that, in fact, were few local
clergy serving the Temple. The verdict of the Court stated, inter alia, as follows:
“In the present case, Cambodia alleges a violation on the part of Thailand of Cambodia’s
territorial sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah and its precincts. Thailand replies by
affirming that the area in question lies on the Thai side of the common frontier between the two
countries and is under the sovereignty of Thailand. This is a dispute about territorial
sovereignty…”.  As quoted by the Court in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Viehar
(Cambodia vs. Thailand), Merits of the Case. See, I.C.J. Reports (1962) p. 6.
32 For scholarly comments on this case, see, Gunter Wiesberg, “Maps as Evidence in
International Boundary Disputed: A Reappraisal”, pp. 781-803 at 792-796; Covey T. Oliver, “Case
Concerning the Temple Preah Vihear”, pp. 978-983; Covey T. Oliver, “Case Concerning the
Temple Preah Vihear”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 56 No. 4 (October 1962) pp.
1033-1053.
18
consideration in the following paragraphs. We start our elaboration in order to
answer two general questions: 1) what is international stability and 2) what are
the sources of international (in) stability?
In International Relations literature a clear cut definition of the concept of
international stability per se is not given. Its definition is contrived from the
analyses and observations made by scholars as to the nature of the international
system (bipolarity vs. multipolarity); the means or institutions designed for the
management of power relations within the international system (balance of
power, hegemony, collective security, world government, peacekeeping and
peacemaking, war, international law and diplomacy); finally, the analyses and
observations concerning the very nature of international actors, e.g. states
(democracies vs. non-democracies).
When defined, though, the concept of international stability in its essence
captures the main features of either the international system or of its
components. In both situations, the definition of the concept focuses on state-as-
actor unit, rational in its actions, thus excluding other non-state entities from this
conceptualization. These non-state actors, such as national or religious groups,
terrorist organizations, etc., may as well be incorporated into the definition of the
concept.
Of the definitions focusing on a state-as-actor, those offered by Karl Deutsch
and J. David Singer, are singled out as the most important. Although probabilistic
in its nature, this definition purports to take as a vantage point both the total
system and the individual states comprising it. From the broader, or systemic,
point of view, these authors define the stability as “the probability that the system
retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes
dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war
does not occur”. And, from the more limited perspective of the individual actors,
stability would refer to the “probability of their continued political independence
and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in
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a war for survival”.33 This conceptualization of international stability does not
account for non-state entities and their actions are not taken into account as a
potential source of international instability. These non-state entities, following the
end of the Cold War, proved to be a huge source of instability not only in
interstate relations but also in the relations and affairs that develop within
sovereign states. These non-state factors were at the end one of the major
causes of the dissolution of the former Communist federations (Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). The ethnic claims for self-determination
triggered by the rising nationalism in the post-Cold War era threatened and
continue to threaten the regional and wider stability, this being admitted by
liberal34 and realist35 scholars alike.  The case we study, the former Yugoslavia,
is a metaphor for the new international system, that is, a system which is more
turbulent and anarchic at present than ever before during the recent history.36
This is not to say that the international system of the Cold War period was not
anarchic. It did not have an overreaching supranational authority entrusted with
securing the order and stability in the system. However, it did have some relative
stability and the mechanism to maintain this state of affairs, which rested with the
two superpowers who took on the role of disciplinarian within its own blocks (or
spheres of influence). With the collapse of this system, new logic of anarchy
ushered in focusing not only on interstate relations but also on the internal
dynamics of the existing sovereign states. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact,
NATO’s new security role dramatically changed accordingly. This new security
role of NATO had to be formally accepted in the light of new changes in the
structure of the international system. Thus, meeting in Rome in November 1991,
the alliance’s heads of state and government adopted what they called NATO’s
                                                
33 Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “ Multipolar Power Systems and International
Stability”. World Politics  Vol. 16 Issue 3 (April, 1964) pp. 390-406 at 390-391.
34 See, for example, Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War”.
International Security Vol. 15 Issue 3 (Winter 199/91) pp. 7-57.
35 See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after
the Cold War”,  International Security  Vol. 15 Issue 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.
36  A thorough analysis of the Yugoslav case in the above sense can be found in Richard
H. Ullman, “The Wars in Yugoslavia and the International System after the Cold War”. In Richard
H. Ullmand (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
1998) Chapter 2.
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“new strategic concept”. The danger the alliance faced was no longer “calculated
aggression” from Moscow but “instabilities that may arise from the serious
economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial
disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe”.37
The initial debate regarding the international stability focused on the
international system and its structure. Some scholars asserted that the multipolar
world was less stable compared to that composed only of two powers
(bipolarity).38 In this debate, some other scholars denied the existence of
bipolarity and multipolarity in international politics. 39 Some others saw the
nuclear deterrent as the main source of international stability, ignoring the role of
the structure of the system itself.40 Empirical evidence relied upon by these
scholars belongs mainly to the pre-WW II period. This evidence is put foreword
both to support and oppose the distribution of capabilities (bilpolarity and
multipolarity) as the sources of international stability in K. Waltz’s terms. The
debate was heated in particular after the Cold War and was triggered by John
Mearsheimer’s famous article Back to the Future41.
Scholarly works examine various means and institutions designed for power
management in international politics. They are ranked and classified, according
                                                
37 See, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of
Information and Press, 1993), appendix II, the Alliance’s Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads
of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th
and 8th November 1991.
38 More on this debate, see, Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power
Systems and International Stability”, pp. 390-406; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace. 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966); Richard Rosecrance,
“Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 10 (September 1966), pp.
314-327; Kennth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison, Wesley: Reading Mass,
1979) ;  John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of  Stability in the Postwar System”.
International Security, 10 (Spring, 1986) pp. 99-192.
39 Thus, R. Harrison Wagner, proposes distinction between  the tight power distribution of
the Cold War and the loose distribution  following it. Cf. R. Harrison  Wagner, “What Was
Bipolarity”. International Organisation, Vol. 47 Issue 1  (Winter, 1993), pp. 77-106.
40 James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery
in the Post-Cold War Era”. International Organisation Vol. 46 Issue 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-491.
For the opposite view, see, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp.180-182.
41 The crux of the issue in this article is the bleak future of humanity the author foresees
after the Cold War. Mearsheimer believed that the new system of multipolarity created after the
Cold War would be more war-prone. He also believed that the stability of the past 45 years shall
not be seen again in the decades to follow. Among the reasons for this, Mearsheimer included
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to their order of importance in different ways.  In common, they mostly relate to
the following concepts: balance of power, hegemony, collective security, world
government, peacekeeping and peacemaking, war, international law and
diplomacy.42 Among these means and institutions, the balance of power takes
the most prominent place in scholarly analysis as well as in interstate relations.43
For this reason we devote some more attention to the balance of power in the
following pages, while the rest of the instruments and institutions will be dealt
with throughout the appropriate parts of this dissertation, with special reference
to the former Yugoslavia.
Balance of power is an end result of the activities of the state-as-unitary actor
acting in an essentially anarchical environment. Although there are very few
differences among the scholars as to the side effects of the balancing behavior of
states, such as that concerning the possibility of cooperation under the conditions
of anarchy, most of the authors agree that the balances of power are formed
systematically.44
                                                                                                                                                
the hyper-nationalism, especially in Eastern Europe. See, John Mearsheimer, “Back to the
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”, pp. 5-56.
42 See more on this in E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939. An Introduction to
the Study of  International Relations. (London: Macmillan, 1946; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical
Society. A Study of Order in World  Politics. (London: Macmillan, 1977; Inis L. Claude, Swords
Into Ploughshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random
House, 1984); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press, 1981); Charles W. Kegley, The Long Postwar Peace. (New York: Harper
Collins, 1991); Thomas J. Volgy and Lawrence E. Imwalle, “Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives
on the New World Order”. American Journal of Political Science Vol. 39 Issue 4 (November 1995)
pp. 819-834.
43 See more on the development and the history of the idea of balance of power, in Evan
Luard, The Balance of Power.The System of International Relations, 1648-1815. (London:
Macmillian, 1992), pp. 1-30.
44 Hedley Bull, though, says that balances of power may come into being through
conscious efforts and policies of one or all sides. Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society, pp. 104-106.
Among these types of the formed balances fall the Concert of Europe (1815-1919). This system
of great power management of international affairs did achieve the greatest ever success in
maintaining the stability in international affairs. There were wars among great powers during this
time as well: Britain, France and Russia fought in the Crimea in 1854-1855 and Bismark went to
war first with Austria and then with France to unify the German states in 1870-1871.
Nevertheless, a certain amount of conflict may be accommodated and is accommodated by the
international system  without the system itself losing its overall stability. It is stability, at the end,
mot conflict, that has been normal condition of the international system. See, also, Andreas
Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990. Peacemaking and the Conditions of
International Stability. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 3-4.
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As we have seen earlier, the second part of the definition of international
stability focuses on the state, or the second level of analysis. From this
perspective it is assumed that stability exists when states continue to preserve
their political independence and territorial integrity without the need to pursue the
struggle for survival. Is this definition, which we label a “classical” one, accurate
enough to cover all forms of stability pertaining not only to the present but to the
Cold War era as well? In trying to give an answer to this, IR scholars have
focused their attention on the internal dynamics of states and their social, political
and economic fabric they are made of. This line of reasoning, by and large
present during Cold War years, has produced a large amount of evidence and
very useful theoretical insights, known as the  “theory of democratic peace”.
The main premise of this liberal view on international stability is that
democracies are war-prone but that do not go to war with each other.45 In their
mutual relationship, democratic states observe and externalize the democratic
norms, rules and procedures and institutions which, in turn, prevent the
recurrence of the logic of balance of power and security dilemma. The logic of
anarchy and its consequences, say these authors, remain valid only among the
undemocratic and authoritarian states that are, in some cases, named as the
“outer concentric circles”,46 or the “periphery” of international society.47 The
“theory of democratic peace” is not confined to the interstate relations only.
Within this liberal view there has also emerged another stream of thought
focusing on intra-state relations. The assumption, notes Kelvi Holsti, that the
problem of war (conflict) is primary a problem of relations between states has to
                                                
45 See, more on this in Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”. American
Political Science Review Vol. 80 (December 1986) pp. 1151-1169; Joanne Gowa, “Democratic
States and International Disputes”. International Organization Vol. 49 No. 3 (Summer 1995) pp.
511-521; John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Peace”. International Security Vol. 19 No. 2
(Fall 1994) pp. 87-125.
46 Barry Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism
and Regime Theory Meet the English School”. International Organization Vol. 47 Issue 3
(Summer 1993) pp. 327-352 at 349-352.
47 James M. Goldgeir, Michael McFaul,  “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in
the Post-Cold War Era” pp. 476-491.
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be seriously questioned.48 In essence this assumption was earlier questioned in
scholarly work, in the studies regarding the phenomena of state-building of the
nations that emerged from the process of decolonization. As we shall see in the
following chapter, these new states did not have to struggle for their survival in
an anarchical society of states in order to secure and preserve their newly won
independence and territorial integrity. Their political independence and territorial
integrity were rather guaranteed and preserved by the same “anarchical” society.
This was done through the norms on sovereign equality of states, fixed territorial
borders and the so-called juridical statehood49. The international regime
providing for these norms proved to be very stable in the long run and has
favored the political    independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  these states but
to the detriment of political and economic development and the social cohesion
of these countries.50  The legitimacy of the ruling elite that took on the task of
state-building following the end of decolonization derived not from the will of
those governed but from the norms on equality of states, fixed territorial borders
and juridical statehood. These qualities, in essence, enshrined the collective will
of the majority of the members of international society.51 However, as we shall
argue later, any other approach other than the above one, supporting former
administrative (colonial) borders as a basis for international statehood, would
have proved more destabilising, especially had it been based on the ethnic
principle.
The analysis of state building, both in theory and practice, in former colonies
and its impact on the international stability has further been extended to the new
states that emerged after the collapse of Communist federations following the
end of the Cold War. Long before these new states emerged, the Communist
                                                
48 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996) p.15.
49 More on this, see, the eloquent study by Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States:
Sovereignty, International Relations and Third World  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990).
50 Jean François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of Belly. (London: Longman,
1993) pp. 41-118.
51 I. William Zartman, Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate
Authority (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1995) pp.1-11; 207-273.
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federations had descended into anarchy and violence, imperiling their own
citizens and threatening their neighbors through refugee flows, political instability,
and random warfare. This second wave of the failed (collapsed/or weak) states,
whose very existence rested with the presence of juridical statehood in
international realm, produced the instability in the system (in one case even
causing a serious rift among the great powers of the present-day international
system : Kosova during NATO air campaign of March – June 1999). These types
of states are associated with the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and the
violence it produces.52
Ethnic nationalism, as a divisive and destabilizing force in international
relations, has been treated with equal care as even the state system itself. In
fact, those who studied ethnic conflicts as a source of international instability
have made a parallel between the behavior of ethnic groups and the states.
Barry R. Posen is among them. He states that ethnic (and other religious and
cultural) groups enter into competition with each other, amassing more power
than needed for security and thus begin to threat others. The crux of this
argument is that ethnic (and other religious and cultural) groups behave, upon
the collapse of the previous state structures, in the same manner as do the
sovereign states under the conditions of anarchy.53 Nevertheless, as opposed to
the previous wave of the failed states, this time the role and the commitment
(military and non military) on the part of international community, in terms of
preserving the political independence and territorial integrity of its newly accepted
members, is by far greater and more effective than in the past.  As a sign of this
role and commitment, the international community has added new norms and
                                                
52 They are called this way because of the weaknesses of the state institutions and the
lack of political and social cohesion within these states. See, Gerard B. Helman and Steven R.
Ratner, “Collapsing Into Anarchy”. Current Issue 353 (June 1993); Lawrence Freedman, “Weak
States and the West”. Society Vol. 32 Issue 1 (November-December 1994) (http://www.
Epnet.com/).
53 See, Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”. Survival  Vol. 35
Issue 1 (Spring 1996) pp. 27-45. Identical view is expresses also by Markus Fischer, but
regarding medieval times. This author says that the behaviour of communes, duchies,
principalities and other actors of this period was more or less like the behaviour of modern states
acting under the conditions of anarchy. Cf. Markus Fischer, “Feudal Europe, 800-1300:
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procedures concerning democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human
and minority rights  (apart from old ones regarding the sovereign equality of
states, fixed territorial borders and juridical statehood). There was given a
qualitatively new meaning to the territorial integrity of states that emerged from
former Communist federations.  In some cases, as in the Balkans, this new
interpretation was brought to the foreground by the use of force, huge military
deployments as well as economic and other assistance on the part of the
international community. This was done in order to render meaningful the new
concept of territorial integrity that should be seen in close connection with the
internal political and economic infrastructure of these new countries. For this
purpose, new institutional mechanisms and programs, such as the Stability Pact
for Southeastern Europe, were set up.  This means that the assumption of the
“democratic peace”, that the liberal and democratic states are producers of
peace and stability in the system, is gaining weight and proving to be correct, in
Europe at least.
3. The End of the Cold War
The purpose of this section is not to give any account as to when the Cold
War commenced or ended nor why it ended in the way it did54. Our aim is
modest: to offer an overview about the processes triggered by the Cold War’s
                                                                                                                                                
Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices”. International Organization Vol. 46 Issue 2
(Spring 1992) pp. 427-466.
54 The term “cold war” was first coined by Walter Lippmann to describe the initial
confusing period of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over the shape of the
postwar world. After the Second World War, many people believed that it would be followed by a
complex negotiations leading eventually to a peace treaty with the defeated countries and a new
reconstruction of the international system. Nearly a decade passed before it became clear that
such a settlement would not take place and it soon became clear that disagreements between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union governments about an eventual peace treaty were much grater then
had been anticipated. See, more on this, in Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in U.S.
Foreign Policy (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972). This book first appeared as a series of
newspaper articles criticising George Kennan’s famous article The Sources of Soviet Conduct,
which was written in Foreign Affairs in 1947 under the pseudonym “X”. Kennan’s article was, of
course, wherefrom the idea of containment was first sketched out for the general public.  More on
this period until its end, see, the eloquent elaboration by Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1994) pp. 423-446, 762-804. Kissinger gives in a comprehensive manner
an account of Cold War’s demise (the fall of the Berlin Wall) and the reasons for it.
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end, first and foremost those concerning self-determination and the response of
the international community to them.
The most important single event after the fall of the Berlin Wall was the
attempted coup in the former Soviet Union in August 1991. That week of August
looked as if the Second Russian Revolution would restore the Communist world
and stop the trends of history. Yet, the coup failed and Michael Gorbatchev
restored his authority. It raised hopes throughout the world. However, in 1992,
negative trends suddenly slanted downwards. The dream of global harmony and
exaggerated expectations of democracy, human rights and prosperity generated
by the collapse of Communism, were harshly jolted, if not exploded. Someone
accurately described this as a “new pessimism”,55 while others predicted a world
full of interstate conflicts. Statesmen, like George Bush, were more optimistic.
Bush himself uttered a hopeful phrase about “new world order” and the reality
behind it seemed suddenly more chaotic just as described by scholars. And,
meaner, too, whether in the murderous clashes of Hindu and Muslim in India or
the epidemic scale famine caused by corrupt warlords in Somalia. Even amid the
promise of new democracies in the Philippines, Nicaragua, or South Africa, the
path seemed more vulnerable than it seemed. The role of the great powers as
keepers of the world’s peace and stability, soon dashed away. The Gulf War
remained a past memory of the unity of the great powers and the UN in opposing
the classical case of aggression. As a matter of fact, the Gulf War went into
shadow within a short period of time not as much because of the great powers’
disunity as due to the pressures from the claims to ethnic self-determination of
the long-time suppressed peoples. Most of the conflicts and wars following the
Gulf War have been intra-state wars, or, as one author has put it, “third type
wars”.56 These conflicts and wars, driven by the quest for ethnic self-
determination, began in the Balkans, at a time when Europe itself was striving for
unity and common defense and security policy agreed upon in Mastricht in
                                                
55 Charles Williams Maynes, “The New Pesimism”. Foreign Policy No. 100 (Fall 1995) pp.
33-49.
56 Martin van Kreveld, The Transformation of War (London: the Free Press, 1991), pp.
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December 1991. The world watched in horror as proud assertions of
independence in what used to be Yugoslavia turned into a barbarous ethnic
conflict among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs. The term “ethnic cleansing”
resurfaced again from the same region and nation, almost a century and a half
later.57
After four years of fruitless negotiations under international mediation,
hundreds of broken ceasefires and a hostage crisis, involving the kidnapping of
UN troops by Serbs, the 1995 Dayton Accords marked a turning point in the
international approach. It showed that when dealing with tough minded Balkan
politicians, a credible threat of force can cause them to be more reasonable. The
tragedy repeated itself though. This time in Kosova during 1998-1999, but with
some difference. While in Bosnia-Herzegovina the West’s publicly declared
political aim was to implement the basic tenets of the principle of territorial
integrity of that state, in the Kosova case, the preservation of  the FRY’s territorial
integrity was only a side-effect of an international action designed to prevent an
unraveling human tragedy, threatening international peace and security.
In other parts of Europe, the Communist legacy did not prove so violent
and tragic as in former Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia was divided into two, its
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Enlightenment of the 19th century. Karadjic in 1860 used the term to describe the retaking of
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International Criminal for Former Yugoslavia”. Criminal Law Forum Vol. 6 No. 2 (1995) pp. 260-
301 at 294-296; Drazen Petrovic, “Ethnic Cleansing - An Attempt at Methodology”. European
Journal of International Law Vol 5 No. 3 (Spring, 1994) pp. 342-360. To stop this opaque
occurrence in intra-state relations, it took too much time.
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“velvet revolution” showed that it was unable to sustain the unity of Czech and
Slovak nations. It was a peaceful separation so that two nations joined the rest of
the former Communist countries in the process of social, political and economic
transformation but is was not without painful symptoms of readjustments. In the
case of Czechoslovakia, the application of self-determination along former
administrative lines (borders) proved to be an exemplar for the rest: none of the
nations expressed conflicting self-determination claims stretching beyond their
former republican (administrative) borders58.  Further inside the Communist
world, the situation was quite different, resembling in many aspects that of
Yugoslavia. In the Caucasus, violent conflict brought new bloodshed between
Armenia and Azarbajan over Nagorno Karabakh. The old Soviet state of Georgia
was torn apart  by war among Georgians, Ossetians, and Abkhazians. At the root
of these conflicts were quests for self-determination and territorial integrity that
were either denied  in a violent manner or demanded in the same way by one of
the parties to the conflict. Within the territory of former Soviet Union, the war in
Chechnya was another example of the prevalence of uti possidetis over self-
determination and independent statehood59.
The Balkan war was a test for President Bush’s “new world order”. At the
outset, both the Europeans in NATO and the United States shied away from
military intervention, initially on grounds that the war was an internal conflict, later
arguing that intervention would be a quagmire. To stop the carnage, first in
Bosnia and later in Kosova, NATO undertook military operations that were
unimaginable just a decade earlier. “Out of area” operations of NATO
encompassed not only military intervention but also large peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement operations, aimed at restoring the peace and stability of the
war-torn countries. This segment, made possible under conditions of
globalization in international relations, besides the problems of poverty, hunger,
                                                
58 With regard to the application of uti possidetis to the dissolution of Czechoslovak
Federation, see, J. Malenovsky, ”Problems Juridiques Lies a la Partition de la Tchecoslovaque” .
Annuaire Fraçais de Droit International  Vol. XXXIX (1993) pp. 325-338 at 328.
59 For an eloquent overview of the prevalence of uti possidetis over self-determination
and independent statehood in the case of Chechnya, see, Gail W. Lapidus, “Contested
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crime, human rights, environment protection and global economics, ushered in a
new era in the concept of state sovereignty. NATO military engagement in the
Balkan wars and after has definitively rendered the concept of sovereignty futile
one for some areas of the world, or, to use UN General Secretary's own words,
there are now “two emerging concepts of sovereignty”.60 Some have labeled this
as a “new NATO expansion”. NATO’s eventual interests apart, the fact remains
that the decade after the Cold War has offered more tragedy than triumph, less
economic and political liberation than economic dislocation and political
disintegration, more disenchantment and despair than renaissance and
reassurance. This period shall long be remembered as an era of the outburst of
the claims and counterclaims for self-determination. It will also be remembered
for a new concern regarding relations between ethnic groups and states, and
between the polyethnic and multiethnic character of actually existing states and
the stability of the international order. The alleged right to self-determination,
which had been assimilated by the anti-colonialist ideology, the Westphalian
consensus (albeit broken very often during the course of history, starting with the
French Revolution) and uti possidetis juris, has in recent decade been revitalized
by a new surge of (sometimes) violent self-determination claims and
counterclaims. One effect of this new crisis situation in the relations among the
international order and its component states (and peoples) was a reconsideration
of the underlying political theory and the practice of self-determination. To this
issue we turn next.
4. Territorial and Ethnic Self-Determination
In the case of self-determination, the main issue is to decide who the “selves”
entitled to self-determination are. Next to it comes the question concerning the
legitimate authority to decide about who the “selves” are. In principle, the “selves”
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could be considered entire peoples inhabiting certain portions of a territory. This
begs the next question: What is the meaning of “peoples”? Or, which parts of
territory form the territorial base for the legitimate exercise of self-determination?
On the top of this comes the issues of legitimate authority: Who shall decide on
the legitimate categories of self-determination, be it territories or populations ?
Scholars have made efforts to answer the above questions. For this
purpose, there have been made various classifications. In most cases, they
followed the practice of states on self-determination, although theoretical and
abstract observations on the topic have been present. To this latter category we
devote much of the discussion to follow. Among others, Dov Ronen’s theoretical
explanations and classifications of self-determination have been a valuable guide
in our work.
Ronen sees five manifestations of the self-determination that have been
dominant at successive periods from the French Revolution to the present. They
are: mid-nineteenth-century European national self-determination, late-
nineteenth-century Marxist class self-determination, post-WW I Wilsonian
minorities’ self-determination, and post-WW II non-European/racial self-
determination.61
In order to define self-determination, or “nationalism” as he put it, Ronen
takes the examples of German and Italian movements during the nineteenth
century (the Belgian and Greek cases are mentioned as well). This type of quest
for self-determination “bridges over religious, ethnic and linguistic differences and
thus functions as a centrifugal force in pursuing its goals… and it needs a state
as a machinery to administer problems caused by these differences”62. Here the
state serves as a reference point to distinguish between ethnic and national self-
determination. In the former case, as opposed to the latter, the quest for self-
determination emerges within a framework of the state that nationalism has often
created.  This type emerges in states “where democratic representation, if  not
                                                
61 Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination  (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1979), pp. 25-26.
62 Ibid. p. 29.
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adhered to in practice, is at least paid service”63. The “selves” are defined as
against the rule of an alien nation, e.g., the French domination, exacerbated by
the Napoleonic wars (the cases of Germany and Italy); the alien Dutch rule (in
the case of Belgians, both Walloons and Flemish); and the Ottoman rule in the
case of the Greeks. Here are included the 1848 national revolutions as well (to
be discussed in the next chapter).64
The next manifestation of self-determination is that related to Marxist or
class quest for self-determination. The core of the Marxist conception of self-
determination is almost the same with other already mentioned cases: It also
tries to get rid of the alien rule. But, the definition of this alien rule is different in
Marxist thought. This rule is made up of the owners of the means of production
(the capitalist class) who rule over the working class (proletariat). The aim is to
create a common “us” in pursuit of self-determination, meaning a communist
society.  So, in this case the fundamental dichotomy and conflict is not between
the “us” and “them” of nations, but between polar groups inversely related to the
means of production65.
The following, and most interesting, typology made by Ronen  is that
concerning Wilsonian self-determination. This type is labeled as “Wilsonian Self-
Determination of Minorities”.66 Since we discuss this issue in the following
chapter, it suffices here to talk about the reasons behind Ronen’s labeling of this
type of self-determination as “minorities’ self-determination”.  Ronen has again
taken the concept of state as a reference point. Wilson’s appeal to “people” did
not mean human beings in general; he referred to unrepresented minorities and,
within them, the politically conscious, the elite, who had rocked Europe with
                                                
63 Ibid. p. 29.
64 Ronen uses the German word Volk to express best what national self-determination
and the nation-state mean. The connotation of this word embraces the German sense of history
(Historismus) of the Volk; it emphasises national uniqueness and the German people’s unifying
sense of community. The German “nation” gives the state an indivisible homogeneous content.
Cf. Ibid. pp. 27-28.
65 Ibid. pp. 29-30.
66 Ibid. pp. 30-32.
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nationalist fervor in the mid-nineteenth century revolutions and who had raised
their voices in the beginning of the twentieth century.67
The third manifestation, which does not take the state as a reference
point, is that belonging to the African quest for self-rule. In the development of
this quest for self-determination since the French Revolution, have emerged
three manifestations: Pan-Africanism, formulated in the mid nineteenth century
and persisting as such until WW II; Decolonization, which began after WW II and
continued throughout 1960s, the decade of independence; finally, the activation
of ethnic identity, in process since post-independence period of the 1950s, which
may be considered as a third manifestation, but is dealt with separately by
Ronen.68
Pan-Africanism, according to the author, embraces all the movements,
protests, conferences, and activities aimed at easing the sufferings of the blacks,
obtaining more rights for them, and gaining their equality as human beings.
Decolonization, differs from the above-mentioned manifestations. It is an attempt
to materialize the “desire for liberation from colonial rule, a rejection of political
domination by a foreign society, especially of a different race, and not merely the
will to secure more rights within the colonial framework, as during the Pan-
African phase”.69 The crux of the issue here is the activation of non-
European/racial identities.
The last and the most divisive and destabilizing form of self-determination
is the one based on ethnicity. It is called ethnic self-determination, or ethno-
nationalism. This is a type of self-determination through which the ethnic identity
is activated aiming at the independence and sovereignty of certain states.  There
are two reasons for this activation: the slowing down of the process of integration
within states (mostly newly independent states) and the speedy process of
modernization.70 The latter brought about integration and also spread the
message of self-determination. Then, the process of integration slowed down.
                                                
67 Ibid. p. 32.
68 Ibid. pp. 35-43.
69 Ibid. p. 36.
70 Ibid. p. 48.
33
However, the message still sounded loud and clear. The quest for self-
determination was there, and the glue to unite people was needed. National self-
determination, as described above, now does not make sense, because its
embodiment in the (nation-) state is precisely the problem; class self-
determination is less available, for one reason because of social mobility;
minorities’ self-determination is impractical, because the issue is not democratic
rights, strictly speaking; racial identity is out, because the rules cannot be defined
in these terms. Ethnic - linguistic, cultural, regional, and historical past identity –
lends itself as an effective adhesive, and the ethnic group emerges.71  This
description may be slightly oversimplified so as to stand for the point that the very
same people, in different circumstances, could have activated other than ethnic
identities.  But still we have to cope with the side-effects of the age of modernity.
Among the definitions following the state practice, two are worth
mentioning here. One is undertaken by James Crawford and belongs to the Cold
War period, while the other refers to the period after Cold War’s demise. We
chose these two authors in a belief that they captures the essence of our original
division between ethnic and territorial self-determination72. As we shall see in the
next chapter, for most of the time since 1945, customary international law and
the practice of states have recognized the right to self-determination. Analyses
focusing on state (or inter-governmental organizations’) practice as the evidence
of the so-called opinio juris , suggest that, although expressed as “people’s right”,
self-determination has in fact been applied to (or recognized on behalf of)  certain
                                                
71 Ibid. p. 48.
72 The division we make is more or less similar to Carr’s  distinction between the principle
of self/determination and the principle of nationality. The principle of nationality tended to be “one
of disintegration”, whereas “self-determination did not necessary entail that”  Men may “determine
themselves into larger as readily as into smaller units”, Carr concluded. E. H. Carr, Conditions of
Peace (London: Macmillan 1942) pp.59-60. The crux of this statement is that self-determination
based on territory is less destabilizing as opposed to that based on ethnicity. One author,
Hannum Hurst, pleads about the neo-decolonization approach to self-determination. He thinks,
however, that “it is less stabilizing than that based on ethnicity”. See, Hannum Hurst, “Rethinking
Self-Determination”. In Robert McCorquodale (ed.), Self-Determination in International Law
(Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000) pp. 195-263 at 232.
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territorial units, even when these units were inhabited by nomadic peoples (the
case of Western Sahara).73
The above stance on territorial units was stated by Crawford in 1979 in his
revised doctoral dissertation, stating that “self-determination had hitherto applied
and recognized in practice only to the territorial ‘units of self-determination’ falling
within one of four categories: 1) mandated territories, trust territories, and
territories treated as non-self-governing under Chapter XI of the UN Charter; 2)
states (except those parts of states which are themselves units of self-
determination); 3) distinct political-geographical entities subject to carence de
souverainete; and 4) other territories in respect of which self-determination is
applied by the parties”74.
The first category above refers to the anti-colonial self-determination while
the second refers to the self-determination of the existing states as foreseen by
the UN Charter and other regional instruments. In this is included the so-called
constitutional right to self-determination (the case of Quebec in Canada), or any
other equivalent solution concerning the territorial units within (con) federal
states. The third case, associated with the carence de souverainete, was first
mentioned in the Aaland Islands Case after WW I (to be discussed later) and
taken into consideration after the Second World War (the secession of
Bangladesh). Although the UN and individual states recognized Bangladesh as a
                                                
73 For an excellent analysis of the territory as a basis for the group identity in the case of
Western Sahara, see, Joshua Castellino, “Territoriality and Identity in International Law. The
Struggle for Self-Determination in the Western Sahara”, pp. 423-551; For the role of territory in
common identity formation, see also, John Agnew, “Mapping Political Power Beyond State
Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and Movement in World Politics”.  Millenium: Journal of
International Studies Vol. 28 No. 3 (1999) pp. 499-521; Daniele Conversi, “Nationalsim,
Boundaries and Violence”. Millenium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 28 No. 3 (1999) pp.
675-698.
74 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979) pp. 84-102. The same view has recently been expressed in his article “State
Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession”  (http://www.
canada.justice.gc.ca/). There is some controversy in Crawford’s later essays on the subject.
Thus, in his essay Democracy and International Law  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), pp. 1-43 at 8-10, the author qualifies as undemocratic the prevalence of the principle of
territorial integrity over that regarding self-determination. A similar restrictive approach to self-
determination in the Cold War era was expressed by Antonio Cassese. Cf. Antonio Cassese,
Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996).
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sovereign state based on systemic and widespread denial of human rights of the
East Bengali population (carence de souverainete)  and took the geographical
distance between East and West (two former parts of Pakistan), the same
precedent was not applied elsewhere. This precedent could have well been
applied following the Cold War but was not, in part out of fear of anarchy and in
part out of self-interest. Kosova and Chechnya, despite the systematic and
widespread violation of human rights of their populations and their distance from
Belgrade and Moscow respectively, have been denied full independence based
on the above precedent of Bangladesh.  The issue of Kosova shall be discussed
later.
Finally, the fourth case refers to the self-determination as agreed upon by
the parties and has to do with the plebiscites and referenda as recognizable
forms for the expression of the free popular will. This form of self-determination
mostly relates to the border areas and regions without entailing the creation of
any new entities. To this we turn again in the following chapter, focusing mainly
on the period between the two wars (1919-1939) when the plebiscite and
referenda were widely applied. The cases after WW II shall be mentioned in
passing only.
Later, some scholars extended the above list to include the cases and
practices that emerged after Cold War’s demise. The focus has been on the
former Communist federations. It is believed that the new precedent was created
with the dissolution of former Communist federations so that the above list should
now include the following : 1) highest level of constituent units of a federal states
that has been (or is in the process of being) dissolved by agreement among all
(or, in the case of Yugoslavia, most) of the constituent units; and 2) formerly
independent entities reasserting their independence with at least tacit consent of
the established state where the incorporation into other state, although effective
and enduring de facto, was illegal or of dubious legality (the three Baltic states).75
                                                
75 Benedict Kingsbury, “Self-Determination and ‘Indigenous Peoples’ “. Proceedings  of
the American Society of International Law: the 86th Annual Meeting (Washington, D.C. April 1-4,
1992), pp. 383-394 at 384 footnote no.1. Similar view is expressed by Marc Weller concerning the
Yugoslav precedent. Cf. Marc Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the
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While the latter point (the three Baltic states)  did not cause a serious divergence
of opinions, the former one triggered a debate over the so-called  ‘federal right to
self-determination’.76  This ‘federal right to self-determination’ is different and
should be distinguished from the above mentioned case concerning the
constitutional right to secession (the case of Quebec in Canada). In the former
case, as this example implies, self-determination is conceived as a right
according to which certain federated states are entitled to dissolve the common
(federal) state whenever they want to. This cannot be the practice of states in the
future. If this were to be the case, then it would mean the precedent set up by the
collapse of the former Communist federations shall have to apply to future similar
cases, thus encouraging the dismemberment of the existing federations. This
precedent, if accepted, would have yet another side effect concerning the rights
of the suppressed peoples living within sovereign and independent states that
are not federations. This would mean that these peoples have no right to
independence and secession, no matter the level of violence exercised against
them. This cannot be the case. As it has been argued for quite a long time,
                                                                                                                                                
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 86 Issue 3
(July, 1992) pp. 569-607 at 606.
76 On this debate, that is, whether there exists such a right, see, Otto Kiminich, “A
‘Federal’ Right of Self-Determination”. In Christian Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-
Determination. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 1993) pp. 83-100; Partic Thornberry,
“The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with some Remarks on Federalism”. In
Christian Tomuschat  (ed.). Modern Law of Self-Determination, pp. 101-138. Other authors have
been engaged in this debate in an indirect manner, mostly through criticizing the way the
Yugoslav precedent had been applied. Thus, Rolan Rich thinks that “ if  a nation with its own
federal unit is entitled to secede, it would be strange that secession be limited to such federal
units and not extended to nations within unitary states”. See, Roland Rich, “Recognition of States:
The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union”. European Journal of International Law  Vol. 4
No. 1 (1993) pp. 36-65 at 61. Similar view is expressed by Radan Peter in his article
“Yugoslavia’s Internal Borders as International Borders: A Question of Appropriateness”,
published in East European Quarterly Vol. 33 Issue 2 (Summer 1999) p. 137, 19 p
(http://www.EBSCOhost.com/). For the critics of this view and the fear that the Yugoslav
precedent might discourage states to devolve more power to the autonomous regions in their
efforts to meet realistic and effective claims for self-determination, see, Hannum Hurst,
“Rethinking Self-Determination”.  In Robert McCorquodale (ed.), Self-Determination in
International Law, pp. 195-263 at 232-233; Hannum Hurst has also expressed a general feat
throughout his book Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1990); See, also, Marc Weller, “The International Response to the
Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, pp. 569-606, footnote 215; Donald
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 563-684.
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international law has a neutral stance towards state formation and secession77.
This implies that there does not exist a right to revolution leading to secession.78
The line followed by the international community in the case of former
Communist federations, especially in the case of Yugoslavia, was based on
considerations pertaining to regional and wider peace and stability rather than
relying upon some abstract administrative lines and divisions. These
administrative lines have served and still serve the purpose of this peace and
stability in interstate relations, not the opposite. Whatever the level of their
correctness, the selection by the Badinter Commission for former Yugoslavia
(and the international community as a whole) of former administrative borders (of
the federated republics) as a reference point for the evaluation as to who was
entitled to a sovereign statehood, along with the fulfillment of other traditional
requirements for international statehood, was considered as a stabilizing factor in
the process of the creation of new states after Cold War’s demise.79 Initially
                                                
77 International law, in principle, has always had a ‘neutral’ stance towards the domestic
regimes of states, their creation and disappearance. The same applies to their legitimacy. Cf.
Geatano Arangio Ruiz, Gli Enti Soggeti Dell’ Ordinamento Internazionale. (Milano: Editore
Giufrre, 1951) pp. 344-345. See, also, Geatano Arangio Ruiz, L’ Etat dans le sens du Driot des
Gens et de la Notion du Droit International (Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria, 1975) pp.
6-9, 22-63. Nevertheless, there are some cases from the past when international law has put
some burden on the states as to their treatment of their own nationals. This was, however, made
on a contractual basis. Thus, the articles 15 and 17 of the Peace Treaty with Italy foresaw an
obligation on the part of Italy to respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the persons who
fell within here jurisdiction according to the above treaty of peace. Similar provision had been
stipulated in article 3 of the Treaty of Havana (between the U.S. and Cuba), concluded in 1903.
Cf. Gaetano Arangio Ruiz, Gli Enti Soggetti, pp. 344-345; See, also, Geatano Arangio Ruiz, L’
Etat dans le sens du Driot des Gens et de la Notion du Droit International, pp. 28-63. In cases like
these, one has always to deal with contractual obligations not having an universal character and
whose legitimacy does not go beyond the reach of individual contracting parties. On the other
side, there are situations in which state’s legitimacy is measured internationally based on the
respect for international human rights standards. This has been a very frequent occurrence
following the end of the Cold War and shall be discussed later in details in Chapter VI.
78 See, David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order. The Revolutionary State in
International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Heather Wilson also writes that the “use of
force by elements opposed to an established government, for whatever cause, was neither
condoned nor condemned by customary law. The resort to the use of force in the first place
remained a matter of self-help beyond the purview of international law.” Heather Wilson,
International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, p. 28. See, also, pp.
55-88 of the same book, confirming the above-quoted stance on the rights to revolution.
79 In scholarly work, we have found only one author linking directly, as we do, the peace
and stability in Europe and wider with the consequent application of uti possidetis as suggested
by the Badinter Commission and the international community as a whole. Cf. Vladimir Djuro
Degan, “L’Arbitrage Juridique Ignore: La Jurisprudence De La Commission Badinter”. In Marie-
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designed to prevent the total unraveling of the state structures over the transition
period from decolonization to independence, the principle of uti possidetis has
gradually legitimized former colonial administrative lines for all times. As a matter
of policy, uti possidetis has ever since militated in favor of territorial stability80,
notwithstanding the opinion of the inhabitants concerning the transfer of territory
by states.81 Having been considered a success story in Africa, the precedent was
further extended in the 1990s to the unraveling of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
and Czechoslovakia. In all three cases, the parent states broke down under the
pressure of ethnic nationalism of the different peoples living within them. Facing
the threat of destabilization, the international community once more responded
by calling on the principle of uti possidetis as a reference point for setting the
territorial scope of the new quests for self-determination82. New entities claiming
international statehood could do so only along the fault lines already in place
during the time they were administrative units within the parent state.
Paradoxically, though, the quest for self-determination was ethnically based and
heavily relied upon ethnicity while its final realization went along the former
administrative borders of a certain type (along the borders of former federated
republic only). So, no ethnic self-determination has been recognized or
encouraged by the international community after the Cold War.83 The only
                                                                                                                                                
Françoise Allain et al. (eds.), L’ Ex Yugoslavie En Europe. De La Fallite Des Democraties Au
Processus De Paix (Paris: Edition L’Harmattan, 1997) pp. 31-43. Other scholars have, as we
shall see later, discussed either legal aspects of the Commission’s ruling or put the whole blame
for war and conflict on Badinter’s work.
80 Ian Brownlie, “General Course on Public International Law”. Recueil des Cours Tome
225 de la Collection (1995). Academie de Droit International de la Hague (1996), pp. 71-72.
81 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)
pp. 170-171.
82 It must be appreciated that there is a complementarity between uti possidetis and the
principle of self-determination in certain aspects. It is uti possidetis which creates the ambit of the
putative unit of self-determination. Ian Brownlie,” General Course on Public International Law”, p.
72.
83 Ethnic claims for self-determination call into question the legitimacy of states and
governments. This is where the reluctance of  states to recognise these claims stems from. The
regulation of ethnic conflict by international law, the consequences of such an eventual regulation
included, like it was the case with anti-colonial self-determination, remains a doctrinaire issue for
the time being. See, David Wippman (ed.), International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998) pp.1-7; Anne Marie Slaughter, “Pushing Limits of the Liberal Peace:
Ethnic Conflict and the ‘Ideal Polity’ “. In David Wippman (ed.), International Law and Ethnic
Conflict, pp. 128-144; Michael Freeman,  “The Right to Self-Determination in International
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document recognizing such a right, the 1993 Vienna Declaration, is in the
process of gaining acceptance on this issue and thus cannot be said to represent
a strong opinio juris in favour of ethnic self-determination84.
Apart from the territorially based self-determination as described so far, in
the post-1945 era, “selves” have also been considered territories under military
occupation and territories where majority colored populations were victims of
institutionalized apartheid at the hands of Europeans. In both cases, self-
determination did not entail the creation of new state entities. Self determination
was, in these cases, attached to the very position of the inhabitants of certain
territories, inhabitants and territories who at the same time enjoyed some limited
international status. In order to improve their limited international standing, they
were entitled to the so-called internal self-determination aiming at the
improvement of their self-governing position, their human rights or their right to
full-fledged and genuine democracy.85  We turn to this issue in the next chapter
again. Now, without claiming to have exhausted the first part of this section, we
shall examine the next question we asked at the outset: Who decides as to who
the “selves” are ?
When President Wilson announced his appeal for self-determination, the
U.S. Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, expressed his fears about the extent of
self-determination and those entitled to decide on that matter. On the surface,
                                                                                                                                                
Politics: Six Theories in Search of a Policy”. Review of International Studies  25 (1999), pp. 355-
370 at 357-359.
84 After having declared the right of “all peoples to self-determination”, the 1993 Vienna
Declaration states the following:
“In accordance with the Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, this shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind”. See, The Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action. World Conference on Human Rights, June 1993 (New York: The UN
Department of Public Information, 1993) para. 2 at page 29.
85 Cf. Patric Thornbery, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with
some Remarks on Federalism”. In Christian Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination,
pp. 101-138; Allan Rosas, “Internal Self-Determination”. In Christian Tomuschat (ed.), Modern
Law of Self-Determination, pp. 225-252; Jean Salmon, “ Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-
Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle? ”.  In Christian Tomuschat (ed.),
Modern Law of Self-Determination, pp. 253-282.
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said Lansing, it seemed reasonable: let people decide. “In fact it was ridiculous
because people cannot decide until someone decides who the people are”.86
Scholarly work has given a very simple answer to this by denoting the
international community as the bearer of this responsibility. The community of
nations decides  who the “selves” are.87 Nevertheless, this answer begs another
question regarding the legitimacy to decide on the above, as it has been
apparent throughout the Yugoslav process of dissolution.  Which/or whose
international community decides about who the “selves” entitled to self-
determination are? Since there is no superior organ of the international
community entitled to decide on the matter, a simple question follows: which
organ of this community should decide upon the issues raised above? The
practice of states, acting individually or collectively, has differed from time to time
and from one case to the other. The following are some  initial  observations in
this regard.
Recent practice, following the Cold War’s end and the collapse of former
Communist federations, demonstrated that a regional organisation can decide on
the above issues. It was then that the European Community (now European
Union) decided on behalf of the whole international community as to the “selves”
entitled to self-determination and the scope of  its application. The then EC (now
EU) did so through an arbitration procedure, naming a French judge, Robert
Badinter, as its chair. The Badinter Commission (initially called ‘Committee’) was
an organ of the EC, whose legal opinions had an advisory and non-binding
character on parties, both regarding the issues of self-determination and
succession. However, the work of this body had a huge impact on the Yugoslav
crisis and beyond, extending to all former Communist federations. The rules the
Commission set up were more or less designed to follow the policies of the EU
and, later, the rest of the international community.
                                                
86 Quoted by Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1956) pp.55-56.
87  Allain Pellet, Droit International Public (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1994) pp.500-501. For the both
sides of self-determination, regressive and progressive, see, more, Necati Polat, “Regressive
Versus Progressive Self-Determination“. Peace Review Vol. 10 No. 2 (June 1998) pp. 121-226.
41
In a similar fashion, the UN had to follow the pace of events and create
norms, rules and procedures (institutions) concerning anti-colonial self-
determination. Although the UN acted on behalf of the whole international
community, thus having a wider constituency than the EC, its actions on the
issue of self-determination’s implementation, had been followed for the most part
by the Third World Countries (in cooperation with the Soviet Block). Before the
decolonization started in full swing, the actors knew more or less the territorial
limits of their would-be political actions and the rights and duties vested on them
by the international community (upon the attainment of their independence). This
was not the case after the Cold War. Apart from the Western leaders, mainly
from Europe, the rest of the local actors new nothing about who the “selves” were
to be and, consequently, their political actions went far beyond the territorial limits
of the units they were ruling. Therefore, the conflicts over self-determination were
pushed well above the administrative borders of the local rulers. What this case
had in common with the former, is that in both situations the regional initiatives
and bodies (the EU and the OAU respectively) proved to be ineffective in
stopping the violence and tragedies created as a result of the conflicts and wars
over self-determination. Their effectiveness increased after an initial failure and a
deep involvement of the other outside actors: the UN during the decolonization
process and the U.S./ NATO throughout the Yugoslav drama. In terms of
legitimacy of the actions undertaken on behalf of the international community, the
case of the OAU presents itself as more legitimate, compared with the EU’s
involvement in Yugoslavia. In the former case, the OAU dealt with its own
members, an element clearly missing in the latter’s case88.
                                                
88 In scholarly work, there have been proposals aimed at unifying the practice of
international community as to the legitimate authority to decide about the subjects entitled to self-
determination. Thus, Kemal S. Shehadi believes that the international community must clarify its
conception of self-determination; this conception must balance the principle of the territorial
integrity of states with the aspirations of aggrieved nations; and there should be international
institutions with the authority to settle self-determination disputes in accordance with the rule of
law rather than the rule of force. See, more, in Kemal S. Shehadi, “Ethnic Self-Determination and
the Break-Up of States”. Adelphi Paper No. 283  (London: The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1993) pp. 1-90 at 81-85.
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CHAPTER III:
SELF-DETERMINATION: FROM THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA (1648) TO
THE END OF THE COLD WAR
1. Dynastic Legitimacy (1648-1815)
There are three periods through which self-determination has gone during the
history of its own development. First period starts with the Peace of Westphalia
and ends up with the Congress of Vienna (1648-1815). This phase is better
known as the period of dynastic or monarchic legitimacy, meaning that the right
to rule over people derived not from their will but from a divine law instead89. The
                                                
89 Hedlley Bull, The Anarchical Society.A Study of Order in World Politics. (London:
Macmillan, 1977), especially the section “European International Society”, pp. 33-38. A similar
typology is expressed by Martin Wight in his book Systems of States (London: Leicester
University Press and London School of Economics, 1977), especially Chapter 6. According to
Wight, there have been three main epochs in the modern states system. In its early history, the
dynastic principle determined membership of the system and established the rights and duties of
sovereign rulers. In the following period, the idea of national self-determination revolutionarized
the rules of membership with the result that the political boundaries of multinational states in
Europe were substantially redrawn. In a thirds phase, which succeeded the struggle for self-
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other two phases shall be discussed in the following sections. They are: the
period of the balance of power (1815-1914) and the period between the two wars
(1918-1939). In this second phase, self-determination served more or less as a
guide for the conduct of international relations rather than as a revolutionary
principle.
The Peace of Westphalia marks the starting point in the development of the
modern state system. From this time until the American and French revolutions
respectively, the international society was made ripe for ushering in the phase of
nation states as we know today.  At the same time, scholars prepared the
intellectual setting for this modern-type self-determination. It covered not only the
concept of the nation state but as well the realm of individual human rights. Self-
determination in this period was a logical consequence of these two aspects of
the intellectual work, that is, the recognition of  individual human rights and the
idea of the nation state. These ideas  of the thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries
found their application in the above-mentioned revolutions. “Bill of Right” (1776)
and the “Declaration of Man and Citizen” (1789) were the first (legal) documents
that had a great impact on the outside countries. The 1789 Declaration in
particular has had a universal impact and influenced the ensuing events
elsewhere.
During the ancien regime, the monarch was equated with the state. They
were absolute rulers, both domestically and on the international plane. No right
was recognised in favour of citizens or the population because the monarchs
ruled in the name of God. This practice dominated until the American and French
revolutions. This does not mean that there were not opposite views. Some
intellectuals opposed the way the monarchs ruled. The opposition grew
especially after the Reformation. Following the Reformation many thinkers openly
challenged the divine right of Kings to rule in absolute terms. Among these, John
Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau deserve special merit and credit90.
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In practice, it was the French Revolution that proclaimed self-determination as
a revolutionary principle against despotism and monarchic rule. According to this
principle all citizens were declared equal before the law The divine right ceased
to serve as the basis of legitimate rule. The above-mentioned French document
on human rights was later supplemented by the Declaration on the Rights of
Peoples. The Declaration asserted the inviolability of all peoples, respect for their
independence and sovereignty, the condemnation of war and aggression, and
the principle of non-intervention. These were to be the foundations of the new
society.91 Inter-dynastic law was replaced by interstate or positive law. No divine
law was recognised as the source of law.  Every law stemmed from the will of the
people which acted through the state and its organs. The dream of a universal
monarchy was abandoned, the authority of the Church matched by that of state,
and the human beings became conscious of their destiny.
The nationality principle, proclaimed by these two revolutions, proved to be
troublesome and very soon made room for the state principle. Following
revolutionary heydays, it became difficult, as it is at present, to recognise the
nationality principle as a basis of international law and order in its original form.
The modification of its initial form made it possible for the new rulers to see their
own nationals through the lenses of state whose citizens enjoy the right to freely
chose the government they desire. For nations without state and under foreign
rule the appeal of the original nationality principle has remained valid. This meant
that they were entitled to have their own state organisation. It is precisely in this
context that the principle of nationality has emerged as a destabilizing factor. The
principle of nationality did not relate any more to the denial of dynastic or divine
rule but to the refusal of being under foreign rule or control , no matter the nature
of political organization.  The cases of Greece and Belgium, as well as some of
the 1848 revolutions in Europe, single out in this regard. This extension of the
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principle of nationality beyond the state borders is a merit of the French
Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, as it is the transformation of the balance of
power system following Napoleon’s defeat. It is the conflict between the principle
of nationality and the balance of power that permeated the period between 1815-
1918. However, the balance of power, not the principle of nationality, had been
the rule in interstate relations in this period of time. To this issue we turn next.
2. The Balance of Power  (1815-1914)
Next period in the development of self-determination starts with the Congress
of Vienna, which introduced a new philosophy and the concept of self-
determination in power management. This period ended around the years 1917-
1918.
The Congress of Vienna (1815) suppressed the nationality principle and
installed the balance of power based on dynastic legitimacy as an order of the
day. This meant that territories could be traded for the sake of stability
notwithstanding the wishes of the population. For the stake of preserving the
balance of power, the Congress allowed the application of the previous methods
of ceding and partitioning the territories of sovereign states without consulting
the populations concerned.  Attempts at secession were ruthlessly suppressed.
Throughout this period the opposition to the nationality principle was
institutionalised and linked to the political alliances and their structures (such as
the Congress of Vienna), contrary to the modern opposition which centres on the
fear that uncontrolled exercise of self-determination may seriously threaten and
destroy the international peace and stability92.  This institutional opposition, linked
to the Congress of Vienna and its mechanisms, was the rule and the philosophy
on which the application of self-determination was based until 1917-1918.
However, there were exceptions to this, either regarding the complete secession
or the expression of the will of a given population. Among these exceptions the
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most notable were the cases of Greek and Belgian independence, the 1840s
revolutions, Italian plebiscites leading to Italy’s unification and, finally, the
German and Italian acts of unification.
The Greek and Belgian cases represent a complete secession and a triumph
of the principle of nationality against the alien dynastic rule, whereas the
plebiscites held in some areas in Italy leading to its unification were an exception
to the rule and did not entail the formation of new states. The Italian and German
acts of unification, though, match the American and French revolutions
respectively. In all cases, however, the balance of power was an order of the
day. It was designed to protect certain states (dynasties) from internal upheavals
(revolution). Since the balance of power is a system designed for power
management on the international stage, in the above cases as well this system
had no choice but to pursue power configurations as they formed at the
international level, as an end result of the struggle for power developing among
states. This means that in the cases under discussion (the Greek and Belgian
successful secessions, Italian plebiscites, and the Italian and German
unifications),  the balance of power ran against the principle of dynastic rule, be it
domestic or alien.  This rendered necessary the need for a limited or controlled
application of the nationality principle. This further means that the peacemakers
of 1815 never allowed the principle of nationality to become a rule in interstate
relations. The same balance of power that exceptionally promoted the principle of
nationality in the above-mentioned cases, in a later stage, such as the 1848
revolutions in Europe, had been used to ruthlessly suppress the wishes of other
nations. So was the rule.
Self-determination in its secessionist form, in the case of Greece
demonstrated how correct were those who argued that “states that end up
supporting secessionist movements do so either primarily or exclusively for
economic, political and other instrumental motives”, meaning that “rarely, if ever,
do so for affective reasons such as ideological, ethnic, or religious affinity”.93
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Despite sentimental sympathy for Greeks nourished at the outset of the armed
struggle against the Ottomans, it never overwhelmed the calculations of the
European great powers who were far more concerned with the political
implications of the Greek uprising. This Greek revolt against the Ottoman Empire
(in the 1820s) was far more dangerous than earlier cases in Spain and Italy
because Greece had a geostrategic value in the eyes of the Great Powers. The
suppression of the revolution in Greece was seen from the beginning as an
essential step foreword to preserve the general stability and peace in Europe.94
As things dragged on, the Great Powers were unable to unite to suppress the
Greek revolution as Metternich of Austria had advocated. To preserve the
balance of power and prevent the Russian influence over Greece, the allied
British and French forces even fought the Battle of Navarino against the
Ottomans (September 1827).  The recognition of the Greek independence
(February 3, 1830)  marked the major first change in the map of Europe since
1815, but this change did not unleash major European war as Metternich feared
it would. However, the Greek successful secession shook the international
system in another sense. It exposed the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire so
that even Sultan’s own subjects started to challenge his supremacy. Thus,
Mehmed Ali Pasha, the ruler of Egypt, encouraged by the success of Greece and
Russia, attacked his nominal overlord, the Sultan of Turkey, to make some
territorial gains of his own. Apart from this, Greece’s independence brought to the
surface Russia’s threat to security, interests and stability of all states of Europe.95
Lasting almost for a decade, the Greek uprising led some scholars to argue
that secession’s long duration is in general one of the precondition for success,
legality and legitimacy of this form of self-determination.96   We do not share this
view because political calculations in connection with a given balance of forces,
rather than the long duration of secession are the decisive factors in the success,
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legality and legitimacy of the secessionist forms of self-determination. The
pattern of Greece repeated itself in many cases but no success story was
recorded in terms of duration of the secessionist movements. These are some of
the issues we discuss later throughout the next chapters.
The following case where the nationality principle prevailed over that of
dynastic legitimacy is the case of Belgian independence of 1830. Of the 1830s
revolutions, the Belgian uprising proved the most single serious threat to the
general peace of Europe. The Union with Holland, erected in the peace
settlements of 1814-1815 (with the view of creating a bulwark against France),
now stood  as a new test of the principle of legitimacy.97 In this case, it was not
the Russian fear that counted for the great powers caution towards the
intervention into Belgian crisis. France and Britain were not so much concerned
about Russia as about each other. The British for their part feared  that France
would take advantage of the crisis to annex Belgium and therewith gain a
springboard for further expansion in Western Europe – or for an invasion of
England.98 To avoid shifts in the balance of power caused by the Belgian
independence, great powers decided to establish an independent and neutral
Belgium. This was done on November 15, 1831, when the great powers and
Belgium signed the Treaty of London.99 This neutrality proved to be a good
replacement for Belgium’s role as a bulwark against France, but at the same time
it proved as well to be a seductive lure for Napoleon III in the 1860s. However, it
was Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 that propelled Britain into
World War I. This history demonstrates that fears of the peacemakers of 1814-
1815 were not without justification in the Belgian case.
The 1848 revolutions were of two sorts: liberal and national. Greater threat to
the international peace and stability was posed by the national revolutions in the
Hapsburg Empire (Bohemia, Hungary and Italy) and those that developed in
Schleswig-Holstein duchies. The revolutions in France and Germany (Prussia)
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were of liberal nature, that is, they aimed at changing the internal constitutional
order of these countries forcing them to be liberal democracies. It was due in
large to what might be called a rump Concert of Europe, in which Britain and
Russia played a principal role, that none of the 1848 revolutions set off a general
European war, and that the widespread domestic upheavals did not destroy the
international order established in 1815 or upset the European balance of
power.100 However, after 1848 only Russia had remained the staunch supporter
of the 1814-1815 peace settlements because the national consciousness that
developed out of the 1848 revolutions proved to be much stronger than it was
thought of at the time of their occurrence. First unifications (of Italy and Germany)
owed very much to the spirit created during the 1848 revolutionary upheavals.
Before we turn to other issues, it is a proper place to give here an overview of
other manifestations of self-determination. Apart from the above forms, the
plebiscites represent a very common form of self-determination used for the
expression of the popular will. As in the case of secessions, the plebiscites were
used only as an exception to the rule as foreseen by the peacemakers of 1814-
1815. They were certainly not a proper expressions of the popular will as the
term would imply. Their development and realisation occurred within the limits of
the conventional (international) law at the time. The basics of this law were set up
by the great powers as a means to maintain the international peace and stability
(mainly through congresses and conferences).
First plebiscites were held in the Italian provinces of Nice and Savoy (then
Sardinian provinces). The agreement on their cession was reached between
Napoleon III of France and Victor Emmanuel of Italy in the city of Turin on 12
March 1860 (in fact, Napoleon III signed the Treaty two days earlier in Paris).101
Although they were formally handed over to France following the plebiscites, their
cession represents a clear-cut example of the victory of the balance of power
over the nationality principle.102 As soon as the unification of Italy was completed
                                                
100 Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, pp.78-100, at 99.
101 Ibid. p. 139.
102 Ibid. pp. 136-139.
50
(30 June 1871), Italian nationalists laid their claim to the above provinces on the
basis of nationality principle.
Italian unification, made possible at its final stages by the French defeat at the
hands of Prussians, was a long process. But it did not seriously affect the
European equilibrium set up in 1814-1815 (and adjusted thereafter). Even after
unification, Italy proved unable to mobilise its own resources to join the ranks of
the great powers.103  This equilibrium and this potential will be threatened and
mobilised respectively only after the German unification. In this case, the
nationality principle would manifest itself in a total opposition to the previous
cases since the French Revolution. The policy of the “iron fist”, or from top-down,
associated with Bismark, proved as well to be yet another manner for the
implementation of the nationality principle.
German unification was the major shift in the balance of power in Europe
since 1815. It was proclaimed rather tactlessly by the Prussian leadership on
January 18, 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors of Versailles.104 The proclamation of
German independence in the French territory showed in a symbolic way the
emergence of the new European balance of forces. Germans got united, their
pride was restored, but not their security. The “nightmare of coalitions”, to use
Bismark’s wording for the system of alliances, faced new German statesmen who
ruled after Bismark. The Iron Chancellor’s inability to institutionalise his policies
forced Germany onto a diplomatic treadmill it could only escape, first by an arms
race, and than by war. By the end of the twentieth century, the Concert of
Europe, which had maintained peace for a century, had for all practical purposes
ceased to exist.
Territorial arrangements of Europe after Napoleon’s wars (1814-1815) were
designed to prevent any political, economic and military shifts from going to
whichever great power that might threaten the already established balance of
forces.  These arrangements left no room for the popular wishes. The latter had
to follow the territory, not the opposite. The principle of nationality, successful in
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some exceptional cases that we already discussed,  was made use of only for
practical exigencies of politics of the balance of power that emerged with the rise
of national consciousness and the industrial revolution of the 19th century. These
events proved to be a powerful forces for change in the international system in
the century. However, the forces under discussion proved no match for the old
thinking in the foreign policy of the existing states at the turn of the century.
Centuries old conduct of foreign affairs remained the same well into the years
proceeding the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and WW I (1914-1918).105 In and
around the Balkans particularly, this state of affairs in the conduct of foreign
policy proved to be a prelude to the Great War and, after that,  to the defeat of
the nationality principle: not even an inch of territory of the former Ottoman
Empire in Europe was divided along previous administrative lines existing in the
Ottoman time, or based on the nationality principle.  Territorial gains were treated
as a war spoil to be divided only on the basis of strategic and national security
considerations. These aspects, not the national composition of a given territory,
were considered as conducive to the peace and stability of the Balkans and
wider.106  The same disregard for the previous administrative borders and, to
some extent, to the nationality principle, was shown after the collapse of the
Austro-Hungary in 1918.
3. The Principal Manifestations of Self-Determination Between the Two
Wars (1918-1939)
The end of the First World War marks the beginning of the third phase in the
development of self-determination. After this war, self-determination does not
appear any more as a revolutionary principle but as a guide to the conduct of
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day-to-day international relations. Through this guiding aspect of self-
determination, it was made possible the restoration of the previously lost political
and international status of states and/or nations, such as Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Baltic States, Ukraine and Finland. The
expression of the free will of the populations, as a basic premise of the genuine
self-determination, was either presumed (in most cases) or it was foreseen by
the Versailles Conference as one of the means of political settlement but only for
certain territories (Danzing, Memmel, and Saar Territory). This in no way means
that strategic, security, political and economic considerations withered away
during this period.107 These considerations were instead to serve as a guidance
in the application of self-determination between two wars. However, its
application was confined, as a rule, only to the cases expressly stipulated by the
Versailles Peace Arrangements. In a similar way to that pursued after the
Second World War (the process of decolonisation), self-determination served as
a concept accepted by major powers as a basis for negotiating the details of the
competing claims in the name of the new arrangements and patterns of
sovereignty. It had a multilateral character and the analysis of self-
determination’s application in this as in earlier periods was bound to have
multiple character. This multilateral character of the self-determination claims,
which must be given due attention in its actual implementation of self-
determination, is often ignored in the rhetoric that asserts the self-determination
itself. 108 Neither the balance of power, nor the principle of self-determination
itself, could in their own be sufficient to maintain the international peace and
stability. The latter has always relied on the operation of two or more principles or
factors (strategic, economic, political, and security), which may modify one
another in their practical effects.109 This complex character of self-determination
was expressed both through theoretical observations made during this time and
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via the practice of self-determination’s implementation (which, as we noted, was
strictly confined to the contractual provisions stipulated by the Versailles Peace
Settlements). The following is the discussion of theory (Lenin’s and Wilson’s
views on self-determination), followed  by the international practice as pursued in
the Aaland Islands Case. The Aaland Case reflects both theoretical approaches
of the time.110  Lenin and Wilsonian conceptions on self-determination and the
message conveyed by the international practice in the Aaland Islands case are
indispensable for an understanding of self-determination as it stands at present.
Pursuing this line of argument will enable us to trace back and grasp the basic
manifestations of self-determination during this period. One of them is the so-
called presumed expression of the free will (the cases of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Baltic States, Ukraine and Finland), while the other concerns
the allegedly express manifestations of the free will in order to make minor
territorial arrangements. In the latter cases, it is assumed that economic factors
have played an important role (the cases of Saar Territory, Memel and Danzing,
although in some of these cases, it should be noted, no expression of the free
will ever took place). The issue of “Munich self-determination” demonstrated
how an entire nation could be sacrificed for the sake of international stability.
3.1. Lenin and the Soviet Conception of Self-Determination
The speed with which Lenin agreed to recognise the independence of Baltic
States and Finland before and after Brest-Litovsk arrangements, led to a belief at
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that time that he was a German spy.111  A closer look at the events preceding the
October Revolution and its success reveal entirely different reasons  behind the
Soviet behaviour before and after the Brest-Litovsk peace process and the years
following it. The reasons of power politics were the main factor that explain
Soviet (Communist) attitude towards self-determination and its forms of
manifestation (the so-called Socialist Federations of the Soviet style).  Internal
dynamics and the structure of the Soviet Russia lay behind Lenin’s policy of self-
determination and his policy of appeasement towards the Poles, the Finnes and
other nationalities of the Tsarist Empire. This appeasement policy was dictated
by the internal conditions prevailing in the first years following the Soviet
(October) Revolution and lasted only for a certain period of time, that is, until
Lenin consolidated his power base.
Besides a long autocratic tradition, three years of war absorbed most of
Russia’s available resources and brought the country to the brink of financial and
economic ruin. The discontent became widespread, famine in many parts of the
country imminent. Little wonder that, after the overthrow of autocracy, the poor
and the suffering, the cold and the hungry, were willing to accept any regime that
promised them relief. And, Bolsheviks of Lenin promised that. The Revolution of
1917, unlike many abortive attempts during the 19th century and beginning of the
20th century, found sober Russia ready to follow her liberators112. Foreign policy
of the Soviet Russia had to reflect this political, economic, financial and military
collapse of the Russian society. Separate peace at Brest-Litovsk with Germany
(March 1918) was first test and the challenge to Lenin’s diplomacy of the
Proletarian Dictatorship.113 As soon as they came to power in Russia, Bolsheviks
announced the principle of self-determination in favour of the nationalities living
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within the former Russian Empire. This was not a matter of principle but a sign of
deep weakness of the new regime and a tactical move undertaken by Lenin.
Within a few months of recovery (November 1918), Lenin denounced the Brest-
Litovsk Peace Treaties and, in the case of Ukraine and Finland, he even sent his
troops to retake them again.114  Lenin now argued that self-determination was a
useful revolutionary slogan which would lose its force once the revolutionary
class    had  seized  power  and  multinational  states  merged   into  a  unitary
socialist order, e.g., socialist (communist) federation.115 However, these
countries, including Romania, would gain their independence on the basis of the
nationality principle (presumed expression of the will through the Versailles
Settlements).
As a means to foster Russian political and strategic goals, Lenin resorted to a
new form of  political organization. This form, known as “the Soviet Federalism”,
would in later years serve as a model for the rest of the Communist world. The
Soviet Federalism was in a contradiction with the principle of self-determination
and human freedom. It made possible a huge concentration of power at the
hands of Moscow and the Communist Party. Moscow was to become, as one
author has rightly put it, “a new international Rome”116, a mission that was
possible to accomplish only through persistent propaganda. Moscow became a
home country to the Proletarian Revolution and propaganda exercised for this
matter became successful only after Moscow gained full control over the means
to push it throughout the world.117  Lenin and his Bolsheviks managed within a
short period of time to subordinate the Communist International to the Soviet
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Union’s national policy, which soon became a deep continuity rather than break
in Russian foreign policy.118
 Ukraine was the first ill fated attempt to achieve its political independence
while other states recognised by Lenin’s Russia would very soon either be
annexed or become satellites of the Soviet Union (save Finland).  Lenin’s or
Soviet Russia, commenced its life as a state with four Union Republics119 to end
up with fifteen and with as much “autonomous republics” and other entities
invented and reinvented by Communists in the run up to the dictates of
realpolitik.120 Border drawings and the population transfers were a frequent
phenomenon in former Soviet Union, especially in the course of the Second
World War.
In the cases of Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany, it is apparently seen
the role the “theory as practice”, to use Jim George’s words, plays in the shaping
and reshaping of state behaviour. This sort of state behaviour would later be
externalised to reach vast areas and populations of the world. Without studying
the basic tenets of the concepts of self-determination in these two countries, the
“dictatorship of the proletariat” and the “race superiority”, no successful
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understanding of the events between the two wars can be achieved. The Soviet
and Nazi Germany manifestations of self-determination reflect the internal
dynamics of these countries, their theory and practice.121  The basic premises of
both cases are based on the concept of nation, its definition and
conceptualisation made to serve pure exigencies of power politics.
Communist conceptions of nation are based on Stalin’s definition who
excluded from the definition all subjective or individual elements (“expression of
the free will”): the Communist Party, as an avant-garde of the proletarians,
should decide on behalf of a given population about the territory this people shall
inhabit, the economy they shall live from and, above all, the language, culture
and psychology they shall belong to.122 This conception stemmed from the fact
that Communism in its early stages (original Marx/Engels version of
Communism) did not recognise the role the nations play in state formation and, in
this context, the place the state itself takes in international relations.123 It was the
Jewish section of the Second Internationale that raised the nationality question in
theoretical sense (the end of the 19th century).124 From this time onwards, Lenin
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analysed the issue of nationality more seriously and ordered Stalin to draft a
proposal about the definition of the term nation to serve strategic and practical
aims of the new revolution to come. The main thrust of Lenin’s order was that the
future definition to be made by Stalin and the practice to come shall have to  take
into full account the then existing national question in Russia. Stalin’s definition,
therefore, was based on the already mentioned elements125. This was contrary to
Lenin’s opinion about the dominant role of the working class and the mode of
production. This attitude of Lenin slightly changed when WW I broke out in 1914.
Then, the working class, contrary to Lenin’s expectations, sided with the national
capitalist classes and their leaders. This fact seriously challenged basic premises
of Communism as to the nationality and state issues. This left no room for Lenin
but to further use self-determination for strategic purposes of his foreign  policy
until he saw the disintegrating force of nationality. The principle of self-
determination in Lenin’s foreign policy meant the right of colonial people to throw
off alien rule, not coincidentally, capitalist domination126. In addition to this, Lenin
invented one another form of this strategic use of self-determination. This was
consisted in Lenin’s resort to the idea of the “Socialist (Communist) Federalism”
as a means to foster Russian national interests. In this way he promised a local
autonomy to the Russian nationalities because Russian tsars had extended their
influence and power over a wide range of other non Russian nationalities. The
sole purpose of Lenin’s “Federalism” was to territorially expand along the
frontiers of Tsarist Russia, an aim achieved with an enormous speed. By the end
of WW II, the Soviet Union managed to put under its control around 178, 000
square miles of European territory127. This was nothing but the realisation of
Stalin’s ambitions presented by his foreign minister, Molotov, to the Germans on
the eve of WW II.128 These ambitions exceeded by far Russia’s pre-1914
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frontiers. 129At the same time, political influence of the Soviet Union became even
greater than physical control.
Until its demise in 1991, the Soviet Union had to struggle between
reconciling two principles: that of self-determination and federalism. Federation
had been emphatically rejected by Marx, Engels and Lenin himself.  But, this was
done only in earlier stages of the revolutionary developments.  After the 1917
Revolution in Russia, the federal concept of the new state emerged as  the post-
revolutionary antidote to the pre-revolutionary doctrine of self-determination.
Federalism was designed to absorb national self-determination as the latter was
redefined within the framework of the former.130  The immediate aim of the Soviet
Federalism was twofold: first, to prevent further separation and, second, to entice
the already seceded border areas back into the Russian state.131 The so-called
right to secession was a myth, not reality132. Its only purpose was to serve as an
ideological bromide to lull the various nations into believing that the Union was a
“voluntary amalgamation”. Although foreseen in Article 4 of the 1924 Soviet
Constitution, any attempt to assert that right would be regarded ipso facto an act
of counter-revolution.133 This attitude towards secession remained unaltered until
the Soviet dissolution. No federalism in its Western sense have ever existed in
former Soviet Union. Perhaps the term cultural autonomy for the non-Russian
republics and nations would better describe the situation that prevailed in this
state: Soviet Union never managed to develop a political and state organization
capable of satisfying non-Russians. National inequalities presided all along.
Apart from the unequal status of the non-Russian republics (Union/or Federated
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Republics), there were other aspects of this discriminatory situation. The most
conspicuous discriminatory situations were those regarding the status of the so-
called  “political and territorial autonomies” granted to the various non-Russian
nationalities living within the Soviet Union.
The concept of “political and territorial autonomy” was introduced in the
Soviet system in order to neutralise the idea of cultural autonomy , first put
foreword by Austro-Hungarian Marxists in 1899 by their Jewish section of the
Second Socialist Internationale. This “political and territorial autonomy” served as
a means to deny to the well established national communities the status of a
nation. These communities usually belonged to nations not loyal to the Soviet
regime. This kind of autonomy was a punitive measure applied almost during the
whole Soviet Union’s existence134. Internal administrative borders, as noted
earlier, were very often drawn and re-drawn to fit the punitive needs of this kind
of autonomous status and to meet the exigencies of the Soviet dictatorship. The
denial of the status of a Union Republic to certain categories of national
communities and the imposition on them the “political and territorial autonomy”
was always accompanied with the internal border drawings and population shifts.
This practice was entirely arbitrary and depended on the will of the Soviet
dictators, Stalin being the most notorious among them135.
3.2. Wilson and His Views Regarding Self-Determination
Another statesman who greatly contributed to the theory and practice of
self-determination is the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. He is associated with
the content and the form of self-determination as it stands today. The attitude he
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adopted and the Aaland Islands case (1921) reflect the contemporary
understanding of self-determination, both internal and external. However, his
views on self-determination were not in conformity with the international practice
of the time, especially the practice that developed within the League of Nations (
not to mention the already discussed Soviet practice ).
Wilson’s espousal of self-determination as a central element of the post-
WW I peace was reactive to both Bolshevik initiatives and wartime exigencies.136
However, Wilson did not use in public the term self-determination until February
11, 1918 (contrary to popular believe, the term itself does not appear nowhere in
his fourteen points). Before that date he had used the “consent of the governed”
meaning democracy (internal self-determination). This was covered by his notion
of “self-government”. As for external self-determination, Wilson was very much
against the dismemberment of Austro-Hungarian Empire.137 External form of self-
determination evolved in Wilson’s discourse later and meant two things:  the right
of people to choose their own sovereignty and their own allegiance and not to be
handed about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.138 The
complexities of Europe, though, were too great to allow for an outright application
of self-determination along nationality lines. At the same time, Wilson was
rebuffed not only by Europeans but also by his own colleagues and advisers.139
His Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, characterised self-determination
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propounded by Wilson as a dynamite, that is, a principle with enormous
destabilising force when faced with practical realisation140. He rightly saw the
difficulties faced in the process of determining who the “selves” should be: race,
territory, community, or all of them cumulatively?
There should be no wonder then that great powers of the time did not
endorse Wilson’s proposal to include self-determination within Article X of the
Covenant of the League of Nations. This article in its final form referred only to
the respect for territorial integrity and existing political independence of the
Members of the League.141 Self-determination was diverted from its universal
application. It applied only in the cases expressly foreseen by the peacemakers
of the Paris Peace Conference and, as far as plebiscites and minority rights were
concerned, their implementation could be enacted only through a procedure
provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations. Although the League was
not to Wilson’s ideal and his vision, he still regarded the League and minority
protection (plebiscites included) as a progress towards the realisation of the
nationality principle. Apart from this, the no-annexation clause for the Mandate
System was Wilson’s merit. While the Mandates System paved the way for the
realisation of  self-determination in certain cases, Minorities System of the
League proved to be ineffective and was used by Hitler as an excuse for
aggression against other states. Two reasons stand for latter’s ineffectiveness:
the System had no universal application (great powers were not bound by the
minority protection arrangements) and no implementation mechanism to render
effective internationally recognised minority rights. Nevertheless, the plebiscites
(used more than ever before, albeit not so extensively), the Mandates System
and the Minority Rights, despite all imperfections, facilitated the subsequent
universalisation of self-determination ( to embrace colonial areas following WW
II).
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On 28 June 1919, the representatives of Germany and the Allied and
Associated Powers signed the Peace Treaty at a ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors
in the Palace of Versailles. Part II of the Peace Treaty with Germany (Arts.27-30)
describes the new boundaries of Germany. Six former German areas, apart from
the territories ceded to France (Alsace-Lorraine), Poland (West Prussia and
Posen), Czechoslovakia (a very small portion of Upper Silesia), Lithuania
(Memel) and other colonies handed over to the League of Nations (including the
Free City of Danzing), were to be decided by plebiscite. These areas were
Allenstein and Marinwerder portions of East Prussia,  Eupen and Malmedy, the
Saar Basin, Schelswig and Upper Silesia. Plebiscites, along with the minority
provisions and the mandate system, were a compensating devises for
inadequacies and the imperfect application of the post-WWI self-determination.
They were mostly directed against former German/Austro-Hungarian and, in the
case of Mandates, Ottoman territories.  In these cases, quite apparently,
economic and strategic considerations prevailed over the nationality principle.
The cases of Upper Silesia and the Saar Basin were the most significant and
controversial ones.142 In the case of Upper Silesia in particular, it was obvious
how difficult is it to define self-determination through plebiscite. In a plebiscite,
held on March 1921, majority voted for union with Germany. Since the area was
mixed and there were allegations of fraud during the plebiscite, clashes between
German and Polish peasants followed. In the end, the League gave to Germany
the bulk of Upper Silesia but most of the rich coalmines to Poland. Both sides
remained unsatisfied and civil war ensued. The message of the Saar Basin case
is that it demonstrated as to what happens if a given area is not handed over to
the country it belongs to.  The results of plebiscite in Saar, held in January 1935,
only demonstrated something that had been known for long: the unification with
Germany.
In other parts of Central and Eastern Europe no plebiscites were foreseen.
Vast minorities existed within the states established on the basis of the self-
determination principle after WW I: Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia,
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Romania, Poland and Hungary. Their rights were supposed to be protected by
the minority regime of the League of Nations, which was ineffective. The new
State of Czechoslovakia was Hitler’s first test and the Munich Settlement his
preliminary success in the way to WW II.143
3.3. The Aaland Islands Case
When the Aaland Islands case emerged in 1920, self-determination meant
full independence. This is the reason why in the scholarly work it is said that the
refusal by the League of Nations to recognise the right of the Islanders to unite
with Sweden was tantamount to the very denial of  self-determination. Taking into
account both internal and external aspects of self-determination the League of
Nations confirmed Wilson’s conception of self-determination instead. In this way,
the League laid a solid ground  for further development of modern self-
determination. The Aaland Islands case would later serve as a basis for a wider
and more liberal interpretation of self-determination, albeit not too often invoked
in this sense. The following discussion is only as to the self-determination
aspects of the case, leaving aside the constitutional issues of Aaland’s
autonomy, 144 as well as the demilitarisation/neutralisation aspects of the Aaland
Islands.145
Deliberations on the Aaland Islands issue could be divided into legal and
political parts. The problem itself arose during Finland’s consolidation of its
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independence from Russia following the outbreak of October Revolution in 1917.
Legal issues were dealt with by Commission of Jurists, while political ones by the
Commission of Rapporteurs. Both issues concerned the issues of the Aaland’s
self-determination.
Finland declared its independence from Russia on the 15th of November
1917 and was finally recognised by the Soviet Government of Russia on the 4th
of January 1918. The Swedish government recognised Finland on the same
date. The United States extended its own recognition only after the establishment
of the newly elected democratic government of Finland. France and Britain
followed the suit, too. Upon the proclamation of Finland’s independence, no
representatives from the Aaland Islands took part in the Finish action. The
Islanders were busy  with their own bid for independence from Russia. For this
matter, they had expressed their desire for a union with Sweden in a referendum
held on December 31, 1917. Several representations were conducted before the
King of Sweden showed a conciliatory mood towards Finland. Then came Brest-
Litovsk, German invasion of the Islands, end of WW I and with it the annulment
of the treaties concluded at Brest-Litovsk. The question was brought to the
attention of the Council of the League of Nations by both the inhabitants of the
Aaland Islands and the Swedish government. A resolution was unanimously
adopted by the Council, with the assent of Sweden and Finland, on  12th July
1920.146 When the question was brought before the Council, Finland objected.
The Finish Government stated that: “In opposing the Swedish Government’s
proposal to submit the question to the future status of the Islands to a plebiscite
of the population, this government is following the principles according to which
several territorial questions were decided by the Peace Conference, in cases of
conflict, as here, between the wishes of a minority and the economic and military
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situation of a nation”.147 Before the said resolution was adopted on the 12th of
July 1920, the officials of the League of Nations circulated the materials of the
case with a brief and simple note which said, among others, that the case was “ a
matter affecting international relations” and that “unfortunately threatens to
disturb the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends”.148
The Council of the League, acting as intermediary, stressed in its resolution of
the 12th July 1920 that “an International Commission of three jurists shall be
appointed for the purpose of submitting to the Council, with the least possible
delay, their opinion, inter alia, as to wether, within the meaning of paragraph 8 of
Article 15 of the Covenant, the case presented by Sweden to the Council with
reference to the Aaland Islands deals with a question that should, according to
International Law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland.” The next
issue to be dealt with by the Commission of Jurists referred to the
demilitarisation.149
The Commission of Jurists, in dealing with other self-determination issues
(apart from the above-mentioned ones) made some points which are of
importance for the present. Thus, in its conclusions of 5th of September 1920, the
Commission made a distinction between domestic and international jurisdiction,
giving the reasons behind this distinction as well.150 Second, the Commission
announced that self-determination was not an absolute right but a right that is
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realised on a case by case basis and upon an agreement. This further means
that, apart from the will of the population, other factors such as economic,
political and security ones, should be taken into account.151 Finally, the
Commission made a distinction between the consequences of self-determination
that arise from the mere fact of state-formation and during that process and those
emerging after a state has definitely established itself.152
The Council of the League, meeting in September 1920, heard the report
of the Commission of Jurists, declared itself competent to consider the question,
and decided to appoint a Commission of Rapporteurs to visit the Islands,
investigate the problem and make recommendations for its solution.  The
Commission of Rapporteurs had to tackle only the political aspects of the issue.
The report of the Commission of Rapporteurs, dated 16 April 1921, covers thirty-
seven large printed folio pages and the annexes fourteen more pages. The
Rapporteurs investigated the historical, political, strategic, and other facts having
a bearing on the matter in dispute.153  The Report certainly represents the most
thorough and multidimensional treatment of self-determination ever made, the
basis for its application and the consequences.  Thus, after declaring, in its
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preambular  part,  that the Finish sovereignty stretches “within the frontiers of the
Grand Duchy of Finland, as it existed during the Imperial Russia”, the
Rapporteurs went on to say that:
“The principle is not, properly speaking, a rule of international law and the
League of Nations has not entered it in its Covenant. This is also the opinion of
the Commission of Jurists … It is a principle of justice and of liberty, expressed
by a vague and general formula which has given rise to most varied
interpretations and differences of opinion… To concede to minorities, either of
language or religion, or to any fraction of a population the right of withdrawing
from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good
pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within states and to inaugurate
anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the
very idea of the state as a territorial and political unity… The separation of a
minority from the state of which it forms a part and its incorporation in mother
State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort
when the State lacks whether the will or the power to enact and apply just and
effective guaranties”.154
After consideration of the Report of the Commission and further hearing of
the parties, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution on June
24, 1921, recognising Finland’s sovereignty over the Islands. In addition to this,
in the following meeting of the Council, upon the Belgian proposal, Finland and
Sweden reached an agreement guaranteeing the rights of the local populace as
recommended by the Rapporteurs. This agreement was unanimously approved
by the Council and terminated the consideration of the case155.
Although there was little development in the realm of self-determination
before 1945, this case along with the plebiscites and the Mandates System
(conventional application of self-determination in only exceptional cases, or the
presumed expression of the free will as discussed earlier) demonstrated the
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political force of self-determination in the inter-war period. The Aaland Islands
case does represent in particular a precedent and the very basis around which
has revolved and the momentum gathered concerning the practice and theory of
self-determination as its stands at present. Even in the cases of the anti-colonial
self-determination that developed in the years after 1945,  the institutions that
emerged during the Aaland Islands precedent, such as carence de souverainete,
took prominent place in the so-called premature recognition,  applied by some
states during the decolonisation process. This issues are discussed later
again156.
4. Self-Determination After the Second World War
The evolution of self-determination from a revolutionary and guiding principle
into a legal entitlement following the end of WW II has not been a small process.
This evolution in the post-1945 era has occurred within the opposing frameworks
of sovereign state rights and state equality (juridical statehood). This opposition,
in turn, resulted in alterations of the basis of international relations.157  A new
international standing was acquired and recognised to former colonies and their
peoples. At the same time, no new states were created following the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War (apart for controversial cases of East
Germany, Korea and Vietnam).  This is not to say that there were no changes in
the territorial map of the world. They mainly related to border adjustments,
sometimes stretching over vast areas. In these WW II border rearrangements,
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freedoms, implicitly present at the last paragraph quoted above (“…a last resort when the State
lacks whether the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guaranties”), the
precedent is certainly a harbinger to the Badinter Commission’s (and international community’s)
rulings over the Yugoslav self-determination and its connection to the corpus of human rights and
freeddoms.
70
former Soviet Union achieved the most (both in Europe and  in Asia).158
However, the end result was not the creation of new states.
The post-WW II international order resembled more than anything else the
order created by the Congress of Vienna: it was a system based on the state
sovereignty, that is, on the concept of state self-determination159. The Atlantic
Charter of 14 August 1941,  ascribed to by twenty-six Allied States as of January
1, 1942,   bears no mention of self-determination. So does not the documents
drafted in 1944 during  the negotiation on the UN Charter held at Dumbarton
Oaks in Washington. In the Atlantic Charter the focus of the Allies has been to
declare null and void territorial changes made during the war and restore
sovereign rights and self-government to those who had been forcefully deprived
of them.160 This attitude was later changed through regional proposals.
Subsequent consultations at San Francisco, however, led  to a further
development which was ultimately to benefit the notion of self-determination: the
consultations in San Francisco in 1946 saw an amendment tabled by the Soviet
Union, which resulted in the insertion of the words “ based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” in the text of Articles 1
(2) and 55 of the U.N. Charter. Given the multiethnic character of the Soviet
Union, its support for self-determination has been cautious and selective since
Lenin’s  era and has served political purposes of Soviet expansion as discussed
earlier. In an effort to forestall Soviet territorial expansion after WW II , the
                                                                                                                                                
157 Elizabeth Chadwick, Self-Determination, Terrorism and International Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflict. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) pp. 20-21.
158 Russel H. Fifield, “International Affairs: The Postwar World Map. New States and
Boundary Changes”. The American Political Science Review Vol. 42, Issue 3 (June 1948) pp.
533-541 at 536-541.
159 J. Sammuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, “The State and the Nation: Changing Norm and
Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations”. International Organisation Vol. 48 No. 1 (Winter
1994) pp. 107-130 at 122-125.
160 The Allies declared that they “desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord
with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned” and that they “respect the right of all
peoples to choose the form of government under which they live; and they wish to see sovereign
rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them”.  Cf. “The
Atlantic Charter”, reprinted in American Journal of International Law 35 (Supplement 1941). As for
the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations, the British representatives rejected the inclusion of the self-
determination phrase in the U.N. Charter because of the fears of her colonial possessions. Cf.
Bengt Broms, The United Nations  (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1990) pp. 41-48, 639-
710.
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Western countries suggested the trusteeship system. Nevertheless, the role
played by the socialist (Communist) theory in the formation and subsequent
development of the UN Charter system has been crucial to an increase in the
number of the issues of “international concern” connected with self-
determination: although the Charter’s self-determination has been and remained
state-centric, the Preambular words “we the Peoples of the United Nations” have
led to non-state-centric, cultural  and other interpretations of the UN Charter and
to demands for the redress of historic wrongs.
Provisions of the UN Charter ( Articles 1/2 and 55) laid down the essence of
self-determination but only at the level of a principle.  Articles 1/2  and 55 of the
UN Charter neither point to the various specific areas in which self-determination
should apply nor to the final goal of self-determination. The drafters of the UN
Charter did not have in mind the later forms of self-determination that emerged
during the Cold War period.  What they had in mind, though, was the inclusion of
self-determination’s application within the concept of the existing states. Self-
determination in the UN Charter was state-centric and this was a result of the fact
that this time self-determination, as opposed to WW I, was not a war aim.161 The
forms of self-determination that evolved later, as we shall see, were the result of
political pressure stemming from socialist countries , later joined by increasing
number of newly independent Third World countries. In all its forms, before it
reached the level of a legal right through various international instruments, self-
determination’s practical implementation was taken over by the events on the
ground. In its first years of development, self-determination was equated with
anti-colonialism. Apart from this initial form, self-determination took some other
forms of manifestations in later years: the “selves” were now considered as well
the territories under alien military occupation and territories where the majority of
coloured population were victims of institutionalised  apartheid at the hands of
Europeans. All these manifestations of self-determination were mostly a product
of the diplomatic and other efforts of Afro-Asian-Eastern Bloc countries.  The final
                                                
161 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples.A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 37-43.
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form, that of the 1975 Helsinki approach, did not consider self-determination to
be relevant only in colonial situations, foreign military occupation and racist
regimes. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act, following the spirit of the 1966 Pacts on
Human Rights, provided for a definition of self-determination that broke new
grounds in international relations. The innovative part of this approach related
primarily to internal self-determination with a distinct anti-authoritarian and anti-
democratic  thrust , thus putting the relationship between human rights and self-
determination into a qualitatively different perspective. This perspective gave its
fruits only after long period of time, that is, with the collapse of Communism and
the end of the Cold War. Before this, the single-party system was regarded as
compatible with the concept of representative democracy; in particular, pluralism
and the rule of law were not always, if ever, considered as indispensable
elements of the true democracy. In this period, internal self-determination  meant
freedom from outside interference . This was the constant practice of the UN
Human Rights Committee, a body set up by the 1966 Pact on Human Rights.
Above all, this was practice in East-West relations.162
In all manifestations, though, self-determination meaning full independence
was strongly connected to the principle of territorial integrity of the existing
sovereign states.
4.1. The Process of Decolonisation: Territorial Integrity as a Means of
Preserving Territorial Integrity
Self-determination , as a right and a principle, did not appear in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights163,  although its article 21 did set forth
some rights later identified with internal self-determination, without labelling them
as such164. The rights contained in the Declaration were more of an individual
                                                
162 See more on this in Ibid.pp. 62-65.
163 See, United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 217A, UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
164 Article 21 of the Universal Declaration says that:
“(1) Everyone has the right to tale part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
 (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
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and general character rather than referring to the specific claims to self-
determination. In this latter form it appeared in the General Assembly’s  1960
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
(hereinafter referred to as Colonial Declaration) 165 to be incorporated as a
human right in both of the 1966 UN Covenants on Human Rights.166 In political
terms, the turning point in this development was the Bandung Conference (1956)
. The emphasis of this conference was shifted from peaceful relations among
sovereign states to independence from colonial rule. The final legal instrument in
this respect was the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations (Hereinafter referred to as Friendly
Relations Declaration) 167. This document was the first to recognise a growing
                                                                                                                                                
   (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of Government; this will shall
be expressed in period and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”  See, UN Doc. A/811. For
comments, see, Bengt Broms, The United Nations, pp. 574-584.
165 See, United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 1514 (1960), Supplement
No.16 UN Doc. A / 4684 (1960).
166 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966,
Article 1, 993 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 3; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, December 16, 1966, Article 1, 999 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 171.
167 See, United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
foresaw the formation of a Special Committee of 24 to supervise its implementation. In the period
until 1970, the work of this committee was sterile as a result of Soviet Union’s use of this organ
for Communist propaganda. This attitude was also obvious in the Mexico and New York City
sessions of the Special Committee on Friendly Relations, held in 1964 and 1966 respectively. In
later cases, though, Soviet Union and its satellites, with the support of some Third World
countries, tried to limit the implementation of self-determination to colonial possessions only. This
was without success because the 1070 Friendly Relations Declaration recognised the right to
internal self-determination to other groups living within sovereign states and paved the way for
further development of internal self-determination based on the rule of law, democracy and the
respect for human and minority rights.  The above groups included black majority in Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa whose right to government was denied by the white minority. See,
more on these issues, as well as the travaux preparatoirs of the Special Committee of 24, the
Special Committee on Friendly Relations and the comments on the 1970 Friendly Relations, in
Robert Rosenstock, “The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations: A Survey”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 65  Issue 4 (October 1972) pp.
713-735 at 719-720, 724-726, 729-733; Seymour M. Finger, “A New Approach to Colonial
Problems at the United Nations”. International Organization Vol. 26 Issue 1 (Winter 1972) pp.
143-153; Elliot E. Goodman, “The Cry of  National Liberation: Recent Soviet Attitudes Toward
National Self-Determination”. International Organization Vol. 14 Issue 1 (Winter 1960) pp. 92-106
at 93, 96-97, 101-102, 106; Eduard McWheeney, “The ‘New’ Countries and the ‘New’
International Law: The United Nations’ Special Conference on Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 60 Issue 1 (January
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consensus concerning the extension of self-determination other than to colonial
areas.
 The forms of self-determination enshrined in the above documents had
previously been backed up by the practice of states and the events on the
ground . No ethnic self-determination appeared within them and the states did
nor endorse it either. Ethnic self-determination became a feature of Cold War’s
end. Only after this time onwards the states had to face the fact of dealing with
ethnic claims to self-determination. This does not mean that these claims were
recognized in practice.  They were given due attention though. This was done in
1993 when the OSCE Vienna Declaration recognized the right to self-
determination for ethnic groups under certain circumstances (see, infra page 38,
footnote no. 84). This document, too, put a strong emphasis on the territorial
integrity.168
Until the mid-1950s, the issue of self-determination was not a pressing
one. The UN focused mainly on the Cold War tensions and the role the Soviet
Union played  was a minor one compared to the later periods.169  In this period,
                                                                                                                                                
1966) pp. 1-33 at 9-11, 15, 19-22, 26, 30-33; Piet Hein Houben, “Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States”, American Journal of International
Law  Vol. 61 Issue 3 (July 1967) pp. 703-736 at 704, 709-710, 723-724, 729, 731, 734-735;
Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, pp.124-125.
168 Compare the Preamble of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the paragraphs 4 and 6, the Preamble and the “principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples”  of the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations.
Along these lines, the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by consensus on 15 June
1993 by 160 Member States of the UN, takes up the saving clause of the Declaration on Friendly
Relations concerning conditions under which the territorial integrity of states shall be protected.
However, the 1993 Vienna Declaration does not include the qualification relating to “race, creed
or colour”. It is now stated that a “representative government” is a government “representing the
whole people…without distinction of any kind”. This means that territorial integrity of states is
protected by saving clause only for those states whose governments represent the whole
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.
169 The U.S. and the Western states considered the UN in this period as one of the aims and
priority activities of their foreign policy. The famous “X” article of George Kennan, published in
Foreign Affairs in 1947 (serving as a groundwork for the future Western policy of containment
towards the Soviets), ascribed the same role and importance to the UN in the US foreign policy.
This was a normal consequence of Western policy during the Cold War tensions existing in
interstate relationships. Cf. Quincy Wright, “American Policy Toward Russia”. World Politics Vol. 2
Issue 4 (July 1950) pp. 463-481 at 466, 469-713. As soon as the colonial self-determination
emerged threatening the stability of the international system during the 1950s, the Western
countries gradually lost their interest and the faith in the UN as an instrument of their national
policy. The UN became, especially its General Assembly, the propaganda tool in the Soviet
Union’s hands.
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even a resolution was passed by the General Assembly to circumvent the veto
power of the Soviet Union (the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 3 November
1950). It looked as if two-pronged and evolutionary strategy of the West on
colonialism would work.170 The accumulation of the anti-colonial sentiment as a
result of the WW II events171 gave to the Soviets by 1955 an upper hand
expressing more radical views on self-determination of colonies as opposed to
Western evolutionary views on this issue.172
                                                
170 In this regard, the UN Charter seemingly offered a strategy in its chapters XI ,  XII and XIII.
First, in chapters XII and XIII the trusteeship system is discussed, the direct successor of the
League of Nations’ mandate system. This system covers:
a) territories now held under mandate,
b) territories which could be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second
World War, and
c) territories voluntarily placed under the system  by states responsible for their
administration (UN Charter, article 77/I).
The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly and
composed of governmental representatives, was set up to exercise the functions of the UN with
respect to trust territories. It was given the power to consider reports submitted by administering
power, to accept petitions without prior submission to the administrative power, to accept petitions
without prior submission to the administering authority, and to make periodic visits to trust
territories. Ibid. Article 87.
As a counterpart to the trusteeship system, the Charter in Chapter XI (the Declaration
Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories), embodied a commitment by the Members controlling
territories not placed under the trusteeship system to “accept as a sacred trust the obligation to
promote to the utmost…the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories”. Ibid. Article 73.
171 Of this nature were the shattering of the colonial empires in the Far East after 1941,
the mobilisation of the economies and recruitment of the manpower of the dependent territories
as the war developed, the ideological influence of the Atlantic Charter, and the decline of Europe.
All these events combined to release the forces for change in what by the 1950s was being called
the Third World. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Fontana Press,
1988) p. 506; Brian Lappig, End of Empire (London: Paladin Books, 1989) pp. 25-42.
172 Bernard Morris, “Soviet Policy Toward National Communism: The Limits of Diversity”.
The American Political Science Review. Vol. 53 Issue 1 (March, 1959) pp. 128-137 at 128,
Rupert Emerson and Inis L. Claude, Jr., “The Soviet Union and the United Nations. An Essay in
Interpretation”. International Organization. Vol. 6 Issue 1 (February 1952) pp.1-26 at 21-23;
Rupert Emerson, “Colonialism, Political Development and the United Nations”. International
Organization Vol. 19 Issue 3 (Summer, 1965) pp. 484-503 at 490-493.
Following Second World War, leading Soviet lawyers (Korovin, S.B. Krylov, Tunkin, etc.)
laid the doctrinal groundwork for the Soviet politics on anti-colonial self-determination. The
essence of the Soviet doctrine was a gradual shift from state sovereignty as provided for in the
UN Charter to the sovereignty of the dependent peoples and territories. Thus, sovereignty
became a slogan of anti-colonial self-determination and lost its legal meaning as an attribute of
statehood: the colonial peoples and their territories were accepted as subjects of international law
and relations. Cf. W.W. Kulski, “The Soviet Interpretation of International Law”. American Journal
of International Law  Vol. 49 Issue 4 (October, 1955) pp. 518-534 at 521, 525-526.
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The 1955 Bandung Conference was the first major political event in the
process of decolonization.173 This conference pressed more than any other organ
before it for a speedy realization of decolonization process, for the UN to focus
more on issues other than the usual Cold War’s “peace and security matters”,
and for “measures to change a world which was still economically dominated by
white men”. The movement started in 1955 and culminated in 1960 with the
admission to the UN of seventeen ex-colonized states, sixteen of them African,
and Cyprus. Five years later, the UN membership rose to 114 to which Africa no
longer contributed four or five states but 35, while the Asian members had risen
to fifteen and Middle Eastern to eleven.174
The year 1960 marks the turning point in the development of the
international system as we know it today.175  With the adoption by the General
Assembly of  the Colonial Declaration ( 14 December 1960), a  new era in inter-
state relations ushered in. The concept of juridical statehood, as opposed to the
empirical one which had prevailed since the 1930s,176 based on full territorial
                                                
173 By this time, Asia had achieved its independence and Africa was at its most militant
phase in the quest of its own. The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference expressed this
quest of Africa:
“The Asia-African Conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of
human rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations.
The Conference declared its full support for the principles of self-determination of peoples
and nations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations
resolutions on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a pre-requisite of
the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights”. Full text reprinted in Robert A. Goldwin,
Ralph Lerner and Gerald Sourzh (eds.), Readings in World Politics. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1959) p. 539.
174 Rupert Emerson, “Colonialism, Political Development, and the UN”. International
Organization  Vol. 19 Issue 3 (Summer 1965) pp. 484-503 at 485.
175 Alexis Heraclides, “Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement”. International
Organization Vol. 44 Issue 3 (Summer 1990) pp.341-378 at 344; Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-
States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third
World”. International Organization  Vol. 41 Issue 4 (Autumn, 1987) pp. 519-549 at 524.
176 The usual point of departure for empirical statehood is Article 1 of the Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), which declares as follows: “The State as a
person of international law should posses the following qualifications: a) a permanent population;
b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states”.  As
quoted in Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 74. The principle of effectiveness
meant that international statehood was empirical, not juridical. That is to say, a state had to prove
unambiguously that it fulfilled all of the above criteria for international statehood before it gained
international recognition of its statehood. This practice prevailed well until 1945. See, Gaetano
Arangio Ruiz, L’ Etat dans le sens du Droit des Gents et la Notion du Driot International (Bologna:
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integrity of former colonial borders affected the interstate relations in time of
peace but also in times of war by recognizing an international standing for non-
state actors. Sovereignty now belonged to self-determination units (former
colonies), not the state per se. This was an invention of the Soviet doctrine.177
Democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights were not a
precondition for the international realisation of (juridical) statehood. 178  The
jurisdiction of these new states stretched, as noted (see, infra pp. 14-16), along
former colonial administrative borders and over highly heterogenous
populations.179 This “new territorial nationalism” in Africa and elsewhere took  the
existing colonies as setting the frame of political reference.180  The ethnic
                                                                                                                                                
Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria, 1975) pp. 265-281. This, in essence Westphalian concept
does not mean that after 1945 there were changes in the realm of international statehood as
described here. All it means is that by this time the principle of effective government was not that
important regarding colonies. This further meant that outside the colonial context the principle of
effective government would apply in full. The basic tenets of this Westphalian or realist concept
remained unaltered, meaning that states retain their responsibility to mutually recognize each
others autonomy and juridical equality. Cf. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature
and Sources of Liberal International Order”. Review of International Studies. Vol. 25 No. 2 (April
1999) pp. 179-196 at 187.
177 For the development of this idea in practice, see also, Heather Wilson, The Use of
Force by National Liberation Movements, Chapters II and III ; Elizabeth Chadwick, Self-
Determination, Terrorism, Chapters I to III.
178 In some cases, Africa being the worst case, bad record on human rights and the non-
fulfillment of the above postulates were tolerated instead. This was done for the sake of
international stability. The juridical statehood meant that new African leaders had to take care
only about their external or foreign relationships. See, Robert H. Jackson, Quasi States:
Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990) pp. 139-163; Rupert Emerson, “The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World”.
World Politics Vol. 27 No. 2 (January 1975) pp. 201-226.
179 For example, on the African continent only four sovereign states, - Swaziland,
Lesotho, Botswana and Somalia, - certainly not among most powerful, contain ethnically
homogeneous population. Asia is different in this regard. The juridical statehood was not applied
because the European-based, empirical statehood, was in place even after the colonization and
the border system and the regime for their maintenance were more or less based on Western
concepts. In Asia the effect of the era of colonization was less marked because the ethnic identity
of the peoples had already been established . Korea, for example, had an ancient heritage of
independent existence under its own ruler so that Japanese domination served less as a unifying
force than a stimulant to national awareness and political action. In Indochina, much the same
was for the Vietnamese and the Cambodians, both of which peoples looked back , after
becoming colonies, to long centuries of separate, if checked, existence. Cf. Rupert Emerson,
“Nationalism and Political Development”. The Journal of Politics Vol. 22 Issue 1 (February 1960)
pp.3-28; Robert I. Solomon, “Boundary Concepts and Practice in Southeast Asia”. World Politics
Vol.  23 Issue (October 1970) pp.1-23 at 15-16.
180 Rupert Emerson, “Nationalism and Political Development”, pp. 3-28 at 14. The role of
the new states in Africa and elsewhere in former colonies has been to shape new nations
composed of various nationalities. By the time of independence of these new countries, the
nations existed only in the persons of the nationalists themselves since they  were  the only
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mixture, combined with the lack of state traditions on the part of these states,
could not but produce undemocratic regimes. The new multiethnic states, largely
supported by the international rules, norms and institutions on territorial integrity
and sovereign equality of states, tended to become less and less democratic in
their response to the growing threat of nationalistic movements within them.181
The invention of juridical statehood during the decolonization process was
based on the international rules, norms and institutions on territorial integrity and
sovereign equality of states. This development has been considered as one of
the ways of the expansion of international society, which by 1960 took an
universal character.182 Independence of these new states, therefore, was not a
result of the development of individual colonies to the point of meeting
qualifications for statehood in its empirical sense. On the contrary, their
statehood stemmed from a rather sudden and widespread change of mind and
mood about the international legitimacy of colonialism which aimed at and
resulted in its abolition as an international institution.183  This is not to say that the
process of decolonization leading to this kind of new statehood in favor of former
colonies developed within the United Nations per se. Or, at least, it was not a
result of its initiative. The United Nations role in this period was to promote self-
determination only in the sense of determining territorial independence184. At the
same time, the UN served as a place where national policies on colonialism were
reflected and, consequently, the views on the anti-colonial self-determination
                                                                                                                                                
people who had beyond the tribal horizons and had come to a broader sense of the society in
which they lived. Ibid. pp.14-17. Formally speaking, former colonies in Africa and Asia have been
under a common government with its uniform economy and system of law and administration, but
in practice they have lingered very largely within the framework of their traditional societies and
have barely, if ever, been brought into any significant degree of association with their fellow
colonisers.
181 Walker Connor, “Self-Determination: The New Phase’. World Politics Vol. 20 Issue 1
(October 1967) pp.30-53 at 51-52.
182 For a remarkable collection of essays analysing this process of expansion, see,
Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1984), especially Parts I and II.
183 Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory:
International Jurisprudence and Third World”, pp. 519-549 at 524-526.
184 Ali A. Mazrui, “The United Nations and Some African Attitudes”. International
Organization, Vol. 18 Issue 3 (Summer 1964) pp. 469-520 at 519-520.
79
crystallised.185 Among these views, those pertaining to the juridical statehood
(negative, not positive/or empirical, sovereignty) based on the territorial integrity
of former colonies took the most prominent place.186
Besides the first and the second, a third type of self-determination that
emerged in this period was that of peoples living under military occupation.
Compared with the Colonial Declaration, this self-determination was not based
on territory but on the position of the peoples living under military occupation, a
situation similar to that foreseen by the Friendly Relations Declaration. However,
                                                
185 Viewed in the large, the long struggle for self-determination in Africa, both north and
south of the Sahara, came to eventual fruition outside rather than within the United Nations. In a
very real sense the UN was instrumental in advancing the independence of Somalia, Togoland,
the Cameroons, and Tanganyika by means of the stimulus, pressures and assistance brought to
bear through the trusteeship system. The UN certainly aided Libya in achieving its independence
and establishing its statehood. It would be foolhardy to say that the debates and resolutions in the
General Assembly on the Tunisian and Maroccan questions in 1950-1951 did not play some part
in hastening ultimate French agreement to their independence. And, at the time of Suez, the
actions of the special emergency session of the General Assembly in calling by an overwhelming
vote for a cease fire and the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Egyptian soil,
together with the establishment of the UN Emergency Force to take over the Suez and then to
police the Gaza strip, certainly were not an insignificant factor in preserving the independence
and the territorial integrity of Egypt. For the vast majority of the newly independent states,
nevertheless, actions taken by Britain, France, and Belgium outside the UN through the
collaboration or at least agreement with nationalist leaders of the various lands were the decisive
factor in their attainment of independence. However, not all scholars agree on this matter.  Ali
Mazrui, for example, goes so far as to blame the UN for having had a destructive and
destabilising role in the process of decolonisation. He thinks that the UN was involved in the
process of destroying the empires and that this process was “ a process of unconscious long-
term self-destruction”. Cf. Ali A. Mazrui,“The United Nations and Some African Political Attitudes”,
pp. 499-520 at 500 and 517.
186 Negative sovereignty, as opposed to positive or empirical one, meant that
independence would belong only to the former colonies and as such not be extended to
nationalities or ethnic communities or groups living within former colonies. See, more, in Robert
H. Jackson,  Quasi- States: Sovereignty, International Relations,  and the Third World, pp. 50-81,
especially at pp. 74-78.  With the attainment of independence, the African states “crossed the
divide” from the dynamics of self-determination into the area of states – that is, the maintenance
of independence and of frontiers – and the protection of territorial integrity became a meeting
place of the old quest for self-determination and the new concern for the status quo. For many
African states the problem had become transformed from the political issue of urging self-
determination to the legal and political one of insisting on territorial integrity. Such a concept had
no meaning in itself without the territorial definition supplied by the adoption of the existing
boundaries drawn in the past by the colonial powers, however artificial they might have  been in
terms of ethnic, economic or geographic factors. Cf. John H. Spencer, “Africa at the UN: Some
Observations”. International Organization, Volume 16 Issue 2 (Spring 1962) pp. 375-386 at 382;
Robert O. Mattews, “Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review”, International Organization” Vol. 24
No. 2 (Spring 1970) pp. 335-360 at 339-342; David Meyers, “Interregional Conflict Management
by the Organization of African Unity” International Organization Vol. 28 No. 3 (Summer 1974) pp.
345-373 at 364-365; Sarah Joseph, “Resolving Conflicting Claims of Territorial Sovereignty and
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as opposed to the latter, self-determination pertaining to the peoples living under
military occupation did not have an internal character (nature). This means that it
was not related to the self-government of the peoples living within sovereign and
independent states. 187
From among the forms of self-determination discussed so far that
concerning the institution of colonialism and its abolition was strongly connected
to territory. As soon as self-determination was achieved, meaning full
independence, no right to secession was recognized for ethnic, religious or
linguistic groups or communities living within newly independent states188. The
UN itself and most of the members of the international community strongly
supported the territorial integrity of former colonies, now sovereign and
independent states. U Thant, in his capacity as the UN Secretary General, stated
in February 1970 that the United Nations “has never accepted and does not
accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part
of its Member State”.189  This attitude was fully endorsed by the International
Court of Justice,190 while the scholars remained divided over it.
Those scholars who predicted that the “anti-colonial character of
nationalist movements in colonial countries was likely to lend a deceptive sense
                                                                                                                                                
External Self-Determination: Part 1” .The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 3 No. 1
(Spring 1999) pp. 40-61 at 42, 44, 47, 52.
187  This form of self-determination concerns the cases of the Arab territories occupied by
Israel, Cambodia and Germany after WW II. These cases are known in literature as a “ prolonged
military occupation”. See, Adam Roberts, “ Prolonged Military Occupation: the Israeli-Occupied
Territories Since 1967”. American Journal of International Law  Vol. 84 No. 1 (January 1990) pp.
44-103; Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1993) pp. 107-190.
188 Michael K. Addo, “Political Self-determination within the Context of the African Charter
on Human Rights”. In Robert McCorquodale (ed.), Self-Determination in International Law, pp.
257-278; Richard N. Kiwanuka, “The Meaning of ‘People’ in the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights”. In Robert McCorquodale (ed.), Self-Determination in International Law, pp. 279-
300.
189  7 United Nations Monthly Chronicle 36 (February 1970) p.1.
190  In the practice of the International Court of Justice, the principle of the inviolability of
the previous administrative borders (uti possidetis juris) was discussed in the Western Sahara
Case (1971); Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali Case (1986); and in the Territorial Dispute Case:
Libya v. Chad (1994). Among them, only two previous cases are discussed in this dissertation. In
the latter case, Libya and Chad submitted to the Court a long standing dispute over territorial
claims in their border region, including the Aouzu strip. The Court allocated virtually all of the
disputed territory to Chad, in accordance with the uti possidetis principle, not taking into account
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of national unity” and that “the fact that a people can stage a consolidated anti-
imperial movement conveys no assurance that it will be able to maintain political
coherence once the imperial enemy has vanished” proved to have been
correct.191 In the aftermath of the first, the largest ever wave of decolonisation
that occurred by the end of 1950s and the beginning of 1960s, national
coherence of new states was challenged. However, in one case only the
secessionist movement was successful (Bangladesh), while in other cases the
movements were suppressed (Katanga and Biafra). The reasons behind this
state of affairs rest upon the preservation of international (peace) and stability,
which in scholarly work has been explained through different perspectives and
concepts.
These reasons can be divided into two groups, subjective and objective
ones. Some authors believe that in Africa new leaders accepted the former
colonial borders as international frontiers, like in Latin America a century earlier,
due to personal inclinations of the new African elite towards the metropolis.192 As
for the objective or external reasons, scholars most frequently mention the
spheres of interest. That is, new African states accepted as valid those abstract
lines (borders) that were set up in 1844-45 in the Berlin Colonial Conference
without any account given to the internal factors and their dynamics already
under way within these states. Ethnic diversity and highly diversified social
structure of African societies fitted well to the concept of colonial borders. The
other way around would have only caused consecutive wars of secession and
bloodshed, as seen in the cases of Katanga and Biafra, or in protracted interstate
conflicts as in the Horn of Africa.193  In other cases, the territorial integrity of the
                                                                                                                                                
other historical, geographic, ethnic or other factors. Cf. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994
ICJ Reports (February 3), also reprinted in 33 International Legal Materials (ILM) 371 (1994).
191 Rupert Emerson, “Nationalism and Political Development”, p. 8.
192 Alejandro Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law”, pp.269-353 at 288; Steven
R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States”. American
Journal of International Law Vol. 90 Issue 4 (October 1996) pp. 590-624 at 592; Jeffrey Herbst,
“The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa”, pp. 676-678.
193 Ravi L. Kapil, “On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa”, pp. 656-
673; Particia Berko Wild, “The Organization of African Unity and the Algeria-Maroccan Border
Conflict: A Study of New Machinery for Peacekeeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of
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former colonial borders delimiting the jurisdiction of the new states turned out to
be a source of ethnic conflict leading to the largest ever commitment undertaken
by the international community (the case of Cyprus). The remaining cases,
unsettled as yet, such as Western Sahara and Kashmir, to mention just a few,
are maverick examples of the colonial heritage. In the case of Sahara, a large
body of practice worth of further theoretical elaboration has been produced. This
case exercised an impact on the frame and basic texture of self-determination, in
particular concerning the manner of manifestation of the wishes of the potential
“selves” (the expression of the free will of the population).  This is the reason
behind our decision to examine the Western Sahara case further before taking
up the cases of Bangladesh, Biafra and Katanga. 194
4.1.1. The Case of Western Sahara
Western Sahara is a small country, rich in mineral resources but scarcely
populated. In regard to the self-determination issue, the case of Western Sahara
represents a unique case, not only because it remains unsettled as of today but
also due to the fact that it conclusively confirmed newly emerged rules on
colonial self-determination as discussed here. This confirmation came first from
                                                                                                                                                
Disputes Among African States”, pp.18-36; Friedrich Kratochwil,  “Of Systems, Boundaries, and
Territoriality: An Inquiry Into the Formation of the State System”, pp. 36-41.
194 The case of Cyprus, not discussed here in details, is from a formal (legal) standpoint
very similar to that of today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton solution for Bosnia (1992) and the
solutions agreed upon at the Zurich Talks on Cyprus (February 10-11, 1959) between the
representatives of Turkey, Greece and the Turkish and Greek communities of Cyprus and
additional agreements signed at the Cyprus Conference (London, February 19, 1959) equally
protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of these two states based on the principle of uti
possidetis juris. The solutions for both cases during the crisis in these two countries were based
on the above principle. The situation on the ground, though, differs very much. While in the case
of Cyprus the areas inhabited by its constituent nations, Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively,
correspond to the pre-1962 situation, in the case of Bosnia the territories inhabited by its
constituent nations were carved up by violent means leading to the commission of crimes against
peace and humanity ( the Serb and Croat areas respectively). Full texts on the Cyprus case, see,
the Conference on Cyprus, British Parliament Papers, NO. 4/Misc. Cmnd. 679 (London, 1959).
For comments on this, see, also, Meir Ydit, Internationalised Territories (Leyden: A.. W. Sythoff,
1961) pp. 77-83; Zaim M. Necatigil. The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), especially Chapter 1, pp. 1-28 and Chapter 13, pp.
272-288; For the Bosnian case, see, The Dayton Peace Accords (http://www.State. gov/www/
current/bosnia/daytable.html). For comments on the status of Bosnia according to the Dayton
solution, see, Noel Malcolm, Bosnia. A Short History. (London:  Macmillan, 1997); P. Rubin,
Dayton, Bosnia and the Limits of Law”.  The National Interest No. 46 (Winter 1996/97) pp.41-46.
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the International Court of Justice195 and was already endorsed, with few
exceptions, by the OAU and most of the members of the international
community.196 There were two major issues in this case. First, the Court did not
allow states, or did not recognize their right, to help themselves to adjacent
territories on the basis of historic claims or titles: self-determination must be
exercised within the confines of former (colonial) borders as of the time of
independence.197 Second, in line with the first point, boundary readjustments
                                                
195 See, Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (1975) ICJ Reports 12. This opinion was
asked by the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3292, 29 GAOR , Supplement 31, UN Doc.
A/9631 (1974) at 103-104. See, also, Santiago Martinez Caro, International Law and
Organization: Cases and Materials (Ankara: Meteksan, 2000) pp. 50-51 and  69-70.
The questions put to the Court by this resolution were as follows:
“I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamara) at the time of colonisation by
Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? If the answer to the first question is in the
negative,
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Marocco and the
Mauritanian entity?”
196 Cf. The Assembly of the Organization of African Unity, AHG/Res.17 (I), Cairo Ordinary
Session, 17 - 21 July 1964. See, also, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Article 3
(3), which pledges respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its
inalienable right to independent existence. As for the universal level of support, the first  of a
stream of resolutions calling on Spain to implement the Sahara’s right to self-determination was
passed in the UN Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. (General Assembly
Resolution 1654, 16 GAOR Supplement 17 at 65, UN Doc.A/5100 (1961), October 16, 1964; 19
General Assembly, GAOR, Annexes, Annex No. 8 , Part I, at 290-291, UN Doc.A/5800/Rev.1
(1964); the General Assembly followed suit one year later. Cf. General Assembly Resolution No.
2072, 20GAOR, Supplement  14, at 59-60, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965). Despite a rare and repeated
display of public unanimity aiming among all the key states at the beginning of 1960s, the clear
and normative   prescriptions of the Charter of the OAU and the UN resolutions were nor
followed. Instead, what occurred during the second half of the 1960s was the acceleration of
efforts by all parties to arrange their preferred outcome behind a façade of support for self-
determination. At present, though, only Morocco sticks to historic title over Western Sahara while
Spain and Mauritania have given up their claims over that territory. Cf. Thomas M. Franck, “The
Stealing of Sahara”. American Journal of International Law  Vol. 70 Issue 4 (October 1976) pp.
694-721 at 703-707.
197 By refusing to be narrowly bound to the questions asked by the UN General Assembly
the Court was able to reframe the question essentially in the manner earlier proposed by Spain,
i.e., how important in the final act of decolonisation is historic title as compared to the right of self-
determination? Addressing its own question, the Court found that self-determination had become
the rule and that independence, free association with another state, or integration into another
state,  while all legitimate forms of decolonisation, must come about only as a “result of the freely
expressed wishes of the territory’s peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their
status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes,
impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage”. Cf. General Assembly 1541 (XV),
15 GAOR Supplement 16 at 29-30, UN Document A/4684 (1960), cited by the International Court
of Justice with approval in its Advisory Opinion, pp. 1-120 at 32-30. The Court cited with approval
various UN General Assembly resolutions setting out these prerequisites of popular consultation
as ones specifically applying to the Sahara itself. Ibid. at 34-35. “All these resolutions”, the Court
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must come as an expression of the democratically expressed will of those
subject to the readjustment.198 The occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco
(and Mauritania for some time at the beginning), caused a continued bloodshed
in Northern Africa which became an arena of Cold War’s superpower rivalries, at
the expense of the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. Moreover,
the Saharan precedent has had an impact on the stability of the international
system. The respect for existing boundaries and the rejection of the revisionist
territorial claims based on allegations of historic rights were not taken into
account in this case. This case showed the futility of the UN and the domination
of politics over law notwithstanding the destabilising effects of the Sahara’s
precedent.199
4.1.2. The Secession of Bangladesh
                                                                                                                                                
noted, “were adopted in the face of reminders by Marocco and Mauritania of their respective
claims that Western Sahara constituted an integral part of their territory”. Ibid. at 35. These claims
were based on historic title. With that, the Court went on to consider the issue of historic title.
After some examination of the evidence of political, military, religious, and fiscal practices in the
region before Spain’s arrival, the Court declared that “the information before the Court does not
support Marocco’s claim to have exercised territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara”. While
the information before it shows the display of some authority by the (Maroccan) Sultan” over
some, but only some, of the nomadic tribes of the region, the evidence “does not establish any tie
of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and that State”. It does not show that Marocco
displayed effective and exclusive State activity in the Western Sahara”. The “inferences to be
drawn from the information before the Court concerning internal acts of Maroccan sovereignty
and from that concerning international acts are, therefore, in accord in not providing indications of
the existence, at the relevant period, of any legal tie of territorial sovereignty between Western
Sahara and the Maroccan state”. Ibid. pp. 48-49; 56-57.
In respect to Mauritania’s claim, the Court’s answer was essentially the same. Although
there is evidence, said the Court, of the “existence of rights, including some rights relating to the
land , which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court,
and territory of Western Sahara… the Court’s conclusion is that the materials and information
presented to it do not establish and tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western
Sahara and … the Mauritainan entity. Ibid. p. 68.
198 The results of the Court were a sharp and essentially anonymous rejection both of
Morocco’s and Mauritania’s historic claims. More important, the Court emphatically rejected the
assertion that “automatic retrocession” can take precedence over the inhabitant’s rights to self-
determination. Thus, the Court concluded that the rules applicable to decolonisation require
respect for “the right of the population of Western Sahara to determine their future political status
by their own freely expressed will”.  Ibid. pp. 36 and  120.
199 About the impact of the Sahara case on East Timor, Somalia’s behaviour within the
international system, the security of Israel, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands, see, more in
Thomas Franck, “The Stealing of Sahara”, pp. 694-721 at 719-721.
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The case of Bangladesh is a unique one. This uniqueness stems from
different factors: the case of Bangladesh has been and remains the only case of
successful secession outside the colonial context, without having repercussions
for other similar situations.200  In literature on the subject of self-determination of
East Pakistan, there have been given various reasons as to the international
community’s reluctance to forcefully prevent the secession of this country and its
final independence from the West Pakistan as it did in the cases of Biafra and
Katanga a decade earlier. Human sufferings due to military crackdown by West
Pakistan’s military, physical separation of East Pakistan from the West and their
reciprocal ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences, the economic exploitation of
East Pakistan from the West of the country and, finally, the fact that there was a
majority determination by vote of independence for East Pakistan are among the
reasons listed in literature in favour of the above stance of the international
community towards this case. 201
Physical separation of the East from the West Pakistan, comprising miles
of Indian territory, rendered the Eastern claims for independent statehood far
more feasible in the eyes of international community than it did in the cases of
Katanga and Biafra. An independent East Pakistan (Bangladesh) was not seen
                                                
200 Conflict over Bangladesh began in March 1971 following the election victory by the
Awami League of the East Pakistan (or Eastern Bengali as it used to be called) in December
1970. This league had been seeking an autonomous development and, by the end of 1960s, full
scale independence from West Pakistan. To prevent this, West Pakistan sent into region huge
military force which committed unseen atrocities against civilians, around ten millions of whom
fled to neighbouring India. The latter was eventually dragged into conflict and won over military
forces of West Pakistan. This military victory led to the establishment of an independent state of
Bangladesh in December 1971. Despite widespread condemnation of the actions of the West
Pakistan’s military from Western, Eastern and Third World countries, the UN Security Council and
the General Assembly did not discuss the situation until a full-scale war between India and
Pakistan had started.   See, United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 307 (1971), adopted
on December 21, 1971; UN General Assembly Resolution No. 2793 (XXVI), adopted on
December 1971. See, also, the UN Secretary General’s Report on the situation,  UN Document
No. S/10410 and Add.1, December 3 and 4, 1971. For the genesis of this crisis, its development
and the reaction of individual states, various NGOs and the UN organs and bodies, see, more in
Ved P. Nanda, “Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad
(West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 66 Issue
2 (April 1972) pp. 321-336; Ivo Skrabalo, Samoodredjenje i Otcepljenje. Pouke iz Nastanka
Drzave Banglades. (Zagreb: Skolske Novine, 1997).
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as a destabilising unit in Asia, nor did it threaten the economic viability and
political stability of its mother (parent) country, circumstances clearly absent in
the cases of Biafra and Katanga. Seen as a factor of stability in the eyes of the
international community, rather than the opposite, the Bangladeshi government
gained speedy recognition of its international statehood as early as the beginning
of 1972.202 The physical position of former Pakistan (East and West), along with
the internal dynamics of that society following the separation from India in 1947,
rendered the principle of territorial integrity useless, that is, its further
preservation was seen as a  continuous threat to the peace and stability in that
part of Asia. In Africa, the situation was different: any major change in colonial
borders would have led to a chain of domino effects throughout the countries
bordering Biafra and Katanga respectively.
As we saw earlier in Chapter II, borders in Africa have had a different
history. The ethnic diversity of the Continent is highest in the world and this
makes costly any border redrawing. It would certainly have had wider
implications for peace and stability in this part of the world.203 Paradoxically,
though, this fact stands at the same time for, and makes of, the very crux of the
African stability. This situation explains the international community’s reluctance
and its strong opposition to Katanga’s and Biafra’s secessions. In Africa there
was, compared with other situations, a striking contradiction between the right of
“all peoples” to self-determination and the right of states to their “territorial
integrity”. It is the African context which led some notable authors, Rupert
Emerson, James Crawford and Antonio Cassese, to see too little room left for
self-determination, meaning independent statehood, apart from the pure colonial
context.204  The UN practice has supported the conclusions arrived at by these
                                                                                                                                                
201 See, more on this, in Ved P. Nanda, “Self-Determination in International Law”, pp.
321-336 at 328-324; 336; Ivo Skrabalo, Samoodredjenje i Otcepljenje, pp. 43-50.
202 Ved P. Nanda, “Self-Determination in International Law”, pp. 334-336; Ivo Skrabalo,
Samoodredjenje i Otcepljenje, pp. 65-71.
203 Jeffrey Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance of Borders in Africa”, p. 692.
204 Cf. Rupert Emerson, “Self-Determination”. American Journal of International Law  Vol.
65 Issue 3 (July 1971) pp. 459-475; James Crawford, State Practice and  International Law in
Relation to Unilateral Secession. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). (http://
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authors: the cases of Katanga (Zaire/Kongo) and Biafra (Nigeria) are the most
conspicuous examples of the prevalence of the principle of territorial integrity
over self-determination of peoples, no matter the popular wishes and the human
costs engaged. The principle of territorial integrity proved to be a stabilising factor
in the countries bordering Congo/Zaire and Nigeria respectively.
4.1.3. Two Failed Attempts at Secession: Katanga and Biafra
Katanga, a province of Congo/Zaire, is an area with an enormous
economic wealth in natural resources.205 Its natural resources seems to have
been the main cause of secession from Congo/Zaire206. In the years preceding
the declaration of independence on 11 July 1960, there had been formed scores
of political organizations representing various interest groups : settlers
(Federation des Associations de Colones du Congo et du Ruanda - Urundi -
Fedacol), tribes of Katanga (Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga
– Conakat), and “alien” tribes ,  mainly Kasain immigrants (Federation Kasaienne
                                                                                                                                                
www.Canada. Justice.gc.ca/). But, Crawford has also labelled the principle of territorial integrity
as “undemocratic” in his earlier essay Democracy in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press,1994) pp. 8-10, thus extending the principle’s application beyond original
colonial context. In a similar fashion, Antonio Cassese, in his book Self-Determination of Peoples.
A Legal Reappraisal, pp. 315-365, strongly supports the restrictive view of self-determination, not
extending its application to sovereign and independent states. While discussing the dissolution of
former communist states (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), Cassese clearly
compares them with former colonies thus excluding any right to self-determination in favour of
non-federal (or non-Union) republics existing in these countries at the time.
205 See, in details, on this in Rene Lemarchand, “The Limits of Self-Determination: The
Case of Katanga Secession”. The American Political Science Review Vol. 56 Issue 2 (June 1962)
pp. 104-416 at 405-406.
206 In literature, economic considerations are put foreword as one of the causes of
secession. Liberal view supports this argument as well. Thus, Buchanan  holds that the right to
secession must be derived from variety of ethical considerations. Two features of his theory are
particularly noteworthy. The first is that it emphasises economic discrimination as a relatively
strong ground for secession. The second is the low value that it accords to the preservation of
cultures, because cultures change over time; because liberal should value culturally plural states;
because secession for the sake of cultural self-determination would lead to indefinite divisibility;
and because culturally-based secessions are likely to lead to serious human-rights violations. Cf.
A. Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) pp. 48-51.
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– Fedeka).207 Apart from these political groupings there existed other Belgian-
run, for economic and commercial purposes, corporations, such as the Union
Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK) and the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas
Congo au Katanga (Beceka). Ultimate control over the UMHK and Beceka,
however, was exercised by the Societe Generale de Belgique, unquestionably
the most powerful of the five corporate groups which dominated the Congo
economy during its colonial days.208
Among the several factors which predisposed the Katanga leaders to
claim full independence, at least three deserve emphasis. One is  the sense of
economic grievance which forged the attitude of the Conakat towards the
inhabitants of the other provinces of Congo/Zaire. A second factor was the part
played by the Fedacol in making the idea of secession both economically
attractive and politically meaningful. A third explanatory factor lies in the outside
support accorded by Belgian metropolitan interests to the advocates of
secession. This by itself did not provoke the emergence of secessionist claims.
But it provided the external stimulus which made the prospects of a secession
increasingly attractive. And in the event, this is what made it feasible.
For the most part, individual states did not recognize the independence of
Katanga, 209 while the Belgian government itself made a declaration as far back
as in January of 1959, making it quite plain  that Belgium recognized the claims
of the Congo/Zaire to self-government.  Equally plain was the assumption that
the entire Congo/Zaire was destined to remain a distinct geographical and
political unit.210 Nevertheless, its independence was not recognized
internationally. Threats to the peace and stability in the African continent seems
                                                
207 See, more, in Rene Lemarchand, “The Limits of Self-Determination”, pp. 410-412; Ivo
Skrabalo, Samoodredjenje i Otcepljenje, pp. 43-50.
208 See, Rene Lemarchand, “The Limits of Self-Determination”, pp. 405-406.
209 United Nations (ed.), The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace - Keeping
(New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1990) pp. 239-340. In the Katanga affair, East-
West cleavage, characteristic of the Cold War, come to the surface, with the West sympathetic to
President Tshombe of the Katanga Province and the East supporting the central government of
Congo/Zaire. Cf. John H. Spencer, “Africa at the UN: Some Observations”, pp. 375-386 at 377.
However, on the issue of formal recognition, no serious steps were taken by the West or
Western-oriented countries of the UN.
210 As quoted in Rene Lemarchand, “The Limits of Self-Determination”, p. 410.
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to have led the individual states’ rejection of Katanga’s independence.211 By the
same token, its collective recognition was also denied on the same ground. This
was clearly expressed by the UN Security Resolution, adopted on November 24,
1961, “completely rejecting the claim of the Katanga as a sovereign independent
nation” and “recognizing the government of the Republic of Congo as exclusively
responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo”.212
Biafra (Nigeria) was the next test for the international community  where
the principle of territorial integrity clashed with the ethnic/regional self-
determination. It is in many respects identical with the case of Katanga. However,
this case is the most tragic event in post-colonial Africa as far as self-
determination is concerned: the resulting war, which lasted two and a half years,
produced over a million casualties from military action, disease, and starvation213.
In the case of Biafra, it was proved continuously that the opening article of the
Covenants on Human Rights to the effect that “All peoples and all nations shall
have the right to self-determination” carries much less weight in postcolonial
Africa than the seemingly contrary principle of the 1960 Colonial Declaration,
which stipulates that “ Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.214
The independence of Biafra was declared on May 30, 1967, following the
tragic events of July 29, 1966.  On this latter date, a coup occurred in the
Nigerian capital. The Northern troops systematically killed about 240 Southern
officers and men, of whom at least three-quarters were Easterners. This action
destroyed the Nigerian army as an effective agent of Nigerian unity.215 A series of
unilateral moves in the areas of economic and political relations by both the East
                                                
211 Cf. Ibid.  p. 416 ; Rupert Emerson, “Pan-Africanism”. International Organization Vol.
16 Issue 2 (Spring 1962) pp. 275-290 at 277and 279.
212 See, UN Security Council Resolution  S/5002 (S/4985/Rev.1, as amended ).
213 Charles R. Nixon, “Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra Case”. World Politics Vol.
24 Issue 4 (July 1972) pp. 473-497 at 473.
214 Rupert Emerson, “Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonisation”.
Occasional Paper No. 9 (Harvard: Centre for International Affairs of the Harvard University,
December 1964) pp. 1-29 at 27-29.
215 Charles R. Nixon, “Self-Determination: The Nigeria-Biafra Case”, pp. 473-497 at 475.
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and the centre of Nigeria undertaken between July 1966-May 1967, simply
served to escalate the conflict which lasted until the collapse of Biafra in January
1970.216
There are several factors that scholars have put foreword in their attempts
to explain the causes of Biafra’s attempt at secession. The leaders of Biafra (the
Easterners) believed that the security of their lives and property could not be
maintained if they were subject to the control of the Nigerian government as then
constituted. Second, they believed that a negotiated solution had been effectively
frustrated by the central government. Third, the Easterners also believed that the
secession would be recognized as a legitimate step throughout Nigeria, if not
actually supported and/or imitated by the rest of the Nigeria. Fourth, they
believed that the move to independence had popular support in the Eastern
region.217
The recognition of Nigeria’s  independence on October 1, 1960, along with
the discovery of huge amount of oil reserves, changed the internal dynamics of
the Nigerian civil war. Other regions of the country turned united against the
Biafra Region.218 Only the internal support never seriously weakened. On the
other hand, the individual states (apart from five African countries) were highly
reluctant to recognize the independence of Biafra219. Even France and Portugal,
                                                
216 However, Biafra was recognized as a sovereign and independent state by Tanzania
(17 April 1968), Gabon (( May 1968), Zambia (20 May 1968) and, lately, Haiti. See, Chris N.
Okeke, Controversial Subjects of Contemporary International Law (The Netherlands: Rotterdam
University Press, 1974) pp. 158; See, also,  David Meyers, “Interregional Conflict Management by
the Organization of African Unity”. International Organization, pp. 345-373 at 364-365.
217 Charles R. Nixon, “Self-Determination”, pp. 476-482.
218 As the prospects of Eastern independence and secession became more likely, the
detrimental consequences of this for other areas become clearer. These concerns, plus the
already strong commitment of many leaders to the principles of Nigerian unity – which they
viewed as being as vital to Nigeria’s future development as the preservation of the American
Union in 1861 was to America’s future – served to build support within Nigeria for the conviction
that Biafran independence was indeed incompatible with the development of Nigeria. Thus,
neither a simple moral concept which an abused people (the Biafrans)  can invoke unilaterally to
impose  its own solution on others, nor the strong support within the region claiming
independence (Biafra itself), did suffice for the attainment of an internationally recognized
statehood. It was the already established norm on territorial integrity of former colonial borders
that proved stronger than the above facts.
219 It has been suggested that there was no real consensus in Africa as to the opposition
to the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria. In this regard, only TANZANIA, Gabon, Ivory
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who favoured very much the Biafran claims, did not recognize its independence
due to the same reasons as those put foreword in the case of Katanga. At the
regional level, the OAU, despite its divisions over the issue, firmly stood against
the independence of Biafra. The UN followed the suit even more united than the
OAU.220 Fear that the success of Biafra  would stimulate similar claims elsewhere
was one important constraint on further recognition of Biafra: there prevailed
assumption that the principle of self-determination applied equally to all colonial
territories but that once independence was attained, the principle of self-
determination was fulfilled. After this, the concept had no further applicability to
subsequent political changes in former colonial areas.
4.2. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Its
Background and Beyond
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe represents a
follow-up to the process of détente that emerged in the 1970s in the East-West
relations. The OSCE process based on the Helsinki Final Act was of a dual
nature, especially concerning its principles. On the one hand, it was an
instrument of détente policy aimed at reducing tensions, building confidence, and
strengthening cooperation. On the other, it could be used to challenge the status
quo in the East of Europe and to promote a far-reaching system change, which in
fact it did by the time the Cold War ended.221
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(later renamed OSCE, hereinafter referred to as OSCE) was signed  in Helsinki
on August 1, 1975, by Chiefs of State and other high representatives of 33
                                                                                                                                                
Coast, Zambia and Haiti formally recognized Biafra’s independence. See, Alexis Heraclides, The
Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, pp. 95, 103.
220 See, in a more detailed manner, in Chris N. Okeke, Controversial Subjects of
Contemporary International Law, pp. 158-177.
221 See, more, in Stephan Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989. (Westview Press: Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1991) pp.
1-55; Ljubivoje Acimovic, Problemi Bezbednosti i Saradnje u Evropi ( Beograd: IMPP i Prosveta,
1978) pp. 31-68.
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European countries,222 the United States and Canada. The Final Act is divided
into what has become known as three “baskets”. Basket I deals with questions
relating to security in Europe and comprises Declaration on Principles Guiding
Relations Between Participating States, some related texts concerning
implementation of the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force, and
a proposal for a new system for the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as
some modest confidence-building measures entailing notification of military
manoeuvres and voluntary exchange of observers at such manoeuvres. Basket II
deals in general terms with co-operation in the fields economics, science and
technology, and the environment. Finally, Basket III deals with co-operation in
humanitarian and other fields.
OSCE was initially a Soviet project dating at least a decade before its
signature in August of 1975. The former Soviet Union aimed at securing the
Western recognition of its post-war position in Eastern Europe, through a
statement concerning inviolability of frontiers. At the same time, it wished to
introduce the German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the community of nations
through such a conference.223 Work of the Conference began in Helsinki in
September 1972 and was proceeded by a rapprochement in East-West
relations.224 Following a nine month of frequently difficult negotiations, that
started in Helsinki in September 1972 , a twenty-seven page mandate was
produced under the title “Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations”.
                                                
222 European participants were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, the Holy
See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. For a
complete sixty printed pages of the text of the Helsinki Final, see, 14 International Legal Materials
(ILM) 1293 (1975).
223 Harold S. Russel, “The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingang or Lilliput ? “ American
Journal of International Law  Vol.  70 Issue 2 (April 1976) pp. 242-272 at 244-246.
224 The signing of the Non-Aggression Treaty between the USSR and the Federal
Republic of Germany, 9 International Legal Materials 1026 (1970), and the Treaty Concerning
Basis for Normalizing Relations Between Poland and the Federal of Germany, 10  International
Legal Materials 127 (1971), represented initial steps towards the Conference. However, the
signature of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin on September 3, 1971, 10 International Legal
Materials 895 (1971), although providing benefits to all parties, was considered by the three
Western powers (Britain, France and the U.S.) to be a sufficient Soviet st in eang of
relations to justify Western attendance at a CSCE.
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Foreign Ministers met in Helsinki in July 1973 for a week of speeches to “adopt”
the Helsinki Recommendations at stage 1 of the CSCE.  Stage 2 met in Geneva
from September 1973 until July 1975, producing the Final Act which was signed
at stage 3 in Helsinki.225
Although legally unbinding,226the Final Act, especially the Declaration on
Principles, did have an impact on the overall political climate in Europe in the
years after its adoption. Thus, for example, the third principle on the inviolability
of frontiers, in particular the part containing a clause confirming that the
“participating States consider that their frontiers can be changed only in
accordance with international law by peaceful means and by agreement”,
showed as much its validity after Cold War’s end as it did during its full reign. The
same holds true for two other principles from the Declaration on Principles which
are of interest to our study, that is, respectively the principles on Territorial
Integrity of States”227 and the “Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, including the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion, and
Belief”.228  The “Principle of Equal Rights and Self - Determination of  Peoples”
(Principle VIII) is a somewhat odd reproduction of the spirit of the 1970 UN
                                                
225 See, more, on the dynamics of these stages and the difficulties in East-West
negotiations throughout, in Arie Bloed, The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe:
Analysis and Basic Achievements, 1972-1993. (The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993)
pp. 4-11; 45-50.
226 Upon the insistence of the Western countries, the Final Act was not registered with the
Secretariat of the UN and published by it as foreseen by the Article 102 of the UN Charter. From
the very earliest discussions in Geneva it became clear that virtually all delegations desired
documents that were morally compelling but not legally binding. See, Harold S. Russell, “The
Helsinki Declaration”, pp. 242-272 at 248; Alfred Bloed, From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic
Documents of the Helisnki Process. (Marinus Nijhoff Publishers: Doderecht/London: 1990) pp.
11-12: Arie Bloed, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, pp. 22-25.
227 This principle, Principle IV, speaks of refraining from “any action inconsistent with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity,
political independence or the unity of any participating State…”. The final paragraph of this
principle states that “no occupation or acquisition of territory resulting from military occupation or
other direct or indirect measure of force in contravention of international law will not be
recognized as legal”
228 This principle, along with the Principle X (“Fulfilment in Good Faith of Obligations
Under International Law”), is the longest of the principles.
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Friendly Declaration, 229 the only difference being that in the former case the
reference is made to “all peoples”.230
By referring to “peaceful change” and “international law” in the third
principle, a wording insisted upon by the Western States, the Final Act made
possible for the Soviet Union to obtain a language it sought. That is, a language
legitimising the forceful occupation of the Baltic States and the creation of the
German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union insisted upon, and sought,
similar concessions as those obtained  in the treaties concluded by the FR of
Germany with the USSR  and Poland concerning normalization of borders231 This
                                                
229 The “ Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples” of  the UN
Declaration on  Friendly Relations has almost a similar wording noting,  inter alia, that
“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed and colour.
Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and territorial integrity of any other States or country”.
230 Principle VIII: Equal Rights and Self - Determination of Peoples. “The participating
States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination , acting at all
times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with
the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination, all peoples always have
the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political
status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social
and cultural development.
The participating States, reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective
exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations
among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any
form of violation of this principle.”
231 The Warsaw Treaty dealt with the inviolability of  frontiers based entirely on the
classical international law theory and practice. Thus, in its preambular part , the Warsaw Treaty
confirms the classical formulae of international law on the awareness of the contracting parties as
to “the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity  and sovereignty” in this case
not only of the FRG and Poland but “of all States of Europe within their present frontiers”, which is
considered, as elsewhere, as “the basic condition of peace”. To achieve this objective of peace,
two States had agreed, in Article 1, paras. 2 and 3, on the inviolability of their existing frontiers for
the rimes to come and had renounced any territorial claims against one another, also for all times
to come.
The Moscow Treaty contained similar language. Thus, after referring to Article 2 of the
UN Charter (Article 2 of the Moscow Treaty), two countries made a commitment to the effect of
recognizing that “the peace in Europe can be maintained only if no one encroaches on the
present-day frontiers”. Going further then the previous treaty, Article 3 of the Moscow Treaty
stipulated that two States “ undertake scrupulously to respect the territorial integrity of all States in
Europe in their present frontiers. They declare that they have no territorial claims whatever
against anyone and will not advance such claims in the future. They regard as inviolable new and
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was a wise approach on the side of the Western countries that gave its results
later. By the end of the Cold War, the fruits of this western approach regarding
the frontiers will be seen in the cases of  Baltic States’ claim to self-
determination. They based their claim mainly on the right to restore their lost
sovereignty on the eve of WW II. 232  By the same token, the issue of succession
of the former GDR was not even posed because the German issue was
considered as a reunification of a divided nation rather than as a case of the
state dissolution 233. The Western insight and vision seems more clear when the
above issues are considered from the vantage point of the territorial integrity of
sovereign States.
The fact that the Soviet Union had even accepted a separate principle on
human rights (Principle VII), laying down the basic principles for the maintenance
of security and co-operation  in Europe of the Cold War was one of the miracles
of the OSCE. The text is not only the longest of the principles, a fact which
troubled the Soviet negotiators , but also contains some of the most innovative
concepts contained in the Declaration which gradually set up the stage for a free
Europe and the collapse of Communism. Of the same visionary character was
the principle regarding self-determination, introduced with the insistence of the
Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries. The FRG saw this
principle as a sine qua non for its argument favouring the fact that the
Declaration on Principles left open the possibility of reunification of the German
nation, not two German states. The Soviet Union and other Eastern countries
                                                                                                                                                
in the future the frontiers of all States in Europe as they are on the day of the signing of this
treaty, including the Oder - Neisse line, which forms the western frontier of the Polish People’s
Republic, and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic”.
232 Antonio Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples and the Recent Break-up of USSR
and Yugoslavia”. In Roland St. John Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honor of Wang Tieya.  (The
Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994) pp. 131-144 at 133-137; Michael Bothe et Christian
Schmidt, “Sur Quelques Questions du Succession Poses par la Dissolution de l’URSS et celle de
la Yougoslavie”. Revue Generale de Droit International Public. Tome XCVI (1992, Paris) pp. 812-
841.
233 Jean-Paul Jacque, “German Unification and the European Community”. European
Journal of International Law Vol. 2 No. 1 (1991), pp. 1-18; Kay Hailbronner, “Legal Aspects of the
Unification of the Two German States”. European Journal of International Law  Vol.  2 No. 1
(1991) pp. 18-42; Dieter Popenfub, “The Fate of the International Treaties of the GDR within the
96
considered that this principle should not be inserted in the Final Act on the
ground that self-determination had traditionally  been associated with the right of
colonial peoples to establish their independence. Inserting this concept only in
the form of a principle said a great deal about the inability of some States in
Europe to determine their own internal and external political, economic, social
and cultural system during the Cold War times234.
CHAPTER IV:
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: FROM ITS
CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION (1918-1992)
1. The Origins of the "Yugoslav Idea" and the Serbian Nationailsm
The idea of the South Slav unification has historically had two antecendents,
one Croat and one Serb. Both emerged at the beginning of the 19th century
under the heavy influence of the Napoleonic Wars and the ideas of the French
Revolution that spread out in the former Yugoslav territory through Napoleon's
war campaign. Apart from French, German literary thought has had an impact on
the rise of national consciousnes among the South Slavs, especially in Serbia.235
                                                                                                                                                
Framework of German Unification”. American Journal of International Law  Vol. 92 No. 3 (July
1998) pp. 469-488.
234 Western countries had three reasons to push for as much ambitious as possible a
formulation concerning the principle of self-determination. First, there was the German interest for
reunification. Second, there was an interest to keep open the issue of the Baltic States. Finally,
there was an intention to support the Eastern countries in their quest for emancipation from the
Soviet Union. See, more, in Ljubivoje Acimovic, Problemi Bezbednosti i Saradnje u Evropi, pp.
195-196.
235 Herman Vendel, Borba Jugoslovena za Slobodnu i Jedinstvo (Narodna Prosveta:
Beograd 1925) pp. 177-206
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The Croat version of the South Slav unification emerged in the form of the
"Yugoslav Idea" by Ludevit Gaj, the founder of the nebulous Illyrian Movement in
the 1820s.236 His ideas arose as a reaction to the German assimilation trends
over Croats living within the then Austrian Empire and included not only Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes but Bulgarians as well. The project was based, apart from
the common Illyrian project, on the acceptance of the so-called stokavski dialect,
a view propounded later by Serbian Enlightement father Vuk Karadjic. But, for
Karadjic the acceptance of this dialect meant that all those who spoke it were the
Serbs, a generalization that , of course, embarced a majority of Croats. This
conviction led logically to the next conclusion that those lands where stokavian
was spoken, namely Croatian, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Bosnia, Herzegovina,
and Vojvodina – belonged to Serbia. This further meant that Gaj's ideas on South
Slav unification ran counter to Karadjic's for whom the Greater Serbian project
had stronger appeal. What Karadjic tried through the language was later to
become an official state policy of Serbia in the first famous national program
known as Nacertanije (the Outline). It was drafted by Ilija Garasanin in 1844 -  he
served  several times as foreign minister until 1867 - as a secret document.
Garasanin made clear that his goal was the unification of all Serbs, not all South
Slavs. His views of the future Serbian state centered on the lands that had been
included in Dusan's medieval empire (Serbian Tzar), but he also favored the
acquisition of territory in which there were large Catholic, Muslim, Albanian and
Bulgarian populations – for instance Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Vojvodina,
Macedonia, Kosova and Albania.237 In slightly changed forms, this project of
                                                
236 Ibid. pp. 177-206; Gregory Peroche, Histoire de la Croatie e des Nations Slave du Sud
(Paris: F.X. de Guibert, 1992) pp. 150-151; Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms –
Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before 1914 (Colombia: Ohio State University, 1990) pp. 8-9;
Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds. Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition.
(London: Westview Press, 1995) pp. 4-13.
237 Gregory Peroche, Histoire de la Croatie e des Nations Slave du Sud,  174-175; Philip
P. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War. Propaganda and the Deceit of History. (Texas: Texas A and M
University Press, 1996) pp. 3-4; Djurdje Jelenic, Nova Srbija i Nova Jugoslavija (Drzavna
Stamparija SHS: Beograd 1923) pp. 115-120; Dragoljub Zivojinovic, “Srbija and Yugoslavija:
Past, Present, and Future”. In Alex N. Draginich (ed.), Serbia’s Historical Heritage (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994) pp. 53-63.
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Greater Serbia reappeared continouosly during Yugoslavia's existence until its
final dissolution.238
The Yugoslav state was from the outset swept by the contradiction of two
opposing ideas, one ''Yugoslav'',  later transformed into the (conf) federal idea,
and the other unitarist or Greater Serbian seeking the mere aggrandizment of the
existing Serbian state along the lines of the medieval kingdom of Tzar Dusan.239
The Yugoslav (con) federal idea, pursued by Croats, meant in practice inclusive
and territorial self-determination, while that of Greater Serbia had exclusively
been based on ethnicity no matter whether the Serbs were in the majority in the
lands they claimed for themselves. When the idea of federation was espoused
among the Serb politicians, as was the case with Nikola Pasic (Serb Prime
Minister between 1914-1918), it meant ethnically-based federalism designed to
prevent any possibility of Serbs becoming the minority (no matter where they
lived).240 The same pattern repeated itself on the eve of Yugoslavia's break up
(1991-1992) when the slogan ''All Serbs in One State'' dominated the Serbian
political discourse. Both of the above forms of the manifestation of self-
determination among the South Slavs were conditioned by the type of
nationalism cultivated among them, that is, aristocratic (in the case of Croats)
and populist or egalitarian (in the case of Serbs).241 These two types of self-
                                                
238  These Serbian national programs were drafted in 1937 (by Vasa Cubrilovic), and
1944-1945 (by Vasa Cubrilovic and Ivo Andric respectively). See, more on this, in Rexhep Cosja,
“The Albanian National Question in Serbia’s Political Programs during 1937-1944”. The Albanian
Journal of International Studies Vol. I Issue 1 (Fall 1997). (http://www. Albanian.com.) and Philip
P. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War. Propaganda and the Deceit of History, pp. 4-6, 19; Last among
them was drafted by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986 and is known as the
Memorandum SANU. This and other related programs shall be discussed later again. (see, infra
pp. 137-138 and 180-181).
239 Paul Garde, “La Logique du Conflict”. In Marie Françoise Allain et al (eds.), L’Ex
Yugoslavie en Europe. De la Faillite des Democraties au Processus de Paix. (Paris: Edition
l’Harmattan, 1997) pp. 19-29; Branka Prpa Jovanovic, “The Making of Yugoslavia (1830-1945)”.
In Jasmina Udovicki and James Ridgeway (eds.), Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Nightmare (New York:
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“Between Two Empires: Serbian Survival in the Years After Kosovo”. In Alex N. Draginich (ed.),
Serbia’s Historical Heritage, pp. 17-53.
240 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1984) pp. 165-166.
241 Petar Sugar, “Nationalism in Eastern Europe”. In John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith
(eds.), Nationalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 176-177.
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determination and the respective nationalisms that emerged thereafter were the
result of the different historical development of these two Slavic nations.
However, while the idea of Greater Serbia had a constant appeal among the
Serbs, the ''Yugoslav'' idea underwent a radical transformation by the end of the
19th century and the beginning of the 20th.242 It is worth stressing, nevetheless,
that the Croat ''Yugoslav idea'', in it in its original version of Illyrianism or as a
(con) federation, never turned into a Greater Croatia, although Croat politicians
and a majority of their scholars never recognized the existence of the Bosniac
nation as such and, consequently, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The concept
of Greater Croatia emerged in practice only in 1991 when the then Croat
President Franjo Tudjman agreed with Milosevic on the partition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (the so-called Kradjordjevo Agreement between Tudjman and
Milosevic, to be discussed later, infra pp. 172, footnote no. 384).243 Among the
Slovenes, one of the cofounders of Yugoslavia in 1918, the ''Yugoslav idea'' had
an extremely weak appeal and never included Serbia, which was seen by the
                                                
242 This time the “Yugoslav” idea revived in the form of  (con) federation of South Slavs,
again among the Croats, not the Serbs. Thus, Josip Strosmayer, an excellent Croat intellectual,
having formed the “Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences” in Zagreb in 1860, further
elaborated his “Yugoslav” ideas in 1874.  In his plan about the “Union of South Slavs”, the
Bulgarians were taken into account as well. The plan was to be based on the principle of (con)
federation. In 1878 it was apparent that Serb politicians were harbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina
within the Serbian Kingdom so that Strosmayer had to abandon his initial ideas. The same
problem over Bosnia arose again in 1908 (after the country was annexed by the Austro-Hungary)
and on the eve of Yugoslavia’s dissolution in 1991. This counts for the lack of force and appeal of
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during WW I (among the ranks of the Yugoslav Committee, or Yugoslovenski Odbor, residing in
London. This committee was composed of politicians of Croat and Slovene background that were
the Austro-Hungarian subjects). But this time the “Yugoslav idea” was half-imposed due to the
conditions surrounding the end of WW I.
243 On the late 19th and the whole 20th century developments of the “Yugoslav idea”, see,
more in Ivo Banac, The National Question, pp. 141-225; Charles Jelavich, South Slav
Nationalisms. Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before 1914 (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1990) pp. 6-31; Branka Prpa Jovanovic, “The Making of Yugoslavia (1830-1945)”, pp.37-
56; Gregory Peroche, Histoire de la Croatie et des Nations Slaves du Sud, pp. 151-165, Alex N.
Draginich, Serbs and Croats. The Struggle in Yugslavia (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Publishers, 1992) pp. 1-19; Djurdje Jelenic, Nova Srbija i Jugoslavija, Chaps. V, VIII and IX. This
author, who represents Serb views, sees the Croatian ideas from the perspective of “Yugoslav
unitarism”, that is, from the perspective of Greater Serbia, something similar to that expressed by
a German author. The German scholar put the Croat ideas on South Slav unification on an equal
footing with those regarding Greater Serbian project as elaborated by Serbs themselves. Cf.
Herman Vendel, Borba Jugoslovena za Slobodu iI Jedinstvo (Beograd: Narodna Prosveta, 1925)
Chaps. VIII, IX and X.
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Slovenes as a backward country. Their main concern was to preserve their
language through the control of their schools and the unification of their people in
a single administrative unit. Unlike Croats and Serbs, who could look back to
their mediveal kingdoms, the Slovenes had except for a brief period in the eighth
century, been continuously under foreign rule.
Serbian nationalism has been and remained throughout its existence a type
of nationalism labeled by scholars as ''popular'' or ''egalitarian''. This nationalism
was weakned and transformed into an aristocratic one only when Belgrade tried
to dominate Zagreb and Ljublana respectively following WW I. These nations, in
turn, cultivated aristocratic and bourgeois nationalism. These different views in
Belgrade, Zagreb (and Ljublana following the unification in 1918) produced two
different, opposiote visions and practices regarding the ''Yugoslav idea'' and the
state-running itself. These visions and practices dominated the political
discourse, including the nature and the brutality of the wars seen in the former
Yugoslav territories during 1941-1945 and 1991-1999. In the first vision and
practice, the (con) federal concept was held in the west of Yugoslavia, while the
second was held in the south and the centre (with Serbia and, until recently,  its
tiny ally Montenegro as champions). When the Communists took power in
Belgrade in 1945, other nations and nationalities, composing the new state of
Yugoslavia would embrace one of the above visions and practices depending on
the circumstances.
Why has the nature of Serbian nationalism been  popular (egalitarian), as
opposed to the Croat and Slovene nationalism? The answer to this question is
found in the history of the rise and development of the Serbian nationalism.
The Ottoman conquest, unlike that in the west of the former Yugoslavia, had
an equalizing effect, that is, it entirely destroyed the class of landowners (the
nobility). The class of landwoners existed only in Bosnia-Herzegovina and partly
in Macedonia where they converted into Islam. But their impact on the formation
of Serbian nationalism was too little as compared to, for example, the case of
Bulgaria. This was because the position of Slav landowners showed little
difference from that of Ottoman landowners. Also, at this time, a trader class did
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not exist in Serbia. The modest development of a trader class during the 19th
century had a negligible impact on the birth of Serbian nationalism. At the same
time, the hatred and the contempt of the Serbian peasantry were directed against
these landowners. This peasantry managed, on the other hand, to preserve its
traditional institutions and language due to the »millet« system of the Ottoman
Empire, an administrative system that offered a basis for future Serbian
nationalism of popular (egalitarian) nature. The leaders and promoters of this sort
of nationalism within Serbian society were the village priests  (middle clergy) and
some traders who lived outside Serbia. The discontent as well as the goals of the
clergy were the same as those of the peasantry, from which the clergy itself
originated. Serbian intellectuals, both inside and outside Serbia, offered a
theoretical and sophisticated framework for this sort of nationalism, which
formulated and chanelled the domestic factors in a form of popular (egalitarian)
nationalism. Although in form it appeared westernized, under these socio-
economic circumstances, it was the only type of nationalism that could have
emerged in Serbian society. Neither bourgeosis (Czechs) or aristocratic (Poland,
Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary), nor bureaucratic  (Turkey and Greece) forms of
nationalism could have developed there.244 This social fabric, supported by state
and religious institutions when Serbia received full autonomy from the Ottomans
in 1830, proved to be a viable ground for the lasting endurance of the Greater
Serbian project and its almost full implementation in cases where other factors,
international environments in particular, allowed for it. Such was the case during
WW I and immediately after it, an issue to which we now turn.
2. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom: The Embodiment of the Principle
of Self-Determination or the Hegemony of One Nation?
                                                
244 Cf.Petar Sugar, “Nationalism in Eastern Europe”. In John Hutchinson and Anthony
Smith (eds.), Nationalism, pp. 176-177; Ivo Banac, “Nationalism in Serbia”. In Gunay Goksy and
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85.
102
The creation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (after 1929 renamed into
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) represents a unique event in the history of the South
Slavs (Bulgarians apart). It came into being as a result of various circumstances,
both internal and international, created during the last months of the First World
War (October-November). Very few cases present itself as clear as that of
Yugoslavia, showing the almost decisive role the international system plays in
the final shaping of a certain type of self-determination. The specificity of the
1918 Yugoslav self-determination is that its final implementation was quite
opposite from the wishes and self-determination quests put forward by two other
parties, the Croats and Slovenes respectively. Different national programs, aims
and considerations of expedience worked together in the ever changing
international situation which, opened new avenues for the solution of the South
Slav national question, comprising only Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In this
process, divergent approaches came to be represented by three separate
groups: the exiled Serbian government, then residing in Corfu (Greece), the
organization of the Monarchy's South Slavic émigrés living in the Entente
countries (Jugoslovenski Odbor) residing in London, and political leaders of the
South Slavs who remained in Austro-Hungary, assembled at the National Council
(Narodno Vjece). Together with the workings of continental diplomacy, the
changing fortunes on the European battlefields, and the disposition of the war-
weary populace, the relative influence of the three South Slavic nuclei – not
homogenous themselves - determined not only the path to Yugoslavia's
unification but also the characteristic features of the emerging new state.245
In the process of the creation of Yugoslavia, a favourable international
environment has played a crucial role. Among the international events having an
important influence in the process of South Slavic unification, the dissolution of
the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires respectively singled out in particular.
The U.S. entry into the European war theatre in 1917 counts for the speedy
realisation of this unification as well. While the first empire, the Ottoman, was
already in the process of dissolution when the war started, the latter, the Austro-
                                                
245 Ivo Banac, National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics, pp. 115.
103
Hungarian, had been vital and an important active actor on the international
scene. The Austro-Hungarian empire appears in the Great Powers’ strategic
plans for the Great War. Its existence presented itself as a serious obstacle to
South Slav unification because Great Powers of the time did not want its
dissolution for different reasons. Britain, because she was afraid of further
Russian influence in the Balkans, seeing Serbia as a natural ally of Russia.
France, because she saw Germany as a threat to her security and not Austro-
Hungary. Russia, due to dynastic reasons, but she was also afraid that with the
South Slav unification, the Catholic Slovenes and Croats would gain advantage
and ally themselves with the Vatican. Apart from this, the events on the ground
and the situation in the battlefield dictated the pace of events in the process of
South Slav unification. The Entente powers had more interest in seeing Italy,
Bulgaria and Romania on their side than the unification of the South Slavs,
especially Croats and Slovenes, which until late 1917 did not show an apparent
desire to unite with Serbia.246  For this reason, eastern coasts of Adriatic were
promised to Italy with the 1915 Secret Treaty of London, while parts of Serbian
Macedonia and Banat (in today's Vojvodina) were awarded to Bulgaria and
Romania respectively. The latter were at the expense of Serbia, while the
concessions given to Italy were directed mainly against the Croats and Slovenes.
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differences over the South Slav unification reappeared. As far as Serbia was concerned, also
noted earlier, its leaders throughout the nineteenth century concentrated on gaining these lands
and territories which they claimed as theirs on historical or ethnic bases, an example followed,
with few interruptions, during the next century. The political and military victory, particularly in the
Balkan Wars (1912-1913), heightened Serbian national enthusiasm and served to attract the
support of the Serbs of the Habsburg Monarchy. Although there were some signs of support for a
Croat Yugoslav program, particularly among some youth groups, the official Serbian goals were
not to create a Yugoslav state but to enlarge and enhance their own national state. These
Serbian goals were made public on the eve of WW I. As soon as the war started, the Serbs,
through their Prime Minister Nikola Pasic, delivered the first public declaration on Serbia’s war
aims (December 1914). This declaration stated Serbia’s intention to enlarge to the detriment of
others rather than South Slav unification. Cf. Ivo Banac, National Question, p.116; Alex N.
Draginich, Serbs and Croats. The Struggle in Yugoslavia, p. 23. This counts for the lack of desire
on the Croatian and Slovenian part for the union with Serbia. The Yugoslav Committee in exile
representing the Habsburg subjects of the South Slav origin was in favour of a federation of all
South Slavs on an equal basis, or the independence of Croatia and Slovenia on their own.
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These powers were seen as more important to win over Entente's support than
unification.247
When the news about the London Trearty leaked out, the Yugoslav
Committee had no choice but to ask for cooperation with the Serbian government
of Prime Minister Nikola Pasic  residing in Corfu. This does not mean that the
idea of equality as expressed in the federal  project of the Yugoslav Committee
would be abandoned. Instead, in May 1917, the Croats and Slovenes adopted
the so-called Vienna Declaration asking for the federal union among the South
Slavs248. The cooperation offered by the Yugoslav Committee consisted of the
quest for being informed on the details sorrounding the Treaty of London
because Pasic kept secret the activities of his government from the Yugoslav
Comittee. He even made the concesions to the Allied Powers to the detriment of
Croats and Slovenes regarding the same territories promised to Italy. While the
London Treaty made it difficult to separate the independence of Croatia and
Slovenia, the Revolution in Russia (1917) also rendered highly uncertain for
Serbia to pursue its war aims for Greater Serbia because Pasic lost its ally –
Tzarist Russia. Under these circumstances, Pasic and the Yugoslav Committee
sought to seek a mutual understanding. In July 1917 they met in Corfu and on
the 20th the Corfu Declaration was signed stating that the new Kingdom would
be called ''the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom''; that its future dynasty will be that of
the Serbian House of Karadjordjevic; the State would be a parliamentary
democracy; and, finally, the new constitution would be adopted after the war by
the majority of both sides, regulating the structure and the organization of the
new state. The issue of federation or confederation, the interal autonomy and
other details were left for discussion after the war because it was felt that the
                                                
247 See, more, in Ivo Banac, The National Question, pp. 115-140; Dimitrije Djordjevic,
“Serbia: Ally of the West in Two Wars”. In Alex N. Draginich (ed.), Serbia’s Historical Heritage, pp.
63-79; C. J. Bartlett, The Global Conflict: The International Rivalry of the Great Powers, 1880-
1970 (London: Longman, 1984) pp. 82-105.
248 Gregory Peroche, Histoire de la Croatie et des Nations Slaves du Sud, p. 212.
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debate over them at that time could have endangered the whole process of
negotiations in Corfu.249
Since as of January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson and the British Prime
Minister Loyd George declared that the Allied Powers had no intention of
supporting the break-up of the Habsburg Empire and that they favored autonomy
only for the oppresed nationalities living in it, because it made easier for the
Allies to live up to the promises given to Italy in 1915 rather than to the South
Slav cause. For this reason, Pasic was afraid and reneged on the Corfu
Declaration by giving a hint that he would settle for territorial acquisitions
promised to Serbia earlier, meaning the establishment of a Greater Serbia, as a
reward for allying with the Entente powers. This worsened the relations with the
Yugoslav Committee and some British officials, who accussed Pasic of  his plans
for a Greater Serbia. The British officials from the Foreign office, Wickham Steed
and R.W. Seton-Watson, were more blunt accusing Pasic for ''making (Yugoslav)
unification difficult, that he wanted to put everything under Serbia, that he was
bent on annexation and rule by force''.250  Since the speedy end of the war was
not foreseen in the Summer of 1918, the realization of a Greater Serbia project
was not certain as yet. The pace of events changed throughout when on mid-
September and early October 1918, there was a gradual collapse of the Austria-
Hungary army in the territories inhabited by the South Slavs. The Slovenes and
Croats seized this opportunity and formed their state structures. In September
that year, the Slovenes formed their National Council as did Bosnia-Herzegovina,
while on the 26th of October, the National Council of the Croats in Zagreb was
formed. However, events took a more dramatic direction. Thus, on 29 October,
Croatia declared its full independence expressing at the same time, its desire to
join the Yugoslav project of the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and
Serbs. On October 31, the National Council of the Croats declared that it was
merging with the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and that it
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250 Alex N. Draginich, Serbs and Croats. The Struggle in Yugoslavia, p. 30.
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was ready to enter into a common state with Serbia and Montenegro.251 From
now onwards, the National Council of the Slovens , Croats and  Serbs
(hereinafter referred to as the National Council) was supposed to speak on
behalf of all South Slavs living in the former Habsburg Empire. These moves
forced Pasic to ask for France to mediate in the conflict with these bodies of the
South Slavs. For this purpose, a meeting in Geneva was held at the beginning of
November 1918, but the Geneva Accord reached there was thrown by Pasic as
soon as he came back to Belgrade.252 In this case, there could be seen the
striking similarity between the years 1991-1992 and the last months following
WW I, both in terms of the internal dynamics going on within the former Yugoslav
territory and concerning the international situation. However, after the Cold War
the latter was very much to the Serbian disadvantage and their intention to
enlarge at others' expense.
After the proclamation of a new state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on 29
October 1918, the National Council as its governing body hoped to reach an
understanding with the Allied powers for its international recognition following the
example pursued with the Polish and the Czech peoples253. But, here the
situation presented itself in a totally different light. There was a general anarchy
in most of today's Croatia and Slovenia, so that the National Council was not able
to keep law and order.106 After the collapse of Austro-Hungary's state structures,
looting and burning by ordinary citizens ensued. The most critical problem was
the widespread popular belief that the collapse of the Monarchy meant complete
liberty , that is, a world free of bureaucrats, landlords, extortionists, merchants
and usurers, and a redistribution of goods and lands. The leaders of the National
                                                
251 Ivo Banac, National Question in Yugoslavia, p.128.
252 This was the first time that the Serbian government and the representatives of the
Habsburg South Slavs met on an equal basis. The situation on the ground in the fromer Austro-
Hungarian Empire changed dramatically during the late October and November 1918. This made
possible for Serbia the realisation of the Serbian plans for a unitary state, e.g., the Greater
Serbian project. See, Gregory Peroche, Histoire de la Croatie et des Nations Slaves du Sud,
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253 Only Serbia and Austro-Hungary had recognized the new state proclaimed in Zagreb.
See, Gregory Peroche, Histoire de la Croatie et des Nations Slaves du Sud , pp.223-224.
254 Livia Kordum, “Geneza Jugoslovenske Ideje i Pokreta Tjekom Prvog Svetskog Rata”.
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Council of course had no intention of satisfying these expectations, and they had
to rely on the existing administration to keep things in hand. This outraged the
ordinary citizens. Apart from this, the National Council had difficulties in
imposing its authority in areas of today's Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
They declared, at the behest of the Serbian military being present there, the
desire to unite with Serbia : Vojvodina's National Council, composed of Serbs 90
per cent, did so on 25 November 1918, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the local
National Councils a few days later broke their ties with Zagreb and joined Serbia,
being again in the majority composed by Serbs. The sovereign state of
Montenegro declared its unification with Serbia on 26 November 1918, with the
Serbian army in full occupation of its cities.255
Apart from the general anarchy and turmoil caused by internal disturbances,
the Italian advance along the lines promised by the 1915 London Treaty stroke
fear at the Croat and Slovene leaders of the National Council. Isolated, ignored
by the Allies, its people repressed by the Italians, and the prevailing anarchy and
turmoil all over the areas they were supposed to control, the leaders of the
National Council were increasingly driven to seek Serbian Army to intervene.
Under these circumstances, the National Council went to the liberated Belgrade
in the last days of November 1918. Prior to this, on November 14, 1918, the
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heart. See, Michla Pomerance, “The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the
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Introduction and Part 1 (London: Longman 1992) pp. 1948-1950; Dusan Bilandzic, “Drzavna
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Council had instructed in vein its delegates to be guided by a number of
conditions in connection with the nature and the organization of the future state.
Among these were the stipulations that the constituent assembly would decide
whether the state should be a republic or a monarchy, that the future constitution
be adopted by a two-thirds vote and that only certain specific functions be lodged
in the central government, with remaining ones to be exercised by local units.
But, the National Council had no time and possibility to press for these issues
because the situation on the ground was disastrous and the Serbian regular
army was already taking control over all areas formally part of the Austro-
Hungary.256 The delegates in their audience, toghether with Serbian King
Alexander, who requested unification, mentioned none of the above conditions.
The points they raised were of quite a different and vague nature: sovereign
authority shall be exercised by Alexander; pending convocation of the constituent
assembly, an agreement shall be reached on the establishment of a responsible
cabinet and a temporary parliament; during the transition period, each unit shall
retain its existing authority, although under the control of the cabinet; and the
constituent assembly shall be elected on the basis of direct, universal, equal, and
proportional suffrage. No other conditions were advanced for the situation did not
allow for it.257 On December 1, 1918, King Alexander proclaimed the creation of
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, after having heard the
statement of the National Council's delegates. In this vary day, the dream of
Greater Serbia became reality.258  At the same time,  this marks the beginning of
the hostilities between the Serbs and all other nations living in this new state.
This is not to say that the National Council representing the Habsbourg subjects
of the South Slavic origin was not  aware of this state of affairs, which definitely
shatered their dreams about  the federal structure of the common state.
Montenegro as well was hopeless in this regard. This  was the victory of
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pp. 65-87 at 85-86.
257 The conditions as put foreword in this audience are listed in Alex N. Draginich, Serbs
and Croats. The Struggle for Yugoslavia, p. 34.
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realpolitik over the genuine will of its founders, which could be seen in the very
way the new state was run as well as its internal territorial organization. The
hegemony of one nation, the Serbs, was obvious also in power sharing terms.
This favourable situation for the Serbs was also a result of the Great Powers'
sympathies towards the Serbian concept of Yugoslavia - in fact Greater Serbia -
stemming from their conviction that the Serbs had given a great contribution
during the war and had been the victims of the Central Powers.  These factors
played very important, if not decisive,  role in the final say about unification and
the international recognition of the new state of the South Slavs.259 The
international sympathies for the Serbian concept of Yugoslavia was in large part
derived from the very fact of Austro-Hungary's demise at the last moment.
Thereafter, threats to the new European order came from Germany's Drang
Nach Osten and the Soviets. Yugoslavia, together with Czechoslovakia, Poland
and Romania, were to serve as barrier against the above Soviet/German threats.
The term denoting this new role of Yugoslavia was cordon sanitaire, first used
and defined by French Foreign Minister, Clemenceau, on 21 December  1918.260
The formation of the Yugoslav state on 1 December 1918 and its
constitutional structure based on royal unitarism after 1921 (the so-called
Vidovdan Constitution), represented a victory of the Serbian forces (political and
military) over the others. Such a political development was an immediate result of
the balance of forces in the last months of WW I, where the Serbian state was
dominant among South Slavs. This domination was both internal (because the
                                                
259 Ivo Leder, Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiermaking (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 3-80, especially at 3, 24, 26, 35, 45 and 57; See, also,
Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslavia and Communist Federation, 1919-1953
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1991) pp. 3-34; Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War. The
War in the Balkans (London: Heinemann, 1994) pp. 115-120; Alexander Pavkovic, The
Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State (London: Macmillan, 1997) pp.
19-35; Dusko Sekulic, “The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: The Case of
Yugoslavia”. Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 3 Part 2 (July 1997) pp. 165-179; R.G.D. Laffan, C.F.,
The Serbs. The Guardians of the Gate (New York: Dorset Press, 1989) pp. 70-86.
260 Robert C. Binkely, “New Light on the Paris Peace Conference”, pp. 335-361 at 354,
footnote 45. See, also, Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, “Geographic Objectives in
Foreign Policy”, First Part. The American Political Science Review Vol. 33 Issue 3 (June 1939)
pp. 391-410 at 404, Dusan Bilandic, a famous historian from the University of Zagreb (Croatia), in
a long interview with Radio Free Europe (in South Slavic Languages), November 19, 1999.
(http://www. rferl.org/
110
Serbian Army was the only regular military force among South Slavs) and on the
international plane (Serbia's allies were the victorious parts in WW I and shaped
the post-War European order)261. As for Serbia's national aims, the creation of
the Serb-Slovene-Croat Kingdom in 1918, renamed Yugoslav in 1929,
represented almost a full realization of its national program as set out in the 1844
Nacertanije plan. For others living within that state, it opened up the issue of
Serbian hegemony as a result of the complete Serbian control of its state
structures.262 This hegemonic position of Serbia  lasted throughout the period
between the two wars. However, the Serbs qualified it as a situation of equality
whereby the national question of the South Slavs (apart form Bulgarians) had
definitely and favourably  been settled for all. They considered themeselves to be
a Piedmonte for the South Slavs.263 Its creation, though, was a failed attempt at
emulating the Piedmonte, leading to the forceful and brutal denial of the very
existence of the national question of Croats, Albanians, Mulsim Bosniacs,
Macedonians and others.264  Futhermore, the new state had such an internal
administrative structure that did not take into account any of the previous
administrative, historic and ethnic borders existing prior to unification in 1918.
The only exception to this was the creation of the so-called Hrvatska Banovina in
1939, used for the purpose of appeasing the Croat national feelings on the eve of
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WW II.265  The Serbian rulers of pre-WW II Yugoslavia were too cautious not to
allow any internal border-drawings that might associate on former administrative,
ethnic or historical units.266
The Serbian claim to the role of Piedmonte of South Slavs has failed
altogether. All it left behined concerns the legacy, as one famous Serbian scholar
and former politician of the 1970s put it, of an imperial mentality, from which the
Serbs have been facing too many difficulties to eradicate it.267  The prevalence of
this mentality for a long period of time, in essence, explains the tragedy of the
Yugoslav self-determination. This is more so due to the huge amount of power
that the Serbs held during the existence of the Yugoslav state . To this and
related issues we turn in the following chapter, which deals with various types of
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self-determination that have emerged within the Yugoslav context, despite their
mutual contraditions.
3. The Second World War and the Communist Conception of Self-
Determination
The Communist movement in Yugoslavia, since the creation in 1919, had
to face the critical questions regarding self-determination within the Yugoslav
context: who were the ''selves'' entitled to self-determination and who were  to
decide about this, ethnically defined nations or certain types of territories only?
The development of the Yugoslav movement, like that in the Soviet Union, shows
that self-determination of peoples (or national self-determination, to use the
wording of the Communist movement) had been used as a tool for revolutionary
purposes and in connection with the concept of territory, the latter coming into
play more often only after a successful  war and revolution. First national self-
determination, then the one based on territory, were used for the promotion of
the world (Communist) revolution dictated by the Communitern. National self-
determination took the prominence in the period between 1919-1941 (with all its
ups and downs, again dictated by Commintern) in a very abstract manner. The
basis of this self-determination was the classical Marxist doctrine of the
Communist (world) revolution. The issue of territory usually came into play only
after war and revolution when it was used as a real means to balance the internal
power politics within the newly created country. This was the Soviet model, more
or less pursued in Yugoslavia even after Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 (with
some minor modifications not essentially changing the core concept of
Communist self-determination itself). By recognizing formally the right to self-
determination (up to and including the right to secession, to use the Communist
terminology), the Communists both in Soviet Union and Yugoslavia intended to
preserve their old states and within them create new nations (Yugoslav and
Soviet ones respectively), a mission not accomplished by the previous regimes of
these countries. The process of defining who the ''selves'' entitled to self-
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determination were had been highly centralized and concentrated at the hands of
a Communist Party as an avant-garde of the working class (proletariat). This
process was highly centralized and based entirely on the arbitrary (so-called
objective) criteria (partially discussed in the previous chapter). The type of a
State and its political organization appropriate for the achivement of the goal of
national  unification of various nations based on new (Communist) system of
values was the (Communist) Federation.268 After the creation of this federation,
self-determination as an issue reverted to the territory, which could in this way be
allocated in an arbitrary manner depending on the practical needs and the
exigencies of the Communist party relying on power politics exclusively.  The
historic and ethnic criteria in the creation of the new internal administrative
borders within these Communist federations was to be entirely subordinated to
the above exigencies. The Yugoslav experience was not an exception to this. It
was in essence an emulation of the Soviet theory and practice concerning self-
determination, granting wide powers to the Communist Party, as an avant-garde
of the Proletariat and the Peasantry, to decide as to who were the subjects
entitled to self-determination, including the content and the scope itself. This
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Federalism, and Ethnic Identity”. In Dennison Rusinov (ed.), Yugoslavia. A Fractured Federalism
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development of self-determination within the Yugoslav Communist movement
underwent two phases; one was more or less doctrinaire and was influenced by
Lenin's and Stalin's ideas on self-determination pertaining to the pre-
revolutionary era, while the other was more pragmatic and influenced by the
Commintern (the Communist Internationale) and its efforts to extent the Soviet
influence abroad. The first phase relates to the time when the Commintern was
still weak while the second to the embodiment of the Soviet state.
In the first years of its existence, the Communist movement in Yugoslavia
underestimated the revolutionary potential of the national question. The stance
towards the Yugoslav state was anti-federalist, centralist and unitarist, as same
as that of the existing Yugoslav state and its political establishment.269  Of
course, the Communists denounced the regime's oppressive policies against
others, especially non-Slavs (Albanians. Hungarians and Germans) but as a
whole they did underestimate the importance of the national question for the
Yugoslav politics and for the future of the country, including the Communist
revolutionary action. This phase was dominated by the doctrinary approach
towards self-determination and was called the ''right'' of the Communist
movement. The approach was based on Lenin's and Stalin's ideas of
prerevolutionary period. This meant that every nation had to be given the right to
self-determination, which did not necessarily entaile the right to secession.
Rather, it would entail the right to form autonomous units within Yugoslavia, thus
preserving the unity of the State. So, Yugoslavia was defended as a union of
sovereign nations, meaning usually Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, and not of
sovereign states. It was believed, in a typical Marxist way,  as predicted by Lenin
and Stalin, that the conflict in Yugoslavia among its constituent nations was
caused by the national bourgeausis over the exploitation of one economic
market: the three capitalist classes were fighting each other and trying to gain the
support of their peoples through nationalist propaganda. These were in fact the
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transplantations into the Yugoslav context of Lenin's and Stalin's ideas equating
colonialism with self-determination of oppressed nations. So, this was basically
class self-determination, meaning that the working class (and peasantry) should
fight their own bourgeosie who were suppressing them without putting into
question the existence of the State of Yugoslavia.
On the other hand, the ''left'' within the Yugoslav Communist movement
favored a more radical approach towards the national question. This happened
after the Commintern became more strong. The Yugoslav Communists should
not only struggle for the constitutional right to self-determination but also for its
realization; there could never be a just solution to the national question within the
Yugoslav ''bourgeoise'' state. At this time, fighting Serbian nationalism took
priority and considerable  tolerance towards separatist nationalism was advised.
This stance was quite the opposite from the above. This meant that Yugoslav
Communists were slowly abandoning the dogmatic Marxism of Lenin and Stalin
of the prerevolutinary days, which in the Yugoslav case reduced the whole
national question in Yugoslavia to the competition for economic market by three
equally greedy ''tribal'' bourgeosis.270 This began after the mid-1920s when the
national question started to be used for revolutionary purposes, like in the Soviet
Union after the Revolution. Self-determination now included the right to create
separate states. However, nothing was said at this time about the borders of
these new states, which shows that self-determination was used by Communists
first and formost as a tactical expedient for highly pragmatic purposes. The right
to secession belonged not only to Yugoslavia's three constituent nations but also
to Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims. Albanians and Hungarians, who
were considered minorities by Communists, were to join Albania and Hungary
only when these two countries had themeselves undergone a revolution and
become part of the federation of the Balkan workers' and peasants' republics.271
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After the rise of Hitler to power, the Commintern drastically changed its
policy of self-determination towards Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Communists after
this time no longer described Yugoslavia as an imperialist and Versailles creation
and they now called for self-rule for certain regions, in particular for Croatia,
without mentioning any separation or full independence. The Commintern now
suggested the preservation of Yugoslavia within its borders, to be reorganized on
the same basis as the Soviet federation. The policy of the Popular Front of all
anti-Hitlerite forces became an official policy of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia (CPY). After Tito resumed the post of the head of the Yugoslav
Communists in 1937, the CPY attacked the Serbian hegemony but it equally
opposed separatism relying on the Popular Front policy against Hitler and his
allies. In the late 1930s, the idea of dividing Yugoslavia into independent states
finally gave way to the idea of preserving the unity of the state while creating
autonomous national units. From now onwards, the Communists would argue in
favour of federalism. The sovereignty now fell into the hands of separate nations
of Yugoslavia, like in the previous phase, but these imaginary federated units had
no fixed borders as of yet. In the view of the Communists, federalism was not a
permanent solution but a way towards the final unification of the proletariat  of all
nations.272  Hence, there should be no need for borders and territories. This
merger of the two approaches was pursued by the CPY all over the WW II. Apart
from the Communists, the Serbian Chetnik Movement, representing the King and
Yugoslavia's government in exile, was also for the restoration of the old state.
The battle during the war time was among these two movements. The
Communists won this battle because, unlike the Serbian Chetnik Movement, they
had a wider Yugoslavian appeal involving representatives of almost all nations
and had  international support, both the East and West, who favoured Tito's war
campaign. The Allied determination as espoused from the Atlantic Charter to
Tehran and Yalta conferences on the restauration of the sovereignty and
independence of all states destroyed by the Axis Powers played a very important
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role on the victory of Communism and the preservation of the Yugoslav state as
well.273
The CPY's policy on self-determination during WW II was based on four
key assumptions. First, the ruling elite (the ''bourgeosie'') had not succeded in
creating a common Yugoslav national consciousness, which by implication
meant that it would be the duty of the Communists to do so within the framework
of the Yugoslav state. To achieve this new unity on the all-Yugoslav basis, the
CPY organized a Congress of its People's Liberation Movement. At its first
meeting, on 26 and 27 November 1942, this body, under the name ''the Anti-
Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia'' (AVNOJ or Antifasisticko
Vece Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije), proclaimed itself the only legitimate
representative of the peoples of Yugoslavia. At its second meeting, held on 29
and 30 November 1943 in the Bosnian town of Jajce (the above mentioned was
held in Bihac,  Bosnia-Herzegovina), AVNOJ announced that after the war
Yugoslavia would be organized on a federal basis. Communist leaders of
Yugoslavia considered it important to reassure Yugoslavia's national groups that
there would be constitutionally guaranteed national equality after the liberation of
the country. They stated, however, that the final decisions about the organization
of Yugoslavia would be made by popular vote after the war. Similar councils with
that of AVNOJ were created later in other territories that would become republics
following WW II. These were important actions in the way to creating the
Yugoslav federation, thus imposing new Yugoslav identity.274 The second
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assumption was that there was Serbian predominance in the pre-war Yugoslavia.
To prevent this from happening again, the destiny of the former King of
Yugoslavia was left to be decided after the war. When the war ended, his entry to
Yugoslavia was strictly forbiden, even as a tourist. More concessions were also
granted to the local Communists, while the Serbs were unable to form their own
communist party well until the end of WW II. Third, it was assumed that every
nation should have an inalienable right to secede, but, fourth, this was to be part
of the Communists' revolutionary struggle for the liberation of the proletariat. In
other words, the national question was connected to the class struggle and, in
that way, with the Communist (world) revolution.275 These four assumptions
were, like in the Soviet Union, the CPY's tactics to win the support of all nations
of Yugoslavia in order to fully realise the revolutionary potential of the national
question, while preserving at the same time the Yugoslav state. The excact
territories of the new republics were not known at this time.276 Their delimiation
was undertaken after the war and lasted well until the 1950s.277 The CPY had a
leading role in this process of territorial delimitation, as in the case of the Soviet
Union, and was guided mainly by political exigencies of power politics, whereby
the historic and ethnic principles were subordinate to the internal power politics.
Since most of the time the CPY had advocated national (ethnically-based)
self-determination, after the war it faced a difficult task of finding the territorial
base for each of Yugoslavia's constituent nations (apart from the Mulsims of
Bosnia-Herzegovina who were later in the 1970s recognized as a constituent
nation, although they possesed their own republic). Self-determination now
became not  an abstract principle but a concrete task. In some cases, national
self-determination coincided with a given territory (Slovenia); in others both
nation and its territory had to be found (Macedonia); still in others, there was
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territory but not a nation (Bosnia-Herzegovina); finally, there existed both the
territorial base and a nation living in it in majority but no right to self-determination
was recognized (non-South Slavs, mainly Hungarians and Albanians because
others, such as Germans, were either expelled or  fled en masse after the
Communist tekeover following the war's end). On the top of this was the
reconciling of national self-determination with the new Yugoslav nation that the
CPY undertook to create. To achieve this new "Yugoslav nation", other nations
within the Yugoslav state were invented and, with this, vast portions of territory
were allocated to them. The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova and
Macedonia are the most obvious ones, reflecting this Communist policy about the
nationality question. While the Slav Macedonians gained both their territory and
the status of a (constituent) nation within Yugoslavia by the end of Second World
War, Bosniac Muslims had to wait for two decades for the new power
configuration to form so as to offer them an opportunity to have their status of
nation be recognized by others (Bosnia-Herzegovina, though, was at all times
considered by the CPY as a decisive factor for the very survival of Yugoslavia).
Albanians and Hungarians were never recognized as a nation and their territory
served as a basis for the creation of new states (federal Yugoslav republics).278
The task of creating these new Yugoslav nations permeated the Yugoslav
discourse on federalism, seeing national self-determination always (at least until
Tito's death) as subordinate to this goal of Yugoslav (national) unity.
4.  Communist Yugoslavia : The Final Dissolution of the State
The development of self-determination in the Communist Yugoslavia has
gone through some simultaneous and overlaping phases.  First, came the
constitutional recognition and sanctioning of self-determination; second, was the
territorial delimitation among Yugoslavia's constituent nations (in the form of a
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newly established federated republics). While the second phase ended up more
or less in the 1950s, the previous one varied considerably and lasted during the
years 1946 –1974. This entire period can be divided into two phases: centralist/or
totalitarian-rule period and the decentralised/bureaucratic period.The former
lasted from 1946 to 1967-68, while the second from these years until
Yugoslavia's final dissolution in 1992. It should be noted, though, that the basic
premise remained the same throughout: It was the CPY and its ruling elite that
decided about the content and the scope of self-determination.
As noted, the Communist Yugoslavia was to become a federation so as to
avoid the hegemony of one nation, the Serbs, and attract the popular support for
the war efforts of the CPY. The idea of "Yugoslavism" did not have any
mobilizing power because it had already been compromised in the interwar
period. This is why the Communists until 1953 focused on the state of Yugoslavia
and its constitutent nationalities rather than on the preservation of the "Yugoslav
nation"  agenda. To achieve this,  the CPY had to emulate the Soviet practice in
its entirety, both during and after the war. This meant that in terms of self-
determination there were no huge differences: In both cases the Communist
Party, as an avant-garde of the proletarians and the peasantry, decided as to
who the subjects entitled to self-determination were.  In some cases, new nations
were created. In this regard, despite some minor differences in appearance, the
quality of the practice of self-determination was much the same in both countries.
When the second meeting of AVNOJ took place (29 November 1943),
proclaiming the federal principle as a basis of the future constitution of
Yugoslavia, the conceptualization of self-determination was much like in the
Soviet Union. Thus, the statement from that meeting read as follows:
"On the basis of the right  of all nations to self-determination, including
union with or the secession from other nations, and in accordance with the true
will of all the nations of Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Council of National
Liberation of Yugoslavia passes the following decisions:  ...
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2) ... Yugoslavia is being built on the federal principle, which will ensure
full equality to the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3) In accordance with the federal organization of Yugoslavia ... organs of
the people's authorities have been established in different parts of Yugoslavia in
the form of National Liberation Committees and Provincial Anti-Fascist Councils
of National Liberation.
4) National minorities of Yugoslavia will be secured all their rights".279
After the Second World War, no consideration was given to the previous
administrative borders, in much the same way as following WW I.280 This time,
borders of the newly established Yugoslav republics were meant to be based on
(or to satisfy the needs of) the nationality principle, meaning the above
mentioned constituent nations of Yugoslavia, although the designation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a nation meant primarly its territory and not the population. In
this case, like in that concerning Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro281, it
was said that the historic principle was more or less to be followed in the
delimitation of new nations living within Yugoslav state. At the same time, the
identity of other important historical and ethnic units, such as Vojvodina,
Dalmatia, Kosova and Sandjak, was not recognized and these were not granted
a status of the full federated republic.282 In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
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CPY's sole aim was to solve the long-standing conflict between the Serbs and
Croats over it.283 This, in fact, remained the alpha and omega of the Yugoslav
Communists' policy on the national question and proved to be the crux of
Yugoslavia's very survival284.
The Communist-organized and controlled bodies set up the local power
structures who voted, as expected, for the new Yugoslavia as described above,
constituting themselves as the governmental organs of the new federated
republics. Also two Autonomous units were formed, the multi - national
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the predominantly Albanian Autonomous
District of Kosova. Thus, before the final liberation of Yugoslavia and long before
the adoption of its constitution, the system of (Communist) government had been
installed in fair detail. This was later reflected, more or less, in the Yugoslav
Constitution, promulgated on 31 January 1946. Article one of this constitution
defined the system of government in general terms, recognizing  the existence of
the national question as opposed to 1953 Constitutional Act of Yugoslavia, and
based its solution on the principles of equality and voluntarism (much like in the
former Soviet Union). Thus, the 1946 Constitution said that:
" The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's State
of republican form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, basing
themselves on the right to self-determination, which includes the right to
separation, have expressed a will to live together in a federal state".285
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According to the 1946 Constitution, all authority stemmed from the people
who realized it through organs of state authority, ranging from the People's
Committees (the Yugoslav equivalent of the Russian Soviets) through
Republican to Federal organs. The Constitution vested original sovereignty in the
Republics and limited their competence only by the powers transferred to the
Federation, leaving them residual powers (Articles 6 and 9 of the 1946
Constitution). The Yugoslavs adopted from Russian practice the institution of
autonomous units, or the so-called political-territorial autonomy. This was
designed for national minorities aiming at the very denial of their status of a
nation (federated republic within Yugoslavia), no matter their number as
compared with other constituent nations (federated republics of Yugoslavia).286
Since the establishment of these units in the Soviet Union, their borders and their
very existence have been quite arbitrary. This is the reason why their theoretical
framework has never been properly analyzed in the constitutional discourse of
former Yugoslavia, or, better to say, discussions on the issue of autonomy
remained vague on purpose.
This sort of autonomy was applied in the former Yugoslavia concerning
only two cases: Kosova and Vojvodina. Large parts of former's territory were
allocated to Macedonia to enable it to become a nation (federated republic).287
However, as opposed to Soviet Union, in Yugoslavia no frequent alteration in
internal border regimes and in the status of its administrative units were
effectuated.288
In 1950, following Tito's break up with Stalin, a new phase in the
development of Communist Yugoslavia started. From this time onwards, the CPY
tried to find out the new way, original one as it was said at the time, for the
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regulation of internal relations among Yugoslavs. However, new changes in the
internal structure of the Yugoslav federation were by no way modeled upon the
Western constitutions and their practice.289 The CPY felt that the previous
transitional period had vastly overcome the internal divisions among nationalities
and republics. Edward Kardelj, the architect of the state system of the
Communist Yugoslavia, acknowledged that the above divisions still existed but
"that by now the Federation could not function along classical inter-republican
and inter-nationality lines"290 The republics, therefore, were considered only one
of the several links in the chain of authority of the "working people" in the
Yugoslav version of class self-determination.291 Admittedly, the Yugoslavs had
been sucessful in their national issue policies; they eliminated postwar national
divisions and were able to develop backward areas politically, economically and
culturally. All this was accomplished in a period of five years. This policy was
expressed in the Fundamental Law pertaining to the Bases of the Social and
Political Organization of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and of the
Federal Organs of the State Authority of January 13, 1953, known also as the
Fundamental Law.292 This act left in place the 1946 Constitution of Yugoslavia
but it replaced and supplemented the latter only in some of its basic parts. Similar
Fundamental Law had been passed by all the People's Republics, much in the
same way as was  done following the promulgartion of the 1946 Constitution.
In its first article, the Fundamental Law vaguely referred to the "sovereign
peoples, equal in rights"  but exchewed any reference to sovereignty or the
sovereign powers of the Republics. It also omitted the concept of the original
competence of the Republics and of the transfer of part of their powers to the
Federation. The unitary element of the "Yugoslav working people" is emphasized
at the beginning of the Fundamental Law. Although the Yugoslav Republics were
still defined as states, the relations between them and the Federation cannot be
considered as relations between states and governments in a liberal sense of the
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term. The Council of Nations from the 1946 Constitution was abolished since it
had been considered useless.293  The Fundamental Law omitted the right of
secession, mentioned in Article 1 of the 1946 Constitution. Although that article
insisted that Yugoslavia's creation was irreversible, its absence from the
Fundamental Law was a clear sign of further development towards Yugoslav
unitarism.294 This trend in unitarism aimed at the creation of the Yugoslav nation
was based on two pillars, one vertical (the empowerment of the communes) and
the other horizontal (the system of the socialist self-management).
Conflict with Stalin increased the risk of the State. Military and state
security services were further empowered. The Communist Party became the
leader in all aspects of social, political and economic life. When this conflict was
over and threats from Stalin passed away, there were voices within the CPY for
liberal reforms directed against an enormous bureaucracy. To meet these
demands for refrom, the CPY's sixth congress, held in Zagreb in November
1952, abandoned the old-type of Leninist, monolithic, disciplined, centralized and
hierarchical party system as obsolete. To pave the way for the 1953
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constitutional reform, such a party was seen as a hindrance to the devlopment of
"democratic socialism". The CPY changed its name into the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in an attempt to transform itself into a
movement of "socialist forces". That would not command as previously but rather
become an ideological center. From this time onwards, the power was to devolve
to the "basis", e.g., factories and communes. Self-management, introduced at
this time, initially was meant to weaken the republics and provinces (although the
latter were already in a weak position by this time and played no role in the
power struggle within the Yugoslav federation) and strengthen Yugoslavism.
Genuinely free discussions, it was held, should take place via the elected
delegates in factories and communes. At no point has this meant that the
process of democratisation should go against the federal bodies. Its purpose and
the very aim was to weaken the republics and provinces so as to dilute  national
loyalties that were about to develop at the expense of the Yugoslav patriotism
and Yugoslavism in general. The introduction of the self-management,
considered in Yugoslavia as a form of direct democracy, in communes and
factories and the democratisation of the party were the main hopes for the
promotion of Yugoslavism. But this had an adverse effect altogether because the
role of the State and the CLY increased further and the Belgrade, that is, the
Federation became filled in (and dominated) by the biggest nation, the Serbs,
who turned the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of one nation.
Centralism suited the interests of the biggest nation in Yugoslavia – the Serbs.295
The power struggle against the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia and the
centralism in general was won by Tito in 1966. The Serb-origin Interior Minister of
Yugoslavia, Aleksander Rankovic, was then ousted by Tito and replaced with
another more moderate Yugoslav leader, Koca Popovic, also a Serb. Aleksandar
Rankovic, who became Yugoslavia's vice president, a few years before he was
ousted in 1966, was known for his strong hand, favouring a unitary and
centralized Yugoslav state. After 1996, the new phase, the so-called
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decentralisation of a beaurocratic nature, commenced. This had wider
repercussions for Yugoslavia's later development until its final collapse in 1992.
However, this period did  not start in the terrain of politics.
In the earlry 1960s, there were talks about the economic reforms that
quckly turned into the debate over national issues. The main focus here was on
giving more power to republics for economic matters. The north of Yugoslavia,
Slovenia and Croatia, pressed hard for more decentralisation and economic,
market-oriented, reforms. Serbia with other poorer republics were against any
hint at decentralising or making the economy and the society as a whole,
market-oriented. This took more so into account that it would have taken from
Serbia and its allies the privileges of development that they enjoyed. Apart from
this, the centralized Yugoslavia bode well to Serbia's hegemonic aspirations, a
prewar legacy still alive. In this context should be seen the north's accusations of
being exploited by the south, that is, accusations raised against Serbia's parasitic
manner of running the common state.296 In the field of constitutional self-
determination, the 1963 Constitution did not greatly change the basic premises
regarding secession as compared to the 1946 and 1953 constitutional
documents: class, rather than national/or republican, self-determination remained
the dominant concept.297 Only after the fall of Rankovic did the constitutional bias
in favor of republican self-determination occurr. Consequetly, self-determination
based on the old concepts of the "working class" was definitely abandoned.
However, this self-determination centered on republics, not on nations per se.
The 1974 Constitution marks the climax of this approach to self-
determination, that is, the approach that gave the greatest possible autonomy to
the republics and, this time, also to the autonomous provinces of Kosova and
Vojvodina. Although this bureaucratic decentralization allowed for the definition of
the Yugoslav republics (not the autonomous provinces of Kosova and Vojvodina)
as the "states" belonging to a given nation (s), it did not permit any right to
secession. The right to self-determination itself was mentioned only in the
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Preamble of the 1974 Constitution. 298 Thus, much like in the previous
constitutional texts, the right to self-determination was considered as a right
"once and for all" exercised when the Communist Yugoslavia was formed in
1945.  However, the process of decentralization offered too many opportunities
for the expression of national feelings, very often in an undemocratic manner due
to the Communist nature of the State itself. This process, that culminated in
1974, started in the second half of the 1960s and is marked by important and
crucial events for the future of the Yugoslav state . The events happened in
Croatia and Kosova and were followed by Serbia's (mainly) liberal answer to the
challenges at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s.
With the fall of Rankovic, Serbs and Montenegrins lost their privileged
positions over Kosova's political and administrative apparatus. Albanians were
allowed, after the hard years following the World War Second (living under police
surveillance and repression), to freely air their national sentiments in a large-
scale demonstration of November 28, 1968. They called for Kosova to become a
full federated-republic. To grant such a status was officially seen as being merely
the first step towards the unification of Kosova and other Albanian-inhabited
regions, especially of Macedonia, with neighbouring Albania. The 1968
constitutional amendments granted the region of Kosova, for the first time, a
republican-type prerogative. This was confirmed by the 1974 Constitution.
Positive trends in Kosova were obvious: the institutional basis of Kosova was set
up, rather separately from Serbia; the University of Prishtina was formed and a
number of state, educational, cultural and administrative instututions were cut off
from Belgrade and tied to the direct administrative and political control of
Prishtina – Kosova's capital.299  However, Tito did not grant a full republican
status to Kosova. He prefered very careful and gradual improvements in Kosova
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so that by the end of 1970s, the highly controlled autonomy of Kosova widened
significantly. National aspirations of the Albanian population, Tito belived, would
be satisfied through the economic integration of Kosova into Yugoslavia and its
own gradual development and prosperity.300 The call for a republic among  the
Kosovar Albanians had its roots in the awakening of a sense of intense national
pride, which for a long time was denied to them, though tolerated in other
Yugoslav nationalities. The Spring 1981 explosion was in many ways a product
of the delayed consumation of national equality and rights. The size and ethnic
compactness were, in the eyes of the Albanian population, sufficient reasons for
changing the status of Kosova and advancing it into a full republic.301 With the
1974 Constitution, Kosova became the catalyst of the nationality issue and a new
serious actor in the balance-of-power game within the Communist Yugoslavia.
But, unlike Croatian nationalism, Kosova and the Albanians represented no
constant and principal threat to the integrity and stability of the state of
Yugoslavia.302
The Croatian national issue reappeared with all its intensity, violence and
war being excluded, during 1967 to 1971. Although it started as an economic
debate over the future decentralization of the country's economy, it soon became
political when the Croatian Literary Association asserted its views on the distinct
Croatian language. The Yugoslav efforts to further portray the Serbo-Croatian
language as a common thread of Yugoslavism were rejected by Croats as a bid
to Serbianize the Croat language. The Croat intellectuals urged their compatriots
not to use the Serbo-Croat language and the (Serbian) Cyrillic alphabet. When it
came to the official use of the Croat language, the Croat intellectuals stressed
the fact that a majority of the civil servants in Croatia were Serbs, albeit from
Croatia. To this came the reply by the Serbian side, who demanded quite the
opposite: the use of Cyrillic alphabet by the Serbs living in Croatia. Apart from the
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language, there were mutual exchanges of accusations on other issues, such as
the low birth rate in Croatia and Serbian attempts to assimilate and Serbianize
the republic, and the portrayal of Croats as criminals.303  These exchanges
culminated in the Croatian Spring of 1970-1971, or, as it is known by the Serb
name, Mass Movement (In Serbian : Maspok/Masovni Pokret). The movement
involved the young Communist leaders of Croatia, Savka Dabcevic Kucar and
Miko Tripalo, while at its head was Matica Hrvatska, a Croat intellectual
organization originally founded in 1884 and revived in 1967. At  the height of this
movement, Matica Hrvatska published various pamphlets and newspaper
columns raising the personal Serb-Croat controversy: whose is the Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Matica Hrvatska published statistics showing the
dominance of Bosnia by Serbs, allthough very soon it openly advocated the take
over of large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As for the issue of Croatia itself, it
stressed the dilemma of its definition, namely whether it should be a State of the
Croat nation or it should be a common state of other nations and nationalities
living within it. At the end, it openly advocated the secession from Yugoslavia.
This caused the reaction from Serbian side, who demanded an autonomous
region for the Croat Lika, Kordun, Baranja and north-west Bosnia. In essence,
this was a good pretext for the Serbs to revive their old idea that developed prior
to the Second World War seeking the special status for these regions. 304 Tito
tried to negotiate a solution with the Croat leaders but it did not yield any result
and an eventual offer for military intervention to settle the issue was made by
Leonid Brezhnev himself. Tito rejected the idea of Soviet intervention and himslef
called a meeting to thrash out the matter, using his own charisma. In the meeting
held in the beautiful resort city of Karadjordjevo on 1 December 1971, Tito made
a decision to crush the nationalist movement in Croatia and not allow, as he
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himself put it, the repetition of 1941.305  The year Tito spoke about, nevertheless,
repeated itself two decades later in quite a different national and international
context, while the city of Karadjordjevo, the old royal hounting lodge in Vojvodina,
was now different. The difference was that this time Milosevic and Tudjman
agreed in principle in March 1991 to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina. It changed
nothing , for while this meeting was taking place, the Serbs in Croatia were about
to form their autonomous units, first, and then an independent entity within the
Republic of Croatia, all this being done at the behest of Belgrade authorities with
whom Tudjman was negotiating in Kradjordjevo.
The Croatian nationalist movement of 1967-1971 was not democratic at all
and those who crushed it, new Communist caders of Croatia following  1971,
were compromised to make it easier for the leaders of the Croatian Spring to
come back to the scene as soon as an opportunity would present itself. This
opportunity presented itself indeed following the Cold War's demise. Franjo
Tudjman, the former important actor in the Croatian Spring, formed the Croatian
Democratic Union (or Hrvatska Demokratska Zajedniaca: HDZ), which had won
the 1990 Republican elections in Croatia and led the country toward full
independence and war.306
The next important movement in this period (until Tito's death in 1980)
was that in Serbia, also known as Serbian Liberal Movement. In fact, unlike its
Croatian counterpart, this movement was a true liberal movement and maybe a
single such movement in the whole Communist world. It was also led by the
leading Communist figures in Serbia, such as Latinka Perovic and Marko Nikezic.
307  The Serbian Liberal Movement started somewhere in 1968 when Belgrade
University students took to the streets demanding more freedom and reform and
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denouncing authoritarianism, unemployment and the Vietnam war. After having
been supported verbally by Tito, the demonstrators went home but some
professors from the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Belgrade were purged
from their jobs. The most notable among them was Mihajlo Markovic, identifed
with the liberal journal Praxis, which was much admired in western Marxist
circles. The same Markovic and the same journal, after 1981 would lead an anti-
Albanian campaign and strongly support the basics of the 1986 Memorandum of
the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (Markovic himself was one of its
drafters).308
Along with this highly liberal movement, which was seeking reforms and
more freedom, in Belgrade developed yet another nationalist movement that
would reappear again after 1986. Mihajlo Djuric, a Belgrade law professor, with
some others demanded in the early 1970s,  an autonomy for the Serbs living in
Croatia, restrictions on Kosova's granted constitutional rights and, lastly, the
redefinition of Yugoslavia's internal borders. This nationalist trend was defeated
by Latinka Perovic and Marko Nikezic, the Serbian liberals. However, Tito felt
that he should, for the sake of the internal balance of power following the 1971
Croat Spring, purge the Serb Liberals as well. Tito did this and, as strange as it
might be, with the help of the old Partisan generation, non-reformers and others
who were credited with the centralist version of Yugoslavia.309 Thus, on the eve
of the 1974 Constitution, there were nationalist movements threatening the
national stability of Yugoslavia. A sad chapter in all this was that the only liberal
movement in Yugoslavia was crushed.  This probably had the most
repercussiuons for the later developments in Serbia and Yugoslavia as a whole.
From the turmoil of the early 1970s, it seems to have benefited only the Muslim
Bosniacs, whose State and very identity had since 1945 been constantly denied.
In 1971, to preserve the internal balance of power and keep Croats and Serbs
apart, Tito recognized the existence of the Muslim Bosniac nation. An external
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factor seems to have also had an impact on this change in the Yugoslav
Communists' policy vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina: Tito's policy of non-allignment
had an effect on Yugoslavia's Muslims, stimulating interest among them in their
Islamic heritage and in widening contacts, commercial and academic, with other
Muslim countries. This led to an increase in the relations between Yugoslav
Bosniac Muslims and the Muslim world, who invested in the religious
infrastructure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These contacts raised the Muslim
consciousness among Bosnia's population and Tito needed this to gather support
of the non-aligned Muslim world for economic and other financial help.310  Still,
the Bosnian syndrome would remain the same in the plans of the Serb and Croat
nationalists, seeing Muslim Bosniacs as converted Serbs or Croats, much the
same case as it had been for almost a century. This state of mind among the
Serbs and Croats would later prove to be a basic precondition for the Bosnian
tragedy (1992-1995).
As noted, the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution did not recognize the right to
self-determination in its operative part. In terms of self-determination, this
constitution was important in other aspects. It provided a legal framework
foreseeing the republics and autonomous provinces as semi-independent actors,
whose relationships with the Yugoslav Federation were based on cooperation
and agreement.  Both republics and autonomies had the right to veto the federal
decisions affecting their interests. The country, following Tito's death, was to be
run by the Yugoslav collective Presidency according to this constitution.
Nevertheless, while the republics were defined as a State, within which given
nations and nationalities realised their rights, no such definition was provided for
Yugoslavia's two autonomous provinces of Kosova and Vojvodina. They were
considered to be part of Serbia, albeit with semi-republican status.311  This
means that as soverign entities were deemed to be only Yugoslav republics (if
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one could speak at all about sovereignty in modern sense of this term), not the
Yugoslav nations or autonomous provinces. The Yugoslav nations (Serbs,
Croats, Slovens, Macedonians,  Muslims) and nationalities (Albanians and
Hungarians) were mentioned in the Preamble of the Constitution as the very
founders of that state. The wording of this passage meant that the right to self-
determination as a legal entitlement was  once and forever consummated within
the Yugoslav context. Its further realisation was designed and reserved for the
outside world only.312
Since the definition of internal statehood was grounded on certain internal
political organization (republics), not on ethnicity, later Yugoslav developments
went along these lines, with Kosova and Vojvodina playing an important role in
this new power relationship (although they were not defined as states/or
republics). The 1974 Constitution with its apparently decentralist tendencies did
not fit well with Serbia's internal dynamics. Immediately after its adoption,  in
Serbia was released in a semi-official way the so-called blue book, asking for the
revision of the 1974 Constitution and branding it as discriminatory against
Serbian national interests. This pamphlet also asked for the revision of the
republican/provincial borders, which were guaranteed by the 1974 Federal
Constitution, 313 urging instead for full ethnic self-determination of the Serbian
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nation living outside Serbia proper. Especially harsh was the attack on Kosova's
and Vojvodina's consitutional position, arguing that they represented ''states
within the state''.
However, during Tito's reign, these quarrels did not represent any threat to
Yugoslavia's internal stability and security. Almost all who ruled after Tito agree
that his charisma and authoritarian rule counted for this stability and security of
Yugoslavia. Next to this comes the favourable international environment and the
role Yugoslavia played as a buffer between East and West.314  The same views
are shared by scholars who wrote on the dynamics and the structure of the
Yugoslav society. This is quite a correct view as Yugoslavia began to crumble
immediately following Tito's death in 1980315 and this crumbling started with the
1981 Kosova Spring. Then, Kosovars asked for more rights, that is, full
republican status on par with other constituent republics of Yugoslavia. The very
name of that state, that is, Yugoslavia and the formal autonomous status enjoyed
by Kosovars were discriminatory, despite their numerical sieze (third population,
after the Serbs and Croats). However, the status of a republic was not
recognized for Kosova. Such a demand was suppressed violently and
considered as a grave criminal offence punishable severely by Yugoslav laws.316
The 1981 events in Kosova were used by Serbia as an excuse to revive
the Greater Serbian project, this time in a more sophisticated manner. The
project appeared in a form of a memorandum, known as the 1986 Memorandum
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of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (in Serbian: Memorandum SANU).
This was to be the only national program, ethnically based, in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia until its disolution in 1992.317 The wording of the Memorandum
was based on the standar0dization of nationalistic rhetoric with the view of
destroying other cultures. It definitely set in motion the terminology that reflected
the intentions of its drafters. There are found words such as ''genocide against
the Serbs'', ''the Serbian Holocaust'', ''martyrdom of the Serbs'', ''the Serbian
tragedy of Kosova'', ''the sacred lands where Serbian graves lay'', ''the Serbian
honor'', ''enemies of Serbia'', ''anti-Serbian coalition'', etc. With this action, the
Serbian Academy opened a Pandora's Box that in the years to come would
prepare the terrain for violent ethnic cleansing of the non-Serbs and the territorial
enlargement of Serbia to the detriment of others.318 The closure of the
Memorandum speaks of the drafters'  ''readiness to be in the service of the
realization of the tasks outlined in it and for the sake of the dictates of history and
our future generations''. These tasks are easily traceable in the Memoranum
when it speaks of the hard position of the Serbs living outside Serbia proper (in
Croatia, Kosova and Bosnia-Herzegovina). This clearly shows how the Serbian
academic circles paved the way for a certain policy - that of territorial expansion,
with agreement or manu militari,  as one of its drafters has put it (Dobrica Cosic)
– and gave Serbian discourse an additional argument in the fututre fight for
Greater Serbia.319
This document and the later actions undertaken by Milosevic after he
came to power in 1986, managed to redifine the collective identity of the ordinary
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Serbs320. From this time forward, the Serbs would have to defend not their
private property but ''the sacred lands and Serbdom'', a strategy outlined excately
by the Memorandum. The slogan ''all Serbs in one State'' destroyed all
possibilities for individual self-determination on behalf of the ordinary Serbs. To
the non-Serbs, this was both an exclusive and discriminatory attitude.
However, the Memorandum had one basic drawback. Namely, it did not
foresee the democratic changes that occurred in the international system
following the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War. After
Gorbatchev embarked upon the course of reforms in his country, the bipolar
system of the Cold War began to show signs of weakness leading to the
democratic changes within the system itself. These changes in the structure of
the system proved to be an enemy of the Greater Serbian project, but also an
enemy to all other non-democratic behaviours in European soil. It was the same
international system that had protected Yugoslavia during all the time of its
precarious existence. This international system used to play an important role in
Yugoslavia's creation in 1918 and, by implication, enabled the Serbs as a greater
nation  to dominate over the others living in that state (apart from the period
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related to the 1974 Constitution)321. Along with the collapse of this system is
associated the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the end of Serb dominance. What
remained of the Greater Serbian project was Belgrade's nostaligia for the past,
but also some failed attempts for dominance, changing the nature of the Serbian
national program. This changed nature is reflected in Belgrade's efforts (until
recently) to achieve a privileged role of a sole sucessor to the former Yugoslav
state (or a role of a state continuity with that state).
5. From Greater-Serbian Project to the Serbian Insistence on State
Continuity with Former Yugoslavia
The former U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, notes in
his book ''Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers'' (1996) that
the then President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia had asked him for American
support in favor of the Serb-Montenegrin continuity with the Yugoslav state in
case other Yugoslav republics seceded from it. This demand was put foreward
by Milosevic in the Summer of 1991, long before Yugoslavia broke up. Strange
as it may be, Milosevic had assured his guest that he himself was not a criminal
of any kind.322
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The issue of Yugoslavia's continuity is dealt with as other facet of the old
project of Greater Serbia dating as far back as 1844 (Nacertanije or the
''Outline''). The project itself was largely ignored and remained dormant in
Communist Yugoslavia for understandable reasons related with the prevalent
censorship over nationalist claims. It revived again on the eve of Yugoslavia's
break up and took different forms, one of which is the Serb insistence on the
state continuity with the former Yugoslavia.
The former Yugoslavia, set up as a Kingdom in 1918 and transformed into a
Communist federation after 1945, ceased to exist in 1992. Within this time-span,
it was considered, from an international standpoint, as one and the single
state.323  After its demise in 1992, none of its former republics, except for Serbia
and Montenegro, claimed to be its sole sucessors or its continuity. Other
republics claimed to be equal sucessors to the Yugoslav state and not its
continuity, a claim firmly endorsed by the whole international community. At first
sight, this appears to be a doctrinary issue involving scholarly niceties without
any practical implications.  However, this is not the case. The idea of Serbia's
state continuity with the former Yugoslavia revived in a given context and with a
clear aim, supported by its officials and the scholars alike. As an official position
of the Belgrade regime, it was made public on the occassion of the FRY's
(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and Montenegro) response
to the EC's Guideliness on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in
the Soviet Union of 16 December 1991, issued in a form of a declaration
intended to impact the ongoing dissolution of the former Communist
federations324.  This document significantly influenced international relations on
the issue of recognition of newly emerging states of Eastern Europe and served
as a foreign policy tool to have an imapct on the events on the ground. The
recognition and other related issues shall be discussed later (see, Chapter VI).
                                                
323 H. Lauterpacht (ed.), Oppenheim’s International Law. Vol. II Seventh Edition
(Longman: London 1952) pp. 1948-1950.
324  See, EC Declaration Concerning the Conditions for Recognition of New States,
adopted at the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991. Text
provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska,
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These two documents are dealt with here only as far as the issue of Yugoslav
continuity is concerned and the impact of this issue on the later events on the
ground.
The EC, as noted, was the first international body to concern itself with the
Yugoslav crisis. Under its auspicies,  the Conference on Yugoslavia and the
Arbitration Committee were set up (later renamed respectively as '' the Arbitration
Commission'' and ''the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia'').  For the
purposes of this section, apart from the above documents, the first opinion of the
Arbitration Commission stating that the ''Federal Republic of Yugoslvia is in the
process of dissolution'' is of greatest importance.325 This opinion left no doubt as
to Yugoslavia's further destiny in the period to come.
The EC Guideliness began by referring to the Helsinki Final Act and the
Charter of Paris (1990), in particular the »principle of  self-determination«. It then
affirmed the readiness of the EC countries to recognize new states ''subject to
the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each
case''. The Guidelines described the potential candidates for recognition as those
new states which ''have constituted themselves on a democratic  basis, have
accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed
themeselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiation''. Lastly, the
Guidelines further specified the conditions to be fulfilled by the new states if they
were to recieve international recognition. These conditions concerned the issue
of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, the non-
violability of borderes, nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful settlements of disputes,
etc.
The Guidelines concluded with an unusual warning, which said that the EC
countries ''will not recognize entities which are the result of aggression'' and that
they ''would take account of the effects of recognition on neighbouring states''.
The first part, as we note later (see, infra page pp. 188-193), concerned the
                                                                                                                                                
Yugoslavia Through Documents. From Its Creation to Its Dissolution (The Hague: Martinus
Niijhoff Publishers, 1995) pp. 431-432.
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Serbs entities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina326, while the second concerned
the issue of Macedonia's statehood  vis-a-vis Greece.
As for the still existing state of Yugoslavia as a whole, the EC introduced a
test that was meant to put under close scrutiny the application of the Guidelines.
The application was designed as a procedure requiring any Yugoslav republic to
apply for recognition by 23 December 1991. Those interested in this had to state
and answer whether:
-they wish to be recognized as independent states;
-they accept the commitments contained in the above-mentioned Guidelines;
-they accept the provisions laid dawn in the draft Convention under
consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia, especially those in Chapter  II
on human rights and rights of national or ethnic groups;
-they continue to support the efforts of the Security Council of the United
Nations and the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia.
The written applications would then be submitted to the Arbitration Committee
established in parallel with the Conference on Yugoslavia for advice (known also
as the Badinter Commission, or the Arbitration Commission). A decision by this
body would be taken and implemented by 15 January 1992. The invitation by the
EC was thus extended to all six republics of the former Yugoslavia but there was
to be no uniformity in the responses of the results. In this place we concern
ourselves only with the cases of Serbia and Montenegro, leaving the rest for a
later discussion. This is more so because the Serbian (and Montenegrin) answer
revealed their approach towards the issue of state continuity with the former
Yugoslav state and, consequently, their war aims against the others.
All six Yugoslav republics responded to the invitation extended by the EC's
Declaration on Yugoslavia, but only four sought recognition.327  Serbia (and
                                                                                                                                                
325 See, Opinion No. 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on
Yugoslavia. Paris, 29 November 1991. International Legal Materials, Vol. 31 (1992) p.1494. Also
reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp. 415-417.
326 The same opinion as to the Serb entities is expressed by Saskia Hille, “Mutual
Recognition of Croatia and Serbia (+ Montenegro)”. European Journal of International Law Vol. 6
No. 4 (1995) pp. 598-612 at 600, 604 footnote 26 etc.
327 See, Opinions Nos. 4-7 of the Badinter Commission. International Legal Materials Vol.
31 (1992) pp. 1501; 1503; 1507; and 1512. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia
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Montenegro) did not. In his reply to the EC on 23 December 1991, Serbia's
Foreign Minister recalled that Serbia acquired ''internationally recognized
statehood'' as early as the Berlin Congress of 1878 and on that basis had
participated in the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
in 1918,  which became Yugoslavia. The Serbian minister concluded that Serbia
was not interested in secession328. Much was the same for the then Serbian ally,
Montenegro, announced by its Foreign Minister on 24 December 1991. The
Montenegrin Foreign Minister also declined the EC's offer to recognize
Montenegro on the grounds that his country retained a potential international
personality. A Montenegrin official also recalled the contribution of his country in
the formation of the state of Yugoslavia in 1918 so that ''in case Yugoslavia
disunited and ceased to exist as an entity, the independence and sovereignty of
Montenegro continue their existence in their original form and substance''.329
While the Serbian answer was more in line with the 1986 Memorandum
relying on Serbian statehood as a basis for any redefinition of the common
Yugoslav  state,330 the tiny republic of Montenegro only pleaded in favor of
retaining its pre-1918 statehood in case Yugoslavia dissolved, having no
pretensions as to the state continuity with the Yugoslav state being dissoloved.
                                                                                                                                                
Through Documents, pp. 486-500. See, also, the Statement by the then Presidency of the
European Community on the Recognition of Yugoslav Republics. EPC Press Release, P.9/92
(Brussels, 15 January 1992).
328 For the text of the Serbian position, see, FOCUS, Special Issue, Belgrade, 14 January
1992 p. 276.
329  For the text of the Montenegrin position, see, FOCUS, Special Issue, Belgrade, 14
January 1992 p. 282.  In fact, the initial position of Montenegro was to ask for recognition. Its
officials accepted the proposals made by Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the Conference on
Yugoslavia. Montenegro was about to ask the EC for recognition but such an attempt was
thwarted by the then President Momir Bulatovic of Monegero, an aide of Milosevic and the last
Prime Minister of the FRY during Milosevic's rule until November 2000.The current president of
Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, recalls that this position was changed at the last moment due to
Milosevic’s pressure exerted on Montenegro’s delegation at this conference. See, Milo
Djukanovic, “Interview”. Radio Slobodna Evropa  (In South Slavic languages), 19 October 1999
(also available in internet: http://www.rferl.org). Similar view is expressed by other high officials of
Montenegro who even compare the 1918 events (the annexation of Montenegro by Serbia) with
the ones that occurred in 1991-1992. Miodrag Lickovic, “Interview”. Radio Slobodna Evropa (In
South Slavic languages) 05 June 2000 (also available in internet: http://www.rferl.org).
330 This position was later elaborated in details by two booklets issued by the Ministry of
Information of the Republic of Serbia. See, The Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia
(ed.), The Creation and Changes of the Internal Borders of Yugoslavia (Beograd: Srbostampa,
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This further showed that Montenegro did not intend to base its quest for self-
determination either on ethnicity or history. Montenegro was especially not
inclined to extend its quest for self-determination beyond its administrative
borders. Montenegro's concern focused on its state continuity with the pre-1918
Kingdom of Montengro, not with Yugoslavia as such.  A similar attitude was
adopted by the Baltic states upon their withdrawal  from the Soviet Union.
These positions regarding state continuity,  embraced by Serbia on one
side, and the rest of the former Yugoslav republics on the other, demonstrate that
Yugoslav self-determination requires more than a unified approach. This means
that every analysis of the Yugoslav case should be context-oriented, especially
as far as the position of the international community is concerned. The Yugoslav
self-determination raised the acute issues unsettled since the beginning of the
20th century. A similar suggestion had been made by George Kennan upon the
fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, when he had rightly  seen the problems
of Central and Eastern Europe as of great historical  depth unsolved since the
end of ''the last war and even some arising from the break up of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire''331 One such unsolved issue was, as opposed to the Soviet
Union, that concerning the state continuity of the pre-1992 Yugoslavia with the
old, pre-1918 Kingdom of Serbia. This had been the main issue in the Serbian
discourse during the Versailles Yugoslavia. It was raised again by Milosevic
following Yugoslavia's dissolution in 1992, to be closed as an issue and taken off
from the agenda of FRY foreign policy only after Milosevic's fall from power in
September 2000. However, the Greater Serbian project after 1991-1992 was a
new one focusing on the concept of state identity and continuity, as opposed to
pre-1945 discourse, which did not need such a concept due to the role the
Serbian elite played in the running of the Versailles Yugoslavia and the overall
international climate vis-a-vis this state.
                                                                                                                                                
1991); Miodrag Zecevic and Bogdan Lekic (eds.), Frontiers and Internal Territorial Division in
Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Srbostampa, 1991).
331 George Kennan, “An Irreversibly Changed Europe, Now to be Redesigned”.
International Herald Tribune  14 November 1989.
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The issue of continuity has raised two questions following Yugoslavia's
dissolution: first, was the former Yugoslavia a new state or a mere extension of
the pre-1918 Kingdom of Serbia ? The second and more important question was
whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), formed on
27 April 1992,  was a new state (like other Yugoslav republics who gained
independence) or the sole sucessor to former Yugoslavia? The answer to these
questions explains the agressive behavior of the Belgrade regime after
Yugoslavia's collapse in 1992.  A proper answer to these issues depends on the
full and exact finding of the facts leading to Yugoslavia's formation in 1918, 332
and its final dissolution in 1992. The latter are easily ascertainable for there
exists a plethora of international authoritative rulings on this matter (rulings of the
Badinter Commission and the attitude of the international community following
the outbreak of hostilities in the Yugoslav territory). The former, though, present
themeselves in a slightly complicated form. The analysis aimed at their
ascertainement can be based primarly on the practice of the Allied Powers
following  First World War, although the recognition practice of the individual
states should not be neglected. Pursuing this approach, the Polish scholar,
Krystina Marek, rightly noticed that the ''history of events leading up to the
formation of Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) ... could
not have failed to have an influence on the events'',333 with Serbs (officials334 and
                                                
332 Krystina Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in International Law (Geneve :
Library E. Droz, 1954) p. 237.
333 Ibid. 237.
334 Nikola Pasic, the Serb Prime Minister (1914-1918) and the most influential politician in
the interwar period, had told the non-Serb proponents of Yugoslavia in 1917 that the King would
always have to be Orthodox by religion. Pasic later denied the understanding of many of Serbia’s
wartime allies that victory had created a new state. Belgrade preferred to see the Serb-Croat-
Slovene Kingdom as merely a natural extension of the Kingdom of Serbia, requiring no new
foundation in international law of the time. This theory of “continuity” between Serbia and
Yugoslavia was to bedevil the new Kingdom, since it raised and settled the acute issue of
whether the non-Serbs were to be treated as equals with the Serbs or just as “little brothers”.
Moreover, in the case of Kosova and Macedonia, Pasic argued that they were annexed and
integrated into the Kingdom before 1914 and therefore cannot be affected by the Paris Settlement
on minority rights. This was again based on the Serb theory of state continuity with Yugoslavia.
See, Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War. The War in the Balkans, pp. 116-117; Dr. F.
Muenzel, What Does International Law Have to Say About Kosovar Independence?  (September
1998). (available in internet only: http://www.rz.uni.hamburg-de/illyria/independence.htm).
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scholars335 alike) seeing the new state of Yugoslavia as a mere extension of the
old Serbian Kingdom, and the Croats and Slovenes336 (and the rest of the
international community337) denying the existence of the state continuity (identity)
                                                
335 Pre-war Serbian scholars made the distinction between internal (constitutional) and
international aspects of continuity. Constitutionally, these scholars saw the Serbs-Croat-Slovene
Kingdom (Yugoslavia) as a new state, while internationally as a mere extension of the pre-1918
Kingdom of Serbia. See, S. Jovanovic, Ustavno Pravo Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca
(Narodna Knjiga: Beograd 1914) pp. 12-21. More on this debate between the two wars, see also,
Stevan Dordevic, O Kontinuitetu Drazava s Posebnim Osvrtom na Medjunarodno-Pravni
Kontinuitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije i FNRJ (Beograd: Naucna Knjiga, 1967) pp. 162-163.
336 The Croat and Slovene scholarly work and public opinion at large saw no extension of
Serbia to the territory of the new state of Yugoslavia. Rather, they saw on it a union of the Croat-
Slovene-Serb Kingdom, formed on 31 October 1918 on the ashes of Austo-Hungarian Empire, on
the one hand, and the Kingdom of Serbia, on the other, both of which decided to form on 1
December 1918 the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. See, O Robarz, “Da li je
Nasa Kraljevina Nova ili Stara Drzava”. Arhiv za Pravne i Drustvene Nauke Knjiga XXIII
(Beograd: 1933) pp. 241-261.
337 After First World War the international community, acting through the Paris Peace
Conference, stood firmly against the Serbian official and scholarly positions. It not only
recognized anew the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (entirely as a new state), but was all too
cautious when drafting the Paris Peace Conference documents so that no room would be left for
any misinterpretation as to the international status of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. Thus, for
the former Austro-Hungarian territories, the Conference used the term “territories” that entered
the 1918 Union with the Kingdom of Serbia. The Conference in its documents made no reference
to the Kingdom of Montenegro as a partner to this union between the Austro-Hungarian
“territories” and the Kingdom of Serbia, because it was seen as a country annexed by Serbia
before the unification day (1 December 1918). The Conference also did not refer in its documents
to former Austro-Hungarian territories as a state because the Allies had not recognized the short-
lived existence of the Croat-Slovene-Serb Kingdom (formed in Zagreb on 31 October 1918,
lasting only until December 1, 1918). On the nature and the structure of the short-lived state of
the South Slavs (mainly Habsburg Slavs), see, more in Joseph Frankel, “Yugoslav Federalism”,
pp. 416-430 at 417-418; Branka Prpa-Jovanovic, “The Making of Yugoslavia (1830-1945)”. In
Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Nightmare, pp. 37-56 at 43; Bogdan Krizman, Vanjska Politika
Jugoslovenske Drzave: 1918-1941 (Zagreb: Skoljska Knjiga, 1975) pp.5-21. This state was
ephemeral but state nevertheless, able to be a partner in an act of unification, and as such
recognized by two other sovereign states: the Kingdom of Serbia itself and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. Similar ephemeral states have existed after Second World War (the Federation of Mali,
the United Arab Emirates, etc.). For the attitude of the Paris Peace Conference toward the new
state (the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom), including the individual recognition of its international
statehood, see, more, in a comprehensive study by Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of
States in Public International Law, pp. 237-262; For the ephemeral states after WW II, see, Habib
Gherari, “Quelques Observations sur les Etats Ephemeres”. Annuaire Français de Droit
International. XL, 1994 (Editions du CNRS, Paris), pp. 419-432. On the other hand, the scholarly
work has slightly been divided as to the status of the ill-fated October 1918 Kingdom of the South
Slavs (before the December 1, 1918 act of unification with the Kingdom of Serbia). See, Krystyna
Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law, pp. 241-258; Stevan
Dordevic, O Kontinuitetu Drazava s Posebnim Osvrtom na Medjunarodno-Pravni Kontinuitet
Kraljevine Jugoslavije i FNRJ,  pp. 160-164; Giorgio Cansacchi, “Identite et Continuite des Sujets
Internationaux”. Recueil de Cours. Academie de Droit International. La Hague, 1970, (II) Tome
130 de la collection (1971), pp. 7-89 at 29-30.
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of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (later, after 1929, renamed as ''the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia'') with the pre-1918 Kingdom of Serbia.
In the Communist Yugoslavia, the issue of state continuity (identity) did
not draw any special attention of scholars, while the official state discourse
viewed the Communist state as a continuation of the pre-1945 Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, but only when it came to its international standing (position).
However, from a constitutional perspective no such continuity (identity) with the
pre-1914 Yugoslavia was assumed by the Communists.338 The lack of debate on
this issue is explained by the political climate prevailing in the Communist
Yugoslavia, not allowing for any discussion having a nationalistic premise.
Exceptions to this existed but the discourse was conducted in a highly cautious
manner. Of this nature was the already mentioned book by Stevan Dordevic (in
fact his Ph.D diseration) and Milan Bartos's book review about the already-
mentioned Krystyna Marek's book on the issue of identity and continuity of states
(also a Ph.D disertation). Although Dordevic's dissertation is a very
comprehensive account of Communist Yugoslavia's international position
compared to the pre-1945 Yugoslavia and the old Kingdom of Serbia, arguing
conclusively in favor of state continuity between the two (pre and post-1945)
Yugoslav states, there is no analysis as to the raison d' etre of the problem of
state continuity in the Yugoslav discourse. The reasons for this discourse are
given by one another author, Milan Bartos, a famous Yugoslav lawyer of the
1960s and 1970s. Bartos stresses in his already-mentioned book review that the
idea of state continuity between the state of Yugoslavia (Communist and the
Kingdom of)  and the old Kingdom of Serbia is grounded on the Greater Serbian
project.339
As noted, it is not a difficult task to ascertain the crucial facts concerning
the issue of Yugoslav continuity (identity) for the period sorrounding Yugoslavia's
demise in 1992.  This is so because there are  scores of international
                                                
338 See, Stevan Dordevic, O Kontinuitetu Drazava s Posebnim Osvrtom na
Medjunarodno-Pravni Kontinuitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije i FNRJ, pp.97-114.
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authoritative documents, both regional and universal, recording the main
discourse concerning the events that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and
those after that. To this discourse we turn the next.
After having rejected the offer for international recognition, Serbia and
Monetenegro proceded with their ''continuity'' or ''identity'' theory and declared a
common state, '' the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'' , on 27 April 1992.340 This
common state was to be, in their view, only a transformation of the former
Yugoslavia (Communist and the Kingdom of). This ambitious claim was
expressed by the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) upon
the promulgation of the new constitution of this state (27 April 1992). The
Assembly stated that ''the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
transformed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a state composed of two
constituent republics, Serbia and Montenegro ''. It further stressed that the FRY
strictly respected the continuity of the international personality of the former
Yugoslavia and that it undertakes '' to fulfill all rights conferred to and the
obligations assumed by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
international relations, including its membership in all international organizations
and participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugoslavia''. A
further important claim for the purposes of this study is that the FRY accepted
that other entities that emerged from the predecessor state, e.g., the former
                                                                                                                                                
339 Milan Bartos: Krystyna Marek, “Identity and Continuity of States in Public International
Law” (Geneve 1954), book review, in Jugoslovenska Revija za Medjunarodno Pravo  Broj 1 God.
I (1954) Beograd pp. 290-293 at 292.
340 This position was an offictial stance of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) well until
November 2000. After Milosevic’s defeat in the September 2000 presidential elections in FRY,
the newly elected head of the Yugoslav state, Vojislav Kostunica, immediately applied for FRY’s
membership to the UN, thus renouncing Milosevic’s idea on state continuity. The UN response to
the newly elected FRY’s president was positive and the State was admitted to the UN on 1
November 2000. This served as a precondition for FRY’s further integration into the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the Council of Europe (CE), and other international structures and organisms. Cf. Radio
Slobodna Evropa (In South Slavic languages), 02 November 2000, 10.00h p.m. CET;
‘’Yugoslavia Admitted to UN’’. RFE/RL Newsline, 02 November 2000; Joylon Neagele, “Kostunica
and Djukanovic Hold Talks in Podgorica”. RFE/RL Newsline, 02 November 2000
(http://www.rferl.org/newsline). FRY’s Prime Minster after Milosevic’s fall, Zoran Zizic, in his
opening address to the Yugoslav Parliament on 4 November 2000, unambiguously pledged his
commitment to break with Milosevic’s past concerning the issue of continuity (identity) and
succession of former Yugoslavia. See, Radio Slobodna Evropa (In South Slavic languages), 04
November 2000, 10.00 p.m. CET.
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Yugoslavia, may be sucessor states entitled to a ''just distribution of the rights
and responsibilities'', regardless of the fact that the same letter stated below that
''the diplomatic missions and consular posts and other offices of Yugoslavia will
continue to operate and represent the interests of Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia'', thus excluding these assets from any ''just distribution'' in the future.
The letter stating the official position of the Belgrade regime was then sent to the
UN for a notification of the FRY's position on this matter.341 This unilateral
statement expressing the will to take over the rights and duties of the preceeding
state could not, in itself, determine the FRY's international standing (position).
The state's own will and conviction may be admitted to a very limited extent as a
controvertible piece of evidence of its identity and continuity, only if it represents
a spontaneous conviction and is not intended to produce effects in the oustide
world. Even so, it will at best be very weak evidence which has to yield before
more objective criteria. It does not, in itself, constitute a test.342 This means that
Belgrade's claim to continuity (identity) with the former Yugoslavia, having been
intended first and foremost to the outside world, did not meet any objective
criteria of state continutiy (identity).343
                                                
341 See, UN Document S/23877 of 5 May 1992.
342 Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity, p. 129. See, also, Joesef L. Kunz, “Identity of
States under International Law”. American Journal of International Law Vol. 49 Issue 1 (January
1955) pp. 68-76.
343 In Serbian circles, both official and unofficial, has existed an opinion that compared
the case of FRY with that of the Russian Federation following the Soviet Union’s demise. This is
not an appropriate comparison, both as far as the history of the two cases is concerned as well as
the weight the Russian state has in international arena.
Being in the possession of largest part of former Yugoslav assets, the FRY thought it
could emulate the Russian Federation. But, the situation is strikingly different. First, in the case of
Russian Federation, both the successor states of the former Soviet Union and the international
community agreed to recognize Russia’s continuity with the predecessor. Second, Russia’s
nuclear power bargain was almost missing in the case of FRY. Cf. Vladimir Djuro Degan, Ove E.
Bring and M. Kelly Mellone, “Correspondent’s Agora: UN Membership of the Former Yugoslavia”.
American Journal of International Law Vol. 87 Issue 2 (April 1993) pp. 240-251; Roland Rich,
“Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union”. European Journal of
International Law Vol. 4 No. 1 (1993) pp. 36-65; Danilo Turk, “Recognition of States: A
Comment”. European Journal of International Law Vol. 4 No. 1 (1993) pp. 66-72; Michael Bothe
et Christian Schmidt, “Sur Quelques Questions de Sucession Pose par la Dissolution de l’URSS
et celle de la Yugoslavie”. Revue Generale de Droit International Public Tome XCVI (1992) pp.
812-842; For a complete opposition to this stance of the international lawyers, see, Yehuda Z.
Bloom, “UN Membership of the ‘New’ Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?” American Journal of
International Law  Volume 86 Issue (October 1992) pp. 830-833.
149
This FRY's unilateral statement reveals the real aims and the directions of
the foreign policy of the Belgrade regime in the years following its adoption. They
concerned three issues, having both internal and international implications.
Internally, FRY's actions were designed in that way so that it takes no
responsibility for the conflicts and wars to come, portrying Serbian territorial
claims elsewhere as having nothin in common with the  Belgrade regime. This
was further meant to enable the Serbs outside Serbia to present their claims as
serving the function of the preservation of Yugoslavia against (other) secessionist
republics.  According to this Belgrade's position, it goes without saying that
Kosova and Vojvodina belonged to FRY based on the respect for the uti
possidetis principle protecting former republican administrative borders only. This
is to say that these two autonomous provinces were to be treated as an internal
affair of FRY, no matter what the final answer to FRY's claims over state
continuity with former Yugoslavia was. Another (internal) implication of this
Belgrade position concerning state continuity was related to the former Yugoslav
assets: FRY belived that it could be the only actor to decide about the way these
assets should be divided. Internationally, the Belgrade authorities did not even try
to be a full member of the international community, knowing that if it were to
apply for new membership in various international bodies, it would have to fulfill
some conditions (as did other Yugoslav republics before becoming equal
partners of the international society). Belgrade knew well about these conditions
since they had been put foreward in the already discussed EC document of
December 1991 (the ''Guidelines''). Their fulfilement was a very hard task for
Begrade because, as noted, they related, inter alia,  to the rule of law,
democracy, and the respect for human and minority rigts. In all these matters
FRY had a bad record during Milosevic's reign.
The FRY's efforts to externalize its domestic dynamics though unilateral
actions have been met with strong resistance by the international community and
its members. The rejection by the international community of the Serbian claims
for state continuity with the former Yugoslavia followed excately the same points
as those outlined by the Blegrade regime upon the promulgation of FRY's
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constitution (27 April 1992). This means that the rejection of the Serbian
continuity claims was related to  FRY's membership to international
organizations, sucession issues regarding assets, archives and international
obligations of former Yugoslavia, and, finally,  international criminal responsibility.
This international rejection did not come at once. It ramified rather slowly, along
with other  developments in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The first actor
to tackle this matter, as far back as 1992, was the Badinter Commission, whose
rulings were then followed by the rest of the international community.
On 18 May 1992, the Badinter Commission received a letter from Lord
Carrington, the then chairman of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, as to
whether the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution, as noted in the Opinion No. 2 of
29 November 1991, could be considered complete. In its opinion no. 8 of 4 July
1992, Badinter noted that a refrerendum held in Bosnia-Herzegovina during
February and March 1992, had produced a majority in favor of independence and
that Serbia and Montenegro consitituted a new state, the ''Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia'', adopting a new constitution on 27 April 1992. In this opinion, it was
further stressed that the ''former national territory and population of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are now under the sovereign authority of the new
states'' and that '' the common federal bodies on which all the Yugoslav republics
were represented no longer exists''. In addition, ''Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia
and Slovenia have been recognized by all the Member States of the European
Community and by numerous states, and were admitted to membership of the
United Nations on 22 May 1992''. The Commission also took into account the UN
Security Council Resolutions Nos. 752 and 757 of May 1992, containing a
number of references to the ''former SFR Yugoslavia''.  The Commission fully
endorsed the UN Security Council Resolution No. 757 of 30 May 1992, which
stated that ''the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in the United Nations) has not been generally
accepted''. On the top of this, Badinter gave its final judgement saying that the ''
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process of dissolution of the SFRY referred to in Opinion No.1 of 29 November
1991 is now complete and that the SFR Yugoslavia no longer exists''.344
This ruling of the Commission, along with others, was entirely integrated in
the UN policy. Most of the UN members adopted this policy concerning the
Yugoslav continuity (identity) issue. Of this nature is the UN Security Council
Resolution No. 777 of 19 September 1992, noting that ''the state formerly known
as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist'' and that
''the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in the United Nations''. It, therefore, recommended to the UN General
Assembly that the Assembly decided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations,
and that it should not participate in the work of the General Assembly.345 Having
recieved this recommendation, the General Assembly adopted the Resolution
No. 47/1 in which it noted that the ''the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) cannot automatically continue the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations'' and ''therefore
decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should
apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the
work of the General Assembly''.346  This attitude was accepted by all UN organs
and other pertinent structures, apart from the UN Legal Council.347 However, the
                                                
344 See, footnote no. 325 of this dissertation.  See, also, Resolution 752 (1992), adopted
by the Security Council of the UN at its 3075th meeting, 15 May 1992,  and Resolution 757
(1992),  adopted by the Security Council of the UN at its 3082nd meeting, 30 May 1992. Texts
provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia
Through Documents, pp. 575-577 and 593-599. (also available in internet: http//www.un.org).
345 See, Resolution 777 (1992), adopted by the Security Council of the UN at its 3116th
meeting, 19 September 1992. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Reprinted
in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, p. 721. (also available in internet:
http//www.un.org).
346  UN General Assembly Resolution No. 47/1, 22 September 1992. (also available in
internet: http//www.un.org).
347 Since the continuity of membership in international organizations largely depends on
their internal regulations (statutes), FRY has insisted most of the time on its right to state
continuity (identity) with former Yugoslavia in an apparent hope to extract some concessions by a
part of the international community (especially concerning FRY’s membership to some
international organizations). And, in fact, such concession were made by the Legal Council of the
United Nations who, on 29 September 1992, issued an open legal opinion setting out the United
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above rulings of the Security Council (and the General Assembly) have had a
decisive impact on the further continuation of FRY's membership in the UN and,
by definition, other international organizations (universal and regional).. Of the
first group of organizations having the universal character, the most important
ones were  the IMF and the WB.  Among the second group, FRY's membership
in  OSCE has during Milosevic's rule presented itself as crucially important. The
former issue is discussed later when the problem of the so-called 'outer wall' of
sanctions is taken up (see, infra pp. 240-248), while to the latter we turn in the
following but only after we have entirely completed the above discussion on the
FRY's membership in the United Nations and its pertinent structures.
The Badinter Commision reached a similar conclusion as the one, which
was arrived at in the UN organs. Badinter reached this in its deliberations as to
the general position of FRY according to the international law, international
recognition being included as well. Thus, in its opinion no. 10 of 4 July 1992, the
Commission answered directly to another question asked by Lord Carrington ,
who asked as to whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) was a ''new State calling for recognition''.   The answer of the
Commisson  was that ''the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a new State which
cannot be considred the sole sucessor to the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia'' and that '' its recognition by Member States of the European
Community would be subject to its compliance with the conditions laid down by
general international law for such an act and the joint statement and Guideliness
of 16 December 1991''. In short, Badinter stated, ''this means that the FRY
                                                                                                                                                
Nation Secretariat’s interpretation of the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 47/1 of 22
September 1992. This concession, made under the UN banner, was in favour of FRY’s attitude
that it could continue former Yugoslav membership in this organization and its pertinent bodies.
This further meant that there was only a simple continuation of the previous membership of  the
former Yugoslavia, not a new admission of the new state, e.g.. FRY (Serbia and Montenegro).
This position caused a confusion within the UN structures so that the General Assembly had to
pass anew one more resolution. It did so on 29 December 1992. The operative paragraph of this
new resolution ‘’reaffirms its resolution 47/1 of 22 December 1992, and urges member states and
the UN Secretariat in fulfilling the spirit of that resolution to end the de facto working status of
Serbia and Montenegro’’.  See, the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 48/88, 29 December
1992. (also available in internet: http//www.un.org).
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(Serbia and Montenegro) does not ipso facto enjoy the recognition enjoyed by
the SFRY under completely different circumstances'', so that ''it is for other
states, where appropriate, to recognize the new state''.348
The issue of FRY's membership in the OSCE presents itself in a more
complicated form. This is the case because in the OSCE, since the beginning of
the Yugoslav crisis in 1991, there existed strong tendencies for a simple
reintegration of the FRY, rather then its admission as a new member (like it was
the case with other former Yugoslav republics). The reason behind this,
according to some OSCE officials, was that FRY's eventual membership would
have made more easier for this organization to exert pressure on FRY to comply
with OSCE's standards on various issues (human rights, democracy, the rule of
law, respect for minority rights, etc.). At the same time, FRY's officials have on
many occassions claimed that no cooperation was possible with an organization
who denied FRY the status of a full-fledged member.  Hence, according to
Belgrade's position, FRY should have merely renewed or ressumed its seat
within the OSCE. This stance had constantly been repeated by FRY officials well
until the end of the conflict in Kosova (June 1999), due also to the fact that the
FRY's membership in OSCE was, inter alia, connected with the functioning of the
OSCE Mission for Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. This claim was recently
renounced by the new Belgrade authorities replacing Milosevic since September
2000. However, the history of Yugoslavia's suspension from the work of the
OSCE is very important, as were the FRY's efforts until September 2000 to
regain former Yugoslavia's membership in this organization.
The decision to prevent the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) from further
participation in the work of the OSCE was first taken by the Committee of Senior
Officials on 8 July 1992, which referred to the assessments contained in the
                                                                                                                                                
For the ruling of the UN Legal Council, see, Opinion of the Legal Council of the United
Nations. Reprinted in ‘’The Status of Yugoslavia in FAO’’ (Informal Briefing Note, September
1996). Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry (Tirana).
348 To the issue of recognition in the context of former Yugoslavia we turn in a more
detailed way in Chapter VI. For the text of the Opinion No. 8 of the Arbitration Commission of the
Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. Paris, 4 July 1992, see, International Legal Materials, Vol. 31
(1992) p. 1521. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunosvka, Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp. 634-
636.
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declarations of 12 and 20 May of the same year. In these declarations, ''the
Belgrade authorities and the Yugoslav People's Army'' were accussed of
''agression on Bosnia-Herzegovina''. The decision on suspension had been made
for an initial period of three months and its withdrawal made conditional on the
respect of main OSCE principles and cooperation with the Permanent Mission for
Kosova, Sandjak and Vojvodina, whose establishment was indicated at this
point. More importantly, the OSCE took the firm stand that when deciding the
future position (of the former Yugoslavia), it would take into consideration the
status of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in the United Nations and its bodies
and the official opinions of the EC Arbitration Commission (Badinter
Commission).349 The meeting of the OSCE Council of Senior Officials, held in
Stocholm in December 1992, endorsed the previous decisions, arguing that the
leaders of Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian forces active in Bosnia-
Herzegovina bear the greatest responsibility for the conflict in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. It furthermore informed the FRY leaders that ''only radical
changes of their policy toward the neighbours and their own people and real
cooperation in the peace process will gradually return the country into
international community''.350  The same messages were conveyed to the FRY's
leaders next December at the OSCE Council meeting held in Rome. The Council
urged the FRY authorities to accept the OSCE  ''principles, obligations and
decisions''. New conditions were attched to the eventual FRY's return to this
organization. Namely, the OSCE advocated an ''urgent and unconditional'' return
of the Permanent Mission for Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina after its expulsion
on 28 June 1993, and the resumption of negotiations about the future status of
Kosova.351 In its last summit, held before the Dayton Peace Agreements were
reached, the OSCE failed to reach a consensus on FRY's membership in it.
                                                
349 See, Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials of the OSCE on the Exclusion of
the Participation of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from the OSCE, 8 July 1992. Text
provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana.
350 Points 2 and 3 of the Document of the Final CSCE Council Meeting, Chapter:
Regional Issues. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry. Tirana.
351 Points 1. 2 and 1.3 of the Chapter on Regional Problems of the “Document of the
Fourth CSCE Council Meeting”. Rome. December 1993. Text supplied by the Albanian Foreign
Ministry, Tirana.
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While the Western countries and most of the newly admitted members saw
FRY's eventual  membership in this organization as an admission of the new
member, the Russian Federation, by contrast, defended the idea about FRY's
mere reintegration and the resumption of the former Yugoslav seat  in the
OSCE.352
Following the Dayton Agreements (1995) some progress was made in
FRY's relations with the OSCE. Next year, the OSCE structures made frequent
visits to Belgrade. In the eyes of the Belgrade regime, rapproachement with the
OSCE looked as if it was going to ensue some concessions in favor of FRY's
admission to the OSCE. Similar interpretations were given by Serbian scholars.
353  However, the position of the parties, the FRY and the OSCE, remained
unchanged ever since. The former still insisted on its claim to state continuity
(identity) with the former Yugoslavia, while the latter opposed it constantly. 354
FRY's authorities have tried hard after 1995 to gather support from former
Yugoslav republics for the cause of state continuity as described thus far. They
hoped that such an eventual support would be enough to obtain international
sympathies, much like the Russian Federation did following the December 1991
Alma Atta Agreement. This would have been equal to FRY's fulfillment of some
of the basic (objective) criteria as to the state continuity with former Yugoslavia
and, in FRY's opinion, leave unaffected its alleged exclusive claims over the
                                                
352 See, “CSCE Budapest Conference 1994 – Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New
Era’’. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. The details of the Russian position
are known to this author due to his personal participation in this summit of the OSCE as a part of
the Albanian Delegation.
353 See, Branislav Milinkovic, “FRY and the OSCE. Inertia of Suspension”. Review of
International Affairs Vol. XLVIII No. 1056 (15 May 1977, Belgrade) pp. 14-18.
354 The issue of the state continuity following the Dayton Accords was raised on the
occasion of the resumption of the work of the expelled OSCE Mission for Kosovo, Sandjak and
Vojvodina. The work of this mission did not resume, though. In its place, however, another
mission, Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), started to work following the agreement between
U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke and Milosevic (October 1998). The work of this mission
was different, having to check the implementations of the achieved ceasefires between the KLA
(Kosovo Liberation Army) and the Serb forces fighting in Kosova during the armed conflict there
(1998-1999). See, “OSCE - FRY - Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement”, 16 October 1998
(OSCE Document CIO.GAL/65/98). For the lates report before the OSCE pulled from Kosova on
the eve of NATO’s air strikes against FRY, see, Report of the Secretary General of the UN
Pursuant to Resolution 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council. UN
Doc. S/1998/1221.
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assets and other property rights of the former Yugoslavia.  Other Yugoslav
republics, however, viewed differently these efforts by the FRY government.
They saw them as an attempt by the FRY to separate the issue of mutual
recognition from the question of state continuity espoused by FRY only.
In the first article of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, it was said that the ''
partners shall particularly respect in full the sovereign equality of each of them,
settle conflicts peacefully and refrain from any act, either by way of threat, use of
force or in any other way, against territorial integrity and political independence of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and other states''.355  In the last article, mutual recognition of
FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent and
sovereign states was foreseen. These provisions, along with the Dayton Accords,
part of which they are, have been in accordance with the general stance
concerning the subjects entitled to sovereign statehood within the former
Yugoslav federation. They came after the Belgrade regime lost the wars in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia respectively. However, the same regime did not
give up the idea of gathering the support for its claims from other republics
concerning the state continuity with former Yugoslavia, regardless of the
provisions about mutual recognition. To this effect,  FRY even concluded two
agreements with Macedonia and Croatia respectively, and participated as a
partner in the Joint Statement with Bosnia-Herzegovina.356
                                                
355 Full text of the Agreement is reprinted also in the ‘Serbian Bulletin - Documents’,
Belgrade, and was circulated as an official document of the FRY’s Embassy in Tirana, Albania
(January 1996). Its official version, though, is reproduced in UN Doc. A/50/790 - S/ 1995, in the
form initiated on November 21, 1995, in Dayton and appears as final version in 35 ILM 89 (1996)
in the very form signed on December 19, 1995, in Paris, with all its annexes.
356 See, The Agreement on Normalisation of Relations and the Promotion of Cooperation
Between Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 8 April 1996. Full text reprinted in
the Skopje-based Albanian newspaper “Flaka e Vllazërimit”, dated 9 April 1996. For the
comments on it, see, the Albanian Embassy correspondence No. 892/96, dated 10 April 1996,
wherein the full text is attached as well; The Agreement on Normalisation of Relations Between
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, 23 August 1996. Full text
reprinted in Review of International Affairs, Vol. XLVII NO. 1048/96 pp. 13-14; See, also, the
Belgrade-based newspaper Politika (24 August 1996) commenting on the Agreement. Regarding
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Joint Statement was signed by Alija Izetbegovic (for the Bosnian side)
and Slobodan Milosevic (for the Serbian, not Yugoslav, side) on 3 October 1996. Full text of the
Declaration is supplied to this author by the Bosnian Embassy in Tirana (Albania). For the
157
Two important issues emerge from the documents concluded by FRY.
They show unambiguosly FRY's intent to make no distinction between mutual
recognition and state continuity  (identity) in order to garner the minimal
international support needed for the state-continuity assumption. The first point is
the title given to these documents, that is, ''Agreements on Normalisation of
Relations''. This heading leaves an impression as if there were some ordinary
frustrations in the normal communication between their signatories so that the
signing serves only to put these relations back on track again. This was not the
case, though. These documents have served as a legal framework for the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the new states, for the first time in
their own history. Their wider legal framework, from an international standpoint,
was the Dayton Accords. As such they could not have any legal validity outside
the Dayton Accords. In essence, they represent the implementation of the letter
and the spirit of the Dayton Accords and could not serve as a test that proves
FRY's state-continuity claims. The opposite was true instead. The same relates,
mutatis mutandis, to the Joint Statement, signed upon the initiative of the then
president Jacque Chirac of France. Its content and the diplomatic message it
conveyed was the same as that contained in the above agreements. This is to
say that all the documents under discussion represent political and diplomatic
step undertaken along the way to implement an internationally binding
agreement – the Dayton Accords. This document recognized all former Yugoslav
republics as sovereign and independent states on an equal basis, thus settling
conlusively any future controversy as to Yugoslavia's further continuitiy.
The second point, which also confirms in a decisive manner the political
nature of the above documents signed by FRY and its partners, is more directly
related to FRY's continuity claims. Articles 4 and 6 respectively (the above-
mentioned agreements) and Article 4 (''the Joint Declaration'') contain provisions
affirming FRY's continuity claims (or, as they put it, ''the parties accept or take
cognisance of''). However, FRY also accepted and took cognisance of the same
                                                                                                                                                
comments on the Declaration, see, Charles Truchart, “Bosnia-Yugoslavia to Swap Embassies”.
Washington Post Foreign Service October 4, 1996 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/).
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continuity assumption concerning other signatories to these documents. This
wording of these documents was seen in Belgrade not only as a matter of
principle confirming Serbian views on the issue of state continuity with the former
Yugoslavia, but as well as a necessary support needed  for the substantiation of
FRY's continutiy claim vis-a-vis the international community at large.357
However, this interpretation was vigorously challenged by other former Yugoslav
republics and the rest of the international community. They made a clear
distnction between the mutual recognition and the right to state continuity with
the former Yugoslavia.358 In fact, both the ''Agreements'' and the ''Joint
Statement'' did not recognize nor accept FRY's continutiy claims. They only note
a historical fact, which states that Serbia and Montenegro existed as sovereign
and independent states prior to 1918 so that, consequently, they had entered the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom in that capacity (as sovereign and independent
states). These documents also say that Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia  ''register
                                                
357 See, “Statement by the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”, Belgrade, 23 August 1996. Text reprinted in Review of International Affairs, Vol.
XLVII No. 1048 (1996 Belgrade) pp. 14-15.
358 Last time the issue was raised by former Yugoslav republics at the end of 1999. Then,
they submitted a draft resolution calling for an equal treatment of all five successor states to
former Yugoslavia on the international plane. See, UN Doc. A/54/L 62 ; and UN Daily Press
Briefing by Office of Spokesman for Secretary General (15 December 1999). For comments, see,
Radio Slobodna Evropa (In South Slavic languages), 28 November 1999, 10.00h p.m. CET.
The issue was acute especially in the period between 1995-1997.  After 1995, the Office
of the High representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina set up a body to tackle the succession issues
that emerged from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. International mediator, Arthur Watts, held
several meeting during 1995-1997 and was very active on the matter. He stopped his work at the
beginning of 1999 when FRY authorities refused to accept a framework convention on the
succession of former Yugoslavia drafted by him.  The FRY Delegation insisted not on the
equitable share, as did other former Yugoslav republics and Arthur Watts himself, but on taking
the largest part of Yugoslavia’s assets treating others as secessionists. So, FRY thought that it
was the only successor to the former Yugoslavia and the other republics secessionists. See,
RFE/RL, 18:00h CET, 01.06. 1997 (In South Slavic languages); RFE/RL, 18:00h CET, 18.10.
1997 (In South Slavic languages); RFE/RL, 18:00h CET, 09.12.1997 (In South Slavic languages);
RFE/RL, 18:00h CET, 08.01. 1999 (In South Slavic languages) and RFE/RL, 18:00h CET, 03.06.
1997 (In South Slavic languages). (Internet version only: http://www. rferl.org); The international
mediator on the succession of former Yugoslavia, Arthur Watts, postponed his work on the matter
for uncertain period of time. The ensuing war in Kosova following year, as well has been one of
the reasons for this postponement. After Milosevic’s fall from power, as noted, the issue has been
settled through an agreement between the parties since the new Yugoslav government did not
raise the issue of continuity with former Yugoslavia. Last meeting on the succession issues
before the Kosova conflict was held on 6-7 November 1997. See, ODRAZ B92 VESTI, 11 July
1997 (English); B92 Open SERBIA, Belgrade, 6-7 November 1997. Also available in internet:
http//www. Siicom.com).
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the mere fact of State continuity of the FRY'', meaning the pre-1918 statehood of
Serbia and Montenegro. However, this means a mutual recognition only and
nothing more than this. It could not, as it did not in fact, have any impact on the
stance of the rest of the international community. Above all, it did not have any
positive impact in terms of improving FRY's position concerning its continuity
claims with the former Yugoslavia. This mutual recognition was never accepted
by the international community as a test that Serbia and Montenegro preserved
their pre-1918 statehood either. This was FRY's unilateral will, endorsed in part
by some other Yugoslav republics (only concerning the above effects of a mere
declaratory nature) and dissmissed entirely by the rest of the international
community.
The preservation of international stability was yet another argument on
which FRY based its efforts to garner international support  in favor of its
continuity claims. Belgrade, in this context, compared its position with that of the
Russian Federation. However, the international stability  could not be put under a
serious threat by FRY's actions due to its lack of the nuclear bargaining power. In
the case of FRY, furthermore, the international community made clear that there
would be no rewards for the sort of unacceptable actions conducted by Belgrade
authorities. These actions even led to the imposition of the mandatary sanctions
against FRY and to its total isolation since the beginning of the war (s) in the
territory of former Yugoslavia359. Apart from this, the support for Russia's
continuity from other former Soviet Union republics was not of dubious nature but
clearly expressed in an international agreement (Alma Ata, December 1991),
stating unambiguously the wishes of the parties.360 At the same time, unlike the
Russian federation who accepted an equitable division of assets of the former
Soviet Union through the agreement, FRY made no distinction between mutual
recognition and continuity. FRY considered instead that it should succeed
automatically not only to the former Yugoslav seat in international organizations
but also to the rights over former Yugoslav assets and property (located both
                                                
359 Roland Rich, “The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union”, pp. 36-66 at 57-59.
360 Ibid. pp.  57-59.
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inside and outside the territory of former Yugosolavia). This position held by FRY
was made possible, as noted, due to the fact that by the time the war started it
held in possession the major parts of the former Yugoslav assets.361
If it is not accepted as the continuation of former Yugoslavia, can FRY be
held responsible for the war (s) and the conflict in the territory of the former
Yugoslvia? This matter was raised in March 1993 by the government of Bosnia-
Herzegovina who filed an application instituting the procedeeing before the
International Court of Justice.362 The matter is still pending before the
International Court of Justice, although the FRY authorities during Milosevic's
time constantly asked Bosnia-Herzegovina to remove the application from the
Court's files.363 The final say of the ICJ would certainly answer in an authoritative
manner the issue of state responsibility that FRY under Milosevic tried so
ardently to escape in her efforts to portray the conflict and war(s) in former
                                                
361 Ibid. 48-49; Mathew Craven, “The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of
States Under International Law”. European Journal of International Law  Vol. IX No. 1 (1998) pp.
142-163 at 142-144.
362 See, “Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of Genocide(Bosnia-
Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))”. ICJ Reports (1993); For comments, see,
Christine Gray, “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)). Orders of Provisional
Measures of 8 April and 13 September 1993”. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.
43 (July 1994) Part 3, pp. 704-714; Peter H.F. Bekker, “Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro))”. American Journal of International Law  Vol. 92 Issue 3 (July 1998) pp.
508-511.
363 Radio Free Europe (In South Slavic languages), 06 October 1999, 10:00h p.m. CET ;
02 August 1997, 10:00h p.m. CET; ODRAZ B92. OPEN YUGOSLAVIA. Belgrade Daily News.
Service News by 14:00h CET 07 May 1998 (Also available in internet: http://www. siicom. com);
“Milosevic Ponudio Izetbegovicu Uspostavu Diplomatskih Odnosa”. In South Slavic Service (In
South Slavic languages), VJESTI, 06 May 1998 (18:00h CET); Interview by Zoran Pajic and
Ambasador Muhamed Sacirbey. In South Slavic Service, 08 October 1999; South Slavic Service,
Vjesti, 30 December 1998 (18:00h CET); South Slavic Service, Vjesti, 06 October 1999 (18:00
CET); Mensur Camo, “Tuzba B i H Protiv SRJ za Agresiju i Genocid” South Slavic Service, 17
Mart 2000 (also available in internet: http://www. referl.org).
Milosevic used to condition the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bosnia-
Herzegovina with latter’s renouncement of the application before the ICJ concerning the
aggression and the crime of genocide against the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its people.
This, of course, has been repeatedly rejected by the officials and the state organs of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Apart from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia also instituted the
proceedings against  FRY in the mid-1999, based on the same legal and political understanding
as Bosnia-Herzegovina. Francis Boyle, a legal representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina before the
ICJ, said that Croatia has good chances to win the case because the ICJ based its ruling on its
own competence to deal with the case on the same grounds as in the Bosnia-Herzegovina case.
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Yugoslavia as events occurring within the other, for her secessionist republics. In
both proceedings of April and September 1993 before the Court concerning the
so-called provisional measures requested by Bosnia-Herzegovina with a  view of
putting an end to the conflict, FRY and its appointed ad hoc judge, Milenko
Kreca, held the view that in Bosnia-Herzegovina an internal/civil war was under
way and no acts of genocide were being committed by FRY or the people under
its control.364  Similar views were repeated during the 1996 preliminary objections
raised by the FRY. This time, apart from the already noted allegations, the FRY
representative to the Court even denied the very existence of the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Its existence, said the FRY representative, came into being only
after the Dayton Accords (1995).365
Although criminal in its nature, as seen from above,  this case has raised
various issues concerning the nature of the FRY policy under Milosevic. Among
these issues, that of state continuity and the succession to the former Yugoslavia
again took a prominent place in the procedeengs before the ICJ. The issue of
state continuity was raised by the Court itself when it came to deciding about its
own competence, that is, the right to be seized of the matter. The Court has in a
very skillful manner avoided any judgement in advance as to the merits of both of
these issues, rejecting at the same time FRY's pretentions that the Court had
neither personal nor subject matter jurisdiction (the so-called rationae personae
and rationae materiae jurisdictions, practically dealing with the issues of
genocide and aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina). On the other hand, when
                                                                                                                                                
Cf. Francis A. Boyle, “Hrvatska Tuzba Protiv SRJ Ima Dobre Izglede”. South Slavic Service, 06
July 2000 (http://www. referl.org).
364 Cf. “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ). Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures. Order of 8 April 1993”. ICJ Reports (1993) 3, paras. 41-42,
44-45, 52; and “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
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the Indication of Provisional Measures. Order of 13 September 1993”. ICJ Reports (1993) 325,
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365 Cf. “Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ). Judgement
on Preliminary Objections “. ICJ Reports (1996). (also available in internet: http://www.icj-icj=org).
For other allegations of the FRY representatives, see, Gavro Perazic and Sead Hodzic, ''Tuzba
Bosne-Hercegovine Protiv Jugoslavije i Protivtuzba Jugoslavije''. South Slavic Service (In South
Slavic languages only). February 1, 1998 (also available in internet:http://www.refrl. org).
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it ordered the provisional measures the Court made a prejudgement as to FRY's
responsibility over what was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time. In this
regard, the Court ruled unanimously that FRY should take measures to prevent
genocide and,  by votes 13 to 1, that it was obliged to ensure that military and
paramilitary  forces under its control, direction or influence did not commit acts of
genocide.366 In this realm as well, FRY used its state continuity claims with
former Yugoslavia to hide behind and shake off any responsibility for the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The proceedings of the ICJ in this case,  concerning state responisbility of
FRY for the genocide and agression against the state of Bosnia-Herzegvoina,
although not directly related to the issue of state continuity with the former
Yugoslavia, together with FRY's continuity claims in the realm of property rights
and other assets of the former Yugoslavia, constitute an important aspect
demonstrating Serbia's intentions that she sought to realise through the
insistence on its state continuity with the former Yugoslavia. In this regard,
international law of the present time has demonstrated that it is ready to meet the
challenges of its own time, thus contributing to the order and stability through a
correct and proper application of its own rules and norms on state continuity and
sucession. The other way around would have meant an edorsement of Serbian
agressive policies, having far-reaching consequences for the order and stability
in interstate relations, at least in this part of Europe.
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CHAPTER V:
THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SEARCH FOR SELF-
DETERMINATION
1. Northern Republics (Slovenia and Croatia) and Their “Western
Type” Self-Determination
In the development of self-determination within the former Yugoslavia,
especially during its last years, there were crystallized two options. The first
option was based on Western values and norms, stressing liberal ideas and
values, while the second one based itself on non-liberal and anti-democratic
values and norms, stressing non-liberal ideas and values. The former was
embraced by the two Yugoslav northern republics, Slovenia and Croatia, and the
latter by Serbia and its tiny ally Montenegro.367  One caveat should be made
here: the Republic of Croatia, after the coming to power of Franjo Tudjman,
began to resemble more and more Milosevic’s Serbia. We refer in this section to
this type of self-determination in Croatia, only as far as the pre-Tudjman era is
considered.368 In between this type of self-determination, there was the one
embraced by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, to be discussed in the
following section of this chapter. A common thread in all four cases, in contrast
with Serbia and Montenegro, was that they were territorially-based quests for
self-determination (notwithstanding the ethnic composition of all four republics).
                                                
367 See, more on this, in John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise
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The ramification of the above-mentioned quests for self-determination
within the former Yugoslavia came as a result of two parallel developments
during the 1980s: economic reforms and the crisis in Kosova that began in 1981.
The latter, however, took precedence over the economic reforms of the 1980s
and came to be a precedent for the future shape of the  Yugoslav tragedy. As a
reaction to the crisis in Kosova, after the 1981 riots there emerged the above
quests  for self-determination dominating the whole Yugoslav political scene.
Following Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia  entered the deepest ever
economic crisis. Its relations with the International Monetary Found (IMF)
became strained and new economic reforms were needed, this time not based
on the self-management and other postulates of Yugoslav Communism.369 When
Yugoslav Prime Minister, Branko Mikulic, took his office in 1986, he had to face a
political environment not akin to reforms as requested by the IMF. During most of
1988, the proposed economic reform was based on administrative measures and
the Socialist concept of self-management. This ran counter to the IMF’s
recommendations for free market and liberal economic policies. Yugoslavia was
placed under the tougher controls for “stand by” credits. Apart  from this, the IMF
also asked for effective measures to combat  the already prevailing inflation. To
this, Belgrade politicians replied with the claims for constitutional reforms
empowering the Yugoslav federation instead of its constituent units.370 Centralist
tendencies in Belgrade became obvious as soon as Mikulic tried sincerely to
embark on economic reforms, shortly before his resignation on December 1988,
as requested by IMF. Then, the pressure came not from Slovenia and Croatia but
from Belgrade. Until then, two northern republics resisted Mikulic’s reforms as
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being based upon administrative measures and old concepts of self-
management. However, following Mikulic’s resignation, Milosevic stood openly
against private property and free market, focusing instead on constitutional
changes of the political nature of the Yugoslav federation in an apparent hope to
take over the control of the federal structures. Milosevic’s move on the
constitutional plane was directed first and foremost against two autonomous
provinces of Kosova and Vojvodina, exactly as foreseen by the 1986
Memorandum. Thus, Belgrade’s first priority became the unity of Serbia via the
destruction of the autonomies of Kosova and Vojvodina, preparing the ground for
a centralized and Serbian-dominated federal Yugoslavia.371
Despite his backing from the Yugoslav military, Milosevic could not
succeed Mikulic as Prime Minister. Mikulic was succeeded by a liberal-minded
Ante Markovic, a Croat and candidate of Slovenia and Croatia. Milosevic and the
Yugoslav military were forced to support the candidacy of Ante Markovic
because of the events in Vojvodina and Montenegro. This endorsement did not
mean the support for reform; it was, rather, a political reaction to the coups in
Montenegro and Vojvodina following the so-called “anti-bureucratic ” revolutions
in these two countries that led to the replacement of their legally elected
representatives. After he toppled down the rulers of these two entities and
replaced them with his men, Milosevic realized that he needed to back off
temporarily. Within a few months, Milosevic succeeded in destroying other
constitutional balances, this time by abolishing the autonomous status of Kosova
and Vojvodina (March 1989). The new Prime Minister, hoping to garner Serbia’s
support for his reforms, did not react to the declaration of the state of emergency
in Kosova at the end of February 1989, which was made to extract the Kosovar
Assembly’s acceptance of the constitutional changes leading to the abolition of
Kosova’s autonomous status within Yugoslavia. The collective Federal
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Presidency proved to be nothing more than Milosevic’s executive assistant .372
The only reaction came from Slovenia.
The Slovenian leaders, both in power and in opposition (the latter recently
formed for the first time in the territory of former Yugoslavia), gathered in a
meeting of solidarity for the plight of the Kosovar Albanians living under the state
of emergency. This meeting, held at the end of February 1989, took place in
Ljublana and is known as Cankarijev Dom Meeting. It consisted of a genuine
support for Kosova and its majority population on the eve of the destruction of
Kosova’s autonomous status.373 Slovenes clearly denounced the state of
emergency in Kosova and began their work in two other directions. One was the
democratization and the next was institutionalization of Slovenia’s position within
the Yugoslav federation. The Slovenes were taken over by the wide support
given to Milosevic within the Serbian and Yugoslav society for his actions in
Kosova.374
The process of democratization in Slovenia began when the Slovenian
Communists gradually allowed the voice of the various associations to be heard.
In April 1989, they even elected their member of the Federal Presidency, Janez
Drnovsek, in a direct balloting. This was an unprecedented step for a Communist
country. Apart from this, the Slovene Communists fully endorsed the so-called
“May Declaration”, passed by the Slovene opposition. This declaration clearly
hinted at Slovenia’s independence with an intentional symbolic reference to that
of 1918.375  The next step in this process of Slovenian democratization was the
June 1989 “Fundamental Charter of Slovenia” that paved the way for Slovenian
constitutional reforms (September 1989). These reforms granted the Republic of
Slovenia the right to protection from centralist tendencies of Milosevic and the
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Yugoslav military. It is this charter and the later constitutional reforms that
ensued that show the true liberal character of the Slovenian quest for self-
determination. Thus, the “Fundamental Charter” in its first passage, announced
that Slovenian leadership wanted to live in “a democratic state grounded on the
sovereignty of the Slovenian people, human rights, and the liberties of citizens”
and, further, that they “ will live only in such a Yugoslavia in which our
sovereignty and our lasting and inalienable right to national self-determination
are secured, together with the equality of all nationalities and minorities, in which
the differences among peoples are protected and guaranteed, and in which the
common tasks in the federal state are regulated on the basis of consensus”. The
Charter also recognized an explicit right for political pluralism, including freedom
of association and free voting.376  These messages were not welcomed in the
East of the country. Milosevic and his aides continued their quest for a tighter
and centralized federation, leading to war and conflict with others.377
To preserve their rights, the Slovenes went further, shifting the political
problem over Kosova into the terrain of constitutional rearrangement of the
Yugoslav federation. In the Summer of 1989, the Slovene Parliament embarked
upon a constitutional reform aimed at preserving the statehood of Slovenia,
including the right to dissolve its association with Yugoslavia. Slovenia rejected
the Serbian claims that its right to self-determination had been “consummated”
through its accession to Yugoslavia in 1918. These Slovenian constitutional
amendments dealt further with human rights, political freedoms, democratic
procedures, economic freedom (including the right to own property), the use of
Slovenian language in Slovenia (including on the part of federal organs), the
financial obligations of Slovenia vis-à-vis the Federation, and the rights of the
Federal Army. A state of emergency, according to the proposed constitutional
amendments, could be proclaimed in Slovenia only with the consent of the
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republic’s parliament.378 These Slovenian moves were the first serious step
towards the resistance of Serbian centralist tendencies. These tendencies were
clearly expressed in a meeting of the Yugoslav Communists (the Communist
League of Yugoslavia, or the LCY), held on afternoon of 20 December 1989. This
meeting, convened at the behest of the Yugoslav military, was designed to put
pressure on the Slovene Communists to give up their drive towards a loose
federation. The Slovenes did not succumb to the pressure and on 27 September
1989 their parliament voted on the proposed amendments granting the Republic
more protection and freedom of action vis-à-vis Serbia and the federal
institutions.379  The Slovenian constitutional amendments were a prelude to full
democracy and independence, although the latter was coined in terms of “ an
asymmetric federation”. The message was clear at the time: preventing the
Serbian and the Yugoslav military’s further tendencies towards centralization of
the Yugoslav federation that had already started with Belgrade’s moves against
Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosova (October 1988-July 1989).
The pressure against Slovenia did not end here, though. Milosevic and his
Federal Presidency (the Army included) staged a rally for December 1, 1989,
hoping to destabilize Slovenia in a similar fashion with the rallies held in
Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosova before they were stripped off their
constitutional rights. The Slovenian authorities banned the rally so that the
Milosevic group charged with the organisational issues had to back off. As a
response to this, Serbia broke its economic relations with Slovenia on December
3, 1989.380  This Serbian action did not trouble Slovenia that much but did trouble
the reform-oriented Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic, who presented
his economic program to the Yugoslav Parliament on 18 December 1989, hoping
to realize the unity of the Yugoslav market.  This was hardly possible after the
December 1989 economic war between Serbia and Slovenia. From this time
onwards, Milosevic not only opposed Markovic’s reforms but also did his utmost
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to push Slovenia out of Yugoslavia and settle scores with the rest of the country.
For Slovenia, the preservation of its independence and the reduction of the
maneuvering room for anti-Slovene forces within Yugoslavia, remained the goals
to be pursued in the future. The Fourteenth Congress of the CLY, held in January
1990, provided an opportunity to advance these goals. The Slovenes also found
a reply to the Serbian economic boycott: on 26 February 1990, Slovenia
discontinued remissions to the Federal fund for the underdeveloped regions, as
Serbia and its regions benefited from that fund.381
After the failure of the LCY in its Fourteenth Congress, the Communist Party
as well as the Yugoslav federation began splintering along republic lines.
Slovenia and Croatia went further ahead with planned multiparty elections
announced for the Spring 1990. The crucial issue emerged: who was sovereign?
Peoples or republics? In the case of Slovenia, the national (ethnic) and
republican boundaries were essentially the same so that the answer was simple:
sovereignty for the republic. In the rest of Yugoslavia, the situation was all too
complicated. However, the first multiparty elections were held in all Yugoslav
republics. Slovenia was leading in this process. After the April 1990 elections, the
Slovenes went further in their quest for self-determination, holding a successful
plebiscite on independence in December that year, and in late February 1991
promulgated crucial federal laws in preparation for “disassociation” from
Yugoslavia in June 1991. Croat leaders began saying that Croatia, too, would
break away if Slovenia did. Both republics were working on new constitutions
modeled upon western democracies.382 The following Spring and Summer saw
the two northern republics declaring their full independence, with Serbia and
Montenegro trying to take control over the Federal Presidency and Macedonia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina holding a compromise stance between the Slovene and
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Croat positions and  that of Serbia.383 For most of 1991, the Federal Presidency
was blocked in its work.384 The rotation of the Yugoslav presidents, which was
due on May 15, was blocked by the Serbs. The President at this time was
Borisav Jovic, a Serb and close collaborator of Milosevic; the next line for the
office was Stipe Mesic, a Croat.385 Jovic refused to be replaced by Mesic. This
was in effect a Serbian coup d’ etat. Jovic was backed by Serbia’s allies on the
Yugoslav presidency: Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosova (the last two controlled
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by Milosevic after the 1989 constitutional changes). In this situation, the Croats,
after the Slovenes did so in December 1990, declared their wish for
independence on 19 May 1991. The full secession of the two northern republics
was prevented by the U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, who met with Prime
Minister Markovic and with each of the republic presidents on June 21, 1991,
urging them to keep Yugoslavia together. Markovic also spoke to the Croat and
Slovene assemblies, urging them not to secede. The two northern republics
refused to turn back. On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia announced their
full independence.386  The immediate result was war in Slovenia, which lasted ten
days. With the Brioni Agreement of July 7, signed by the EC representatives and
the heads of Yugoslavia’s republics, Slovenia gained the right to be independent
by October  8, 1991.387 In Croatia there was no truce. Hostilities there were only
just beginning in July 1991, and matters would go very badly for Croatia because
Yugoslav government authorities (Markovic as Prime Minister and Mesic as the
head of the Yugoslav presidency following the Brioni Agreement) had lost control
over the Yugoslav military. By late 1991, Tito’s Yugoslavia was coming to an end.
In December that year, Mesic resigned as president of the Yugoslav presidency
and Markovic resigned as well. The two northern republics gained their
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international recognition, while the international community began to see
Yugoslavia as a state being in the process of gradual dissolution.
2. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM): the Victims of the Balance of Power Within Yugoslavia
 
 The history of these two Yugoslav republics very much reflects the balance of
power existing within the Yugoslav federation during all periods of its
development. Their formation after the Second World War, as noted, was a result
of the internal balance of forces. The very aim of their formation was to check
and balance Serbian southwards expansion (FYROM) and to prevent the Serb-
Croat conflict over Bosnia-Herzegovina.388  The independence of these two
countries was, to use Meier’s words, unwanted.389 Nevertheless, their path to full
independence and the concrete reasons for it differ in each case. This is not to
say that the basic premises of the balance of power that caused their birth
decades ago do not remain the same.
 The anti-Serbian course in the Macedonian politics began with the November
1989 Congress of the League of Communists of Macedonia (LCM). In this
congress, the old dogmatic and pro-Serbian party leadership was voted out of
the office. However, the first signs of rift between Milosevic’s Serbia and
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Macedonia appeared when the new law on colonists was put foreword to the
Yugoslav parliament (as discussed already). This was seen in Macedonia as a
sign of the potential threat coming from Serbia. These Serbian intentions were
made even clearer with Milosevic’s famous speech on 28 June 1989 on the Field
of the Blackbirds in Kosova, when he referred to certain aspects of the Serbian
medieval history covering Macedonia as well. Upon the Macedonian insistence
for explanation, Milosevic visited Skopje, the Macedonian capital, but his
behavior was highly arrogant, ignoring the Macedonian claims over the
Monastery of Prohor Pcinjski, which is important for modern Macedonian national
consciousness but which, as a result of an earlier decision taken by Tito’s
Communists after the war, when the inter-republican borders were being drawn,
had been assigned to Serbia. It was clear to Macedonian officials that Milosevic’s
gesture was a sign of his desire to include Macedonia, which the Serbs had
called “South Serbia’ in the interwar period, among “Serbian territories”.390  In
fact, this was one of the aims of the 1986 Memorandum.
 After the Slovenes and Croats, new Macedonian Communists that emerged
from the above congress, too, had to get ready for their independence, thus
giving a sign to Milosevic that this republic did not endorse nor support
Belgrade’s course as opposed to previous pro-Serbian officials. However, the
September 1991 referendum on Macedonian independence was even softer than
its Croatian counterpart, leaving open the issue of further coexistence within a
reformed Yugoslav federation. This was in fact the very aim of the Macedonian
officials who, jointly with Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented their compromise
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proposal for a new arrangement in Yugoslavia early in June 1991. It was a
counter-proposal to the Slovenian-Croatian confederative plan and a response to
Serbian centralist tendencies, albeit much closer to the former. The Bosnian-
Macedonian proposal represented an attempt to preserve some sort of
Yugoslavia and, if this would prove impossible, to realize the right to self-
determination in a democratic and civilized manner.391  The Bosnian-Macedonian
proposal foresaw that the new Yugoslav association, its members included,
would be a legal subject  - the latter naturally dependent on external recognition.
It foresaw as well that Yugoslavia should be a unified economic, custom and
currency zone and that its foreign policy should be common, though the member
states would enjoy the right to take independent initiatives in foreign policy392.
This plan was rejected because it offered the Serbs too little, while it went too far
for the Slovenes and Croats.393
 Following the failure of their joint proposal, both Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina submitted their applications for international recognition as
requested by the EC Hague Conference on Yugoslavia. In the meantime,
Gligorov conducted successful negotiations with the Yugoslav military with
regard to its withdrawal from Macedonia, in a time when the same military was
concentrating in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina (February-March 1992). The
Yugoslav military  withdrew from Macedonia in an apparent hope that this
republic would not be able to safeguard its stability.394  However, Macedonia
managed to preserve its fragile peace, first by gaining the support of the Albanian
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Focus (Belgrade, 1992), Special Issue, pp. 82-87.
392 For the text of the Bosnian-Macedonian proposal, see, Belgrade-based daily
newspaper Borba, 7 June 1991.
393 Kiro Gligorov admits that this proposal was too little too late for both side, the Serbs
and the north of Yugoslavia. See, Kiro Gligorov, “Interview”. Radio Free Europe (In South Slavic
Languages).
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population living there who voted in favor of its independence and, second, by
redefining its own constitution declaring Macedonia as a “citizens state” rather
then as the “national state” of the Macedonian people395. The rest of the fight that
Macedonia had to conduct over consolidation of its international statehood was
about its name. For example, the Greeks objected to its name which, in their
eyes, implied territorial claims against Greece.396 To counteract this move,
Macedonia declared through a constitutional amendment, adopted at the
insistence of the West European states, that it did not intend to engage in any
“interference’ in the sovereign rights of the states affected or in their internal
affairs. In a similar spirit, a further amendment affirmed that Macedonia did not
nurture any territorial claims against its neighbors.397 With the Yugoslav army out
of Macedonia and the guarantees given to its neighbors, the new state of
Macedonia was more or less secured in its way towards full independence.398
This means that the Macedonian quest for (territorial) self-determination, apart
                                                                                                                                                
394 Victor Meier, Yugoslavia. A History of Its Demise,  p. 193.
395 For an excellent analysis of these Macedonian moves leading to the consolidation of
the Macedonian state in its initial stages, see, Dean Katsiyiannis, “Hyper-Nationalism and
Irredentism in Macedonian Region. Implications for US Policy”, Part I., European Security, Vol. 5
No. 2 (Summer 1996) pp. 324-360; Dean Katsiyiannis, “Hyper-Nationalism and Irredentism in
Macedonian Region. Implications for US Policy”, Part II., European Security, Vol. 5 No. 3
(Autumn 1996) pp. 470-512; Sophia Clement, “La Prevention de Conflicts dans les Balkans : Le
Kosovo et l’ARY de Macedoine”. Cahiers de Chaillot. Numero 30 (Paris: Institut des Etudes de
Securite. Union de l’ Europe Occidentale, Decembre 1997) pp.13-21.
396 In its opinions nos. 6 and 7 of 11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission announced
that Macedonia and Slovenia fulfilled all the conditions for international recognition as
independent and sovereign states as foreseen by the December 1991 Guidelines. However,
Macedonia was not recognized as a sovereign and independent state due to these objections put
foreword by Greece regarding Macedonia’s name. For an overview of the Greek position and the
reaction of the rest of the international community, see, Dean Katsiyiannis, “Hyper-Nationalism
and Irredentism in Macedonian Region. Implications for US Policy”, pp. 324-360; ,  Dean
Katsiyiannis, “Hyper-Nationalism and Irredentism in Macedonian Region. Implications for US
Policy”, pp. 470-512-360; Keith Highet, George Kahole III, Ane Peters, “Commission of the
European Commission v. Hellenic Republic”. American Journal of International Law  Vol. 89 Issue
2 (April 1995) pp. 376-385.
397  It should be noted, though, that Macedonia was on Milosvic’s partition agenda but it
did not work. After Yugoslav military withdrew, Milosevic contacted Greek Prime Minister
Mitsotakis with a proposal to divide Macedonia between Serbia and Greece. This proposal was
rejected by Greece. See, Vctor Meier, Yugoslavia. A History of Its Demise, p.193.
398  One of the crucial factors making for Macedonian stability has also been the
presence of a small number of  U. S. peacekeepers in its territory. Cf. Victor Meier, Yugoslavia. A
History of Its Demise, pp. 194-195. See, also, Sophia Clement, “La Prevention de Conflicts dans
les Balkans : Le Kosovo et l’ARY de Macedoine”, pp. 21-32.
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from some difficulties as described here, was fully realized. This was not the
case with Bosnia-Herzegovina.
 The decision along ethnic lines among the members of the Central
Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia became initially obvious
in 1988 in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina when the Communists from this
republic sided with Slovenes and Croats.399 This was an ominous sign for the
ethnic realities of Bosnia-Herzegovina where barely few municipalities were
ethnically pure.400 The process of democratization in this republic, which started
too late, had to reckon on this ethnic reality. In January 1990, the parliament of
this republic decided on a new constitution and introduced, in principle, a multi-
party system. But, the parliament had to take care of ethnic reality and, in its
efforts to not exacerbate ethnic tensions, passed a law in April 1990, forbidding
the establishment of parties under national names.401 Despite these legal
constraints, in the first free elections, held on 18 November 1990, national parties
won an overwhelming majority.402
 Following the elections, Radovan Karadjic, the leader of the Serbian
Democratic Party and the future war criminal, declared a day after elections that
the “conditions had now been established for the three national parties (Muslims,
Serbs and Croats), as legitimate representatives of their peoples, to reach an
agreement as to the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina”.403 The Serbs clearly stood
for national (ethnic) self-determination, a line pursued throughout 1990 to 1995.
Only after the Dayton Accords (1995) did territorial self-determination enter the
scene in this republic. In fact, the Dayton Accords shattered down the Serbian
(and Croatian) illusions about ethnic self-determination within Bosnia-
                                                
399 Victor Meier, Yugoslavia. A History of Its Demise, op. cit.  198.
400 For the ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war, see,  Dr.Smail
Cekic, The Agression on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Genocide Against Bosniacs: 1991-1995
(Sarajevo: Institute for the Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law, 1995)
pp. 9-40.
401 The Republic’s Constitutional Court overruled the prohibition imposed by the law of
April 1990. See, Aleksander Pavlovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia.Nationalism in a
Multinational State, p. 113.
402 Victor Meier, Yugoslavia. A History of Its Demise, p. 199.
403 Ibid. p. 199.
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Herzegovina.404  This ethnically-based self-determination was pursued by the
Bosnian Serbs since the beginning of 1991 and  in connection with the
constitutional changes was already under way in this republic. As time passed
on, the Serbs abandoned the constitutional system of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
asked for the creation of separate state structures of their own.
 During 1991, the organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina started to work on the new
constitution of this republic. The draft-constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina was
ready in November 1991. The issue at stake was the type of self-determination to
be applied in this republic. The constitutional commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina
entrusted with the above work on the new constitution faced the same dilemmas
and difficulties regarding the type of self-determination, the dilemmas already
being aired in the public opinion at large. These dilemmas centered on two
issues: the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state within the Yugoslav
federation and, second, the status of its component nations in the future
redefinition of the internal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian
Democratic Party (SDS) was firmly in favor of keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina within
Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. As for the second issue, Bosnian Serbs also held the
view that the sovereigns of Bosnia-Herzegovina were its three ethnic
communities (Muslims, Serbs and Croats), not the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina
as a whole. In the final draft of the constitution (November 1991), the Muslim-
Croat view on (territorially-based) self-determination prevailed, defining Bosnia-
Herzegovina as “a common state of three equal ethnic communities, Serbs,
Muslims and Croats, with the right to full independence in a case Yugoslavia
dissolved”.405  This was the stance of the majority of the people of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and of its organs, which was made public not only vis-à-vis other
Yugoslav republics (via the already discussed Macedonian-Bosnian peace plan
of June 1991, first proposed in May 1991) but also towards the international
community. Based on this, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina applied for
                                                
404 Kasim Begic, Bosna-Hercegovina: Od Vanceove Misije do Daytonskog Sporazuma.
(Sarajevo: Bosanska Knjiga, 1997) pp. 235-302.
405 Ibid. pp.45-53. See, also, Belgrade-based newspaper FOCUS, Special Issue (1992)
pp. 182-183.
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international recognition of its international statehood in December 1991 together
with other Yugoslav republics, held its own referendum on independence on
March 1, 1992 and, finally, gained its international recognition on April 6 and 7,
1992406. The actions of the state organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina after war broke
out were also based on territorial self-determination of the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a whole, a stance clearly expressed in the so-called “Platform for
Action of the Bosnian Presidency During War Times”, dated 26 June 1992.
 By this document, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina pledged itself, through the
state organs, not to accept any division or regionalization of the country along
ethnic lines or based on ethnic criteria especially not if that division is achieved
by force.407 The latter related to the parallel power structures set up by the Serbs
in the course of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, first in the form of the so-called
autonomies and then leveled to the status of full republics. These Serb entities
lacked a clear territorial base by the time they were formed. Their territorial base
was achieved only through the brutal war leading to ethnic cleansing of the non-
Serbs and th edestruction of other cultures.
 
3. Serbia’s War Aims and the Failure of the Greater Serbian Project
 
 As noted (see, infra page 26-27, footnote no. 57), the term “ethnic
cleansing” was used by Serb nationalists to denote a clear policy of territorial
expansion through the destruction of non-Serbs and their cultures. This term was
two decades following  the drafting of the first Serbian national program by Ilija
Garasanin  in 1844 (the so-called Nacertanije, or the “Outline”).408  Garasanin’s
“Nacertanije”, though, was the first to clearly specify the goals of the future
Serbian policies that would dominate Belgrade’s discourse until its failure
                                                
406 Aleksander Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia. Nationalism in a Multinational
State, pp. 156-157.
407 Ibid.  51-52.
408 See, also, Albert Wohlstetter, “Creating a Greater Serbia”. New Republic. Vol. 211,
Issue 5 (08/01/94), pp. 22-28 at 23. (internet version: http//www.gw5.epnet.com). In a slightly
different manner, the term was also used in the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of
Arts and Sciences (Memorandum SANU), depicting the Serbs as victims of others (mainly
Albanians and  Croats). See, “Memorandum Srpske Akademije Nauka i Umetnosti”, pp. 154-155.
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following the defeat of the Serbs in Croatia (1994) and the Dayton Accords
(1995).409  Serbian war aims have accordingly been subordinated to the
realization of this project of Greater Serbia, throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries.410
 The institutionalization of the Serbian hegemony that started in 1918, with
the beginning of the democratic processes in Europe in the mid-1980s, found
itself in a weak position. This state of affairs seemed to have forced Milosevic to
renew the old national program for Greater Serbia drafted earlier by Garasanin.
This revival was considered as a necessary step because, according to
Milosevic’s team of advisers, the new political reality both within and outside
Yugoslavia posed a threat to Serbian national interests as they were defined until
then.411 Notwithstanding these changes, the 1986 Memorandum did not foresee
the role the changing international environment might play in the implementation
of the Serbian national goals. Rather, it focused in the internal balance of forces
within the Yugoslav federation, where Serbs were the dominant nation and
controlled almost entirely federal structures of the old (former) Yugoslavia.412
This sanctioning of the current state of affairs, without regard to the changing
                                                
409 The case of Kosova is still problematic in terms of the Greater Serbian project, as we
shall see in the last section of this chapter.
410  One caveat should be made here: the Serbian war aims have varied in the recent
wars of Yugoslav dissolution (1991-1999). The aims have been either (a) to keep the old (former)
Yugoslav federation together as a centralized federation under Belgrade’s tight control, or (b) to
carve out a Greater Serbia, including large chunks of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosova have not, at the outset, been seen as a war target of the
Serbian regime, meaning that the priority was given to the areas in the north of Yugoslavia, as
outlined by the 1986 Memorandum), and/or (c) to inherit the international personality (assets,
rights and duties) of the old (former) Yugoslavia. Milosvic failed on all accounts. Yugoslavia came
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Yugoslavia. Cf. “Memorandum SANU”, pp. 128-163.
411 Following the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance as a buffer
zone between East and West, while the Non-Aligned Movement went into the shadows of history,
a movement found by Tito to boost Yugoslavia’s international position. See, James Gow, Triumph
of the Lack of the Will, pp.12; 20-31; Zoran Pajic, “The Former Yugoslavia”. In Hugh Miall (ed.),
Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a Transitional Regime (London:Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1994) pp.56-66.
412  For an overview of the Serbian dominance over Yugoslavia, see, more, in Reneo
Lukic and Alen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia
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international environment, is evident not only throughout the 1986
Memorandum413, but from the Serbian scholarly work undertaken at the behest
and under the auspices of the Belgrade regime as well. The latter represents in
fact an operationalization of the vague parts of the1986 Memorandum, thus
giving the latter all features of a national program aimed at territorial expansion to
the detriment of non-Serbs and their cultures. The scholarly work in essence
deals only with the territorial issues within the former Yugoslav federation,
elaborating in detail the 1986 Memorandum’s premise “all Serbs in one State”.
This elaboration was based on various grounds. Thus, insofar as the 1986
Memorandum remained clear for the territories of Kosova and Croatia, this was
not the case for the rest of Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This task
of the 1986 Memorandum clarified the details in the Serb academic discourse by
the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, so that the later Yugoslav wars
spread precisely along the territories discussed in this Serbian academic
discourse, first in Croatia then in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere.414
 At first sight, the 1986 Memorandum seems as if promoted a democratic
goals (“one man, one vote”). But with the passing of time, it became obvious that
it did promote the opposite goals, that is, the preservation of the Serbian
hegemony and dominance over the central state structures of the old (former)
Yugoslavia. When Milosevic failed in the task of preservation of the former
Yugoslav federation in its centralized form, via the control of its federal organs,
he resorted to the second part of his plan for a Greater Serbia, precisely as
foreseen by the 1986 Memorandum. This process started in Kosova in 1987,
                                                                                                                                                
and the Soviet Union (London: SIPRI, 1996) pp. 57-97; Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War.
Propaganda and the Deceit of History, pp. 3-24.
413 It is evident from the 1986 Memorandum that no connection was made between the
position of the Serbs living in Yugoslavia and their surrounding. Rather, the 1986 Memorandum
spoke of popular sovereignty an ethnically-based self-determination taking into account that the
Serbs were the largest nation in Yugoslavia. The quest for democracy, according to this
document, was based on the premise “one man, one vote”, fitting only Serbian interests. See,
Memorandum SANU, pp. 145-147.
414 There was no difference between the academic discourse and Belgrade’s official
position. Cf. Midrag Zecevic - Bogdan Lekic, Drzavne Granice i Unutrasnja Territorijalna Podela
Jugoslavije (Beograd: Gradjevinska Knjiga, 1991) pp. 38-44; The Ministry of Information of the
Republic of Serbia (ed.), The Creation and Changes of the Internal Borders of Yugoslavia
(Beograd: Srbostampa, 1991).
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continued throughout 1991-1992, to culminate in an apparent failure during 1995.
He and his staff made careful preparations to achieve Serbia’s war aims, that is,
the project of  Greater Serbia as described so far.415 These war preparations by
Serbia started somewhere at the beginning of the 1980s and ended up around
1990, comprising all aspects needed for war preparations: psychological,
institutional, economic, propagandistic and military.
 Serb intellectuals, during the mid-1980s, created a critical mass of
prejudice against non-Serbs, the warmongering and ethnocentrism within the
Serbian society. These steps made it possible for Milosevic to easily come to
power and direct the public opinion in Serbia against Slovenes, Albanians,
Croats and Muslims. An anti-Albanian pamphlet, published by Serb intellectuals
in Praxis (Belgrade-based journal), represents the most influential paper after the
1986 Memorandum. The paper spoke of Albanians in a very biased way,
describing them as a primitive and savage population, worthy of nothing but
suppression. The aim of this paper was to prove the discrimination against
Serbs, a fact never proved in reality throughout Yugoslavia’s existence. For the
Belgrade regime, nevertheless, it did suffice that there existed a support from the
public opinion, both in Serbia and in the major part of Yugoslavia, showing the
alleged discrimination against, and the suffering of, the Serbs living in Kosova.416
The first test of this psychological preparation for war (s) and conflict was made
on 25 April 1987 in Kosova. During his visit to Kosova, in the Field of Blackbirds
(In Albanian: Fushw Kosovw; In Serbian : Kosovo Polje), Milosevic held a speech
                                                
415 In scholarly work, though, there have been various interpretations of Serbia’s war
aims, claiming that the wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia were civil wars and not wars
conducted for Serbia’s territorial expansion to the detriment of other non-Serbs living in
Yugoslavia. See, more, David Oven, Balkan Odyssey (London: Indigo, 1996) pp. 374-403; Susan
L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 333-374; Miroslav Pecujlic i Radmila Nakarada, “Slom
Jugoslavije i Konstituisanje Novog Svetskog Poretka”. In Radmila Nakarada (ed.), Evropa i
Raspad Jugoslavije (Beograd: Institut za Evropske Studije, 1995) pp. 41-60; Radmila Nakarada i
Obrad Racic, Raspad Jugoslvije – Izazov Evropskoj Bezbednosti. (Beograd: Projekat ‘Evropska
Kolektivna Bezbednost Nakon Mastrihta’, 1998) pp. 19-28. There is no doubt, nevertheless, that
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416 Muhamedin Kullashi, Ese Filozofiko-Politike (Peje : Dukagjini, 1995) pp. 152-171.
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promising the Serbs that no one would beat them anymore. His support for the
Serbs from Kosova enabled him to further play the Serbian nationalist  game
and strengthen his hold to power in Belgrade. The first sign of this was the purge
from the Communist ranks in Serbia of the moderates like Dragisa Pavlovic and
Petar Stambolic (Milosevic’s former protégés).417  The final phase in these
psychological preparations for war (s) and conflict occurred by the end of 1989
when the Serbian Orthodox Church organized, under the auspices of the
Belgrade authorities, the reburial of the bones of the Tsar Lazar (Serbian
Medieval King, who lost his life in the Battle of Kosova against the Ottomans in
1389). This reburial was a typical parody of a medieval cult, serving to ignite the
nationalist feelings of the ordinary Serbs and was done in the name of the “real
souls of the Serbdom”418
 Institutional preparations for war (s) and conflict were made around 1998-
1990, when Milosevic destroyed in an unconstutional and unilateral way the
autonomies of Kosova and Vojvodina and continued with the usurpation of the
federal state organs paralyzing the normal functioning of the vital parts of the
Yugoslav state (the Central Committee of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia, the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav diplomatic and
consular missions, Yugoslav Informative Agency “TANJUG”, and the Central
Bank of Yugoslavia). The Croat Stipe Mesic, who was to be the rotating head of
                                                
417 Darko Hudelist, Kosovo: Bitka Bez Iluzija (Zagreb: Centar za Informacije i Publicitet,
1989) pp. 34-37; 42; 155-157; 165-167; 173-77; 188-199; John Zametica, “The Yugoslav
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the Yugoslav presidency from Croatia, was blocked by Serbia and its satellites
(Montenegro, Kosova and Vojvodina, who were the supporters of Milosevic after
the coups of 1988-89 following the “anti-beaurocratic revolutions” in these
regions). This occurred in May 1991 and marks the end of Yugoslavia’s
institutional destruction and the institutional preparation for war (s) and conflict,419
which started with Serbia’s unilateral alteration of the constitutional position of
Montenegro, Kosova and Vojvodina. These events radically changed the balance
of forces within Yugoslavia, giving Serbia an apparent advantage against the
others when it came to the decision-making at the federal level.
 Military preparations (political, strategic and operational) for war (s) and
conflict started immediately after Tito’s death in 1980. The Yugoslav People’s
Army (the YPA, or JNA in Serbo-Croatian) intensified its war preparations along
Serbia’s national aims, especially in the period between 1986-1990.420 It was not
the communist ideology, as argued by some scholars, the forced the Yugoslav
Peoples Army (YPA) to side with Milosevic but the Greater Serbian national
program. This fact is seen by the mere fact that since Tito’s death, all Serb-
inhabited areas of Yugoslavia were put under direct control of the Belgrade
Army. At the time, this fact was not so obvious. It became apparent only in 1990
when all the weaponry belonging to the Territorial Defense (a military structure
belonging to the federal units of Yugoslavia, e.g., republics and autonomous
provinces of Kosova and Vojvodina) of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina were confiscated by the YPA. A similar event had occurred in
Kosova after the 1981 riots.421  When the war started in Croatia (September
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1991) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (March-April 1992), the YPA did not hide its
intentions, siding openly with Milosevic in their common endeavor to create either
a centralized Yugoslav federation or a Greater Serbia.422
 Economic preparations for war(s)  and  conflict have  been conducted in
Serbia very skillfully. Namely, they started during the mandate of the reform-
oriented prime minister of Yugoslavia, the Croat Ante Markovic. His reforms
made it possible for the Belgrade regime to collect huge amount of hard currency
at the hands of the Central Bank of Yugoslavia. The Serbian banks, at the same
time, withdrew most of their cash and transferred it into foreign accounts, in
Cyprus above all, but as well in the rest of Europe and the United States.423  The
final act of these economic preparations occurred in December 1990, when
Milosevic transferred,  in his march to war, from the Central Bank of Yugoslavia
more than $ 2 billion. Later, this money served to finance Serbia’s war campaign
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.424
 The most interesting part of Milosevic’s efforts to create a Greater Serbia,
be it in the form of a centralist federation or an ethnically pure  Serbian state, had
been those concerning the international community. Milosevic’s diplomatic
maneuvering has been based on a simple logic: the inertia and an apologetic
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stance of the international community in the first years of the war enabled him to
play off one international factor against the other. In this context, he knew well
that the old (former) Yugoslavia had played an important role during the Cold
War so that this factor would be enough for him to make sure that the same
international community needed time to adjust to the new face of Milosevic’s
Yugoslavia. Tito’s Yugoslavia and its role secured Serbia that the international
community would be passive for some time until the real aims of Serbia became
obvious to foreigners.425  Furthermore, the domination of the diplomatic and
consular staff by the Serbs and Montenegrins rendered the manipulation of the
international community on behalf of Milosevic’s war aims all more easily.
Milosevic’s foreign policy strategy was based, apart from the above premise
concerning the nature of the international system following the Cold War’s end,
on all sorts of alliances, be they real, historic or based on myths. They were real
as far as they were based on ethnicity (Russia), historic when it came to
“traditional friendships” (France) and, lastly, based on myths (Israel) when it
came to the manipulation of the Holocaust, portraying the Muslims and Croats as
Nazis. Apart from this, in his foreign strategy, Milosevic used the alliances that
were based on political interests of those countries fighting secession and the
disintegration processes (Great Britain). But, with the passing of time, the events
in Yugoslavia showed that Serbian actions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
mirrored more closely the Nazis rather then the opposite.426
 The above preparations for war and ethnic aggression against the non-
Serbs and their culture, aimed at the creation of Greater Serbia, have most
conspicuously been reflected in the cases of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Belgrade regime orchestrated a Greater Serbia policy there by instructing
the Serbian leaders living there to declare various Serb entities by ethnically
cleansing the non-Serbs from the territories meant for such declared Serb
                                                
425 Raymond Duncan and Paul Holman, Jr. (eds.), Ethnic  Nationalism and Regional
Conflict. The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, pp. 19-53; Edward Riccuti, War in Yugoslavia.
The Break Up of a Nation, pp. 26-28, 30; Christopher Cviic, “Perceptions of Former Yugoslavia:
An Interpretative Reflection”. International Affairs Vol. 71 No. 4 (October 1995) p. 821.
426 For a detailed account of the anti-Semitism and fascism in Serbia, WW II included,
see, more, in Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War. Propaganda and the Deceit of History ,199.
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entities. The initial form of these self-styled Serb entities was called “political and
territorial autonomy” ( a pure Communist concept regarding the internal form of
self-determination), to end up in a “sovereign and independent republic”, both
named after the Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively427.
 It is this route concerning the failure of the Greater Serbian project to
which we turn in the next section. The analysis of the Serbian interpretation of
the international statehood shall take a prominent place. From this analysis, it
can be seen that the Serbs living in these two republics have apparently
misinterpreted the very concept of the international statehood and the way to
realize the right to self-determination.428
4. Serbian Transformation of the “Autonomous Entities” Into
“Sovereign and Independent Republics”: An Arbitrary Interpretation
of the International Statehood
 
 The creation and the transformation of the Serb entities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina has been a coordinated process that comprised of not only the
territory of this republic but also of the large parts of nonbearing Croatia. Initially,
the formation of these Serb entities was connected to the new constitutional
changes under way in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1990. These changes were
undertaken for the purpose of regionalization of this republic in order to enable it
                                                
427 It is worth noting here that these self-styled “sovereign and independent republics” of
the Serbian people living in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were not recognized by none of the
sovereign and independent members of the present international community. The “Republika
Srpska Krajina” in Croatia, destroyed by the Croat forces in 1995, was recognized by
Transdiensbir, which itself is a part of the Russian Federation. See, Zoran Kusovac, “Zgjedhjet ne
Kine Trazojne Kinen Tjeter”. Koha Ditore (Prishtine), 04 April 2000, p.10. They were not
recognized by FRY either because the Dayton Accords, despite a common public perception at
the time of their writing, did not legitimize the “Republika Srpska”. They have instead marked  the
first serious blow to the Grater Serbian project, denying any international standing on behalf of
the “Republika Srpska”. First article of the Accords recognized only the statehood and the
sovereignty of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
428 The Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina also carved up their own “independent and
sovereign republic”. There is a difference with the Serbs, though. It stems ,from the fact that the
former did this only as a reaction to the Serbian actions. It became an orchestrated policy only
after the Karadjordjevo Meeting between Tudjman and Milosevic (discussed earlier). For an
opposite view, see, Kasim Begic, Bosna i Hercegovina, pp. 55-69.
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to become a modern, reform-oriented, state of Europe.429  As it is usual
elsewhere in this field, the process of regionalization in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
to be based on economic and social criteria, enhancing the effectiveness of the
whole state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.430 Long before the war started, it was
becoming clear that the Serbs had no intention to base their concept of
regionalization on economic or social criteria but rather exclusively on the
principle of ethnicity. Their insistence upon the ethnic principle coincided entirely
with their overall manipulation and misinterpretation of the prevailing economic
trends in some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina that were Serb-inhabited (no matter
their numbers). This strategy was meant to show the alleged Serb economic
discrimination  and their economic backwardness in this republic. The strategy
covered not only those areas where the Serbs were in majority but other parts
where they lived in community with others in a very small numbers as well. The
first manifestation of this strategy aimed at the dismemberment of the state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and took the form of  an association, named “the
Community of Municipalities of Bosanska Krajina”, composed of nine to thirty
municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.431  This form was based on an alleged
agreement between the municipalities, named as “the Agreement on the
Establishment of the Association of Municipalities” (In Serbian: Dogovor o
Udruzivanju u Zajednicu Opcina). This association had a legal and separate
personality from the organs and the state structures of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This
means that it did have the right to exercise all powers otherwise falling within the
jurisdiction of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 16 December 1991, this
“autonomous” region was transformed into the “Srpska Autonomna Oblast” (“the
Serbian Autonomous Area”).432 The Declaration of the (first) “Serbian
                                                
429  Ibid. pp. 55-56.
430 See, for example, the Preamble of the European Charter on Self-Government ( Rome
1984), which speaks of the same values to be promoted by the local self-governments and the
decentralization of powers. For comments, see, Guy Hollis and Karin Plokker, Towards
Democratic Decentralization : Transforming Regional and Local Government in the New Europe
(Brussels : Atkins DGI, European Commission, 1995).
431 There were few proposed versions of this document so that the exact number of
municipalities remains unknown to date. Cf. Kasim Begic, Bosna i Hercegovina, p.57.
432 Both its creation and the transformation into an autonomous area were initially justified
on pure economic and social terms, although in practice it was obvious that the ethnic criteria was
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Autonomous Area” was followed by the similar declarations in other parts of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (November - December e 1991 and January 1992). These
actions covered almost eighty per cent of the Bosnian territory.433 The new
entities exercised the jurisdiction not only of the organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina
but also the jurisdiction pertaining to the federal Yugoslavia, regarding the
defense and the related issues. In parallel with the creation of the  Serb
autonomies, there was under way a process of setting up the “Assembly of the
Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”. This assembly was constituted on 24
October 1991. It took a decision stating that the Serbs had decided to live in a
common state of Yugoslavia (together with Serbia, Montenegro and other self-
styled Serb entities in Croatia). This will of the Serbs shall be demonstrated, said
the above decision of the Assembly, on 9 and 10 November 1991. In justifying
these actions, the Serb leaders openly put foreword ethnic rather than economic
and social reasons. It was called a “plebiscite”, although its very aim was the
dismemberment of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This plebiscite was indeed
held on the above dates, making more explicit the idea of a Greater Serbia. In a
unique manner, the Serbs printed their voting lists in a blue color, leaving for the
non-Serbs yellow ones. This difference in color was followed by different
questions as well. Namely, the non-Serbs had to answer the question as to
whether Bosnia-Herzegovina shall remain an equal republic, while the Serbs had
to answer the opposite, that is, whether they should  remain within Bosnia-
Herzegovina.434
 The next step following the November 1991 “plebiscite” was to make use
of the utmost the results of the “plebiscite”, both domestically and on the
international plane. The latter consisted of the efforts made by Serbs to represent
themselves in relation to the legal organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a “separate
                                                                                                                                                
a driving force behind. This became clear as the time went on, especially following the discovery
of a Serb plan designed for the total dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines.
This plan had been drafted in September 1991, in the name of “science” and “profession”, clearly
opting for ethnic principle as the main pillar in the regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Economic and social factors were manipulated and misinterpreted to serve the ethnic principle.
Cf. Kasim Begic, Bosna i Hercegovina, p.58.
433  Ibid. p. 59.
434  Ibid. pp. 60-61.
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party” and to make representations on their behalf before the representatives of
the EC Conference on Yugoslavia already under way in the Hague. Domestically,
the Serb leaders were using the results of the “plebiscite” to foster the final
proclamation of the “Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina” ,
which in fact they did proclaim on 9 January 1992. This transformation of the
previous autonomous entities into a single “republic” was done in a hope that it
would be internationally recognized as a federal unit within the still existing
Yugoslav federation and, in case that failed, as an independent and sovereign
state.435
 Well until the outbreak of the open war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serb
leaders there relied on their rhetoric on the option of “remaining within
Yugoslavia”. This was in essence nothing but a cover up for the realization of the
Greater Serbian project. In fact, as noted, Yugoslavia, for the Serbs, meant
nothing but a centralized and Serb-controlled federation. If that failed, next to it
came the open and brutal realization of the Greater Serbian project. None of the
ways were to be excluded from the process of realization of the Greater Serbian
project, which  became clear following an earlier statement by Dobrica Cosic (the
most influential intellectual among the Serbs in Yugoslavia and one of the
drafters of the 1986 Memorandum) , who stated that the project would be
realized either peacefully or manu militari.436 Taking into account the ethnic
mixture in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively, it is logical indeed to
assume that the project of Greater Serbia could not have been realized by
peaceful means.437
 The Badinter Commission for the former Yugoslavia in its Opinion of January
1992 opted in favor of the recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia. For Bosnia
and Croatia, the Commission set out some conditions that these two Yugoslav
                                                
435 This “republic” recognized it counterpart in Croatia. Ibid. pp. 63-64. This shows that
the Serbs believed that only entities of the type of a republic would be recognized internationally.
This view relied upon the November 1991 legal opinion of the Badinter Commission for former
Yugoslavia.
436 See, more on this, Philip Cohen, “The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide
in the 1990s”, pp. 39-64.
437 Father Sava, one of the most influential Serb religious leaders, once stated that the
project had a chance to b realized through peaceful means. See, “Father Sava Talks to RFE/RL”
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republics were to fulfill before any international recognition shall be extended to
them. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Commission asked that a referendum be held
in this republic and that the minority rights be respected in Croatia.438  This was
used by Serb leaders as a pretext to boycott the referendum, held on 29
February and 1 March 1992. Following this, Serb leaders openly threatened that
they would declare their own independence in case Bosnia-Herzegovina was
recognized as a sovereign and independent state. In this way the Serbs justified
in advance their military actions undertaken in the months to come with the sole
purpose of creating the Greater Serbia by ethnically cleansing from their entities
all non-Serbs and their cultures. The Serb interpretation of the international
statehood was an arbitrary one . They belived that only the republic-type entities
would be recognized internationally, notwithstanding the manner in which they
were created. In line with this, Serbs declared their own “independent republic”,
following the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina (6 and 7 April 1992). This time ,
                                                
438  “3. The Arbitration Commission considers that:
     I. The Constitutional Act of 4 December 1991 does not fully incorporate all the provisions
of the draft Convention of 4 November 1991, notably those contained in Chapter II Article 2 (c),
under the heading “Special Status”;
           II. The authorities of the Republic of Croatia should therefore supplement the
Constitutional Act in such a way as to satisfy those provisions; and
           III. Subject to this reservation, the Republic of Croatia meets necessary conditions for its
recognition by the Member States of the European Community based on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, adopted by the Council of
the European Communities on 16 December 1991”. Opinion no. 5 on the Recognition of the
Republic of Croatia by the European Community and Its Member States. Text provided by the
Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through
Documents, pp. 489-490.
         “5. The Arbitration Commission consequently takes the view :
           -  that the Republic of Macedonia satisfies the tests in the Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and the Declaration on Yugoslavia
adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 16 December 1991;
              - that the Republic of  Macedonia has, moreover, renounced all territorial claims of any
kind in unambiguous statements binding in international law;
           - that the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ cannot therefore imply any territorial claim
againstanother states; and
           - that the Republic of Macedonia has given a formal undertaking in accordance with
international law to refrain, both in general and pursuant to Article 49 of its Constitution in
particular, from any hostile propaganda against any other State; this follows from a statement
which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic made to the Commission’s request for
clarification of Constitutional Amendment No. II of 6 January 1992”. Opinion No. 6 on the
Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by European Community and Its Member
States. Paris, 11 January 1992. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry. Also reprinted in
Snezana Trifunosvka, Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp. 491-495.
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however, the Serbs put aside the idea of “remaining within Yugoslavia”. In a
matter of months following the declaration of this “independent republic”, the
Serbs managed to ethnically cleanse almost 70 per cent of the territory of
Bosnia- Herzegovina, thus securing the territorial base for their new “state”.
Hoping to gain international recognition for their fait accompli, the Serbs left
behind the old idea of Yugoslavism and focused instead on the Greater Serbian
project based on the policy of ethnic cleansing of the non-Serbs and the
destruction of other cultures. The first reactions of the international community,
mainly the EU, went along with the Serbian argumentation of the international
statehood. This meant open support for ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Only the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), reached under the US leadership,
managed to defeat this ethnic principle. Other peace plans, such as Cutiliero
Plan, Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans, were drafted along ethnic
principle.439  This does not mean that the EU foresaw ethnic principle as a basis
for self-determination within the territory of former Yugoslavia (in both forms,
internal and external self-determination). In its documents, the EU relied instead
on the principle of territoriality, taking the Yugoslav republics as a reference
point. The rule of law, democracy, respect for human and minority rights were put
foreword as a precondition to be fulfilled by the new states in the process of
consolidation of their international statehood. The problems arose in practice
when these conditions, or corrective mechanisms (criteria), had to be applied
alongside the self-determination based on territory. Then, the policy prevailed
over law favoring  (or at least tolerating) the Serb policy of ethnic cleansing.
These and other related issues shall be discussed again in the VI chapter of this
work, when the matter of international recognition is taken up. The Kosova issue
is also connected with the Greater Serbian project. This issue deals with Kosova.
The discussion of this issue is needed for the sake of ascertaining whether the
Greater Serbian project has failed in the Kosova case or not.
                                                
439  For a detailed account of the five proposals on the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
especially those based on ethnic criteria (all but the Dayton Accords) over the years 1992-1995,
see, Kasim Begic, Bosna I Hercegovina, pp. 100-197; Aleksander Pavkovic, The Fragmentation
of Yugoslavia, pp. 155-193.
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5. The Dayton Model for Kosova
When the Dayton Accords were reached in November 1995, very few
people, both in academic and the public in general, believed that there might
ensue an equal treatment in terms of the final status of the “Republika Srpska” in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova. Very few saw that both entities would in the
future be treated as parts of two sovereign states, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FRY
respectively. It did not matter that the former was a result of a policy of ethnic
cleansing and genocidal acts against an entire nation, while the latter possessed
its clear territorial base and a population who were constantly an object of the
same Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing. These efforts to ethnically cleanse
Kosova from its non-Serbian population were prevented by NATO’s military
action undertaken during March-June 1999. However, Kosova remained since
then a part of FRY, which renders dubious the fact as to whether the project of
Greater Serbia has been defeated in Kosova. Or, it might well be the case, the
Belgrade regime has been successful in the preservation of the formal
sovereignty over a vast areas not inhabited in majority by Serbs, thus leaving the
international community with no choice but to take on the role of a care-taker of
the Greater Serbian project, the brutal and violent realization of which is
postponed for a later date when the international balance of forces changes in
favor of Serbia. In order to try to answer this precarious situation, the sections to
follow are divided into two parts, one dealing with the Kosovar Albanians’ way
pursued in their search for self-determination before the conflict and war in
Kosova began (1998), while the other section is concerned with the results that
followed after the March-June 1999 events.
5.1. The Kosovar Albanian Way Pursued for the Achievement of
Self-Determination
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Compared with other territorial entities in former Yugoslavia (federal
republics and the autonomous province of Vojvodina), Kosova did not control its
own territory and population because Kosova’s organs and institutions that were
set up on the eve of Yugoslavia’s dissolution had been paralyzed in this regard.
Although acting under the provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, these
organs were stripped of any real power by the Belgrade regime long before the
process of Yugoslav dissolution started. The so-called Territorial Defense Force
of Kosova and the Police Force in Kosova had been disarmed and put under
Belgrade’s tight control as far back as the mid-1980s. Furthermore, this process
of the disarming of Kosova’s legal organs and institutions accelerated in 1987,
while the Serbs and Montenegrins living in Kosova were being armed. When the
Yugoslav dissolution began in 1990, Kosovar Albanians chose a peaceful way as
a reaction to the abolition of their autonomous status by Serbia (1989), despite
the fact that Milosevic’s repressive policies were well under way. This was, for
Yugoslav conditions, a very specific manner to challenge Serbian rule and
sovereignty over Kosova. By boycotting entirely the Serbian installed system in
Kosova since 1989, the Kosovar Albanians managed to put Serbia in a position
of the occupying power, noticeable to foreign visitors at first sight440.This
challenge to the Serbian rule and sovereignty over Kosova was very successful
and effective throughout the first years of the Yugoslav wars of dissolution, and
well beyond that until Milosevic’s repressive policies reached unbearable
proportions for the local population.
As a means to channel their peaceful policy (1990-1997), Kosovar
Albanians used the policy of parallel institutions vis-à-vis those installed by the
Belgrade regime. This policy of parallel institutions started in Kosova ever since
Kosovar autonomy was abolished by Serbia in 1989. The first step in this
direction had been undertaken on July 2, 1990, when the Assembly of Kosova, a
lawful organ according to the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, declared Kosova as an
equal and independent unit within the still existing Yugoslav federation. The
                                                
440 Mark Balla et al. (eds), Mediterranean Europe on a Shoestring (London: Londy Planet,
1993) p.1093.
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Belgrade regime’s reaction was brutal. It closed down the Kosova Assembly,
which went into hiding and continued its work without Serb and Montenegrin
deputies. The Assembly went a step further by declaring Kosova a federal
republic within Yugoslavia and, following this, announced an independence
referendum, to be held from 26 to 30 September 1990. In this referendum, 87 per
cent of the population of Kosova took part (Serbs and Montenegrins boycotted),
of whom 99.87 per cent voted for Kosova’s independence.441
In trying to keep up with the pace of events occurring elsewhere in the
Yugoslav territories , the self-styled Government of Kosova in exile handed over
to the European Peace Conference on Yugoslavia the application for an
international recognition of Kosova’s independent statehood (December 1991).442
The application for international recognition of Kosova’s full independence did not
meet with a positive response from the international community despite the fact
that it had, as it does at the present, its own territorial base and the population,
This was due to the fact that parallel organs and institutions (the self-styled
Government of Kosova and the equally self-styled President of Kosova) were not
able to effectively control their own territory and population living within Kosova’s
borders. This further meant that the above organs and institutions had no
coercive powers and authority with which to impose their own will upon the
others: the Kosovar government living in exile had neither army nor police to
assert themselves both internally and on the international plane. Their powers
and authority, if any, rested on moral rather than political grounds and
considerations.443   The first such military force of the Kosovar Albanians was set
                                                
441 Fatmir Sejdiu, “Baza Juridiko-Politke e Republikes se Kosoves”. In Instituti i Historise
se Kosoves dhe Shqiperise (eds.), Çështja e Kosoves - Një Problem Historik dhe Aktual (BESA:
Tirane 1996) pp.371-379.
442 For the full text of this application, see, The Academy of Arts and Sciences of the
Republic of Albania (ed.), The Truth on Kosova (Tirana: Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1993)
pp. 341-343.
443 Michael Salla, “Kosovo, Non-Violence and the Break Up of Yugoslavia”. Security
Dialogue. Vol. 26 No. 4 (December 1995) pp. 434-435; A. V. Lowe - C. Warbrick, “Current
Developments in Public International Law”. International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 41
Part 2, 1992, pp. 478-480; Compare also the reasons for positive answer to the former Yugoslav
republics presented in the following papers: Martha Rady, “Self-Determination and the Dissolution
of Yugoslavia”. Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 19 No. 2 (1996) pp. 382-384; Payam Akhavan,
“Self-Determination and the Disintegration: What Lessons for the International Community?” In
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up only during 1998-1999, under the name “Kosova Libration Army” (KLA) or (in
Albanian) “Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves” (UCK). The process of its formation has
been a long one and was connected to two factors, one internal (the repressive
policies of the Belgrade regime) and other  external (the reluctance of the
international community to take concrete steps to reward the peaceful way
pursued by the Kosavar Albanian leadership until then, including the geostrategic
shifts that followed after the Dayton Accords).444  The next section is devoted to
these issues.
5.2. The End of a Sad Chapter: NATO Intervenes to Impose (an
Internal-Type of ) Self-Determination for Kosova (March-June 1999)
In the aftermath of the Dayton Accords (1995), Dragoljub Micunovic, one
of the most influential Serbian opposition leaders, told the media that Serbia felt
relaxed because the international community recognized its frontiers as
international borders, the territory of Kosova included within them445. The same
opinion prevailed within the Serb regime circles and has ever since been very
frequently reiterated in public.446 This state of affairs, coinciding almost entirely
with the international community’s stance over the issue of the potential
internationally recognized borders, as opposed to the Kosovar Albanian view on
the same issue, reveals two things that are crucial for an understanding of
                                                                                                                                                
Donald Clark and Robert Williamson (eds.), Self-Determination. International Perspectives (New
York: St. Martin Press, 1996) pp. 227-28; 233-35; 240-42; Malcolm Shaw, “State Succession
Revisited”. Finnish Yearbook of International Law  Vol. V (1994) pp. 36-37.
444 See, more, on this, the eloquent analysis by Jansuz Bugajski, “Close to Edge in
Kosovo”. The Washington Quarterly.  Vol. 21  No. 3 (Summer 1998) pp. 19-23.
445  Five years later, however, Micunovic was not sure about this. Criticizing plans to
secede by June 2001 (the deadline set out for holding a referendum for the independence of this
republic), Micunovic said that Montenegro’s secession from FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) would
make highly probable the secession of Kosova as well, thus putting into danger the very survival
of the FRY. Cf. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 04/01/2001. 10.00h CET (In South Slavic  Languages).
446 In referring to the so-called Kumanovo Agreement which made possible for NATO
troops to enter Kosova in June 1999 and the promulgation of the 1244 UN Security Council
Resolution on Kosova (12 June 1999), the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army,
Nebojsa Pavkovic, told the press in Belgrade that they (the Serbs) held the deeds over Kosova
because both of the above documents recognized and guaranteed the integrity and sovereignty
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Cf. Radio Slobodna Evropa (In South Slavic languages),
17 Decembr 1999, 10:00h p.m. CET.
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NATO’s actions against FRY (March-June 1999) and possible ramifications of
the future developments in and over Kosova, its final status included. The first
issue is related to the international community itself, while the second is related
to Kosova and its possibility for the achievement of statehood, separate from that
belonging to FRY and Serbia itself.
The above attitude of the Serbian circles, including the opposition,
indicates a certain political profile prevalent within the Serbian society at large.
This profile takes the state, not the citizenship or the ordinary individuals, as a
reference point. Regarding the issue of borders and self-determination in
general, this has well coincided with the approach taken by the international
community following the end of the Cold War. This by no way means that the
international community per se has created this Serbian political profile. The
current profile stems rather from the very nature of Serbian nationalism (already
discussed in Chapter III). The international community’s stance over the
(inviolability) of the former administrative borders has further cemented the
Serbian myths over Kosova and their a priori right to unquestionably rule its
majority population.447 Why the Belgrade regime was given these assurances as
to the (unconditional) inviolability of Serbia’s borders? Was it a matter of principle
or a pure realpolitik that took into account other geopolitical/geostrategic factors?
Two dilemmas emerge when discussing the NATO intervention against
FRY (March-June 1999). The first, the realpolitik dilemma based on geopolitical/
geostrategic considerations, means that the inviolability of  (former republican)
borders was not an aim in itself but a side effect  of NATO’s concern over peace
and stability in the Balkans and wider. Next to this comes the dilemma based on
humanitarian considerations, publicly stated aim of NATO officials both before
                                                
447 For identical views, see, Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History;  Tim Judah, Kosovo.
War and Revenge (New Haven and London: Ya;e University Press, 2000); Steven Schwartz,
Kosovo. Background to a War (London: Anthem Press, 2000); Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo. How
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pp. 124-131; Shlomo Avineri, “The Future of Kosovo” East European Constitutional Review Vol. 8
No. 3 (Summer 1999) pp. 1- 4 (internet version only: http://www.law.nyu).
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and after the intervention against FRY.448 The NATO Secretary General, Javier
Solana, also put foreword humanitarian considerations on the last day before the
air strikes began on 24 March 1999.449 In fact, concerning the use of the air
                                                
448 This aim was expressly stated by NATO’s Council in its special statement on Kosova
on 8 December 1998, arguing that “NATO’s aim has been to contribute to the international efforts
for stopping the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, to put an end to the violence there and to assure a
permanent solution to the crisis in Kosovo”. Full text in “Kosova Information Center”, Daily Report
No. 2264 B (Prishtina), 8 December 1998 (Albanian version only).
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Antonio Cassese, “Ex Injuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of
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“NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” European Journal of International Law Vol.
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Others have as well supported NATO actions against FRY on humanitarian grounds but
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set a precedent for the future but should instead be taken as an exception due to the regional
considerations (Kosova, they say, belongs to Europe where gross human rights violations cannot
be tolerated). Cf. W. Michael Reisman, “Kosovo’s Antinomies” American Journal of International
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The last group of authors, quoted below, do not support NATO actions in Yugoslavia,
stressing the sovereignty rule and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign
and independent states. Cf. Bruno Sima, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects”.
European Journal of International Law Vol. 10 No. 1 (1999) pp. 1-23; Jonathan I. Charney,
“Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo” American Journal of International Law  Vol. 93
No. 4 (October 1999) pp. 834-841; Christine M. Chinkin, “Kosovo: A ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ War ?”
American Journal of International Law Vol. 93 No. 4 (October 1999) pp. 841-847; Mary Ellen
“O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo” Human Rights Quarterly. Vol.
22 No. 1 (February, 2000) pp. 57-89.
As for NATO itself, its officials have been explicit that the decision to go into Kosova did
not set any precedent for its future actions elsewhere, despite what some Russians fear and what
some East Europeans clearly hope when Russia is in question. See, Paul Goble, “Another
Precedent From Kosovo?” RFE/RL Newsline. November 9, 2000 (also available in internet:
http://www.rferl.org).
449 See, Statement by the Secretary General, date 23 March 1999. (also available in
internet: http//www.nato.com). When the air campaign started, NATO leaders referred more
explicitly to humanitarian considerations as a basis for their actions against FRY. See, Bill
Clinton, Ne Luften, Ju Paqen. Masazhe, Artikuj, Konferenca Shtypi, Intervista dhe Fajlime per
Kosoven. (Tirane: Gazeta “Albania”,  2000).
In terms of success or failure of the air campaign against FRY, an important thing is to
understand the previous goals set by the Alliance. These goals have varied during the air
campaign. Thus, at the outset, the Clinton administration circulated three goals of the bombing
campaign against FRY: a) to “demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposing to aggression”;
b) to deter Milosevic’s  “continuing and escalating attacks in Kosovo”; and c) to “damage Serbia’s
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strikes against FRY, NATO officials referred almost exclusively to the
humanitarian considerations. This was not the case, as we shall see below,
during the early stages of the Kosova conflict (February-March 1998 and after).
Be as it may be, the case remains that the end result of NATO air strikes was the
preservation of FRY’ territorial integrity and, by consequence, the imposition on
Kosova in a long run of a certain internal-type self-determination. This is
supported unambiguously by the provisions of the UN Security Council
Resolution No. 1244 (12 June 1999).
The question we put foreword, standing at the same time for our second
dilemma, cannot be answered solely through a reliance on humanitarian
considerations as a basis for the NATO air campaign against FRY.  Our
argument is based on the events preceding the air campaign and after that
(January - June 1999).  The commitments NATO made through its public
announcements on the crisis in Kosova unambiguously referred to the full
endorsement by NATO of the UN Security Council resolutions on the Kosova
issue. This means that humanitarian considerations in these UN documents do
not take precedence over other issues, such as borders and related issues (most
notably the preservation  of the international peace and stability and the solution
of the final status of Kosova). This attitude of NATO is best reflected in two
documents of this period: The Rambouillet Peace Accords (February - March
1999) and the UN Security Council Resolution on Kosova No. 1244 (12 June
1999). The latter document serves at present as the only legal foundation on
which the current international administration over Kosova is based (both civilian
and its military components).
                                                                                                                                                
capacity to wage  war in the future”.  Cf. R.W. Apple, Jr., “A Fresh Set of U.S. Goals”. New York
Times (March 25, 1999) p. A1.; See. also, Barton Gellman, “Allies Facing the Limits of Air Power”.
Washington Post. March 28, 1999, p. A1. The same goals were reflected throughout in the NATO
statements over the crisis in Kosova. The statements required that Milosevic ended repression in
Kosova, withdrew his forces from the province, agree to an international military presence there,
as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and provide assurances of his
willingness to work toward a political framework along the lines of the Rambouillet Accords. Cf.
Statement issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO
Headquarters, Bruselles, April 12, 1999, and Statement on Kosovo, issued by the Heads of
States and Governments Participating in the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Washington, D.C. April 23-24, 1999. (also available in internet: http://www.nato.com).
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When the Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia issued a statement on
19 January 1999, agreeing to summon representatives from FRY and Serbian
governments and representatives of the Kosova Albanians to Rambouillet
(Southwest of Paris, France), it connected the humanitarian situation in Kosova
to the issues of peace and stability and the territorial integrity of FRY and the
neighboring states, as the only viable solution to the crisis in Kosova.450 This
statement was fully endorsed by NATO on 30 January 1999.451 In both cases,
the previous UN Security resolutions on the matter were taken into full account,
reinforcing in this way even further the international community’s commitment to
FRY’s territorial integrity and to the preservation of regional and wider peace and
stability.452
 The above stance of the international community permeated the whole
negotiating process held at Rambouillet from 6 to 23 February 1999.453  The so-
called non-negotiable principles put foreword for signature before any discussion
on the Rabouillet Accords stressed the inviolability of the FRY’s borders, implying
that any solution had to be found within FRY’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In terms of self-determination, this practically meant that Kosova and its majority
population would have to remain satisfied with the internal right to self-
determination. This was nothing new for Kosovar Albanians. Such a right to
internal self-determination had earlier been labeled by the international
community as “a substantial autonomy for Kosova”.454  However, apart from the
                                                
450 “Big Powers Demand a Deal on Kosovo Within Weeks”.  Kosova Information Center.
Daily Report No. 1677, Prishtina, 19 January 1999; “Contact Group Sets Deadline for Kosovo
Agreement”. Radio Free Europe/RL Newsline. Vol. 3 No. 31 Part II, 15 February 1999.
451  See, “NATO Statement on Kosovo”. January 30, 1999. Kosova Information Center.
Daily Report No. 1679. January 31, 1999.
452 For the previous UN Security Council resolutions, see, Rsolution No. 1160 (31 March
1998); Resolution No. 1199 (23 Septembr 1998); and Resolution No. 1203 (24 October 1998).
(also available in internet: http://www.un.org).
453 The Rambouillet Peace Process ended with the signing of the Rambouillet Peace
Accords in Paris on 19 March 1999.
454 In essence, regarding the autonomy of Kosova there were put foreword various
models in the past, albeit not specified. The models were proposed by the international
community as well as by the parties themselves. They have usually followed the lines taken by
the international community. Cf. Dimitros Triantophollou, “Kosovo Today: Is There No Wat Out of
the Deadlock?” European Security Vol. 5 No. 2 (Summer 1996) pp. 291-292; Zoran Lutovac,
“Options for the Solution of the Problem of Kosovo” International Affairs No. 1056. Belgrade, 15
May 1007 pp. 10-14.
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vague comparison with other existing autonomies, no precise document had
been produced showing its full content, at last not before the Rambouillet
Accords. It was this paper that for the first time specified the content of Kosova’s
“substantial autonomy”, albeit for an interim period of three years.455 This
document provided for a democratic self-government, peace and security for
everyone living in Kosova. Democratic self-government included all matters of
daily importance to people in Kosova, including education, health care, and
economic development. Kosova would have a President, an Assembly, its own
courts, strong local government, and national community institutions with the
authority needed to protect each community’s identity. Security was meant to be
guaranteed by international troops deployed on the ground throughout Kosova.
Local police, representative of all national communities in Kosova, was foreseen
to provide routine law enforcement. Federal and Republic security forces would
have to leave Kosova, except for a limited border protection presence. The final
                                                                                                                                                
The first model consisted on granting Kosova the 1974-type of autonomy. This was
proposed most frequently by the international community’s circles. For the first time, its version
was made public by the Special Group on Kosovo (acting within the Working Group on Ethnic
and National Minorities of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia) and remained in
option well until the conflict in Kosova began in February 1998. This model, drafted by the
chairperson of the Special Group on Kosovo, German ambassador Gerht Ahrens, foresaw an
autonomy solution for Kosova based on the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution and the experiences of
South Tyrol, Spain, Aaland Islands, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (the so-called  “Plan  Z4”
drafted on behalf of the Serbs living in Croatia). Cf. Hugh Poulton, “The Rest of the Balkans”. In
Hugh Miall (ed.), Minority Rights in Europe. The Scope for a Transitional Regime (London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1994) pp. 71-72.
The second model dealt with the re-federalization of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro). It
meant a supplemental or new federalization of FRY, making Kosova, in addition to Serbia and
Montenegro, a separate federal unit, that is, a third republic. This was exactly what the Kosovar
Albanians demanded in the 1981 riots. Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, however, this solution
had been considered as an obsolete solution. On he Serbian side, this proposal was supported
by the so-called Serbian Resistance Movement leader, Momcilo Trajkovic. Cf. Carl Bildt, “Kosovo
Should Have the Same Status as Montengro” Kosova Information Center. Daily Report No. 1736
(3 June 1997), Prishtina (Albanian version only). M. Trajkovic has in several occasions asked for
Kosova to be a third republic within FRY. In one case, Trajkovic has even threatened that if
Kosovars do not accept this, it should be followed by a military campaign against Kosova. Cf.
Kosova Information Center. Daily Report No. 1945 (20 January 1997), Prishtina. (Albanian
version only).
455 The Rambouillet Peace Accords contained also the so-called non-negotiable
principles (already mentioned), in which the issue of FRY’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
takes precedence. See, Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo. Text
reprinted in Thanos M. Veremis and Dimitros Traintaphyllou (eds.), Kosovo and the Albanian
Dimension in Southeastern Europe: Thee Need For Regional Security and Conflict Prevention
(Athens: ELIAMEP, 1999) pp. 261-330.
201
issue was that concerning the mechanisms for the final settlement. In this regard,
the Rambouillet Accords foresaw an international meeting to be convened after 3
years to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosova. The will of the
people was conceived as an important factor to be taken into account at that
international meeting.
Despite the guaranties given to the FRY’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty, Belgrade authorities refused to sign the document. Milosevic’s
regime, instead of negotiating the peace terms of Rambouillet, continued its war
campaign throughout Kosova expelling hundreds and thousands of Albanians out
of their homes. The humanitarian situation in Kosova by the time the Rambouillet
Conference ended was becoming a real threat to regional peace and stability so
that NATO had no choice but to act in the way it stated in its statement of 30th
January 1999.  However, by the time the air strikes began on 24 March 1999, the
language of NATO leaders changed. The stress was now put on the
humanitarian reasons rather than on other considerations connected to regional
peace and stability.456 This was not, however, the language of the UN Security
Resolution No. 1244 of 12 June 1999. The order of issues ranked according to
their importance differs in this document as compared with the above ones. In
this resolution, as in other previous ones concerning the crisis in Kosova, the
preservation of regional peace and security and the FRY’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty took prominence. Next to these come the humanitarian issues (the
return of refugees and the displaced persons) and the final settlement of the
status of Kosova, the implementation of a temporary regime of self-government
being included as well.457 In practical terms this meant that NATO air strikes, in
                                                
456 In fact, apart from FRY’s territorial integrity, regional stability and security, and the
humanitarian situation in Kosova, there had been only one case where NATO expressly referred
to a political aim if it intervened in Kosova. Namely, the then NATO Secretary General, Javier
Solana, said on 22 January 1999 that NATO's political aim was to restore Kosova’s autonomous
status it enjoyed according to the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia. This practically meant that
military intervention would have as a result, if not a direct aim, the imposition on Kosova a status
of autonomy (internal self-determination), it enjoyed previously during Tito's times. Cf. Kosova
Infromation Center. Daily Report No. 2308 B (Prishtina), 22 January 1999.
457 Two international mediators, one on behalf of the EU (Martti Ahtisari) and the other on
behalf of the Russian Federation (Victor Chernmerdin) have later revealed that Milosevic had
accepted NATO’s conditions for surrender when he was given by them assurances that the
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terms of self-determination, have resulted in the preservation of the regional
peace and stability, FRY’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, the protection of
the Kosovar Albanian population, and, finally, they set the stage for a political
solution of the Kosova issue via granting a “substantial autonomy” for the
region.458
The 1244 Resolution recalls and fully endorses the previous UN Security
Council resolutions on the crisis in Kosova. These resolutions, as well as the
present one, call for the preservation of the FRY’s territorial integrity and the
integrity of the neighboring states to FRY. The 1244 Resolution further codifies
the G-8 formula for the political solution of the Kosova conflict, adopted on 6 May
1999.459 The formula is more or less the one expressed in the 1244 Resolution
which says that it “reaffirms the call in previous resolutions for a substantial
autonomy for Kosovo”. Among the responsibilities of the international civil
presence in Kosova is to “facilitate a political process designed to determine
Kosovo a future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords”. The end
                                                                                                                                                
international mission in Kosova would be under the UN auspices and, above all, that the same
community guaranteed FRY’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over Kosova. Cf. The UN
Document: S/1999/699 (dated 2 June 1999). For the comments of both international mediators,
see, Victor Cheromerdin, “Nismo Izdali Srbiju”. (Interview). Balgrade-based weekly NIN
(Belgrade), 14 October 1999; Martti Ahtisari, “Nuk e Kam Kercnuar Milosevicin”. Prishtina-based
daily newspaper Kosova Sot. 26 July 2000, p. 8.
458 Apart from NATO’s pronouncements on political issues, such as that regarding the
status of the 1974 autonomy enjoyed by Kosova during Tito’s times, some Western officials have
at an earlier stage of the conflict in Kosova made statements regarding the Western commitments
to FRY’s territorial integrity. Thus, in his visit to Prishtina in early March 1998, the US Special
Envoy for Kosova, Robert Gelbart, unwittingly underscored the validity of the peace option by
revealing American and others’ support (mainly NATO countries) for “Yugoslav integrity”. This, in
turn, gave Milosevic free hands to expel almost entire population of Kosova, kill innocent civilians
and apply the policy of scorched earth. See, for the critics of this Western stance, in Miles
Pomper, NATO Readies Strike Plans Against Serbia. CO Weekly. 07/25/98, Vol. 56 Issue 30, p.
203; James Brady, “History Proves Again Balkans Bite Is Worse Than Its Bark”. Advertising Age.
07/13/1999, Vol. 69 Issue 28 p. 25; Roland Steel, “Hijacked”. New Republic. 07/13/1998, Vol. 219
Issue 2 , p.10; Johnatan Landay, “NATO’s Drums Beat Louder Over Kosovo”. Christian Science
Monitor. 09/25/98, Vol. 90 Issue 212, p.1; Justin Brown, “Living Cross Hairs of NATO”. Christian
Science Monitor. 10/07/98, Vol. 90 Issue 230, p.1; Mark Dennis, “Locked and Loaded”.
Newsweek. 10/09/98. Vol. 132 Issue16, p. 50; Michael Hirsch et al.,”Holbrookee’s Nervy Game of
Chicken”. Newsweek. 10/26/98, Vol. 132 Issue 17, p. 50; Richard Newman, “NATO’s Patience is
Wearing Thin”. US News and World Report. 10/09/98. Vol. 125 Issue 15, p. 40; Justin Brown,
“Uncomfortable Peace in Kosovo”. Christian Science Monitor. 10/14/98 Vol. 90 Issue 224, p.1;
Jansuz Bugajski, “Act Now in Kosovo or Regret Later”. Christian Science Monitor. 03/11/98. Vol.
90 Issue 72, p. 19 (these article are available in internet: http://www.gwz.epnet.com).
459  See, the UN Document S/1999/516. (also available in internet: http:www.un.org).
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result of this is that, at  least in its formal sense, the policy of Greater Serbia has
not been defeated in Kosova, at least not as long as the international community
treats it as an integral part of the Serb-dominated FRY. In this formal sense,
again, there is a striking similarity between the position of Kosova and the
“Republika Srpska” in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
CHAPTER VI:
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE
ILLEGAL AND ILLEGITIMATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SELF-
DETERMINATION WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
1. The European Guidelines on Recognition of New States in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (16 December 1991)
Even when the United States denounced Serbia as the aggressor in
September of 1991, the accompanying message was that the US, finding no
strategic interest at the time, would not militarily intervene to stop the killing. At
the same time, the European Community (EC) was not prepared for military
intervention. Encouraged by this, the Serbian leadership escalated attacks on
civilians in Croatia. A few months later, with the change in geopolitical
considerations (the break up of the Soviet Union), justifications for discouraging
the democracy-and independence- seeking Yugoslav republics came to an end.
This trend was also reinforced by Serbia’s intransigence to accept nothing but a
highly centralized (Yugoslav) federation, leading to a Greater Serbia. This stance
of Serbia, in conjunction with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union,
constituted the context within which the EC made public its so-called “Guidelines
on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” on 16
December 1991. Their drafting was the end result of the Austro-German
pressure on the EC to recognize those republics desiring it, especially Slovenia
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and Croatia.460 However, their impact was wider, covering the entire Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. They were to serve not only the EC’s
recognition policy towards the newly emerging states, but would also serve  as  a
crucial political platform on how to handle the crisis as well as the results of
armed conflicts in the territory of former Communist federations. This is the
reason why in this section we discuss the background for their drafting and their
very impact on the shaping of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
On August 27, 1991, the EC and its member states assembled in Brussels
in an extraordinary ministerial meeting, expressing dismay at the increasing
violence in Croatia and reminding “those responsible for violence” that the EC
was determined “never to recognize changes of frontiers which have not been
brought about by peaceful means and by agreement”. The EC further deplored
the Serbian irregulars’ resort to military means and the support given to them by
the JNA, calling at the same time on “the Federal Presidency to put an immediate
end to the illegal use of the forces under its command”.461  Finally, on the same
occasion, the EC stated that it could not “stand idly by as the bloodshed in
Croatia increases day by day”, urging the parties to the conflict to accept a peace
conference and an arbitration procedure. The Peace Conference (known
variously as “the European Peace Conference” (EPC), “the Conference on
Yugoslavia”, or “the Hague Conference”) was to bring together, “on the part of
Yugoslavia”, the Federal Presidency, the Federal Government and the
Presidents of the Republic. At this time, the EC accepted at this time that
Yugoslavia still existed as a state rather than a mere geographical description
(“on the part of Yugoslavia”). The setting up of the arbitration procedure, known
variously as the Badinter Committee or Commission, was much in line with the
                                                
460 “EC Declaration Concerning the Conditions for Recognition of New States”, adopted
at the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991. Text provided by the
Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, pp. 431-432.  For the
analysis of this document,see, Rein Mullerson, International Law, Rights and Politics.
Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS  (London: Routeledge, 1991) pp. 125-135; Predrag
Simic, “Dynamics of the Yugoslav Crisis”. Security Dialogue  Vol. 26  No. 2 ( June 1995) pp. 153-
173.
461 “Declaration on Yugoslavia”, adopted at EPC Extraordinary Ministerial Meting, 27
August 1991. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana
Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp. 333-34.
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international practice as applied to similar cases. It was to give its decisions (in
the form of legal and formally non-binding opinions) within two months.
The Peace Conference met at the Hague on September 7, 1991, under
the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. The Hague Peace Conference was
convened as a result of a franco-german compromise, marking the outset of
Europe’s obvious disunity over the crisis in former Yugoslavia and the clear
ramification of Serbia’s war aims. As for its legal nature, the Conference was to
serve as good offices only, acceptable by all sides in Yugoslavia by mid-1991
due to the fact that the Conference on Security in Europe (CSCE) soon reached
the limits of its influence in the Yugoslav crisis so that the lading role in
international mediation to the crisis was relinquished to the EC. The Conference
was a compromise because at this stage it proved impossible for any discussion
in favor of military intervention to stop the unfolding tragedy in Yugoslavia. This
gave clear signals to Milosevic that he could safely pursue his war goals, treating
the work of the Conference solely as good offices and as a simple mediation
effort without any binding effect on the parties to the conflict. Although by the end
of 1991, the Conference ended in failure, with the peacekeeping as a substitute
for military intervention to stop the war462, the documents and the guidelines it
produced served as a solid ground for further work of the international community
in its efforts to solve the Yugoslav crisis.463  Among them, the Statement of   4
                                                
462 For the peace-keeping in former Yugoslavia, its origins and the mandate, see,
"Concept for a United Nations Peace-Keeping Operation in Yugoslavia" (as discussed with the
Yugoslav leaders by the Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Personal Envoy of the Secretary General
and Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs),
November/December 1991. UN Doc. S/23280, Annex III. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign
Ministry, Tirana. Also reproduced in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp.
418-423. For scholarly work on this issue, see, Marts R. Berdal, “Whither UN Peacekeeping?”
Adelphi Paper No. 281 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993); Shashi
Tharoor,”United Nations and Peacekeeping in Europe” Survival Vol. 37 No (Summer 1995) pp.
121-134; Bertrand de Rossanet, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1996).
463 Despite its non-binding character, the mandate of the Conference had been refined by
the EC, rather than by the parties to the conflict. The Conference, according to an EC ministerial
declaration of September 3, 1991, was “to ensure a peaceful accommodation of the conflicting
aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples, on the basis of the following principles: no unilateral change
of borders by force, protection for the rights of all in Yugoslavia, and full account to be taken of all
legitimate concerns and aspirations”. Cf. “EC Declaration on Yugoslavia”, adopted at the EPC
Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, 3 September 1991, The Hague. Text provided by the Albanian
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October 1991 represented a framework for action setting the limits of self-
determination and the rules of the game on behalf of the Yugoslav actors. This
statement reflected the Franco-German rivalry over the issue of recognition and
over the very concept of the Yugoslav self-determination, further cementing the
previous EC’s policy on the matter. This eventually led to the final clarification of
the self-determination process to be pursued in the future by the Yugoslav
actors. The Statement, along with the Guidelines on Recognition, definitely
shaped Yugoslav self-determination, its form and content. The Yugoslav self-
determination ever since has remained unchanged and has followed the basic
premises foreseen by these two documents.464
The Statement, issued after a meeting held at the Hague with the
participation of the presidents of Croatia and Serbia and the Yugoslav Secretary
for National Defense, Veljko Kadijevic, stressed the will of all participants who
“agreed that the involvement of all parties concerned would be necessary to
formulate a political solution on the basis of the prospective recognition of the
independence of those republics wishing it, at the end of negotiating process
conducted in good faith”. The recognition, said the statement, would be granted
in the framework of a general settlement and have the following components:
a) a lose association or alliance of sovereign or independent republics;
                                                                                                                                                
Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents,
pp. 342-343. For comments, see, James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of the Will, pp. 52-53.
The Hague Peace Conference had been replaced by the London Conference on Former
Yugoslavia (ICFY). The London Conference followed the two-days meetings in London on 26-27
August 1992. The main difference between these two institutions lies in their legal nature. The
Hague Conference was a “good offices” offered by the EC, whose decisions were non-binding
for the parties to the conflict, a feature clearly missing in the second case.  The London
Conference was convened at the height of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Due to its
seriousness (Serbia’s open involvement in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina after latter’s
recognition in April 1992 by the EC and the US government), the international community
convened this new conference, dealing with the by now defunct Yugoslav state, whose decisions
were to be authoritatively binding for all parties to the conflict. Their implementation were to be
done by the UN Security Council, which it did not in most part. See, a compilation of the basic
documents of these two conferences, in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents;
B. G. Ramcharan, The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Official Papers. Vols I
and II (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997). For further comments, see, Vladimir
Djuro Degan, “Jugoslavia u Raspadu. Politicka Misao. Vol.  XXVIII No.  4 ( Zagreb 1991).
464 The work of the Badinter Commission, to be discussed throughout the following
section of this chapter, did nothing but further made operational the basic premises of these  two
documents.
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b) adequate arrangements to be made for the protection of minorities,
including human rights guarantees and possibly special status for certain areas;
c) no unilateral changes in borders.465
This Statement for the first time formally admitted the possibility of
secession but tied its international legitimacy, e.g., recognition of the prospective
new states to the “framework of a general settlement”.  On the same day, the
presidents of five of the six Yugoslav republics, expressed their general
agreement, with certain qualification, to continue working on a draft paper
prepared by Lord Carrington, entitled “Arrangements of a General Settlement”.
This document  spelled out the details of the envisaged framework agreement
concerning the process of self-determination. The process included the
commitments by the Yugoslav republics to protect human rights as foreseen by
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Human Rights
Covenants, the OSCE documents on human dimension and other relevant
instruments of the Council of Europe.  Detailed provisions on human rights as
“particularly applied to national or ethnic groups” were set forth, and a special
status (autonomy) was to be established for areas in which a national or ethnic
group formed a majority. In addition to these provisions, a provision was made
for cooperation or consultation among the Yugoslav republics in trade, foreign
affairs and security, and a customs union was envisaged.466
The President of Serbia considered this paper to be unsuitable for a
detailed discussion.467 Similar reservations were put foreword by the still existing
Yugoslav Vice-President who, since October 3, 1991, had been presiding over
the “rump Yugoslav presidency” because, as he himself put it, the paper  “...
recognized the legality of unilateral secession”.468  Notwithstanding these
objections, a similar arrangement for the general settlement of the Yugoslav self-
                                                
465  See, UN Doc. S/23169, Annex II. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry,
Tirana.
466 "Arrangements for General Settlement” (the so-called Carrington Draft-Convention),
October 18, 1991 (the Hague). See, also, UN Doc. S/2369, Annex VI. Text provided by the
Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through
Documents, pp. 357-365.
467  See, UN Doc. S/23169. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana.
468  See, UN Doc. S/23169. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana.
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determination was further pursued by the EC. The new paper came out on 25
October 1991, but the President of Serbia again maintained his reservations with
regard to the proposed solution.469  The EC, in response, gave the parties a
deadline (until November 5, 1991) to indicate their acceptance or refusal of
Carrington’s outline agreement.  The EC’s draft sanctions were formally prepared
by the end of October 1991, providing for the suspension of cooperation
agreements with Yugoslavia and trade concessions. The EC’s attitude was
influenced by the events on the ground  (the fighting in Croatia) and the behavior
of the Yugoslav authorities. However, a special regime was to be applied vis-à-
vis parties contributing to the peace process.  Serbia again refused to accept the
proposed paper and the sanctions were instituted. In addition to this, the EC
asked the Security Council to impose an oil embargo and to adopt additional
measures to enhance the effectiveness of its arms embargo.470
The EC’s stance was that the recognition of the independence of those
Yugoslav republics wishing it “can only be envisaged in the framework of an
overall settlement” and this was also supported by the UN Security Council.
Thus, in its letter dated December 10, 1991, the Council openly opted for the
policy of a general settlement as foreseen by the EC.471 It as unlikely, however,
that the general consent could be achieved,  as long as recognition depended on
the agreement of all parties and with Serbia using its veto over the issue of
recognition, thus frustrating the talks at the Hague. To overcome this stalemate,
the EC outlined the conditions for recognition in a common position known as the
“Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the
Soviet Union” of 16 December 1991. This common position was in fact the
Austro-German idea, dating as far back as early July 1991, when most of the
                                                
470 Cf. “EC Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia” (Brussells, 28 October 1991); “EC
Declaration on the Suspension of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia”
(Rome, 8 November 1991). Texts provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also
reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp. 368-369 and 378-380.
For further comments, see, James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of the Will, pp. 57-66.
471 “Letter from the Secretary General of the United Nations Addressed to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands”. 10 December 1991. UN Doc. S/23280, Annex IV. Text
provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska,
Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp. 428-429.
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German and Austrian political parties were convinced that the war in Slovenia
had been a war of aggression committed by Serbia, and demanded that the crisis
be stopped by a unilateral recognition of those republics wishing to separate from
Yugoslavia, thus internationalizing the crisis. This, in the Austro-German view,
would open the way for the international community to regard the crisis in
accordance with the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The fact that the other
Yugoslav republics were not being recognized internationally was construed by
the Serbs as a validation of their policy of conquest472 This attitude was opposed
by some EC’s member states, especially France.473 However, the German
stance prevailed, not only in the Guidelines on Recognition but also when it came
to the practical implementation of this new recognition policy: Germany forced its
way out by a unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia before the deadline
set out in the Guidelines on Recognition.
The conditions for recognition as set out in this document, as opposed to
previous ones, allowed for progress to be made even in the absence of unanimity
among the Yugoslav republics, but would still safeguard the essence of the
Carrington proposal, as the republics were required to embrace its provisions
unilaterally and to continue working towards a collective agreement.474 This two-
                                                
472 Mark Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal
republic of Yugoslavia “, pp. 386-387; James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of the Will, pp. 35-36.
473 See, more on this, Peter Viggo Jacobsen, ”Myth-Making and Germany’s Unilateral
Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia “. European Security. Vol. 4 No. 3 (Autumn 1995) pp. 400-
417.
474  The conditions for recognition were:
“ - respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments
enshrined in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule
of law, democracy and human rights;
-  guaranties for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with
the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;
- respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can be changed only by peaceful means
and by common agreement;
- acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation as well as to security and regional stability;
- commitment to settle by agreement, including when appropriate by recourse to
arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes”.  Cf. EC Declaration
Concerning the Conditions for Recognition of New States, adopted at the Extraordinary EPC
Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana.
Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp.43-432.
The EC confirmed again that it would not recognize entities that “are the result of
aggression” and further invited all Yugoslav republics to state by December 23, 1991, whether:
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pronged strategy of the EC served two purposes. First, it bridged the gap
between the French and German foreign policies regarding Europe’s common
interests (Mastricht Summit of December 1991). Second, the Guidelines served
as a yardstick preventing the validation of the factual situations that were against
the basic norms of international conduct (genocide and the policy of ethnic
cleansing already under way, aimed at the creation of the territorial base for the
Serbs entities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina: the “Republic of Srpska
Krajina” and the “Republika Srpska” respectively).475
The Guidelines, as it can be seen, did not dwell upon the basic criteria for
international statehood as they exist in general international law (the possession
of territory, a population and the government in control of this territory and the
population). These criteria were taken for granted, whereas the conditions from
the Guidelines on Recognition were designed to politically influence the events
on the ground and to fit the EC’s interests. Their main aim was to enable the
establishment of diplomatic relations with those entities which fulfilled the
conditions set forth and, at the same time, to punish those Yugoslav republics
who did not want to comply with them. The perception of  these conditions that
were to be fulfilled was different on the side of the Yugoslav republics. They
viewed them as the basic criteria and a reference point for the attainment of their
international statehood. This means that the Yugoslav republics equalized the
establishment of diplomatic relations with international statehood.476 The
applications submitted within the terms set forth in the Guidelines on Recognition
and the positive response to them was by definition seen as a crucial stage in the
process of attainment of full independence for former Yugoslav republics. This
further meant that other applications submitted not by former Yugoslav republics
                                                                                                                                                
1) they desired to be recognized as independent states;
2) they agreed to the commitments in the guidelines above;
3) they accepted the provisions of the Carrington proposal, especially those on human
rights and the rights of national or ethnic groups; and
4) they approved the involvement of the United Nations Secretary General and Security
Council and continuation of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia.
475 See, Rein Mullerson, International Law, Rights and Politics. Developments in Eastern
Europe and the CIS, pp. 134-135; Mark Weller, “The International Response”, pp. 560-607; John
Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, pp. 138-139.
476  Mark Weller, “International Response”, pp. 587-588.
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but by other entities, who either did not have a clear territorial base at the time of
application ( the Serb entities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) or did not
effectively control their territory and population (the case of Kosova) would not be
taken into consideration. Only in these cases, cannot be argued that the
establishment of diplomatic relations and international statehood fully coincided.
By denying any international legitimacy and a position to other than Yugoslav
republics, the EC opted for two forms of self-determination, one external (in favor
of former Yugoslav republics), and the other internal (other entities not
possessing a full republican status at the time of the Yugoslav dissolution). This
process of Yugoslav self-determination, ramified during the early stages of
Yugoslavia’s dissolution (November 1991-July 1992), has been elaborated by the
Badinter Commission.
2. Work of the Badinter Commission and Its Impact on the Crisis
The work of the Badinter Commission is nothing but a further
operationalization of the Guidelines on Recognition477. No discussion of the
Yugoslav self-determination is complete without an understanding of the work of
this commission that further clarified the Guidelines on Recognition. It provided,
                                                
477 During its mandate, the Commission has rendered thirteen opinions on the various
aspects of the Yugoslav crisis, three of which shall be discussed in detail in the sections to follow.
Apart from the first opinion, dated 29 November 1991, the Badinter Commission has rendered
some others that were of crucial importance for the future ramification of the crisis in former
Yugoslavia.
The Commission was called upon to give its opinions from the various sides. Initially, it
was called upon to give one opinion thee request of Lord Carrington, Chairman of the Hague
Conference (Opinion No. 1, discussing the question as to whether the seceding republics could
legally inherit former Yugoslavia and, if so, by virtue of which procedures). The Opinions 4 to 7 of
January 11, 1992 were given also at the request of the EC’s Council of Ministers and were
concerned with the question of whether the Republic of Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, which
had requested the recognition by the EC and its member states, satisfied the conditions laid down
in the Guidelines on Recognition. The Opinions 7 to 10 of July 4, 1992, which specified
conclusively that new states that emerged from former Yugoslavia, their rights and duties, and
Opinions 11 to 13 of July 4, 1993, that dealt with the date when the succession to former
Yugoslavia occurred, have also been asked by the EC authorities. The only case in which
Badinter’s procedure was put into motion upon the request of the conflicting parties is that
regarding the Opinions Nos. 2 and 3 of January 11, 1992. In the second opinion, the Commission
dwelt upon the question as to whether the Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
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above all, the framework for the EC, and the international community at large, to
settle the sovereignty and self-determination issues in Yugoslavia.478
Nevertheless, the work of the Commission has in the scholarly world had, in
some cases, controversial interpretations.
As noted in Chapter II of this dissertation, the work of the Badinter
Commission in terms of international legitimacy was less legitimate as compared
with similar cases in Africa: neither Yugoslavia, nor its constituent republics, were
members of the EC. In the case of Africa, though, the conflicting parties (Nigeria
and Zaire/Congo) were full-fledged members of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). With a few exceptions, accepting the legitimacy of the Commission’s
work479, this author included, the rest of the scholarly work for most of the part
has rejected the pronouncements of this body. However, this rejection did not
concern the legitimacy of the Commission’s work per se, focusing instead on the
merits of the work itself.  Some of the scholars have argued that Badinter’s work
was the least legal, thus putting the Commission’s entire efforts into the realm of
                                                                                                                                                
had the right to self-determination, while the third one addressed the issue of whether the internal
boundaries between the former Yugoslav republics could be regarded as international frontiers.
478 See, also, James Gow, “Serbian Nationalism and the Hisssing Sssssnake in
International Order: Whose Sovereignty? Which Nation?“ The Slavonic and East European
Review.  Vol.  72 No.  3  (July 1994) pp. 456-476.
479 See, Vladimir Djuro Degan, “Jugoslavija u Raspadu “. Politicka Misao. Vol. XXVIII No.
4 (Zagreb 1991); Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Committee: A Second Breath for
Self-Determination of Peoples “. European Journal of International Law. Vol. 3 No. 1 (1992) pp.
178-181; Alain Pellet, “Note sur la Conference Europeenne pour la Paix en Yougoslavie“.
Annuaire Francais de Droit International. Vol. XXXVIII (1992) pp. 223-238; Vladimir Djuro Degan,
“Samoopredeljenje Naroda i Territorijalna Celovitost Drzava u Uvjetima Raspada Jugoslavije “.
Nasa Zakonitost. Vol. 46 No. 4 (Zagreb, April 1992) pp. 543-569; Vladimir Djuro Degan, “UN
Membership of Former Yugoslavia “ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87 No. 2 (April
1993) pp. 240-244; Ove E. Bring, “ UN Membership of Former Yugoslavia “ American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 87 No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 244-246; M. Kelly Malone, “UN Membership of
Former Yugoslavia “. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87 No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 246-
248; Antonio Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples and the Recent Break-Up of  USSR and
Yugoslavia” . In Roland St. John Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honor of Wang Tieya  (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) pp. 131-144; George Karipsiadis, “ State Succession in the
Balkans: Its Impact Upon International Boundaries “ The Southeast European Yearbook 1994-
1995 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1995) pp. 151-181; Milan Sahovic, “ Raspad SFRJ i Stvaranje Novih
Drzava “. In Milan Sahovic (ed.), Medunarodno Pravo i Jugoslavnska Kriza. (Beograd: Institut za
Medunarodnu Politiku i Privredu, 1996) pp.14-47; Konstantin Obradovic,”Problemi Vezani za
Sukcesiju SFRJ “. In Milan Sahovic (ed.), Medunrodno Pravo, pp. 275-315;  Vladimir Djuro
Degan, “ L’Arbitrage Juridique Ignore: La Jurisprudence de la Commission Badinter “. In Marie
Francois Allain et al. (eds.), L’Ex Yougoslavie en Europe. De la Fallite des Democraties au
Processus de Paix. (Paris: Editions L’ Harmattan, 1997) pp. 31-43;
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pure politics.480 Others, though, went thus far as to accuse Badinter of being a
direct accomplice and a very cause of the Yugoslav dissolution and tragedy.481
Still others have held the view that the Commission did misapply and misinterpret
the internationally recognized criteria for international statehood and self-
determination.482
The first group of authors who deny the legitimacy of Badinter’s work by
focusing on its content, that is, the rulings of the Commission,  are not right.
Once the fighting was underway, the EC’s goal was order and stability. It  tried to
contain the conflict by using a mixture of traditional principles and  innovative
ideas to produce a workable framework for a political solution to the Yugoslav
crisis. It is these aims that Badinter followed in its work. Only in procedural terms
can the work and the legitimacy of the Commission be contested. However, the
work in this respect should also be looked at contextually. This is so due to the
fact that the EC was not even initially motivated simply by altruism or by fear
about the consequences of a war on its borders. Many issues on the European
agenda were to become entangled with the development of the policy towards
Yugoslavia: the future of the EC’s foreign policy role, the relationship between
major EC powers, especially France and Germany, the relationship between EC,
                                                
480 See, for example, “Martha Rady, Self-Determination and the Dissolution of
Yugoslavia”. Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 19 No. 2 (1996) pp. 382-384; John Williams,
Legitimacy in International relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, pp. 130-131, 138, 140-
141; Payam Akhavan, “Self-Determination and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia: What Lessons
for the International Community?” In Donald Clark  and Robert Williamson (eds.), Self-
Determination. International Perspectives (New York: St. Martin Press, 1996) pp. 227-228, 233-
235 and 240-242.
481 Thomas Raju, G.C., “Nations, States and Secession : Lessons from the Former
Yugoslavia”. Mediterranean Quarterly  Vol. 5 No. 4 (Fall 1994) pp. 40-65; Peter Radan, “The
Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia”  Nationalities Papers. 25 (1997)
pp. 537-557; Reneo Lukic and Alan Lunch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals. The
Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, pp. 275-281; Said Mohmoudi, “Recognition of
States: the Case of Former Yugoslav Republics”. In Ove Bring and Said Mahmoudi (eds.),
Current International Law Issues. Nordic Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Jerzy Sztucki  (CE
Fritzers AB: Sweden 1994) pp. 135-159.
482 These authors claim that Badinter could have declared Bosnia-Herzegovina as being
in the process of dissolution as of January 1992, as was former Yugoslavia few months earlier
when the Commission rendered its first opinion (November 1991). Put another way, these
authors say that Bosnia-Herzegovina lacked an effective control over its own territory and
population by the time Badinter declared Bosnia-Herzegovina to be a state (provided that it held a
referendum on independence). See, Robert M. Hgden, “Bosnia’s Internal War and the
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NATO and WEU, etc. The EC was entering uncharted waters in its efforts to lead
international efforts to manage the crisis in Yugoslavia. Its previous diplomatic
role focused on trade relations. Its role in more “classical” foreign policy issues
had been limited to coordination and prior discussion of positions in the
European Political Cooperation (EPC) process. With the end of the Cold War
came the end of the principal reason for US involvement in European security
affairs, meaning U.S. leadership was likely to be less decisive and the US
government was seeking to reduce its role. Proponents of the Common Security
and Foreign Policy (the EC CSFP) saw this as a gap which the EC should fill.
Proposals were made for the revival of the WEU as the defense arm of the EC’s
new security role.
The EC was also taking the leading role in economic assistance to
Eastern Europe and was the focus of attention of these states. Institutions such
as PHARE program, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and Association Agreements came thick and fast. The EC was establishing itself
as the leading institution in post-Communist Eastern Europe. Under the
expanded rubric of security it was already fulfilling a security role and this fuelled
momentum for it to take a larger role. With its lack of military capabilities, the EC
inevitably emphasized the “new” aspects of security. Within them, it also included
the mission to extend democracy, market economies and cooperation as far to
the East as possible and especially to the tottering Soviet Union to meet the
unexpected changes of the collapse of a nuclear superpower. The international
context of the collapse of Yugoslavia was therefore very complicated and rapidly
changing . The fact that the former Yugoslavia was not its member counted little
in the face of the new challenges the EC was facing at the time. Apart from this,
all actors of the Yugoslav drama accepted the work of the Badinter Commission
as legitimate. Only Serbia denied its legitimacy, but only after Badinter’s first
opinion on  29 November 1991. Serbia denied the legitimacy of Badinter’s work
because she apparently seems to have hoped that the Commission would
                                                                                                                                                
International Criminal Tribunal”. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 22 No. 1 (Winter/Spring
1998) pp. 45-65 at 50-51.
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dogmatically apply the international criteria for statehood  by recognizing
unconditionally the right to territorial status quo on behalf of the Yugoslav
federation (then controlled by Milosevic’s regime in Belgrade). The opportunities
and uncertainties arising from the end of the Cold War were followed also by an
enthusiasm and a determination to do something about Yugoslavia’s increasingly
desperate position, but equally its power to set precedents could not be ignored
by the EC officials.
However, Yugoslavia set no precedent. The work of the Badinter
Commission, as noted, was a mixture of traditional and innovative approaches. In
this context, the second group of authors who see the work of this body as
politically motivated try in fact to deny the competent work the Commission did in
essence. Being innovative and deciding politically are two different things.
Badinter was innovative in a sense that it tried to achieve the goal of order and
stability. To achieve these effects, it took as a reference point only former
administrative borders of the Yugoslav republics. The same precedent was used
elsewhere throughout history (Latin America, Africa and Asia, already discussed
in the second chapter of this dissertation). This means that Badinter set up no
precedent. It only applied the old rule into a new context and innovatively, not led
by political considerations. The innovation consisted on the nature of new states
that would succeed the former Yugoslavia: Should they be dictatorships as their
predecessor? This dilemma was settled by the Commission through the
suggestion given to the new successor states to take case of  the rule of law,
democracy, respect for human and minority rights. This further means that the
legitimacy of the former Yugoslavia and that the EC efforts via the Badinter
Commission were to be judged through new lenses: the goal of order and
stability was linked by the Commission to the liberal ideas of rule of law,
democracy, free market economy, respect for human and minority rights.
This linkage was due to the fact that the EC and its Badinter Commission
had no military force to back up the issued rulings. This seems to have forced the
EC to turn more towards liberal political ideas and liberal economics. This by no
means reduced the long-run effects on the Yugoslav crisis of the Commission’s
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rulings. We shall see this when we discuss the EC’s policy on recognition and its
sanctions regime in the penultimate section of this chapter. This initial response
of the EC through its organ, the Badinter Commission, only shows that the EC
before December 1991, and some time after it, has mostly relied on realpolitik
considerations translated into concrete liberal values as described above, not the
opposite. Such an approach was conditioned by the EC’s lack of a credible
military force, such as NATO. The role of the liberal values was prominent.
Hopes for establishing democracy, free market economies, protecting human
rights and the encouragement of other standard features of the liberal states
were high on the agenda of the newly emerging states and, therefore,  an
important motivating factor in Badinter’s work throughout. In post-Cold War
Europe, traditional power and security politics were considerably redefined and
replaced by the new emphasis on political integration and economic
interdependence.
The Badinter Commission did nothing new in yet another respect, that is,
in the sense of the concepts it further crystallized (the criteria for international
statehood) and which form another aspect of criticism leveled against it by the
third group of the authors under discussion.  As we shall see in the following
section, the Commission did not negate or misapply the traditional criteria for
statehood. It instead took them for granted once the Yugoslav wars of
succession started. True, it downplayed the principle of governmental effective
control as a precondition for international statehood. This, however, was a logical
attitude because had it accepted this classical criteria as valid, then it would have
meant that the EC would have been taking the aggressor’s side, that is,
Milosevic’s Serbia. This was not new for the Yugoslav case alone. As noted
earlier (see, infra  p. 14), the institution of the so-called premature recognition
existed in Africa during the decolonization process and was aimed at preventing
the colonial states in order to further keep colonies under their control. What is
new in the Yugoslav case, however, is that Badinter linked the application of
these traditional criteria to some liberal values, a case clearly missing during the
decolonization process. Even if these were to be pure political conditions, which
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was not the case, again this would be nothing new because in the past there
have been cases of recognition of states under political conditions. The drafting
of the Guidelines on Recognition, applied by Badinter throughout, stating that the
EC and other members of the international community should take into account,
upon their decision to grant recognition, “political realities in each case”, must be
read as implying that some parts of former Yugoslavia were no longer under
effective control of the Federal government in Belgrade by the time this
document was issued by the EC.  By the end of 1991, apart from Serbia,
Montenegro, Kosova and Vojvodina, the rest of Yugoslavia was more or less
under the control of new authorities. True, the international community could not
deny that some part of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were under Serbian
control, but not their capitals. It is an established international practice that
emerged from the decolonization period saying that no recognition should be
granted to the authorities in control of other parts of the country, not the capital
city.  Had the Badinter Commission pursued the old rule of total effectiveness
than it would have meant support for the Serbs who already had an upper hand
and a permission to further speed up their policy of ethnic cleansing  through
military means, which in fact they did later in an apparent hope that their policy of
fait accompli shall be recognized.
The Badinter Commission did nothing in fact but elaborated more than
ever in the past on the practical side of self-determination, concerning one case
only - former Yugoslavia. This is obvious from the first ruling of the Commission
stating that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution since 1991, the dates of
succession of other republics to Yugoslavia being also elaborated later in the
1993 rulings.  Other aspects of the Yugoslav self-determination, such as
succession, the issue of independence referendums, protection of human and
minority rights and other liberal values, the respect for former republican
administrative borders, etc., represent without any doubt an integral part of the
Yugoslav crisis, its conflict and war (s) over how to implement self-determination
and to what extent its implementation becomes a destabilizing factor in
international relations. Badinter’s rulings should therefore be seen as having had
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a wider appeal than in the Yugoslavian context, not because of their legally
binding force but rather due to the moral credibility of the EC on whose name
Badinter acted throughout and the competence and professionalism of the
Commission itself.  It is true that the rulings did not contain any justification. No
reasons were given to them upon which to judge as to the possible motives that
might have been a driving force for Badinter’s  decision. This is, in fact, unusual
for an international arbitration. However, this does not diminish the real value of
the Commission’s work and its contribution given to the development of self-
determination.
The aspects of the Yugoslav self-determination chosen as prime for
elaboration in the sub-sections to follow are not less important compared to other
issues that this case raised. Both are equally important and represent another
facet of the Yugoslav self-determination. However, the three selected topics
below best reflect the essence of the case under study. There are several
reasons for this choice. One is that the type of the Yugoslav self-determination is
better understood through the selection we make here: self-determination does
not mean only independence. It has other forms of manifestation short of
independence (internal self-determination) and should as such be equally
treated, especially when it comes to the practical implementation of self-
determination. The next reason is that the limits and the subjects entitled to self-
determination are better comprehended through such an institution as uti
possidetis juris.  Finally, the topic concerning the democracy, rule of law, respect
for human and minority rights serves for a better understanding of the liberal side
of self-determination that the EC gradually imposed on the Yugoslav actors.
Through the imposition of these liberal sides, the EC delegitimized at the same
time other non-liberal concepts pursued by some of the Yugoslav actors (Serbia
and Montenegro). The understanding of this topic, in essence, represents a
condictio sine qua non of Yugoslav self-determination and its almost universal
appeal at the present.
2.1. Self-Determination
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The issue of self-determination was dealt with by the Commission in two
aspects. One concerned the former Yugoslavia itself and its international
legitimacy by the time the crisis in the country began to be seen as an issue of
international concern resulting from the changes in the internal dynamics of the
Yugoslav state. The other related to the self-determination of the Yugoslav
republics (external form of self-determination) and other forms of self-
determination short of independence (internal self-determination). In both cases,
the Commission’s response was based on liberal views regarding self-
determination.
Throughout the second half of 1991 there were negotiations going on
among the Yugoslav republics with the view of reforming the common state. In
these negotiations, Serbia held the view that Yugoslavia should be an even
tighter federation and that its claims were legitimate because they were the only
ones favoring the preservation of an internationally recognized independent and
sovereign state - the Yugoslav state.  The Serbs seems to have perceived the
international law and the norm on territorial integrity as favoring thier views. This
became obvious from their reaction to the attempted  secession of Slovenia in
June 1991.483 The Badinter Commission ruled against the Serb interpretation of
                                                
483 The international support for the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav federation voiced
strongly before and some months after Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence
(June 1991) by the representatives of influential states and organizations, including the United
States, the EC and the CSCE, undoubtedly strengthened Milosevic in his perception that flexibility
was not required in negotiations about the  future of Yugoslavia.  This position of the international
community was transmitted to the Serbian leadership by the US officials. On June 21, 1991, the
US Secretary of State, James Baker, while visiting Belgrade, strongly endorsed a declaration
adopted two days earlier at the Berlin Meeting of the CSCE, which expressed support for
democratic developments and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. This meant no international
support for secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia. Since this was the case, the Serbian
leadership had the central army, the Yugoslav People’s Army (the YPA or, in Serbo-Croatian:
JNA) declare martial law against Slovenia. Cf. The Berlin Statement on the Situation in
Yugoslavia, adopted at the 1st meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the CSCE, held
from 19-20 June 1991. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. See, also, the
Reference Manual of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. CSCE Decisions -
Part V.: Chronological Review and Final Word. (Vienna 1994), pp. 272-291. For the comments on
this, see, James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of the Will, pp. 166-167, 240-241.
The US and international position as expressed above has later been justified on the
ground that Western world had feared that Yugoslavia’s dissolution might have had a negative
impact on the ongoing events in the Soviet Union. This view was expressed also by Baker
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international law regarding the issue of territorial integrity and self-determination
of an existing state.  The Commission was at the same time the first international
institution to flatly deny the legitimacy of Yugoslavia, based on the liberal
tradition, that is, on the fact that the very legitimacy of any government must rest
upon the consent of the governed  who have an inalienable right to withdraw the
consent whenever they wish.484 Throughout 1991 and long after it, the Serbs
claimed that the right to self-determination had been consummated by the mere
fact of Yugoslavia’s formation whose further existence was strongly protected by
the norms of positive international law.485  By the time of the first ruling of the
Commission, Serbia had altered the internal balance of forces within Yugoslavia
(military, economic and political). The internal balance militating entirely in favor
of Serbia rendered obsolete and arcane any further international support for the
territorial integrity and self-determination of the Yugoslav state as a whole. Its
existence put other Yugoslav republics into a colonial position vis-à-vis Serbia486.
Apart from the internal dynamics of the Yugoslav society, the external
changes in the internal environment have also played an important role in the
process of delegitimization of Yugoslavia. With the end of the Cold War, the
consensus on the issue of territorial integrity of the existing states was weakened
                                                                                                                                                
himself. See, David Gompert, “How to Defeat Serbia” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 73 No. 4 (July/August
1994) p. 33. For Baker’s view, as quoted, see in Damir Grubisa, “Diplomatija na Kraju Povjesti”.
Erazmus 18 (Zagreb 1996), p.  91. This position of the Western countries was rightly compared
by an author with the position of the Holly Alliance over the same border issue, and was kept
unaltered well until the first ruling of the Badinter Commission (November 1991). See, Mark
Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p.35.
484  See, Michael Freeman, “The Right to Self-Determination in International Politics: Six
Theories in Search of a Policy”. Review of International Studies. 25 (1999), pp. 335-370.
485 For an excellent overview of the Serb position on the so-called consummated right to
self-determination within the Yugoslav context, see, Vladimir Ibler, “Pravo Naroda na
Samoopredeljenje i Zloupotreba tog Prava” Politicka Misao Vol. XXIX No. 2 (Zagreb, 1992) pp.
53-78 at 67-73. This theory of the consumed right to self-determination, in essence, is a Soviet
product that emerged during Stalin’s times with a views to justify the Communist dictatorship and
the imposed rule over non-Russians. See, Blerim Reka, E Drejta e Vetevendosjes: Dimensioni
Nderkombetar i Problemit te Kosoves. Studim Komparativ (Shkup: Interdiscont, 1996) pp. 57-58
486 This liberal view focusing on the very nature of a government, as opposed to the
unconditional self-determination preserving an existing state, is expressed by Gross Espell, the
UN Special Rapporteur of the 1970s, in his paper entitled “The Right to Self-Determination.
Implementation of United Nations Resolutions”. See, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1/1980/,
para. 90. For an excellent account of the liberal views on the Yugoslav dissolution, see, also,
John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, pp. 74-
162.
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and shifted into the realm of good governance, at least concerning former
Communist federations, Yugoslavia included. Hedley Bull’s assumption, saying
that international law as an institution is very important only if its further
application does not have as a consequence the break down of the international
order, seems very insightful when judging the legitimacy of Yugoslavia form the
standpoint of international law.487 Had the international community upheld the
position it did at the beginning of the crisis and thereafter until November 1991,
than it would have definitely contributed to the disorder in international relations
since the further existence of the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia was becoming an
obvious destabilizing factor. As soon as the Soviet threat disappeared,
Yugoslavia was not able to any more have adverse effects elsewhere; its
international legitimacy diminished and eventual “breach’ of the international law
as conceived of during Cold War years had, in fact, only the stabilizing function in
international relations. Order was the goal of the EC and of the rest of the
international community throughout 1991, first by trying  to promote Yugoslavia’s
peaceful transformation into a democratic and decentralized state and, when this
failed, through containing the conflict within Yugoslavia’s borders.
Following the failure of Yugoslvia’s transformation, the Commission made
public the EC’s views on the very content of self-determination to be pursued in
the Yugoslav case. Concerning the policy of containment of the conflict and the
mitigation of its consequences, the Commission had no choice but to resort to
the old rule of uti possidetis juris. On the top of these matters came the
Commission’s task regarding the further status of the Yugoslav state, thus
shifting the right to self-determination, in both forms of its manifestation, from the
central government agencies in Belgrade onto the Yugoslav republics. By
resorting to the self-determination based on the administrative territories of
former Yugoslav republics, Badinter implied that the right to secede varies with,
and is dependent upon, the degree of autonomy recognized (or obtained) from
the central government (no matter the manner, violent or peaceful, through which
this degree of autonomy is realized).  By the same token, concerning the fate of
                                                
487 Cf. Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society,  pp. 127-161.
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the Yugoslav state, the Commission had to observe that the “existence of the
State implies that federal organs represent the components of the Federation
and wield effective power”. Since the composition and functioning of the essential
organs of the Yugoslav federation by November 1991 no longer satisfied the
“requirements of participation and representative ness inherent in a federal
state”, the Commission came to the conclusion that “the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is engaged in a process of dissolution”. 488  It is obvious
that the possession of a government in the effective control of its territory and
population (the classical criteria for an international statehood) have in full been
taken into account by the Commission during the process of evaluation of the
legitimacy of the Yugoslav state. This became more apparent when Badinter
further declared that “the process of dissolution of the SFRY referred to in
Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991 is now complete and that the SFRY no
longer exists", because  “the existence of a federal state, which is made up of a
number of separate entities, is seriously compromised when a majority of these
entities, embracing a greater part of the territory and population, constitute
themselves as sovereign and independent states with the result that federal
authority may no longer be effectively exercised”.489 When it came to the
evaluation of the existence of the independent statehood of the Yugoslav
republics, no such measurement criteria were used. The Yugoslav republics had
to demonstrate not positive or empirical statehood, as did have to the Yugoslav
federation, but rather a negative or juridical one in the way described in the
Chapters II and III of this dissertation. This attitude over the statehood of the
Yugoslav republics definitely crystallized when the Commission faced the choice
between the territorially based self-determination and that based on ethnicity.
The issue was raised by Serbia, asking the Commission to answer the question
as to who were the subjects entitled to self-determination within Yugoslavia:
republics or nations?
                                                
488 Opinion No.1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia.
Paris, 29 November 1991.
489 Opinion No. 8 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia.
Paris, 4 July 1992.
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Serbia’s foreign minister, in a letter addressed to the Commission using
the Hague Conference as intermediary, made public the Serbian views on
(ethnically-based) self-determination. The Commission had on 20 November
1991 received this letter from Lord Carrington, Chairman of the Conference. The
letter requested from the Commission an opinion on the following question put
forth by the Republic of Serbia:
“Does the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one
of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right to self-determination?”490
The Commission had in general addressed the issue of self-determination
in its first opinion concerning Yugoslavia as a whole. This time, however, the
Commission had to render more concrete its own previous ruling, especially
those  parts speaking as to who were to be the subjects entitled to self-
determination. Or, to use Badinter’s own wording, the Commission had to answer
who were within the Yugoslav context  “the communities that possess a degree
of autonomy and, moreover,  participate in the exercise of political power within
the framework of institutions common to the Federation”.491  To effectuate this,
the Commission drew a distinction between minorities and the already
established and territorially defined administrative units of a federal nature, that
is, the Yugoslav republics, whose population was as a whole entitled to full
independence if certain procedures were followed, including the holding of a fair
and internationally supervised referendum in which all communities could
participate on an equal footing.492   On the other hand, to temper the possible
consequences for a minority finding itself suddenly within a new state, the
Commission ascribed a second level of content to the right to self-determination
within the Yugoslav context. It confirmed that all members of minorities were
entitled to benefit from the internationally recognized human and minority rights
                                                
490  Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia.
Paris, 11 January 1992. Para. 1.
491  Opinion No. 1, Para. 1.d.
492  See, Para.  2 (1-4) of the Opinion No.4 on International Recognition of the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and Its Member States. Paris, 11
January 1992.
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standards, the right to choose their nationality being included. The commission,
therefore, answered the above question asked by Serbia declaring:
“ (i) that the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is
entitled to all rights concerned to minorities and ethnic groups under international
law and under the provisions of the draft Convention of the Conference on
Yugoslavia of 4 November 1991, to which the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia have undertaken to give effect; and
(ii) that the Republics must afford the members of those minorities and
ethnic groups all the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in
international law, including where appropriate, the right to chose their
nationality”493
Although the Commission referred to the international standards on
human and minority rights as the basis of the internal right to self-determination
of the Serbs living in these two republics, it did not further specify the overall
extent of this right (the issue of nationality being an exception to this). This extent
was defined later in the Commission’s Opinion no. 4, dealing with the application
for international recognition submitted by Bosnia-Herzegovina. On that occasion,
Badinter again repeated the Commission’s commitment to the protection of
human and minority rights of all living in former Yugoslavia. This time, though,
the right of minorities and ethnic groups to equally participate in government took
prominence, thus further filling the content of the Yugoslav self-determination.
Since no referendum on independence had taken place that would have given a
voice to these minorities and groups, the Commission found that the popular will
for independent statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina had not been “clearly
established”.494 In this way, the Commission juxtaposed both forms of self-
determination against each other, making the validity of one form conditional
upon the other. In this regard, the Commission indicated that the above
conclusion on the popular will, a precondition for the realization of both forms of
self-determination, could be changed if an internationally supervised referendum,
                                                
493 Opinion No. 2 of  the Arbitration Commission, Para 4.
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open to all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina without discrimination, were held.
This referendum, as discussed, took place on March 1, 1992, without the
participation of the Serbs who boycotted it. They opted therefore for a full-scale
ethnic self-determination, as planed, whose implementation was done through
violence and war. This was against all the prescriptions of the international
community.
2.2. Uti Possidetis
The application of uti possidetis juris beyond the colonial context has
occurred only when former Communist federations (Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) dissolved following the Cold War. While
Czechoslovakia dissolved peacefully and the Soviet Union did not face deep and
violent dissolution, both being the result of an agreement between the interested
parties, the case of Yugoslavia brought to the forefront the essence of the nature
of Yugoslav wars and the positive function of uti possidetis principle. They were,
in essence, wars over territory and the application of uti possidetis juris was
exactly applied in an effort to mitigate and control these wars.
One side in these wars, the Serbs, denied the legitimacy of Yugoslavia’s
internal frontiers, while the rest of the Yugoslav republics accepted their validity
and legitimacy.  Or, to put it another way, some actors of the Yugoslav self-
determination were against the territorial status quo existing at the time of
Yugoslavia’s collapse and others were against this change in the territorial status
quo. The ruling of the Badinter Commission went along the lines of this latter
group of the Yugoslav actors, declaring firmly that “whatever the circumstances,
except where the states concerned agree otherwise, the right to self-
determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers existing at the time
of independence (uti possidetis juris)”,495 so that, stressed the Commission in its
third opinion answering the question asked by Serbia, “except where otherwise
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agreed, former borders (here it makes a specific reference to the internal borders
between Serbia and Croatia and between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina)
become international frontiers protected by international law” This stance was
based on the respect for territorial status quo ( the “photograph of territory” in the
African case) and the principle of uti possidetis itself, which, according to the
Commission, is connected with the phenomenon of independence. It was, said
the Commission, the precedent of the International Court of Justice in the
Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali case. Behind this reasoning lies, like in Africa,
the prevention of conflicts over borders among newly independent states that
emerged from former Yugoslavia, maintained the Commission.496
To further strengthen this position, the Commission expressly noted that
only through an international recognition of former administrative borders as
international ones, protected by Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, could the conflicts
and wars over territories be prevented.497  This view also represented a political
aim of the European leaders since June 1991. This European stance had been
transmitted to the Belgrade authorities  by British officials and meant that only the
federal republics of Yugoslavia would be invested with the right to self-
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Para. 2.2. This fear about eventual conflicts over borders, Badinter himself shared with Steven
Ratner in an interview on 29 June 1994. See, Steven Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti
Possidetis and the Borders of New States” American Journal of International Law Vol. 90 No. 4
(October 1996) pp. 590-624, at 614, footnote 192.
497 Ibid. pp. 614.Those authors who have criticized the application of uti possidetis juris in
the Yugoslav case, usually focus their attention on the appropriateness of such an application,
claiming that the goal of preventing the conflict and war had not been achieved. These authors
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in a long run by the mere fact that its application set out the fixed territorial limits for a legitimate
exercise of self-determination. Its application has certainly yielded the results. The conflict over
borders was not caused by the application of uti possidetis juris, but because the issue of borders
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dissolution of Yugoslavia started. The issue of Yugoslav internal borders was also a hot spot
during the January-June 1991 negotiation on the restructuring of the Yugoslav state. The ruling of
the Commission was therefore nothing but a response to this political agenda of the Yugoslav
leaders, showing the limits of the legitimate exercise of self-determination. See, Steven Ratner,
“Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States”, pp. 596-691, 613-614,
616, 623-624; Gerry J. Simpson, “The Diffusion of Sovereignty. Self-Determination in the Post-
Colonial Age”. In Robert M. Corqoudale (ed.), Self-Determination in International Law.
(Dartmouth: Ashgate 2000) pp. 585-616 at 587; Peter Radan, “Yugoslavia’s Internal Borders as
International Borders.A Question of Appropriateness”, p.137. 19p.
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determination, meaning full independence.498  The problems in practice arose not
from the utilization of the African precedent to indicate the entities fulfilling the
standard conditions for international statehood but from the resistance put by
some of the Yugoslav actors to the application of uti possidetis juris in the
Yugoslav context.499
It should be admitted, however, that the Yugoslav case has historically
been different from that of  the Soviets. In the former case, as opposed to the
latter, only three territorial rearrangements took place. This means that
Yugoslavia’s internal borders were more stable than elsewhere in the Communist
                                                
498 It is sure, though, that the Badinter Commission based its rulings on the elementary
assumption of international law and politics, which says that states are considered only those
entities who, inter alia, fulfill the essential criteria for international statehood (territory, population,
and a government in control of this territory and population). In this regard, it had to say the
following:
"1. In its opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991, the Arbitration Commission found that:
-a state’s existence or non-existence had to be established on the basis of universally
acknowledged principles of international law concerning the constitutive elements of the state;
- …
-the composition and the functioning of  essential bodies of the Federation no longer
satisfied the intrinsic requirements of a federal state regarding participation and
representativeness;
-recourse to force in different parts of the Federation had demonstrated the Federation’s
impotence;
…
-the existence or disappearance of a state was, in any case, a matter of fact.
-2. The dissolution of a state means that it no longer has legal personality, something
which has major repercussions in international law. It therefore calls for the greatest caution.
The Commission finds that the existence of a federal state, which is made up on a
number of separate entities, is seriously compromised when a majority of these entities,
embracing a greater part of the territory and population, constitute themselves as sovereign
states with the result that federal authority may no longer be effectively exercised.
By the same token, while recognition of a state by other states has only declarative value,
such recognition, along with membership of international organizations, bears witness to these
states’ convictions that the political entity so recognized is a reality and confers on it certain rights
and obligations under international law ". Para 3 of the Opinion No. 8 of the Arbitration
Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. Paris, 4 July 1992.
499 This precedent, by analogy, was extended to the former Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia, an attitude firmly endorsed by the Guidelines on recognition. The new states of
former Soviet Union accepted uti possideis juris in 1993 as a principle that would be a valid
answer in their mutual relationships over territorial issues. This was stated expressly in Article 3
of the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States (June 22, 1993), which affirms the
“inviolability of states’ borders, recognition of existing borders and rejection of unlawful territorial
acquisition”.  At the same time, the Alma Atta Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of
Independent States (December 1991) includes similar provisions. Texts reprinted in European
Journal of International Law Vol. 4 No. 3 (1993), Annex: “Decision of the Council of Heads of
States of the Commonwealth of Independent States”, pp. 418-430. For the comments , see,
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world, especially more stable than in the Soviet Union. Although some of the
issues to be discussed below are already discussed in Chapter IV, it is worth
restating them in clearer form  for a better comprehension of the manner in which
the African precedent was applied in the Yugoslav case.
Two of the above-mentioned territorial arrangements  belong to the pre-
WW II period, while the last one has to do with Communist Yugoslavia. From
1921 to 1929-31, the Yugoslav state was divided into 33 regions, or so-called
oblasti that were effectuated mainly in disregard of ethnic and historical
considerations. Bosnia-Herzegovina, for its support given to the 1921
Constitution, was left in its 1878 ( Congress of Berlin) borders, although divided
into four oblasti. Another exception was Serbia, who retained its pre-1918
borders due to its privileged position in the new Kingdom. After 1929-31, King
Alexander of Yugoslavia introduced the system of provinces, known as banovine.
The banovine system abolished entirely the concessions made to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The banovine  names were given after the main Yugoslav rivers
and waterways. There were nine banovine.  The last one was formed in 1939,
granting to Croatia a special federated status within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
The Croat Banovina enjoyed semi-federal status. The Sporazum (the
“Agreement”) establishing the Croat Banovina set out in essence a federal
arrangement between Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia. The rest of the country
fell under the provisions of the 1929-31 laws enjoying no distinct territorial
identities based either on history or ethnicity.
Following WW II, Tito and Communist-led Partisans made a decision to
divide the country into six republics and two Autonomous Provinces. The latter
was named “oblast” and the former “province”, with very little difference regarding
the legal position in terms of self-determination as foreseen by the 1946
Constitution of Yugoslavia (only republics had a formal right to secession). The
borders of the Republics were considered inviolable, as opposed to the
Autonomous Provinces which reached that stage only after the promulgation of
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the 1974 Constitution. These internal borders were designed to increase political,
social and economic cohesion of Yugoslavia. This practically means that these
borders were considered in function of strengthening the brotherhood and unity
among Yugoslavs, a new Yugoslav identity based on Communist values. This
was stated on several occasions by the highest Communist officials of
Yugoslavia, Tito himself included. No serious problems over these borders arose
for most of the time of Yugoslavia’s existence. This shows that they were widely
accepted as a basis of new identities and internal loyalties.500
The Badinter Commission and the international community as a whole,
Europeans particularly, respected the same premises in the Yugoslav case as
those applied in Africa: since Yugoslavia was a multiethnic federation, the only
solution was to take the African uti possidetis juris as a reference point in the
process of the territorial delimitation of the new sovereign states and their quests
for self-determination. In practical terms, this meant that uti possidetis juris was
to refer only to the Yugoslav republics, not the Autonomous Provinces. The
Republics were the only ones constitutionally defined as states in all former
Communist federations. The difference with Africa, however, lied in that in this
case some corrective criteria were put foreword by the international community,
whose fulfillment was a precondition for full independence.  The rule of law,
democracy, respect for human and minority rights were now to be considered as
a basis for the international legitimating of the independent statehood of new
states emerging from the collapsed (Communist) federations. By the same token,
former Yugoslav republics were by now to give guaranties as to the above issues
if they were to be internationally accepted as new members of the international
community. However, no effective mechanism for the implementation of these
guaranties existed in practice: economic sanctions proved unsuccessful over the
short period of time, while the use of military means resulted in a long waiting
period due to the lack of consensus among the drafters of this new model of uti
                                                
500 See, more on this, in Peter Radan, “Yugoslavia’s Internal Borders as International
Borders: A Question of Appropriateness” p.137. 19p.
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possidetis juris.501 Only when it was seen that the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina were bent on the wrong interpretation of  (or the resistance to)
Badinter’s self-determination ( the Serbs thought apparently that only republics
would have the right to full independence, notwithstanding the way they were
created), did the international community intervene militarily to protect the
territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the same token, the further
dismemberment of Croatia was prevented by allowing it to destroy the illegal
Serb entities there (known as “Republika Srpska Krajina”). Croat military actions
against the Serb entities in Croatia were seen in the West as a useful substitute
for Western action against the Serbs, which in turn more than justified covert
military assistance to Tudjman.502 In the Bosnian case, however, the international
                                                
501 Lord Owen, one of the most influential of internationals in the Yugoslav drama (1992-
1995), and former President Francois Mitterrand of France were the ones who have ardently
advocated the opposite attitude to the boundary issues in former Yugoslavia. It did not matter that
the Yugoslav uti possidetis had been a brain child of their respective countries. Both favored the
approach that would make the right to secession conditional upon the previous settlement of the
issues of borders among the Yugoslavs. See, Petar Radan, “Yugoslavia’s Internal Borders as
International Borders: A Question of Appropriateness”, p.137, 19p., pp.7-9 out of 14. However the
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recognition included. The issue of borders is different, having a separate function from the
recognized right to secede. In the first case, the issue at stake is the succession to previous
administrative borders for the sake of order and stability in interstate relations. In the second,
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existence (or non - existence) of  a given factual situation calling for secession of a given entity.
The above approach of the two internationals was different as well from the then ongoing
plans in Europe over the same issue. Such was the case with the 1993 plan put foreword by the
then French Prime Minister Edward Balladour, who proposed Pacte sur la Stabilite en Europe.
The Pact was accompanied by a number of  bilateral agreements concerning individual boundary
disputes and minorities problems following the recognition as independent states of former
Yugoslav republics. The Pact was designed to provide a way to temper the side-effects of the
EC’s recognition policy since it foresaw economic incentives and technical assistance for a
durable settlement of the conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe.  These lofty goals,
nevertheless, were not pursued further so that the Pact was never implemented in practice. See,
more on this, Martti Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory
and Practice”. In Robert McCorquodale (ed.), Self-Determination in International Law, pp. 555-
583 at 583; Kemal Sehadi, “Ethnic Self-Determination  and the Break Up of  States”, pp. 75-85;
Stephanos Stathatos, “Pact on Stability in Europe” The Southeast European Yearbook: 1994-95
(Athens: ELIAMEP, 1995) pp. 99-105.
502 See, Jane M.O. Sharp, Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion? British Policy in Former
Yugoslavia. (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997) p.50. The gradual military defeat
of Croatia’s Serbs during 1995, culminating with the Summer 1995 total defeat at the hands of
Croat forces, is closely connected with the so-called Z-4 plan for the special status of the Serbs-
held regions in Croatia.
The then cochairmen of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Owen and
Stoltenberg, and the ambassadors of the US and Russia (the Zagreb Four: Z-4) began in late
January 1995 to seek a lasting solution to the Krajina issue. The goal was to give the Krajina
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military intervention came too late, after a  fait accompli and a genocidal acts
against the Bosniac Muslims.  When the time came again to forcefully apply, and
impose the respect for, uti possidetis in its complete form (covering the above-
mentioned corrective criteria), a paradoxical situation emerged: Kosova was
equated with the illegal Serb entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia
respectively as far as the international legal framework for the solution of its final
status is concerned.
The lack of a real political and administrative organization in post-colonial
Africa, inherited from the Berlin Conference (1844-45), did not make necessary
the need for an attachment of any corrective criteria to the implementation of uti
possidetis juris: the rule of law, democracy, and the respect for human and
minority rights did not represent an important factor for the level of political and
administrative organization existing in Africa (an area without state administration
for most of the time of its existence). Apart from this, the African leaders knew
long before independence what the territorial limits of their (colonial) self-
determination would be so that they had to concentrate only upon the struggle
against colonialism without taking into consideration the real interests of various
ethnic groups living within the (former) colonies. In this state of affairs, the Cold
War atmosphere exercised a great impact on East-West relations concerning
                                                                                                                                                
Serbs a broad measure of self-rule while maintaining the formal unity of Croatia and permitting
the refuges to return home. On 30 January 1995, the Z4 Ambassadors presented a Draft
Agreement on the Krajina, Slavonija, Southern Baranja and Western Srem, but both sides
rejected it. Zagreb rejected the package because it created a “state within a state” and thus
violated the Croatian constitution. The Croatian Serbs also rejected the plan arguing that Krajina
Serbs could not accept a return to Croatian sovereignty and Milosevic apparently did not want to
recognize Croatian frontiers, thereby relinquishing his long-standing project for a Greater Serbia.
Z-4 Plan was seeking a compromise by emphasizing Croatia’s territorial integrity, while
seeking to assure the Serbian minority of its rights. It offered the rebel Serbs a broad measure of
autonomy into parts of the territiory where they formed a majority. Serbs living in other parts of
the self-declared “Republika Srpska Krajina” would be expected to reintegrate into Croatia and
the government in Zagreb would be forced to observe strict human rights legislation to protect the
Serbian minority. In the autonomous Serbian region, the Serbs would have control over taxation,
police, education, tourism, housing and public services and Zagreb would act for foreign affairs,
defense, trade, transport and communications. Krajina would be demilitarized and the border with
Bosnia-Herzegovina monitored. See, “Reuters”, February 1, 1995 and February 9, 1995; Partick
Moore, “The Winds of War Return” Transition Vol. 1  No. 5 (14 April 1995) pp. 32-37 at 36.
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self-determination. In the Yugoslav case as well, the actors had some previous
knowledge as to the limits of self-determination (as noted, since June 1991).503
There has existed a wide consensuses on the issue, in an apparent belief
that the African precedent would prevent further bloodshed in Yugoslavia and
gradually put its process of dissolution under control. For internal self-
determination as well (the rule of law, democracy, and the respect for human and
minority rights), there was a wide consensus.  The latter’s  implementation had to
be guaranteed by the states emerging from former Yugoslavia. However, as
noted, there were no mechanisms for the implementation of such guarantees.
This, in practice, resulted in applying the principle of uti possidetis juris as in
Africa, at least between 1991 and 1995. It is against this background of the
corrective criteria concerning internal self-determination that the reasons for
NATO military intervention against the Serbs should be examined (both in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and FRY). This means that the military intervention has had,
in both cases, as its purpose to impose, besides the respect for territorial
integrity, the rules on internal self-determination (the rule of law, democracy, and
the respect for human and minority rights).504
Why have the Yugoslav republics existing at the time when the process of
Yugoslav dissolution started   have been chosen as a reference point for the
application of uti possidetis juris? As noted, apart from Serbia, the majority of the
Yugoslav republics accepted the territorial status quo existing at the time of
Yugoslavia’s dissolution. This further meant that these republics were to be the
would-be repositories of power by the time Yugoslavia dissolved. Serbian
                                                
503 British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, on a few occasions had urged the Yugoslav
leaders to accept the African precedent when the OAU came into existence based on the respect
for the previous administrative colonial borders. See, James Miall, “Sovereignty and Self-
Determination in the New Europe”. In Hugh Miall (ed.), Minority Right in Europe : The Scope for a
Transitional Regime (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994) pp. 10-11; See, also,
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(1992) p. 719.
504 For a similar view, see, also Martti Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today:
Problems of Legal Theory and Practice”, pp. 555-583 at 580.
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resistance to uti possidetis juris was grounded on the alleged artificiality of the
internal borders of Yugoslavia.505  In practice, though, this rejection of uti
possidetis by the Serbs was a cost-benefit calculation in  a hope to achieve
territorial gains. In other words, the Serb argument coined in terms of the alleged
artificiality of the Yugoslav internal borders, was nothing but a realpolitik
approach, as it was that of other Yugoslav republics who were aware of the
implications of this Serbian stance well before June 1991 while the negotiations
on the redefinition of Yugoslavia were under way. No wonder than that the goal
of uti possidetis in Yugoslavia was the same as that in Africa, that is, preventing
the conflicts and bloodshed over borders. At the root of these conflicts rests the
cost-benefit calculation of the parties as to the advantages of the territorial status
quo. It  took time, pressure from the outside world and, above all, human lives
until the Serbs realized that they also have to accept  the principle of uti
possidetis juris. In order to depict this trajectory of the Serb attitude towards the
internal borders of Yugoslavia, we shall make use of a full quotation from an
author, Jeffrey Herbst, expressed in the African context but that clearly reflects
the crux of the issue in the Yugoslav case of uti possidetis juris:
“The borders in Africa are often characterized as artificial and arbitrary on
the basis of the fact that they do not respond to what people believe to be
rational demographic, ethnographic, and topographic boundaries.  However,
borders are always artificial because states are not natural creatures. Therefore,
                                                
505 The then Serb-dominated  “rump” federal presidency denied the validity of Badinter’s
rulings, that is, the Presidency rejected the applicability of uti possidetis juris to internal borders of
Yugoslavia since, it assented, they had been drawn up to meet policy considerations after WW II
at the instigation of the Yugoslav Communist Party and without regard to ethnic consideration.
Therefore, the Presidency considered them to be artificial creatures of Tito. See, “Position of SFR
Yugoslavia on the Question of Internal Borders of Yugoslavia”. Belgrade, 30 December 1991.Text
reprinted in Review of International Affairs Vol. XLIII, February 5, 1992 (Belgrade) p. 23. The
issue of the artificiality of the Yugoslav internal borders has in fact been a Serbian discourse long
before the case was on the agenda of the international community.  Not only the 1986
Memorandum, but later on the eve of Yugoslavia’s break up the Serbian public was very active in
the discussions on the “artificiality of Yugoslavia’s internal borders”. Thus, the Belgrade-based
daily newspaper Ilustrovana Politika published a map on 12 February 1991 showing the future
shape of Serbia. According to this map, Serbia would have the right to incorporate the bulk of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and large parts of Croatia. Kosova as a whole was taken for granted, e.g.,
as a territory that without no doubt were to belong to Serbia.
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it is important to judge boundaries  - political creations - on the basis of their
usefulness to those who created them. Based on this criterion, the current
African boundaries are not arbitrary. The boundary system developed in 1885,
represented a rational response by the colonialists because it served their
political needs. The vast majority of borders have remained virtually untouched
since that time because the system for the most part continues to serve the
political needs of the colonialists and present-day African leaders.  There is a
chance that in the future African elites may find preservation of existing borders
to be more costly than other alternatives, but a large number of political
calculations will have to change first. Until then, Africa’s  ‘rational’  borders will be
preserved”.506
Will the political calculations in the former Yugoslav territory change in the
near future? It is very hard to predict. For the time being, it seems unlikely that
these calculations will change, at least for the foreseeable future matching the
African case.
3. Rule of Law, Democracy and the Respect for Human and Minority
Rights
As it could be seen from the above sections of this chapter, the issues of
the rule of law, democracy and the respect for human and minority rights have
been high on the top of the agenda of the Western countries in dealing with the
Yugoslav self-determination. These liberal values dealt with the issues of self-
determination itself, territorial limits for its implementation, as well as the
international recognition of self-determination as such. Although at first sight
these values looked as if they were of a procedural nature, in reality they were
meant to fill the content of the Yugoslav self-determination. For the first time they
                                                
506 Jeffrey Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa”, p.
692.
235
appeared in the rulings of the Badinter Commission and other documents related
to the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), but were later on
repeated throughout documents and other endeavors undertaken by the
international community during the Yugoslav wars of self-determination.507  The
essence of the human rights approach to self-determination was to avoid the
Westphalian concept of territorial exclusivity by focusing instead on manageable
set of criteria for international statehood in the conditions of an increasingly
interdependent world. This was done, to put it differently, to mitigate the
territorially-based self-determination and its consequences.   In line with this, self-
determination in the rulings of the Commission that were followed by the
international community at large was not perceived as an end in itself reflecting
the preference for a homogenous, independent and small "nations states". 508 To
be able to have a universal application without massive discrepancy, the
Commission viewed self-determination from the opposite perspective. In its
                                                
507 Democracy, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights were the basic
values the West offered to those Yugoslav republics wishing to become independent states.
Apart from the opinions of the Badinter Commission, respect for these values had been strongly
expressed in the Guidelines on Recognition. These values were then inserted in the constitutions
of the Yugoslav republics wishing to become independent and sovereign states, a practice
followed almost without exception by all former Communist countries. See, Vladlen S.
Vereshchetin, “New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship Between International
and National Law” European Journal of International Law Vol. 7 (1996) No. 1 pp. 29-42; Aeyal M.
Gross, “Reinforcing the New Democracies: the European Convention on Human Rights and the
Former Communist Countries – A Study of Case Law" European Journal of International Law
Vol. 7 (1996) No. 1 pp. 89 -103; Menno T. Kamminaga, “State Succession in Respect of Human
Rights Treaties" European Journal of International Law  Vol. 7 (1996) No. 4. pp. 469-485.
508 As noted earlier in this chapter (see the uti possidetis issue), the Serbian government
posed two questions to the Commission, one concerning the borders and the other concerning
the issue of self-determination. On the issue of self-determination, the Serbian government asked
the Commission as to whether "the Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were
entitled to benefit from the right to self-determination". The Commission had already addressed
the problem of self-determination in abstract when rendering the second opinion. In this case,
however, the Commission concluded that "the Serbian populations of Bosnia–Herzegovina and
Croatia have the right to benefit from all the rights recognized as belonging to minorities and
ethnic groups by international law and by provisions of the Draft Convention of the Conference on
Peace in Yugoslavia" and, further, "that the republics ought to grant to the members of these
minorities and ethnic groups the totality of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by
international law, including as the case may be the rights to choose their nationality". This type of
self-determination granted to the Serbian people, that is, the right to internal self-determination
was more apparent when it came to the discussion of the application for international recognition
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this regard, the Commission based its ruling on the right of  minorities
and ethnic groups to equal participation in government. Cf. Paras. 3 - 4 of the Opinion No. 2 and
Para. 4 of the Opinion No. 4 of the Commission.
236
views, self-determination was a means to an end, the end being order and
stability through the promotion of a democratic, participatory political and
economic system in which the rights of individuals and the identity of minority
communities shall be protected.509 In this sense, the Yugoslav self-determination
did not mean only independent statehood, but the exercise of what is termed "
functional sovereignty ". This functional sovereignty assigned to sub-state groups
the powers necessary to control political and economic matters of direct
relevance to them, while bearing in mind the legitimate concerns of other
segments of the population and the state itself.510 This meant that the
Commission was against further partitioning along ethnic lines of former
Yugoslav republics. In this regard, it fully endorsed the Judgment of the
International Court of Justice of 22 December 1986 in the already - mentioned
case between Burkina Faso and Mali, stating that the obvious purpose of the
principle of non-violability of the previous administrative borders was " to prevent
the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal
struggles ".511
In some respects, this functional sovereignty reflects the " principle of
subsidiarity " developed within the EU and the old injunction that  " government
                                                
509 The Commission did not in fact use the same terms as we do here. In addressing the
above question of Serbia concerning the rights to self-determination of the Serbian peoples living
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the Commission drew a distinction between minorities and
entities that were a territorially defined administrative units of a federal nature by the time the
former Yugoslav state dissolved, that is, the federated republics of former Yugoslavia. The latter
were entitled to a full external-type of self-determination, while the latter not. The Commission
tempered the bad consequences for a minority suddenly finding itself within a new state by
ascribing a second level of content to their right of self-determination.  This level was connected
to the preservation of minorities’  identity and culture. Cf. Paras. 3  to  4 of the Opinion No. 2 and
Para. 4 of the Opinion No. 4 of the Commission.
510 In fact, the Commission clearly referred to the so-called Carrington Proposal (its
chapter II on human rights). Cf. Para. 2. 2. of the Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitration Commission.
Chapter II of the Carrington Proposal, on the other hand, specified to the details the rights and
duties of the minorities and ethnic groups. This chapter, in fact, was named as "Human Rights
and Rights of National or Ethnic Groups". See, Treaty Provisions for the Convention, The Hague,
1 November 1991. UN Doc. S/23169, Annex VII. (This is amended and supplemented draft
arrangement for general settlement of the Yugoslav crisis of 18 October 1991). Text provided by
the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia
Through Documents, pp. 370-378.
511 Para. 2. 2. of the Opinion No. 3 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace
Conference on Yugoslavia. Paris, 11 January 1992. Text provided by the Albanian Foreign
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governs best which governs least ".512 Those republics who did not conform to
this rule were denied international legitimacy. However, those who refused this
had gradually been forced to obey the common liberal values of international
behavior. To achieve this, the international community has had at its disposal
various means.
4. Means at the Disposal of the International Community to Achieve
Its Goals Concerning Yugoslav Self-Determination
In its dealing with the Yugoslav self-determination, the international
community has used various means at its disposal. The aim was to channel
possible consequences stemming from the realization of self-determination within
the Yugoslav territory. That is to say, the means used by the international
community were meant to check and balance the implementation of self-
determination in this specific case, a self-determination that was a mixture of
territory and ethnicity.
The means the international community used can be divided into two
categories. First category has had a coercive nature and the other did. There are
many types of coercive pressure (sanctions, military actions, diplomatic isolation,
etc.). However, here we focus only on two such measures: military actions and
economic sanctions.513 Both of them have had a multilateral character and were
                                                                                                                                                
Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana Trifunosvka, Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp.
479-480.
512 Hannum Hurst, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) p. 260. See, also, Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the
Badinter Committee”, pp. 178-181.
513 Coercion is the use of threat and force, including the limited use of actual force to
back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would. We use
this particular definition to emphasize that coercion relies on the threat of future military force to
influence adversary decision making, but that limited uses of force sway adversaries not only
because of their effects on an adversary’s perception of future force and the adversary’s
vulnerability to it.
Coercion is not destruction. Although partially destroying an adversary’s means of
resistance may be necessary to increase the effects and credibility of coercive threats, coercion
succeeds when the adversary gives in while it still has the power to resist. Coercion can be
understood in opposition to what Shelling termed " brute force " : " Brute force succeeds when it
is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of
damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply ".  Thomas C.
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undertaken by the international community as a whole. This is the reason why we
did not list in this category the so-called " outer wall of sanctions ", undertaken by
one state only - the US. In line with this, we took out of the list the category of the
diplomatic isolation, putting it into the second category instead. Diplomatic
isolation is dealt with in the context of non-coercive means and should be seen
as a part of the policy of non-recognition used by the international community in
the process of solving the Yugoslav case of self-determination. This means that
the diplomatic isolation is a variant of non-recognition in international relations
and that it shall be treated as such in this work. Along with the " outer wall of
sanctions ", the policy of non-recognition forms the core of the non-coercive
means used by the international community in the Yugoslav case of self-
determination.
When the international community decided to use these means, it did not
specifically say that their use was meant to implement a certain type of self-
determination per se. This community has rather used the above means in a very
selective manner and against those Yugoslav actors acting against the Western
and liberal conceptions of self-determination. This conception had as its premise
the territory, not ethnicity, and the international order and stability. These values
were to be kept only via the respect for liberal principles, norms and values, such
as human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human and
minority rights. At the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the international
community explicitly used these means to influence the type of self-determination
it wanted to implement. Later, it used these means to protect the independence
and sovereignty of former Yugoslav republics and the human rights of their
citizens without a distinction of any kind.
The first category we chose to discuss here, the sanctions (mainly of
economic nature as foreseen by the Article 41 of the UN Charter), have been
widely used in the Yugoslav case. The target country has been the FRY (Serbia
                                                                                                                                                
Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Heaven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996) p. 3. Coercion
may be though of, then, as getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute
force; those who coerce must have the capacity for organized violence but choose not to
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and Montenegro). This country was seen as the most responsible actor for the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, later, in Kosova (1992-1999). However, there
is a difference between the regime of sanctions instituted against the FRY during
the Bosnian war and in the conflict in Kosova. In the first case, the FRY was held
responsible for the direct involvement in the ongoing conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, while in the second " threats to the peace " came as a result of the
FRY’s actions within its own territory.
The imposition of sanctions in connection with the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina has been a long process. The UN Security Council first decided
with its resolution no. 713 (1991) to impose an arms embargo against the then
Yugoslavia. The use of sanctions as a means to impose on the Yugoslav actors
the Western-type of self-determination was first encouraged by Europeans. In
this regard, the European Union during the first stages of the Yugoslav crisis
(June – December 1991), within the mechanisms of the Hague Conference,
proposed the sanctions regime (mainly on oil embargo and trade embargo)
against those Yugoslav republics who obstructed the work of the EU and its
efforts to peacefully settle the Yugoslav crisis.514
Following the above, the UN Security Council with its resolution no. 752 of
12 May 1992 demanded that  " all parties and others concerned in Bosnia-
Herzegovina stop fighting", while third parties ceased "all forms of interference
from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, including by units of the Yugoslav People’s
                                                                                                                                                
exercise. See, Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996) p.
13.
514 EC Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia. Brussels, 28 October 1991; EC
Declaration on the Suspension of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia. Rome,
8 November 1991. Texts provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in
Snezana Trufunovska, pp. 368-69; 378-380. For a complete scholarly analysis of the relations
between the EU and the FRY, see, Blagoje Babic and Gordana Ilic (eds.), Jugoslavija i Evropska
Unija (IMPP and Beobanka: Beograd 1999). The contributors to this volume, however, do not
make any difference between former Yugoslavia and the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), referring
to " Yugoslavia" for both cases. See, also,  Peter Bruckner, The European Community and the
United Nations. " European Journal of International Law" Vol. 1 (1990) No.1/2, pp. 174-193;
Rachel Frid, The European Community – A Member of a Specialized Agency of the United
Nations. "European Journal of International Law" Vol. 4 (1993) No. 2, pp. 239-265; Sebastian
Bohr, Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community. "
European Journal of International Law" Vol. 4 (1993) No. 2, pp. 256-269.
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Army (JNA) and Croatian Army".515 Fifteen days later, the UN Security Council
adopted the resolution no. 757 (1992) deploring the "failure of the authorities of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including the
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), to take effective measures to fulfill the
requirements of resolution 752 (1992)". The Council further asked that all "states
adopt the measures foreseen in Art. 41 of the United Nations Charter, including a
wide range of sanctions in trade, finance, communications, international
cooperation, as well as the reduction of the level of staff at diplomatic missions
and consular posts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)".516  The sanctions regime imposed on FRY was reinforced by two
other resolutions of the UN Security Council, nos. 787 (1992) and 820 (1993),
which  had widened the scope of the existing sanctions. The sanctions now
covered not only FRY’s territory but also the territory under the control of  the
Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.517 The first group of sanctions lasted only until the
Dayton Accords were reached518. To reward Milosevic’s behavior for the signing
of the Dayton Accords, the UN Security Council first suspended and later totally
lifted trade and other sanctions against FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) with its
resolution nos. 1022 of 20 November 1995 and 1047 of 1 October 1996
respectively519.
                                                
515  UN Security Council Resolution No. 752 (1992). Adopted at the 3075th Meeting of  the
Security Council  (15 May 1992). Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also
reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska,  Yugoslavia Through Documents, pp. 575-577.
516  UN Security Council Resolution No. 757 (1992). Adopted at the 3082th Meeting of  the
Security Council  (30 May 1992). Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also
reprinted in Snezana Trifunovska, pp. 593-599.
517 Texts provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana. Also reprinted in Snezana
Trifunovska, pp. 757-762; 909-915.
518 It should be noted,  however, that after the acceptance of the Contact Group Plan by
the FRY (July 1994), the UN Security partially suspended these sanctions (mainly those
concerning culture, sport and communication) and for a limited period of time depending on
FRY’s behavior vis-à-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.  See, the following resolution in
connection, The UN Security Council Resolution No. 713 of 25 September 1991; The UN Security
Council Resolution No. 752 of 25 May 1992; The UN Security Council Resolution No. 787 of 16
November 1992; The UN Security Council Resolution No. 820 of 17 April 1993; and The UN
Security Council Resolution No. 943 of 30 July 1993. Texts provided by the Albanian Foreign
Ministry, Tirana.
519 See,  Resolution No. 1022. Security Council – Suspension of Sanctions Against
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Date: 22 November 1995. Meeting: 3595; Resolution No. 1047.
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The regime of sanctions against the FRY was re-imposed again after the
outbreak of hostilities in Kosova in March 1998. This time, however, the reaison
d’ etre of the new sanctions regime was the behavior of the FRY authorities
within its own territory, a behavior that gradually posed a threat to the peace and
stability of the region and wider. The UN this time guaranteed the FRY’s territorial
integrity but asked the Belgrade authorities to respect the rights of its citizens
living in Kosova and to find a peaceful accommodation for their rights.520
The second group of means, military ones, have been used twice by  the
international community, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova. Compared with the
already-mentioned case of Kosova (see, infra pp. 194-201), where the military
actions were used to prevent the unraveling human tragedy that gradually
became a threat to international peace and security. The use of these means in
Bosnia-Herzegovina has had a different nature. In the case of Kosova the use of
military force was designed to prevent a human tragedy threatening international
peace and security. This ended in the imposition upon Kosova a fixed territorial
limits for the exercise of the internal-type of self-determination. In the second
case, though, the use of military means was designed to prevent the consecutive
breaches of the cease-fire agreements by the Bosnian Serbs, as well as the
breaches of the other provisions of the international humanitarian law521. In both
cases, however, the mandate of the UN for military action under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter had been received only after the use of the military action on the
ground. In terms of self-determination, these military actions resulted in the
                                                                                                                                                
Security Council – Lifting Sanctions Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Date: 1 October
1996. Meeting: 3700. Texts provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana.
520 See, UN Security Council Resolution No. 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998; UN Security
Council  Resolution No. 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998; UN Security Council  Resolution No.
1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998; UN Security Council  Resolution No.1239 (1998) of 14 May
1999; and UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244 (1999) of 12 June 1999.  Also available in
internet: http//www.un.org/
521 See, Gabriel Manuera, Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent
Experience. " Chaillot Paper " No. 15/16 (the Institute for Security Studies of the Western
European Union : Paris June 1994), especially the chapter "Bosnia-Herzegovina”; Nicole
Gnessoto, Lessons of Yugoslavia. " Chaillot Paper "  No.14  (the Institute for Security Studies of
the Western European Union : Paris June 1994). Filippo Andreatta, The Bosnian War and the
New World Order. " Chaillot Paper" No. 1 (the Institute for Security Studies of the Western
European Union : Paris October 1997), especially the chapter " the Causes of Peace". All papers
available in internet: : http//.www. weu. int/institute/
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preservation of the administrative borders of the former Yugoslav republics.
Within them, the international community asked for the respect for democracy,
rule of law, human and minority rights.
Among the non-coercive means used by the international community to
effectuate the types of self-determination described thus far, the policy of non-
recognition takes prominence.522  It appears in all documents concerning the
Yugoslav crisis, from the Badinter Commission to the Dayton Peace Accords, the
relevant UN documents dealing with the Kosova issue are included. Non-
recognition, as an established rule in international law that aims at invalidating
the illegal uses of force employed to achieve territorial gains, proved very
effective and a strong rule in the case of Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia. In addition to this, the policy of non-recognition was used as a threat to
former Yugoslav republics with the view of imposing on them a given system of
democratic values.523
                                                
522  For the policy of non-recognition in international law and relations, used as a means
to invalidate the illegal and illegitimate situations and positions, see, in general,  James Crawford,
The Creation of States in International Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1979), pp. 31-77; Ian
Brownlie, Principles of International Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1990) pp. 87-106 at 98 ; Helen
Ruiy Fabri, Etat (Creation, Succession, Competences). Geneze et Disparition de l’ Etat a l’
Epoque Contemporaine. "Annuaire Francias de Droit International". Vol. XXXVIII (1992). Editions
du CNRS, Paris, pp. 153-178.
523 The case of the FRY authorities regarding Kosova and that of Croatia concerning its own
Serbs. It should be noted, however, that other Yugoslav republics as well  had to obey the same
liberal values but these two cases were the most conspicuous ones that took most of the
attention of the international community.  This distinction concerning the policy of non-recognition
is reflected throughout the following documents of  the international community:
- the EC Statement on Yugoslavia (Brussels, 8 June 1991);
- Documents adopted by the Committee of Senior Officials in the framework of the CSCE
Mechanisms (Prague, 3-4 July 1991);
- the EC Declaration on Yugoslavia (the Hague, 5 July 1991);
- Joint Declaration of the EC Troika and the Parties Directly Concerned with the Yugoslav
Crisis, the so-called  " Brioni Accords" (Brioni, Croatia, 7 July 1991);
- the EC Declaration on Yugoslavia (Brussels, 27 August 1991);
- the EC Declaration on Yugoslavia (the Hague, 3 September 1991);
- the UN Security Council Resolution No. 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991;
- the Arrangements for General Settlement of the International Conference on Yugoslavia,
the so-called " Carrington Draft Convention " (the Hague, 18 October 1991);
- Treaty Provisions for the Convention of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (the Hague,
1 November 1991);
- Statement issued by the Heads of State and Governments Participating in the Meeting of
the North Atlantic Council (Rome, 8 November 1991);
- the UN Security Council Resolution No. 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991;
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Within non-coercive measures fall the so-called " outer wall of sanctions ".
This measure was imposed by one state only, the US. It has a long history that
lasted until the Dayton Peace was reached.  Then, in a statement issued by the
US State Department on 23 November 1995 (distributed by the US Informative
Agency), it was made public, for the first time, the " outer  wall of sanctions "
concept.524 This in practical terms  meant that following the Dayton Accords,
president Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia was being recognized as a new
                                                                                                                                                
- the EC Declaration Concerning the Conditions for Recognition of New States (Brussels,
16 December 1991);
- Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
(Paris, 11 January 1992);
- Opinion No. 3 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
(Paris, 11 January 1992);
- Opinion No. 4 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
Concerning the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina  by the
European Community and its Member States (Paris, 11 January 1992);
- Opinion No. 5 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
Concerning the Recognition of the Republic of Croatia  by the European Community and its
Member States (Paris, 11 January 1992);
- Opinion No. 6 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
Concerning the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European
Community and its Member States (Paris, 11 January 1992);
- Statement by the Presidency of the European Community on the Recognition of
Yugoslav Republics (Brussels, 15 January 1992);
- the UN Security Council Resolution No. 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992;
- the EC Statement on Yugoslavia (London and Brussels, 6 August 1992);
- the UN Security Council Resolution No. 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992;
- International Conference on the former Yugoslavia – Statement on Principles (London,
26-28 August 1992);
- the UN Security Council Resolution No.  776  (1992)  of 14 September 1992;
- the UN  Security Council Resolution No.  777 (1992)  of 19 September 1992;
- Decisions of the Council of CSCE on Former Yugoslavia (Stockholm, 14 and 15
December 1992);
- The Dayton Peace Accords (November 1995);
- The Rambouillet Peace Agreement (February-March 1999);
- The UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244 (1999) of 12 June 1999;
The above list is not exhaustive. It has been compiled selectively in a belief that these
documents reflect the spirit of the international community’s stance over the issue of liberal
values, that is, democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for human and minority rights.
524 See, USIA Wireless File, November 23, 1995, pp. 38-39. Text provided by the Albanian
Foreign Ministry, Tirana. The very concept of the "outer wall of sanctions" is closely related to the
previous sanctions imposed on FRY,. This can be seen from the Statement of 23 November 1995
that contained the following message:
" A resolution will be introduced in the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo
against all of the states of former Yugoslavia. Trade sanctions against Serbia will be suspended,
but may be re-imposed if Serbia or any other Serb authorities fail significantly to meet their
obligations under the Dayton Agreement. An "outer wall"  of sanctions will remain in place until
Serbia addresses a number of other areas of concern, including Kosovo and cooperation with the
War Crimes Tribunal".
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peacemaker ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The UN Security Council,
accordingly, first suspended and later totally lifted trade and other sanctions
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as described above. Apart from the
Dayton Accords’ obligations, especially those concerning the cooperation with
War Crimes Tribunal, the rest remained identical to those fulfilled by other
Yugoslav republics on the occasion of their admission to the membership of the
international community. They specifically concerned the respect for liberal
values on the part of the FRY authorities vis-à-vis the majority Albanian
population in Kosova.
Not only in the opinions of the Badinter Commission and the Guidelines on
Recognition, but also in other international documents, the Western democratic
values took a very prominent place. This fact is noted already in the penultimate
section of this dissertation and in this section we are about to complete. The
Kosova issue was not an exception to this: the FRY authorities had to comply to
the same liberal values as did other Yugoslav republics when they were admitted
as full-fledged members of the international community. This position did not
change until the conflict in Kosova took dramatic dimensions, threatening
international peace and security.525
Although unilaterally imposed by one state, the US, the "outer wall of
sanctions" was by no means a category of a purely political nature. As already
noted in the previous section of this chapter and the Chapter VI, the concept has
had a strong international legal basis starting from the opinions of the Badinter
Commission up to the stipulations of the Dayton Accords (the issue of
                                                
525  In this regard, the first pronouncement of the international community via the so-
called Contact Group on Former Yugoslavia (formed in April 1994 to tackle the Bosnian crisis)
spoke about the respect for these liberal values and the internal type of self-determination on
behalf of Kosova and its majority population. See, Statement on Kosovo. London Contact Group
Meeting (9 March 1998); Statement on Kosovo. London Contact Group Meeting (15 and 25
March 1998);  Bonn Statements by the Contact Group (29 April and 9 May 1998); Statement on
Kosovo. London Contact Group Meeting (12 June 1998); Statement on Kosovo. Bonn Contact
Group Meeting ( 8 July 1998).  The first UN Security Council Resolution, issued after the outbreak
of hostilities in Kosova, adopted the same language. See, UN Security Council Resolution No.
1169 (1998) of 31 March 1998. This resolution imposed for the second time the sanctions regime
on the FRY authorities. They concerned mainly arms and trade embargoes.
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cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal).526 The issues forming the core of the
concept had to do with the following:  FRY’s membership of international
organizations; financial and other assistance by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank (WB); and normalization of relations between the US
Government and FRY. All these issues were mutually connected. As noted (infra,
pp. 140-164), the Belgrade regime was denied the claim to state continuity with
the former Yugoslavia. This meant that it had to apply for the UN membership as
foreseen in the UN Security Council Resolution No. 777 (1992) of 19 September
1992 and the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 47/1 (1992). By definition,
this further meant that FRY would not inherit former Yugoslav seat in other
international organizations and bodies (the OSCE, the Council of Europe and
other regional organizations). The implications of this US stance regarding the
FRY stretched over to international financial institutions, such as the IMF and
WB. These two very important financial institutions fully endorsed this
international position in December 1992 and February 1993.527 The latter
decision were a logical consequence of the previous ones, that is, the
consequence of the fact that a non-member state of the UN cannot enjoy the
membership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB).
The "outer wall of sanctions" has had marginal effects only. It triggered
some two-track diplomacy and the signing of the Education Agreement by the
then President Milosevic of Serbia and the Kosovar Albanian leader of the time,
Ibrahim Rugova. The two-track diplomacy consisted of informal talks held
                                                
526 Following the fall of Milosevic in October 2000, the US Government showed its
readiness to lift the "outer wall of sanctions", an event that happened gradually until January
2001.  In January 2001, however, the new US administration of  President George W. Bush
withdrew the previous Bill Clinton’s consent to lift the "outer wall of sanction". This move was
based on the fact that the newly elected President of the FRY, Vojislav Kostunica, was showing
no readiness to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal concerning the handover of Milosevic to the
Hague authorities. See, Ylber Hysa, Problemi i Presheves Zgjidhet ne Mitroivce. Prishtina-based
daily newspaper "Koha Ditore" (31 January 2001),  p. 10.
527 On December 15, 1992, the IMF found that " Yugoslavia has ceased to exist and has
therefore ceased to be a member of the IMF ".  The same position was taken by the WB on
February 25, 1993.  See, the IMF Press Release No. 92/92 of 23 December 1992 and the
Decision of the Executive Directors of the World Bank, 25 February 1993. For comments, see,
Malcolm Shaw, State Succession Revisited. " The Finnish Yearbook of International Law " Vol. V
(1994), pp. 52-54;  Paul R. Williams, State Succession and the International Financial Institutions:
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between the Serb opposition and the Kosovar Albanians during March and June
of 1996 in New York (USA) and Ulcin (Montenegro) respectively528. However,
these measures proved ineffective to impose any sustainable form of self-
determination over Kosova and its majority population. Only military actions,
undertaken by NATO in March – June 1999, managed to serve the liberal values
of the West and consequently, preserved  peace and international stability.
CHAPTER VII:
CONCLUSION
Among the concepts closely associated to self−determination in general,
that of uti possidetis takes prominence. In essence, the message of this principle
provides for respect for former administrative borders, both within and outside the
colonial context.
Another concept which is closely related to self−determination is that of
“international stability”. Its classical definition remains connected with the
state−as−actor acting in an essentially anarchical environment. This classical
definition, however, says very little about its own relationships with the concept of
                                                                                                                                                
Political Criteria vs. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations. " International and
Comparative Law Quarterly " Vol. 43 (Ocober 1994), Part 4 , pp. 776-808.
528 For the meeting of New York, see, Daily Report (In Albanian) of the Kosova
Information Center, Nos.1687 (7 April 1997),  pp. 1-2, 1689 ( 9 April 1997), pp.1-2, 1690a (10
April 1997), pp. 1-2. For Ulcin meeting, see, Daily Report (In Albanian) of the Kosova Information
Center, Nos. 1754 (24 June 1997), pp. 1-3,  1756 (26 June 1997) pp. 1-3, and 1757 (27 June
1997) pp. 1-2. Also available in internet: http://www.Albanian.com
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self−determination. These two concepts are related only when the former is
conceptualized from a different perspective, focusing on the sources of
international (in) stability. This refers to  the issue of the internal dynamics of the
so−called weak  (collapsed/or failed ) states. The externalization of the internal
dynamics of these states has in recent years proved to be a huge source of
international instability because these dynamics were usually associated with
ethnic or nationalist conflicts occurring within them. The very survival and further
development of these states rests with the rules, norms, and institutions and
principles of the current international regime. In International Relations literature
the statehood of these states is labeled as a “juridical statehood” as opposed to a
“real” or “normal” one that relies on the balance of power logic. The end of the
Cold War, in essence, proved the fallacy of the old balance−of−power concept as
a basis for explanation of international (in) stability. The end of the Cold War was
followed by instability stemming from inside the weak (failed/or collapsed) states
and not from the international system.
There are two sets of questions in every case related to self-
determination. One is the would−be unit of self−determination and the other is
the potential body entrusted with the right to decide about potential
self−determination units. Both of these questions are closely connected. The
answer to them settles the crucial dilemma as to whether today’s
self−determination is territorially or ethnically based. The would−be units of
self−determination have changed over time. During the Cold War the colonial
territories were considered as units having the right to self-determination. A later
addition to this list has been the category of the federated states, that is, the
federal units of certain federations. In none of the above cases has ethnicity been
a decisive factor in the implementation of self-determination. It still the case that
territory serves as the basis for the determination of the would-be units of self-
determination, despite the fact that self-determination claims have usually been
triggered by ethnic factors.
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Various regional organizations have been the bodies entrusted with the
mandate to decide about the units of self-determination on behalf of the
international community. In the case of Africa, it was the OAU that took up this
responsibility, while in Europe after the Cold War this task belonged to the
European Community (now European Union). Moreover, the units of
self−determination have been considered territories under military occupation
and territories where the majority colored population were victims of
institutionalized apartheid at the hands of Europeans. In these cases, however,
self−determination did not entail the creation of new states. It was rather attached
to the very position of the inhabitants of certain territories that,  at the same time,
enjoyed some limited international status.
The Peace of Westphalia marks the beginning of the state system as we
know it today. In terms of self−determination, the period that followed the Peace
of Westphalia is known as the time of dynastic legitimacy. This meant that the
rulers were considered the only sovereigns on earth, ignoring the will of the
population. They ruled according to the divine right without any  regard as to the
wishes of the populations concerned. This order of things was challenged by
various thinkers, including Locke and Rousseau. This scholarly challenge of the
divine right was later followed  by concrete actions on the ground, such as the
American and French Revolutions. These events restored the popular
sovereignty and legitimacy denied until then by the Westphalian concept of
state−centered and dynastic legitimacy.  Napoleon’s war campaign, however,
pushed popular legitimacy to the extreme so that after his defeat in 1815, Europe
again returned to the old principle of dynastic legitimacy. Only this time the
concept of dynastic legitimacy had a different nature and content. It intended to
serve as a cover up for the balance of power system set up in the Congress of
Vienna in 1815. The period following this congress until 1918, was characterized
by a struggle between the nationality principle and the dynastic legitimacy.
Depending on the power politics exigencies, one of the above principles
prevailed. The successful revolutions in Greece and Belgium and the unifications
of Italy and Germany respectively, represent the use of power politics. The same
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applies to the ruthless suppression of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, which
reflected sheer power politics. This means that neither the dynastic legitimacy
nor the nationality principle can alone explain the concept of self−determination
in this period. Both were the principal manifestations of the balance of power
concept. It was, in fact,  the logic of balance of power that paved the way for the
nationality principle which became a guiding rule in the international affairs after
WW I.
When WW I ended there was no clear concept of self−determination.
There existed a vacuum in this regard. In fact, from this time onward  began the
modern development of self−determination as it stands today. Two statesmen
and one significant event deserve credit for this development: Lenin and Wilson
and the notorious case of the Aaland Islands in Finland. While Lenin took up the
issue of self−determination as a sign of weakness of his regime following the
1917 Revolution, President Wilson believed that the previous system of power
management was the main cause of the Great War. This is the reasoning behind
his Fourteen Points. He argued for a more manageable system of international
relations based on a consensus, not pure power politics. He named this new
system the League of Nations. The consent of the governed, as he termed it,
was one of the main pillars of this new power management system, something
similar to the logic of  the “democratic peace” theory. His counterpart. Lenin,
based his concept of self−determination on the interests of the working class and
Socialism (Communism), not on the consent of governed. In international
relations, Lenin preached for full self−determination for oppressed nationalities of
the Tsarist Russia, but only for a short period  of time. As soon as he
consolidated his power, Lenin started to take back former territories that he gave
up in the 1918 Brest Litovsk peace arrangements. One of the core concepts of
Lenin’s self−determination was that of a “Communist Federation”. In fact, the
Soviet (or Communist) Federation was nothing but a tool in the hands of Lenin to
gradually retake former Russian territories. Of a similar nature had been the
250
concept of so−called “territorial and political autonomies”, designed to deny the
status of nationess to non−Russians.
The practice that developed in the Aland Islands case is entirely different
from Lenin’s concept of self-determination. It approximates Wilsonian views and,
in essence, together form the very concept of modern self-determination as it
stands today.  In this case, the Islanders asked for a union with Sweden following
Finland’s successful secession from Russia in 1917. This move was resisted by
Finnish authorities and, as a result, the issue had been brought before the
League of Nations. The League Commission’s view concerning the carence de
souverainete and the internal aspects of self-determination were especially
significant. In fact, the Commission’s understanding of self-determination,
together with the Latin American precedent concerning the uti possidetis
principle, has been the very foundation of the self-determination in the Cold War
and after. However, none of the precedents just discussed managed to level the
issue of self-determination into a legal entitlement. This task became possible
only during the process of decolonization.
After the Second World War, the UN Charter followed the premises of the
Atlantic Charter and other documents issued during the war. No legality or
legitimacy had been accorded to the territorial changes effectuated by the Axis
Powers. This does not mean that such changes did not occur (Stalin’s territorial
gains exceeding by far the borders of the Tsarist Russia). It simply means that no
new political entities were set up as a result of the Second World War. The
partition of Germany was considered an illegal occupation under international
law, only temporary in character. By the same token, the annexation of three
Baltic republics in 1939 was considered illegal in the West so that their accession
to independence after the Cold War was deemed as a restoration of lost
sovereignty rather than as the creation of new states. At least, this was the
stance taken by the then European Community (now European Union), a position
fully endorsed by the rest of the international community.
The process of decolonization first raised the issue concerning the legal
character of self-determination. The UN Charter failed to address this issue.
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Following the events on the ground, the UN took the lead in the process of
decolonization, granting to it the status of a full legal right. The Colonial
Declaration and the Friendly Relations Declaration represent the UN documents
that unambiguously leveled the status of self-determination into a legal
entitlement even providing a procedure for the realization of this right.
The crux of colonial self-determination is that it was based on territory,
leaving aside the issue of the internal organization of the newly independent
states (former colonies). Despite the fact that its help was crucial in the
channeling the process of decolonization, the UN did not  include the issues such
as the rule of law, democracy, and the respect for human and minority rights in
its political agenda. This position was also endorsed by the international
jurisprudence in the famous Burkina Faso vs. Republic of Mali Case (1986). In
the pronouncements of this case, the International Court of Justice clearly gave
advantage to order and stability, as opposed to other liberal values, such as
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights. These
issues were tackled for the first time after the Cold War. Only  this time the
concept of self-determination took on a different content, taking into account both
the liberal values and the value of order and international stability.
The newly independent states enjoyed full international protection equal to
that foreseen for the other sovereign and independent states. This implied that
the territory of former colonies was inviolable under international law and fully
protected by the international regime of the time.  This concept of territorial
integrity for former colonies served as a reference point in determining the scope
of colonial self-determination, and also served as a stabilizing factor in interstate
relations. Furthermore, the period following the process of decolonization proved
this to be the case. The rest of the international community resisted and
prevented other sub-state entities or ethnic groups striving to secede from former
colonies after the latters accession to independence. The cases that illustrate are
respectively, the provinces of Katanga in Congo/Zaire and Biafra in Nigeria. The
case of Bangladesh (1970/71), however, was an exception to this rule. The
successful secession of this country can be explained by the fact that the
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preservation of the territorial integrity of a former colony (Pakistan) would have
been conducive to instability and disorder in the international system.
The common state of the South Slavs, the Yugoslav state, formed on 1
December 1918, was initially named the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. Its power
structures were entirely Serb-dominated. In fact, it represented nothing but the
realization of the dream of Greater Serbia. In the international environment
between the two wars there was no way to change the internal balance of forces
existing within this state because the new state had been given a role of a
“cordone sanitaire”, first against the Soviet influence and later against the further
penetration of the German factor to the East (Drang Nach Osten). The Serbian
military and political elite used this opportunity to realize  its hegemonic
ambitions. In the 1930s, it even imposed a royal dictatorship led by the Serbian
King from the Karadjordje dynasty. The only political force that tried at this time to
come up with a real pan-Yugoslav idea was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
Among the Yugoslav communists, however, there had been a stream acting in
favor of the dismemberment of the Yugoslav state. At the end, though, the
unitary wing of the Yugoslav communists took the upper hand. It fought for a
single Yugoslav state but organized on the basis of different principles from those
of the interwar period.  With some variations in this period, the Yugoslav
communists took up the Soviet idea about the “Communist Federation”.
This idea was implemented immediately after Second World War. In the
Yugoslav context, nevertheless, the issue of borders proved to be less
troublesome as compared with the Soviet case. Once the new federal units had
been set up in 1946, no serious border changes occurred until Yugoslavia’s final
dissolution in 1992. When it dissolved, however, the issue of borders and their
succession became the main cause leading to brutal wars and conflicts. Only at
this time was raised the significant issue concerning the type of self-
determination that would be pursued: Shall self-determination be based on
territory or on ethnicity? The latter was espoused by Serbs while the former was
supported by the former Yugoslav republics and endorsed by the rest of the
international community. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1992, there was a
253
close connection with the mentioned types of self-determination regarding state
continuity. In this regard, the Serbs insisted on being the sole successors to the
common Yugoslav state, an action flatly denied by others. The above Serbian
stance on state continuity has been an intrinsic part of the Serbian understanding
of self-determination. This was outlined as far back as 1986, when the
Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences had been drafted.
The Serbs argued that it was unnecessary for Serbia to apply for new
international statehood after Yugoslavia’s dissolution since Serbia jad been the
very founder of that state.and, further, that the pre-1918 Kingdom of Serbia
formed the core of the Yugoslav state.
Another important argument put foreword by the Serbian elite was that
other Yugoslav republics were secessionists, meaning that their departure from
Yugoslavia left untouched the international subjectivity of the Yugoslav state.
This position, of course, was rejected by all former Yugoslav republics and the
rest of the international community. They both considered Yugoslavia’s
disintegration in 1992 and that from this process there already emerged five new
states: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM), Slovenia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro).  The tiny republic of Montenegro supported Serbian claims on state
continuity with the former Yugoslavia for quite some time, although  from different
perspective. Montenegro did not demonstrate any expansionist tendencies and
its quest for self-determination was based on the fact that the pre-1918 Kingdom
of Montenegro had also been one of the two founders of the common state of
Yugoslavia in 1918. In none of the public pronouncements did the Montenegrin
authorities claim the right to self-determination extending beyond the borders of
this republic. Serbia was different in this regard. Its claims for state continuity with
the former Yugoslavia and self-determination, although justified on historical and
quasi-legal grounds, were in fact a plea for ethnic self-determination following the
spirit and the letter of the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts
and Sciences. This Serb claim had  been further elaborated in Serbian scholarly
work, with Serbian military backing throughout 1992-1999.
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As we have noted throughout this dissertation, the main conflict within the
former Yugoslavia has been concerning the nature of self-determination. In the
north of Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia) there existed a concept of self-
determination based on territory. In the south of the country, Serbia opted for an
ethnic self-determination. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were caught in
between. While Croatia during Tudjman’s era greatly resembled Milosevic’s
Serbia, it could not fight outside its own borders for long due to military
weakness. The tiny republic of Montenegro followed Serbia’s path for some
years following Yugoslavia’s collapse until 1995. It gradually opted for the path
chosen by other Yugoslav republics at the begining. However, Montenegrin
territorial self-determination did not mean full independence. For a long time,
mainly during Milosevic’s reign, Montenegrin self-determination meant equal
status for this republic with that of Serbia. Only during the last years of
Milosevic’s rule and thereafter did the Montenegrin government assert its plea for
full independence.
The mere fact that all Yugoslav republics , apart from Serbia, have opted
for territorial self-determination does not mean that the content of self-
determination remains the same  for all cases. In Yugoslavia’s north, self-
determination was not only a territorial in nature but also based on liberal values
regarding democracy, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights.
In the south and the center of Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia),
the type of self-determination was forced upon them. The choice by these two
former Yugoslav republics was made in haste and had been a result of the
internal balance of forces. This disadvantage in the balance of forces has had an
enormous impact on the content of self-determination within Bosnia-Herzegovina
and FYROM. The difference between these two Yugoslav republics with the
north consists in the fact that in former case the Yugoslav option was not entirely
excluded in the ongoing arrangements concerning the future of Yugoslavia. Apart
from this difference, the rest of self-determination remained much the same and
focused on democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human and minority
rights.
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Analyzing the behavior of the Serbs living outside Serbia, the author of
this dissertation has found a causal relationship between this behavior and the
Serb conception of (ethnically-based) self-determination. Although it had been
clear from the outset of the Yugoslav tragedy that the international community
would not tolerate any forceful changes in the previous administrative borders of
the Yugoslav republics, the Serbs nevertheless pursued their ethnically-based
self-determination claim. This has led to the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs
because it was entirely impossible to realize any ethnic self-determination within
the Yugoslav context due to its highly heterogeneous ethnic composition. The
decision-makers in Belgrade seemed to have believed that their quest for (ethnic)
self-determination could be realized by force and with impunity if some territorial
units resembling former Yugoslav republics were created.  These units had  been
created violently, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was
nothing but a wrong interpretation of the international statehood, having far-
reaching implications.
The Belgrade’s policy of Greater Serbia was defeated in Dayton (1995).
The Kosova issue, however, remained unsettled and the international community
resorted to the application of the same criteria for international statehood in the
rest of Yugoslavia. The basic premise was that only former Yugoslav republics
should be encouraged to pursue external self-determination. Those entities not
having the status of a republic at the time of Yugoslavia’s dissolution were to
enjoy the internal self-determination only.  Among them was Kosova as well. By
the time the conflict in this region began in early March of 1998, the international
community was caught by its own rulings so that NATO’s military intervention to
stop the killings in Kosova resulted in the preservation of territorial integrity and
stability of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), much in
the same way as it resulted in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the Dayton Accords
were reached.
The conclusion of this study is that the Yugoslav case of self-
determination should not be singled out from other similar cases of its time. This
covers not only the period following the end of the Cold War, but also the period
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prior to the South Slav unification of 1918 and thereafter.  In all cases, the
Yugoslav case reflects the features of self-determination as they appeared at the
times under discussion. Evidence of this is best seen from the last period of the
Yugoslav self-determination after the Cold War. In this period, Yugoslav self-
determination was nothing but a part of the wider picture of self-determination
covering all former Communist Federations (Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia).
The relevance of the Yugoslav case for the future rests in the fact that it has
further crystallized and strengthened one of the significant aspects of self-
determination, namely the principle of uti possidetis.  The Yugoslav case shows
that the fixed territorial borders, as a rule of international law, limits the territorial
scope of self-determination. Another contribution of the Yugoslav case is that the
international community used cmeasures to effectuate a certain type of self-
determination. These measures applied according to the gravity of the situation
on the ground and the type of breach committed by the Yugoslav actors.
The first sign as to the principle of self-determination to be applied in the
Yugoslav context was given by the British officials as far back as the Summer of
1991. The British Foreign Secretary of that time, Douglas Hurd, told the Belgrade
leaders that the West would not accept any forceful changes in the internal
borders of Yugoslavia. At this time, it was not quite clear as to what were to be
considered “internal borders” within the Yugoslav context. This became clear in
November 1991 when the Badinter Commission left no doubt over this stating
that only former Yugoslav republics shall be internationally entitled to a full
protection of their administrative borders. This stance was later endorsed by the
major part of the international community. In addition to this, the international
community via the Badinter Commission, tackled the problem of the very content
of Yugoslav self-determination. In this regard, the international community
recognized two types of self-determination, one internal and the other external.
This position was later reflected in the EU Guidelines on the Recognition of New
States in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (16 December 1991). External
self-determination belonged to former Yugoslav republics alone, while the
internal one was left for other entities, which did not have the status of a
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federated republic at the time of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The same rule applied,
mutatis mutandis, to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. This was, in fact,
nothing but an extension of the application of the colonial self-determination to
the existing sovereign states that would eventually collapse.
As opposed to the colonial self-determination, in the Yugoslav case and in
in the case of other former Communist Federations, there existed some
corrective criteria in connection with the realization of self-determination. They
were democracy, rule of law, and the respect for human and minority rights.
These criteria aimed to guide the would-be states as to their acceptable
behavior. Those entities claiming the international statehood had to act according
to these corrective criteria. Otherwise, the legitimacy of their international
statehood was not considered as valid under international law. This denial of the
international legitimacy of the newly independent states was effectuated by the
international community (alone or through its various organs and organizations).
This was done in various ways. The most common method was the policy of non-
recognition by the international community. Next to this came the imposition of
the sanctions regime on the disobedient states claiming fully-fledged international
status. In some cases, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova, even military
means were used to check and balance the Yugoslav self-determination. There
is a difference, however, between these two situations. The corrective criteria
concerning democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human and minority
rights meant different things for both cases. In general, corrective criteria were
designed to prevent the development of dictatorship tendencies within the newly
established states of the former Communist world. In this regard, these criteria
were equal to the realization of self-determination because they presented
themselves as a precondition for the integration of these new states into the
community of sovereign and independent nations. On the other hand, the same
criteria formed the very core of the internal self-determination because they
offered a solid ground for the development of other forms of self-determination
falling short of full independence. The problems emerged only when it came to
the implementation in general lines of this vision. Then, the preservation of the
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territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one of the manifestations of self-
determination of the sovereign and independent states, had as a consequence
the treatment of the Kosova issue  on par with other entities that did not have the
status of a federated republic. It did not matter that Kosova (within the FRY) and
“Republika Srpska” (within Bosnia-Herzegovina) had entirely different
background. While Kosova existed as an autonomous entity for a long time, the
“Republika Srpska” was set up by violent means leading to the commission of
genocidal acts.  It might be that this was not the intention of those who used the
military power against the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). However, intentionally or
unintentionally, the treatment of the Yugoslav case yielded this paradoxical
result.
Has the international community become a catalyst in helping to make a
reality of a pre-existing principle, self-determination, that could not be realised
under the sovereign model of the former Yugoslavia? The intrusion of the
international community in the political events altered the modality of governance
and thereby made possible the realisation of the long accepted principle of self-
determination. The international community via the mandate it gave to the
international organizations, such as UN, OSCE, NATO and the EC/EU, allowed
for the implementation of mechanisms for the realisation of the potential of self-
determination of the people of the former Communist federations. The
international community in its call for democracy, the rule of law and the respect
for human and minority rights allowed for process to begin for the actual
realisation of self-determination within the accepted norms of international law
relating to self-determination. Clearly, self-determination as a principle has not
been altered. What existed prior to the 1990 events that caused international
intrusion, existed after the events. The difference is that the crises and the
international response to these crises made the principle a potential reality but
not necessarily a universal norm. Comparing this experience with that of
colonialism and the self-determination process associated with its end provides
substantial differences. While in colonialism there was no insistence on
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preconditions, e.g., democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for human and
minority rights, in this instance they became a condictio sine qua non for the
realisation of any self-determination regime, be it internal or external. It can be
concluded that no single binding principle of self-determination monopolises the
contemporary international law. The recent experience after the Cold War
provided only a model for actualisation of the principle. Self-determination, as a
right and a principle, whose structure and meaning continues to evolve with case
examples, presents challenges for international law and politics. The liberal
values concerning democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human and
minority rights will certainly be enhanced with a more developed understanding
of the actual meaning of self-determination. Unquestionably, based on recent
experience, human rights which is now seen as tied to democracy and the rule of
law can be better realised in territories which have not benefited by self-rule. This
means, in turn, that the human rights agenda may be greatly enriched with the
appropriate realization of self-determination.
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- International and Comparative Law Quarterly
- International Herald Tribune
- International Legal Materials (ILM)
- International Organization
- International Studies Quarterly
- International Security
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Jugoslovenska Revija za Medjunarodno Pravo (Belgrade)
- Koha Ditore (Prishtina-based daily newspaper)
- Kosova Information Center. Daily Report (Prishtina-based informative
agency)
- Kosova Sot (Prishtina-based daily newspaper)
- Millennium: Journal of International Studies
- Nasa Zakonitost (Zagreb)
- Nationalities Papers
- Nations and Nationalism
- Nase Teme (Zagreb)
- New Republic
- Newsweek
- New York Times
- NIN (Belgrade-based daily newspaper)
- Official Journal: League of Nations
- Politika (The Belgrade-based newspaper)
- Political Science Quarterly
- Politicka Misao (Zagreb)
- Proceedings of the American Society of International Law
- Procedeengs of the American Political Science Association
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- Proceedings of the UniDem Seminar in Lausanne.  Science and
Technique of Democracy. Council of Europe
- Radio Free Europe (In South Slavic Languages)
- Radio Slobodna Evropa (The Prague)
- Recueil de Cours. de l’Academie de Droit International
- Reuters
- RFE/RL Balkan Report
- Review of International Affairs (Belgrade)
- Review of International Studies
- Revue Generale de Droit International Public
- Security Dialogue
- Society
- South Slav Service (In South Slavic Languages)
- Survival
- The Albanian Journal of International Studies
- The American Political Science Review
- The Economist
- The International Journal of Human Rights
- The Journal of Politics
- The National Interest
- The Reference Manual of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
- The Slavonic and East European Review
- The Southeast European Yearbook
- The United Kingdom Materials on International Law (UKMIL)
- The UN Secretary General Report
- The Yearbook of the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and  Foreign Policy
(ELIAMEP
- The Washington Quarterly
- Transition
- USIA Wireless File
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- US News and World Report
- Vjesnik (Zagreb-based daily newspaper)
- Washington Post
- Washington Post Foreign Service
- World Politics
- Yearbook of European Studies
Web Sites
- http://www.State. gov/www/ current/ bosnia/daytable.html
- http//www.un.org
- http://www.icj-icj=org
- http//www.nato.com
- http//www.Albanian.com
- http://www. rferl.org/
- http://www.rferl.org/balkan report
- http://www. Epnet.com
- http://www. canada.justice.gc.ca
- http://www.EBSCOhost.com
- http://www.rferl.org/newsline
- http://www. rz.uni.hamburg-de/illyria/independence.htm
- http://www.siicom. Com
- http//www.gw5.epnet.com
- http://w5ww.law.nyu
- http://www.gwz.epnet.com
- http//www. weu. int/institute
